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So from an early age I developed the habit of
looking, detaching myself from a familiar scene
and trying to consider it as from a distance. It was
from this habit of looking that the idea came to
me that as a community we had fallen behind.
And that was the beginning of my insecurity.
 
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
Over the past ten years immigration has become one of the most important issues of
our time, and therefore one of the most controversial. This is perfectly understandable,
since the arrival of countless newcomers is of enormous significance for Western soci-
ety. The choice by so many to leave their countries of origin also changes the lives of
people who already live in the places where they settle. In America and in many coun-
tries in Europe, more than one in ten residents is an immigrant, and in more than a
few major cities, half the population is now made up of migrant families.
These developments have provoked fierce debate. The emotional and political
overtones, while not making the task any easier, mean it’s essential to offer a well-ar-
gued contribution to the ongoing academic and public debate. The open society and its
immigrants looks at how we can describe and understand the social changes brought
about in the United States and Europe by immigration. In other words: What is the fu-
ture of an open society at a time of mass immigration? I’m more interested in social
change, especially as it relates to post-war migration from what used to be called the
Third World, than in policy or in models of integration, although these will certainly
come up. An undue emphasis on differences between models, such as French republi-
canism and British multiculturalism, tends to obscure the many similarities between
living conditions in the major conurbations of Europe. Instead I focus on comparable
developments in cities such as Lyon, Rotterdam, Bradford and Malmö.
The question is addressed in four ways. First I look at whether it’s possible – taking
due account of differences between European countries and between Europe and
America – to describe characteristics common to all large-scale migration processes
in today’s Western world. I’ve sought to clarify the experience of migration, placing
less emphasis than is usual on the differences between countries and migrant groups
and thereby revealing patterns that fail to emerge from studies of those groups in isola-
tion. Turkish and Pakistani migrants obviously differ in many respects, just as Turkish
migrants in Germany are different from those in the Netherlands. Indeed close exami-
nation reveals a contrast even between Turkish immigrants in Berlin and Cologne. All

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this is relevant – and I do focus specifically on each of these diverse groups of newcom-
ers – but my aim is to develop some well-founded generalizations about migrant expe-
riences and the reactions their arrival provokes.
Anyone attempting to understand these social changes needs to look at them from
the perspective of all those involved. So the next question concerns how present-day
immigration is experienced, both by newcomers and by established residents. I have
noticed that in much of the literature about migration the ‘native’ viewpoint is under-
played. Prejudice and xenophobia are certainly discussed, but in my opinion too little
attention has been given to the way established populations help to form immigrant
societies. I have sought an approach that does justice to the experiences of both new-
comers and natives.
If we take both points of view seriously it becomes clear that integration brings
with it an obligation to engage in self-examination. What after all do we mean when
we talk about integration? What does the word imply? Another question that arises in
this study is: How does immigration change our thinking about citizenship? This
question relates not only to the material dimension of citizenship – for example the
question of who has access to the provisions of the welfare state and who does not –
but to its more symbolic aspects as well, such as our attitudes to rights and duties in
the context of freedom of religion. In a general sense I’m interested in how immigra-
tion forces an open society to reconsider the question: ‘Who are we?’ To put it another
way, how does immigration change the ‘imagined community’ and what are the asso-
ciations that arise when we talk about American, French or Dutch citizens?
The final question concerns whether the shared characteristics of present-day mi-
gration – insofar as we can identify any – can also be found in accounts of nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century migration. I have attempted to gain greater insight into
the historical continuity, or indeed lack of it, between pre-war and post-war immigra-
tion in Europe and America. Can we discover repeating patterns, or are we forced to
conclude that because of the increasing ease of cross-border communication or the ar-
rival of a new religion, the integration processes of the past have acquired a new dy-
namic? In short, I examine whether old and new immigration are fundamentally dif-
ferent or broadly comparable.
Perhaps the combination of these interrelated questions adds something new to ex-
isting research, which concentrates on numerous more limited fields. Of course there
are whole libraries full of important studies encompassing a century and more, but we
are also in need of a generalizing approach. All those valuable specialisms may cause
us to lose sight of the existential significance of migration for society as a whole. This
is after all not just an economic, demographic, cultural or judicial issue. The crux is
that extensive post-war immigration changes society in all these ways at once – which
is why the debate can sometimes become so fierce.

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I’ve attempted to answer these questions by means of a wide-ranging study of the
literature. The enormous wealth of material available makes this strictly speaking an
impossible enterprise, yet I believe it renders up insights that are of value, if only for
further research. Immigration is all about crossing borders and its study requires not
only specialists but generalists who are willing to step beyond the boundaries of disci-
plines and genres. I have drawn freely on a wide range of sources, including works of
urban sociology, history and anthropology, trying to combine them in a political-
philosophical approach. 
This breadth of range inevitably brings with it a degree of eclecticism. Anyone at-
tempting to straddle so many disciplines will inevitably have to combine the concepts
used within them. Take the discussion of prejudices. I draw upon both the sociological
approach of Sumner and Elias and the more socio-psychological interpretation of au-
thors such as Adorno and Allport. Any attempt to bring together concepts like ethno-
centrism and the authoritarian personality inevitably entails eclecticism, and from
the start I have been aware of its disadvantages as well as its benefits.
This eclectic approach is reflected in the book’s essayistic style. The essay is a genre
that combines academic study with journalism and literature, and although a great
deal of academic research is included here, I’ve also been inspired by reportage, novels,
and the public debates of the past ten years. The considered deployment of journalism
and literature in an academic context can add value to the whole, and I have made a
conscious decision to write in the style of an essay, addressing myself to an informed
readership that is broader than the academic world. This too has its advantages and
disadvantages, but arguably the public controversy surrounding the issue of immigra-
tion and integration represents an urgent requirement to offer any insights I may have
gained to a wider circle of those affected.
Over the past few years I’ve taken part in countless public debates, but above all I’ve
engaged in intensive discussion of my ideas with people from strikingly diverse sec-
tors of society. I’ve received invitations from many political parties at home and
abroad, but the Dutch version of my book has also led me to attend innumerable
gathe rings held by trades unions, churches, the museum world, local councils, educa-
tionalists and the police. Many requests have reached me from migrant organizations
too, ranging from a Moroccan association in Antwerp to Surinamese organizations in
Amsterdam. I’ve been to all kinds of places and experienced again and again how diffi-
cult it is in this stormy period to find words that point to a way forward.
Given the urgency of the subject, I decided against avoiding normative issues. It
seemed important to search for ideas that may help us to overcome the impasse that
exists in so many countries. Views that touch upon policy are discussed here, but this
is not a political book, ending with a list of recommendations on how to proceed. Nev-
ertheless, I examine opinions about which kinds of immigration may or may not be
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desirable, as well as adjustments to the welfare state in societies of immigration, how
to deal with segregation in neighbourhoods and schools, ways in which Islam can find
a place in an open society and much more along those lines.
As I have already mentioned, this is primarily a study of the available literature. In
selecting from that literature I have taken a balanced approach. Let me limit myself to
two examples. The first concerns the manner in which I recount the history of immi-
gration into America. I have drawn upon studies that represent well over a century of
research, from Mayo-Smith () via Handlin () to the most recent survey by Zol-
berg (). They include books that can be regarded as classic works on the subject,
or at any rate are referred to regularly in the literature. Alongside these broad-ranging
works I’ve selected a number of more specific studies, such as research into cities in-
cluding Chicago (Kefalas), Detroit (Hartigan) and New York (Moynihan and Glazer),
as well as countless thematic studies like those on the Know Nothing movement (An-
binder), positive discrimination (Sowell, Glazer and Schlesinger) and the Civil Rights
movement (Du Bois, Baldwin, Franklin and Berlin among others).
Another example of my approach to selecting from the relevant literature is the dis-
cussion of the Netherlands as a country of avoidance, for which I have consulted the
major authors – mostly historians – on colonial history (including Wesseling, Van
Doorn and Oostindie), on tolerance (Kossmann, Aerts and Van Deursen) and on ‘pil-
larization’ (Lijphart and Van Sas). In addition to general historical studies I’ve made a
representative selection from the large amount of research available on migration
into my own country, by experts ranging from historians like Lucassen and Emmer to
sociologists such as Duyvendak and Entzinger, and from philosophers including
Boomkens and Cliteur to geographers like Knippenberg and Musterd. I have also
drawn upon the most important reports by the WRR, the CPB and the SCP. Last but
not least I have consulted countless authors with a background in migration, among
them Abdolah, Ramdas, Bouazza, Allas and Baycili. Here too I have tried to combine
works giving a general overview with more specific studies.
Finally, a few remarks on the use of these sources. In tackling such a controversial
subject as the social changes brought about by immigration, it is of great importance
to describe contrasting positions in the partly academic, partly public debate as clearly
as possible. I have therefore tried to present the arguments for and against certain posi-
tions as accurately and robustly as I could. I’m sure I will not have succeeded com-
pletely in every case, but I believe this study to be balanced. That at least has been my
aim throughout the researching and writing of the book.
Let me offer a few examples. Take cultural relativism, which I deal with by exami -
ning theworkof classic authors suchasBoas,Herskovits andBenedict before assessing
its strengths and weaknesses. I look at the productive aspects of relativism as a reac-
tion to the racial view of the world that acquired scientific legitimacy in the course of

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the nineteenth century. At the same time I draw attention to its weaknesses by looking,
for example, at criticism by Todorov, Lemaire, Levi-Strauss and Sen.
Or take the discussion of Islam as an aspect of present-day immigration. Based on
the work of a wide range of Islamic philosophers and academics, I deal at length with
the secularization of Islam, its orthodox elements and attempts to reform it. In other
words, I have consciously sought diverse views from the contemporary Muslim world,
such as those of Mernissi, Djait, Maalouf, Pamuk, Abu Zayd, Soroush, Filali-Ansary,
Charfi, Gezik, Ramadan, Hirsi Ali and Djavann. I have also quoted and drawn upon
important authors from outside that world, among them Norris and Inglehart, Roy,
Buijs, Cardini, Esposito, Buruma, Bauberot, Snouck Hurgronje and Goldziher.
Then there is my treatment of the advantages and disadvantages of migration for
developing countries. I haveweighedup that debate exhaustively fromall sides, exami -
ning for example the issue of the brain drain as set against proceeds from remittances.
This leads on to a considered judgement about the impact of immigration on inequa -
lity in the world, based on the work of authors including Dummett, Singer, Attali,
Kennedy, Harris, Castells and Miller, Legrain, and Weiner. The same can be said of the
treatment of questions surrounding the significance of immigration in the context of
aging populations, or the debate about segregation and inequality, or the pros and
cons of a ‘civilizing offensive’. Time and again I have tried to present the strongest ar-
guments in favour of the different positions and judge them on their merits.

Where has this approach led? What are the main conclusions of this study? The four
questions I asked myself have produced the following conclusions, which are given in
outline here and substantiated at greater length throughout the book. The first ques-
tion was whether, based on the facts available, it’s possible to say anything about the
shared characteristics of large-scale migration processes in today’s Western world. I
believe experiences in America and Europe have more in common than we tend to as-
sume. Here lies one conclusion of this study; similarities between the two continents
crop up time and again. Of course the differences are discussed as well – especially the
impact of Islam in Europe and the consequences of the continent’s comprehensive
welfare states – but it soon becomes clear that behind the proud self-image of America
as a ‘nation of immigrants’ more uncertainty and conflict lurk than is generally recog-
nized. Further examination reveals that European and American experiences in the
postwar era are broadly comparable as far as the extent of immigration, public opin-
ion, the degree of segregation and the patterns of integration are concerned.
I therefore disagree with American writers such as Christopher Caldwell and Wal-

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 15
ter Laqueur who are extremely gloomy about the future of Europe in this respect and
at the same time see America as a fairly unambiguous model. Caldwell writes: ‘Immi-
gration is not enhancing or validating European culture; it is supplanting it. Europe is
not welcoming its newest residents but making way for them.’ He is quick to contrast
this with the situation in the United States: ‘Mass Hispanic immigration can disrupt a
few local habits … but it requires no fundamental reform of American cultural prac-
tices or institutions. On balance, it may strengthen them.’
While accepting that a contrast exists, it’s important to realize the extent of the sim-
ilarity. This claim can be supported in different ways. Let’s look first at the size of im-
migration over recent decades when measured as a share of the population. Until the
First World War, America received far more migrants; indeed in the nineteenth cen -
tury millions of Europeans crossed the Atlantic. By , roughly  per cent of the 
population was foreign born. The figure is slightly lower today, but it is now in line
with the percentages in member states of the European Union: in the United States
. per cent of residents are immigrants, compared with . per cent in Germany,
. per cent in Britain, . per cent in the Netherlands, . per cent in Spain, . per
cent in France, .per cent in Austria and .per cent in Italy. The average for Western
Europe is around  per cent.
Europe and America are converging in another sense too. This becomes apparent
when we look at public opinion. A recent comparative study shows that  per cent of
Britons and  per cent of Spaniards believe there are too many immigrants in their
countries, while  per cent of Americans are of the same opinion, although less resist-
ance is expressed in Germany, France and the Netherlands, with figures of ,  and
per cent respectively. Furthermore, per cent of Americans are worried about ille-
gal immigration, compared to an average of  per cent in the European Union, while
per cent of Americans think illegal immigrants cause crime and an average of per
cent of citizens of the EU agree with them. The proportion of those questioned who
favour the granting of legal residence status to illegal immigrants is practically identi-
cal: a minority of  per cent in America compared to  per cent in the European
Union. In short, attitudes to legal and illegal immigration coincide.
The degree to which populations live apart is another example. If we leave aside
America’s history of slavery and the forced segregation of its black population – a past
still at work in maintaining the profound divides seen in cities such as New York, De-
troit and Chicago – and look at how migrant communities in Europe cluster together
in their own neighbourhoods, then we may well share the conclusion of Amsterdam
social geographer Sako Musterd: ‘The differences are much smaller than perhaps ex-
pected and in some European cities they are even comparable with  metropolitan
area averages.’ Generally speaking, while the level of segregation is higher in America
it does not differ dramatically from that of migrants from Bangladesh and Pakistan in

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cities like Birmingham, Bradford and London. The spatial concentration of Moroc-
cans in Brussels, Turks in The Hague and Iranians in Stockholm is considerable as
well.
Finally, and this will come as no great surprise in light of the foregoing, integration
has taken a roughly comparable course on the two continents. The history of America
teaches us that practically every sizeable new group encounters opposition, and this
has been the pattern in postwar Europe too. It will suffice to cite the conclusion of
French researcher Denis Lacorne, a view shared by most historians: ‘A land that re-
ceives immigrants of every provenance and every social class, the United States is also,
paradoxically, a country that rejects immigrants.’ The cycle of avoidance, conflict
and accommodation described by American sociologists contributes to an under-
standing of contemporary Europe. Of course reality is rather messier than this model
suggests, if only because new groups are continually arriving and in large cities all
three stages of the cycle occur simultaneously.
Out of this situation arises another conclusion: the dynamism of societies of immi-
gration is generated by the loss of familiar worlds and the need to come to terms with
new environments. The attitudes of both the established and newcomers are coloured
by that experience, and both points of view must be taken into account by anyone
studying immigration and integration. This would seem to go without saying, but
much current research concentrates primarily on the fortunes of migrants and their
children. If the native population is discussed at all, it is mostly seen as a hindrance, its
members regarded as the personification of prejudice and all too rarely as citizens
helping to shape a new kind of society.
The cycle of avoidance, conflict and accommodation can be understood as result-
ing from ways of dealing with this loss of certainty. This provides an answer to the sec-
ond question, namely how present-day immigration is experienced by newcomers
and by natives. Some commentators, such as author Geert Mak, have drawn a parallel
with the grieving process. It’s an enlightening analogy. What after all are the phases of
grief, in which we cope with loss? Surely they include at the very least denial, anger and
acceptance. At first people refuse to acknowledge what has happened, then they rebel
against it – why me? – before finally coming to terms with circumstances they cannot
change and making the best of things. This reflects the cycle some historians and soci-
ologists have described. 
The stress on a shared experience of loss throws fresh light on the role of prejudice.
The conflict that accompanies all major migratory movements means that prejudices
on both sides will be challenged sooner or later. Much of today’s research, however, is
rather one-sided in its approach. In their informative survey of population move-
ments, Stephen Castles and Mark Miller write of anxieties about Islamic fundamental-
ism but insist that ‘such fears are based on racist ideologies rather than social reali-

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ties’. They go a step further by assuming that a fearful response by the majority fuels
Muslim fundamentalism and therefore amounts to a self-fulfilling prophesy. This is to
ignore / and the influence of worldwide radicalization on Muslim communities in
Europe and America.
We come upon an identical tendency in the work of German immigration histor -
ian Klaus Bade, who ends his wide-ranging and brilliant historical account by saying
that European reluctance to admit refugees is ‘an historical scandal by which future
generations will judge Europe’s understanding of humanity in the late twentieth and
early twenty-first centuries’. He clearly has no sympathy for ‘fortress Europe’, but
should we not try to comprehend the desire to reduce the influx of refugees in the
s before describing it as a scandal? Should we not also, in passing judgement, take
into account the large groups of refugees that have already been given access?
Surely neither avoidance nor the conflict that arises in countries dealing with large-
scale immigration can be laid entirely at the door of majority populations. The causes
of prejudice described in a classic study by American social psychologist Gordon All-
port – including a precarious position in society, strict religious beliefs and an authori-
tarian upbringing – are to be found in migrant communities as well. This too affects
relationships between the established and newcomers. Hostility is no less deeply felt in
migrant circles, nor is it merely a response to rejection by the majority. The imbalance
in power between majorities and minorities is obvious to all, but in many major cities
in Europe and America the majority is gradually becoming a minority, and migrants
and their descendents now have considerable influence. 
Which brings us to another important conclusion, namely that integration re-
quires both natives and newcomers to engage in self-examination. Migration brings
about changes on both sides, and as a result the phrase often used to define multicul-
turalism, ‘integration with the retention of identity’, comes to represent an unhelpful
approach. Many changes may pass unnoticed, becoming obvious only when migrants
return to their countries of origin after many years and suddenly realize the extent to
which they have been moulded by their new homelands. Aside from this tacit form of
integration, one of the potential benefits of migration can be derived from a con-
scious reassessment of routines and traditions long taken for granted. Once again this
applies both to newcomers and to members of receiving societies.
Here we find an answer to the third question, about how immigration alters think-
ing on citizenship. While inviting immigrants to see themselves as citizens, receiving
societies cannot avoid thinking about what they understand citizenship to mean. This
reciprocity is fundamental to any understanding of integration; it’s never simply a
matter of adjusting to society as it is. Immigration forces both natives and newcomers
to confront fundamental questions about the rights and duties of citizenship. To put it
another way, immigration forces a society to measure itself against basic principles of

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equality of treatment, such as freedom of religion. Naturally enough, we see evidence
all around us of the temptation to avoid these issues.
As long as reciprocity is its guiding principle, re-evaluation of this sort will not be
directionless. The open society is founded upon equality before the law. Consistent ap-
plication of this principle encourages a sense of responsibility, especially in societies
of immigration, as regular visitors to a Turkish mosque in Amsterdam found out
when, to their astonishment, they won a court case against the local authority. The ex-
perience of victory in a legal battle against a powerful city council certainly made an
impression. The constitutional state became their constitutional state. Outcomes like
this build trust of the kind that oils the wheels of social interaction between people of
widely differing backgrounds.
Reciprocity takes us beyond equality since it means ‘do unto others as you would
have them do unto you’. Those who hate being treated with condescension on the
grounds of their convictions or disposition would do well to avoid treating others
with condescension for similar reasons. Those who require of others that they ques-
tion their own habits and customs must be prepared to do the same. Those who ask
questions must be not only open to the answers but willing to think about the ques-
tions others are asking. In an open society, reciprocity is not something people can be
forced into; it needs to be accepted freely. Philosopher of law Dorien Pessers writes
that it means ‘people do more than they are legally obliged to do, and more is expected
of them than the law demands’.
What if people refuse to acknowledge others as equals, because of their faith or
lifestyle or ethnic background? What if they demand freedoms for themselves that
they are not willing to grant to fellow citizens? Is freedom of expression, for example, a
constitutional right that must be accorded even to those who attempt to use it to re-
strict the freedom of others? To take a concrete example: Should that particular right
be defended in the case of people who want to place limits on the religious freedom of
Muslims? Should Muslims be expected to feel obliged to defend such people’s rights?
If so, and if equality matters, then freedom must be safeguarded for all, even for Mus-
lims who embrace radical beliefs and advocate the introduction of sharia in whole or
in part – just as long as they are merely voicing their opinions, not inciting others to vi-
olence.
So the open society must make room for those who adhere to a closed world view
and reject reciprocity. This is the liberal paradox: orthodoxy, whether religious or sec-
ular, has a place in a lively democracy. Equality extends that far. But an open society
needs a majority of its citizens to believe fundamentally in reciprocity, to try to live ac-
cording to the notion that the right of one entails the duty of another. Such a majority
will not come into being of its own accord. Indeed this is precisely the reason the open
society is vulnerable. There can never be any guarantees.
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One final conclusion of this study is that we must take history seriously, although
without drawing the unambiguous conclusion that all migratory shifts will ultimately
end in accommodation. There are clear indications to that effect, and historian Leo
Lucassen is right to remark that current developments point more ‘in the direction of
ongoing integration than toward the dawn of a multicultural society where descen-
dants of immigrants remain visible and culturally distinct groups’. Yet however fa-
miliar this trend may seem from history, it’s impossible to derive from the past any as-
surance that integration will be successful in the future. That is the starting point in
the search for an answer to the fourth and final question that I have asked myself,
namely whether the shared characteristics of present-day migration can also be found
in histories of migration in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
The historical continuity is clearly in evidence, but there are a number of features
of post-war immigration that make its long-term outcomes uncertain. While religion
has always been of crucial importance to immigrant communities, Islam is a new phe-
nomenon in the Western world. The fact that around fifteen million Muslims are liv-
ing in the member states of the European Union is a challenge in every sense. For be-
lievers whose religion has always held either a majority or a monopoly position in
most of their countries of origin, living as a religious minority means reshaping prac-
tices to suit quite different circumstances. Receiving societies, for their part, need to
look for ways of dealing with a religion that has not been part of the modern history of
Europe, aside from the Balkans. The migration of Muslims is an unprecedented event
and we cannot be certain that Islam will find a natural place for itself in the Western
world. The attacks of  September and since do not make any of this any easier.
In regions such as the Arab world where Islam is dominant, religion, culture and
politics are intertwined, whereas in modern societies they have become separate do-
mains. If Islam is to be part of liberal society it will have to free itself from the cultures
of its countries of origin, if only to prevent certain customs and traditions from ac-
quiring an aura of sanctity. Canadian Muslim Irshad Manji is unimpressed by the ar-
gument that critics of Islam fail to draw a clear distinction between religion and cul-
ture. ‘Why would Islam be so hard to extricate from local customs – tribal customs – if
there wasn’t something profoundly tribal about the religion to begin with?’ No one
should be forced to abandon Islam as a spiritual tradition, but Muslims must find
ways to live as a religious minority in a democracy. 
For the receiving society too, the arrival of a new religion ought to be an incentive
to ponder afresh the issue of religious freedom. Many countries have regulations that
are at odds with the principle of the separation of church and state – think of the
church taxes Germans and Danes have to pay, the constitutional status of the Anglican
Church in Britain, faith schools in the Netherlands, or the crucifixes in Italian courts
and classrooms. Only if there is a willingness to re-evaluate the relationship between
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church and state will it be possible to formulate a proper response to the arrival of
Islam.
Past and present migration differ in another sense as well. That migrants are often
poor is nothing new, but the extent of unemployment in migrant communities, in
Western Europe especially, certainly is. One of the causes of low participation in paid
work is a generous social benefits system. The combination of mass immigration and
the welfare state is unique, lacking any historical precedent. The consequences are
plain to see: large groups of migrants find themselves in a situation of dependence.
What ought to be an innovative segment of society – immigrants are the pre-eminent
survivors – has become the most passive segment of all.
The subsidized isolation of so many migrant families has turned out to be an obsta-
cle to them, to their children and to society as a whole. The entrepreneurial instincts of
those who left their home countries to earn money abroad is stifled by a society that at-
tempts to protect people against every conceivable risk. In Amsterdam, for example,
more than half of all first generation Moroccans and Turks are unemployed or classi-
fied as unfit for work. A comparative study leads American researcher John Mol-
lenkopf to conclude that Amsterdam is doing less well than New York, where over 
per cent of the first generation is in work. He shows that labour inactivity among mi-
grants in Amsterdam has led to ‘a polarisation between productive, employed natives
and unproductive, unemployed immigrant minorities’. If arguments in favour of
large-scale immigration are based on the contribution newcomers make to society,
then the high rates of long-term unemployment among them make it harder to justify.
There is one other difference between old and new migration. The fact that the first
generation of migrants is still steeped in its countries of origin should come as no sur-
prise. It’s a feature of all immigration. Irish-Americans have always been profoundly
engaged with their mother country’s struggle for independence. Similarly, Germans
in America remained concerned about the changing fortunes of the old country, and
this had a direct impact on them during the First World War. After  they paid a
high price for their neutrality at the time of that conflict. It was no longer desirable to
be identified as of German extraction and many changed their names.
Relations with the country of origin are a recurring theme in the history of migra-
tion, but because of modern communications technology and the growth in opportu-
nities for cheap travel, ties with the old country are now easier to maintain than they
were. Nowadays migrants are occasionally described as transnational citizens, mean-
ing they have a presence in more than one society. Many commute, if only in a psycho-
logical sense. Will today’s migrant groups increasingly function as diaspora, or will
they, as in the past, become more oriented towards their new countries with each gen-
eration that passes?
The fact that governments in their countries of origin are keen to keep a grip on mi-
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grant communities often escapes attention. Dual nationality is important in this re-
spect. Many countries, including Germany and Japan, resist the concept, while others
go even further. The Moroccan government believes it can control its subjects and
their descendants as it sees fit; it’s impossible to relinquish Moroccan nationality. This
autocratic stance is bound up with economic interests, since around per cent of Mo-
rocco’s national income is derived from its emigrants. The refusal of governments to
leave emigrant communities free to choose their own path also stems from a fear that
liberal ways of thinking will be brought back from the countries where migrants have
settled. 
All these novel circumstances – the presence of large Muslim communities, the rise
of the welfare state and the increasing importance of transnational ties – may mean
that integration will no longer follow the old pattern of three generations at most. ‘It is
questionable whether the cycle that would see the third and subsequent generations of
all population groups living in the Netherlands thoroughly absorbed into society will
run its course if the second generation has achieved so little progress.’ In the decade
since that conclusion was drawn, the picture has grown more mixed. There are indica-
tions that generational change is developing according to familiar patterns, but the
most recent generation to emerge, composed of the grandchildren of immigrants
who arrived from the early s onwards, is still relatively few in number, and the ef-
fects of new circumstances are hard to predict. For this reason alone, patience is a bad
councillor. Living together requires commitment on both sides. Integration really is
more than a question of time.
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A suitcase in the hall
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  
‘Welcome,’ someone calls out unexpectedly from across the street. ‘You like it here?’
Absolutely I do; there’s a lot to like about this place. The Moroccan port city of Tang-
iers is an inviting chaos in the summer months. Young and old, wrapped and un-
wrapped, parade along the promenade. The city is packed with returned migrants,
their children often fashionably dressed, and behind the wheel of their roomy cars
they’re the embodiment of success to those who stayed behind.
I’d often heard that kind of welcome over the previous few weeks, as Morocco has a
tradition of hospitality, but this time the greeting came from a young Moroccan who
addressed me in my own native tongue, with an Amsterdam accent no less. He spoke
with the pride of a host: ‘This is my country. So what do you think?’ We exchanged a
few comments about here and there, then he got into a car with his friends and disap-
peared into the traffic.
I was left slightly perplexed. The man who’d welcomed me was a compatriot of
mine. As soon as he opened his mouth the market traders of Tangiers would realize he
was a foreigner by birth, if they hadn’t already concluded as much from his bearing.
Prices were higher for him than for the locals; he too was primarily a wallet on legs. He
was a tourist in a country he knew only superficially, really only from the stories his
parents had told him.
In his ‘welcome’ I detected not just ritual hospitality but bittersweet vengeance. At
last he could show off about something that truly belonged to him. At last the roles
were reversed. The guests he welcomed were people who often gave him the cold
shoulder back home. That ‘welcome’ was almost a challenge, drawing the attention of
Dutch visitors to shortcomings in their own dealings with outsiders. At least, that was
how it felt.
Compatriots in a strange country, yet strangers in our own. That’s the state of un-
certainty this book explores, a confusion that has its milder side, but an agonizing side
as well. Behind that verbal welcome in a foreign country lay a no man’s land, a feeling
of not really being at home anywhere. That young man wanted to be proud of a place
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he mainly knew about second hand because he couldn’t be proud of the place where
he grew up.
If we retrace the routes taken by migrants back to their countries of origin, we dis-
cover an insecurity that has become our own. Immigrants from all over the world
have changed the face of our cities. The original intentions, whatever they were, theirs
and ours, ceased to matter a long time ago. The world has settled into our neighbour-
hoods, and it’s a confusing and shocking experience. Our markets, places of worship,
schools, sports clubs – everything and everyone has been affected by the great migra-
tion that’s underway and whose end is nowhere in sight.
We’re in themidst of profound changes and it’s unwise to pretend they’re inconse-
quential or simply to closeourminds to them.Howoftendowehear theunanswerable
‘immigration has always been with us’, the notion that people are always on themove
and our own time is no exception? The Amsterdam municipality writes, matter-of-
factly: ‘Almost half of all Amsterdammers were born outside the Netherlands. This is
nothing new. For centuriesAmsterdam, as a city of immigrants, has been open to peo-
ple of different origins and faiths. Think of the Portuguese Jews, French Huguenots
and seasonal workers from Germany.’
Even if we accept that from a historical perspective there’s nothing new under the
sun, no one can doubt we are witnessing a profound change to the composition of
Western populations. People certainly moved around a great deal in the seventeenth
century, but that surely does nothing to mitigate the upheaval that cities are going
through now. The guest workers from Morocco and Turkey who are changing Dutch
neighbourhoods aren’t simply counterparts to the seasonal workers from Germany
who spent time in the Low Countries in centuries past. The fact that Jews from Portu-
gal fled to the Netherlands to escape the Catholic Church’s Inquisition doesn’t make it
a matter of course that refugees from Islamist despotism in Iran and Afghanistan
should come to live here. 
In any case, how much is it possible to know about the newcomers who made Ams-
terdam into a city of immigrants in earlier times? A recent study by historian Erika
Kuijpers speaks of ‘the innumerable’ and ‘the invisible’ and demonstrates that our
knowledge about them is limited, aside from a social elite that left a heritage of public
works and charming houses on the city’s main canals. It’s hard to find out anything
about the lives most migrants lived; even the numbers are a rough approximation.
The lack of information alone makes that stalwart ‘there’s nothing new under the sun’
little short of exasperating.
How long can you downplay the significance of what’s happening to you by talking
about those who shared the same fate in the past? How long can a deeply felt experi-
ence be declared off limits? There’s a growing feeling that today’s migrants and the re-
actions provoked by them have not as yet done much to move Western societies for-
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ward. This feeling refuses to be placated. Here in the Netherlands and in neighbouring
countries, tolerance and freedom are under strain.
In a time when progress is all that counts, when the sense that something is being
lost is dismissed as nostalgia, we’ve become adept at transforming reality, blithely de-
scribing impoverishment as enrichment, allowing semi-lingualism to pass for bilin-
gualism and treating narrow-mindedness with sympathy. But compliant language
doesn’t make reality any more amenable. Turning a blind eye to the clashes caused by
the arrival of immigrants is no longer an option.
Today’s migration cannot simply be described as making receiving societies more
open, since as a result of the traditional beliefs many migrants bring with them, old
questions about the position of women have suddenly resurfaced and freedom of ex-
pression has become controversial. People have started to talk about blasphemy again,
even apostasy. It may all seem familiar from recent history, but having to repeat the
emancipation struggles of fifty years ago can hardly be described as progress.
There’s a need to go beyond the simple assumption that the migration of past
decades amounts to an enrichment of the societies in which newcomers have arrived.
In fact the continual use of the word ‘enrichment’ is rather unfortunate, considering
the impoverished lives many immigrants and their children lead. Schools are sudden-
ly faced with a multiplicity of special needs, and this alone causes significant prob-
lems. Set against the benefits, the costs of migration have so far turned out to be high,
in some countries perhaps even higher than the returns, although such calculations
are always complicated.
This has nothing to do with the question of guilt that raises its head in so many con-
temporary discussions of immigration. Receiving societies are hesitant in their deal-
ings with newcomers; established populations are becoming noticeably more rigid
and tending to turn away from the outside world. It has even proven possible to find
majority support for measures to limit immigrants’ civil rights. Nevertheless, many
migrants could have done more to create a place for themselves in their new countries.
They ought to have rid themselves sooner of the ‘myth of return’, the belief that their
stay was only temporary. As someone remarked in a debate: ‘The price of staying is
that you take the trouble to learn. Learning and spurning are two quite different
things.’
It’s not difficult to point to shortcomings on all sides but there’s a good deal more
to be said. This book examines how the conflicts surrounding migration can bring
about a renewal of society as a whole, taking us closer to our aim of creating an open
society. There’s a need for a more candid approach to the frictions and clashes that al-
ways result from the arrival of sizeable migrant groups. Earlier generations of histori-
ans and sociologists have left us a remarkable body of work to draw upon. Oscar Han-
dlin, the best known historian of immigration in America, is one source of inspira-
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tion. In The Uprooted () he describes the causes and effects of migration from Eu-
rope to America. They can be summed up in one sentence: ‘the history of immigra-
tion is a history of alienation and its consequences.’ Alienation and loss are key fea-
tures of any description of the arrival of migrants in a strange environment.
Handlin is thinking primarily of those who came, ‘for the effect of the transfer was
harsher upon the people than upon the society they entered’. He tells the story of the
millions who were set adrift by industrialization and by the astonishing population
growth of the second half of the nineteenth century. The dislocation and poverty that
resulted, especially in rural areas, led to mass emigration from countries including Ire-
land, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Norway and Poland. Huge economic and social forces
were at work, and people were torn loose from environments they had occupied for
centuries. Hardly anyone welcomed this liberation, Handlin says, since above all it
meant separation. He describes with great empathy the often atrocious journey they
made across the Atlantic and their arrival in a new land where they had to make their
way as immigrants, often utterly destitute and with no idea what the future might
bring. 
In unfamiliar surroundings many sought refuge in the certainties of their religion.
‘In that sense all immigrants were conservatives… All would seek to set their ideas
within a fortification of religious and cultural institutions that would keep them
sound against the strange New World.’ This hankering after old structures and cus-
toms served as an aid to survival in an urban environment. It’s easy to see why many
migrants tried to perpetuate village life in foreign cities, which makes it all the harder
to understand why immigrants are so often described as great innovators.
In their new country, so confusing and full of dangers, people felt a need for the sup-
port of their religion, but maintaining religious faith was a challenge: ‘The same envi-
ronment, in its very strangeness and looseness and freedom, made it difficult to pre-
serve what could be taken for granted at home.’ The end result was all too often a
sense of not belonging anywhere any longer. ‘They had thus completed their alien-
ation from the culture to which they had come, as from that which they had left.’This
is an experience shared by many contemporary migrants as they try to connect with a
new society.
It was not only the migrants themselves who were afflicted by insecurity. Those al-
ready living in the new country, which after all was not a blank canvas but had customs
and traditions of its own, were thrown off balance. Handlin acknowledges their side
of the story: ‘Everything in the neighbourhood was so nice, they would later say, until
the others came. The others brought outlandish ways and unintelligible speech, for-
eign dress and curious foods, were poor, worked hard, and paid higher rents for inferi-
or quarters.’
In an earlier study Handlin had examined the reaction of nineteenth-century
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Bostonians to the arrival of Irish immigrants, who came in huge numbers. After the
two groups clashed it took at least half a century for the city to regain its balance.
‘Group conflict left a permanent scar that disfigured the complexion of Boston social
life.’ Yet Handlin’s approach was subtle and he avoided laying the blame on one side
or the other. He used cautious terms like ‘latent distrusts’ and ‘social uneasiness’ to de-
scribe the attitudes of longstanding residents.
It’s not hard to understand reactions like these. People saw their world changed by
immigrants and instinctively harked back to a shared notion of the community as it
had been before. It serves little purpose to impress upon people who no longer feel at
home in their neighbourhoods that we all have to move with the times. In the often
hostile expression ‘stranger in your own country’ lies a recognition that migration has
brought people from all over the world to settle in today’s major cities. We need to face
up to the feeling among established populations that a tried and tested society is being
lost, just as we need to acknowledge the feeling of uprootedness among many new-
comers.
For far too long, those who didn’t live in the neighbourhoods where migrants set-
tled were the warmest advocates of the multicultural society, while those who did live
in them steadily moved out. Their opinions were ignored, or they were belittled for
suddenly giving voice to their own latent xenophobia. Now that the middle classes can
no longer escape the changes migration brings – in part because they can no longer
fail to notice migrants’ children in the classroom – the argument has broken out in
earnest and there is a need to think seriously about both the life stories of immigrants
and the experiences of indigenous residents. It is indeed true to say that the history of
immigration is a history of alienation and its consequences.
Yet that alienation does not last for ever, quite the reverse in fact. Back in the s
American sociologist Robert E Park described what was then generally referred to as
the race relations cycle as beginning with isolation and avoidance and moving on via
contact, competition and conflict to accommodation and assimilation. There is an
underlying logic here: on arrival migrants tend to keep to themselves, partly as a result
of the attitude of avoidance they detect in the society around them. In the years that
follow, migrants and their children struggle to claim a place for themselves in the new
country, and this leads to rivalry and strife. The question of how everyone can live to-
gether becomes unavoidable. If a satisfactory answer is found, the descendants of the
original migrants will be absorbed more or less smoothly into society. This is a hope-
ful view and it suggests the familiar model of three generations.
Of course the process can’t really be divided into phases or generations as neatly as
this, but the important point is that every story of migration involves conflict. That
was and is the case in America and the pattern is being repeated in contemporary Eu-
rope. It’s difficult to say how long or how severe the period of conflict will be, but the
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phase of avoidance is gradually coming to an end. We should see today’s frictions as
part of a search for ways for newcomers and the established population to live togeth-
er. Conflict has a socializing effect.
Immigration is the most visible aspect of globalization, which gives many people a
sense that their familiar world is vanishing. This is not yet felt to be an improvement.
In European countries many people are convinced that a period of stagnation or even
decline lies ahead. Few still believe their children will have a better future, whereas the
post-war generation enjoyed the prospect that their offspring would live freer and
more prosperous lives. It doesn’t really help to say that future generations will see
these as the good old days. Right now all that counts is that a sense of loss has taken
hold and people are looking for ways of reaching beyond that experience.
Literary critic Svetlana Boym discerns a pattern: ‘Nostalgia inevitably appears as a
defense mechanism in a time of accelerated rhythms of life and historical upheavals.’
Newcomers and natives react in similar ways – and no wonder, since the cause of their
unrest is the same. Migrants personify a world set adrift, and those they come to live
amongst are swept along by changes to their everyday environments, but shared expe-
rience does not bring the two sides together, Boym concludes. ‘The moment we try to
repair longing with belonging, the apprehension of loss with a rediscovery of identity,
we often part ways and put an end to mutual understanding.’ That is exactly what’s
happening now: the desire for a firm footing in a turbulent world is driving old and
new citizens apart.
In the history of immigration the pendulum swings back and forth between open-
ness and withdrawal. Later we’ll examine the American experience at some length, but
we should note at this point that after forty years of mass immigration between 
and , new legislation was introduced that kept the numbers to a minimum until
. The similarity with present-day Europe is striking; here too, after decades of
mass immigration, there’s a widespread desire for tighter controls.
In other words, the call for the influx to be curbed is not an exclusively European
phenomenon, nor does it represent an inability to get along with migrants, a failing
that could perhaps be ascribed to Europe’s relatively short history of immigration. A
more restrictive policy as a means of restoring the social balance is an option that
ought to be taken seriously. History shows that spontaneous rapprochement between
indigenous populations and newcomers is rare. The risk that each side will keep rais-
ing the stakes with opposing declarations of loyalty – both in effect openly saying ‘my
own people first’ – means we must take the trouble to explore what lies behind this
hostility. Let’s first take a closer look at the experiences of the migrants we encoun-
tered on the promenade in Tangiers.
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   
People rarely leave hearth and home simply to seek their fortunes in the wider world.
They are usually trying to escape deplorable living conditions in their native coun-
tries. Guest workers were motivated by economic misery, migrants from former
colonies were set adrift by worries about the repercussions of independence, refugees
are by definition fleeing political or religious persecution, and migration arising from
the formation or reuniting of families is often the result of emotional attachments or
of problematic circumstances at home.
So although people’s motives for leaving differ appreciably, migration almost al-
ways arises out of need, and not everyone has the talent to make a virtue of necessity.
Nowadays we’re often presented with a romantic image of the migrant as the personi-
fication of an increasingly mobile world. He is described as a forerunner, part of a re-
luctant advance guard. We should be aware that it requires an immense effort to make
the best of what is often a traumatic experience. Some writers, entrepreneurs, sport-
ing heroes and politicians have acquired prominent positions for themselves in their
new countries, an admirable achievement, not to mention the innumerable teachers,
shopkeepers, police officers and nurses who have made a success of migration.
The early work of Anil Ramdas, a Dutch writer from Surinam, shows that migra-
tion need not be a sombre story of loss and homesickness. The migrant’s journey will
often mean a broadening of horizons: ‘This means a gulf opens up, a breach in the
memory, a void in recollection, as wide as the ocean he has crossed. And I want to 
insist that this emptiness, this blank space, this vagueness of the past, far from being
tragic can be a fortunate thing, that it can be interpreted as a liberation.’
Generally speaking, Ramdas’ view of his old fatherland is affectionate and steeped
in a tone that allows the reader to share it. Yet we can sometimes taste a bitterness in his
verdict on what he has left behind. He does not baulk at writing: ‘Surinamese litera-
ture has failed. And the most obvious explanation for this is that Surinam has failed.
Surinam as a community does not exist and has never existed.’ Even for Ramdas,
who clearly sees the benefits of migration, the relationship with his native land has its
painful side.
It’s been called a ‘brutal bargain’: to gain entry to another culture you have to relin-
quish many things you hold dear. Securing a place for yourself often involves disloy-
alty to family traditions. Learning a new language distances many migrants little by lit-
tle from the parental home. It takes a great deal of effort to balance on a slack rope
slung between the country of origin and the country of arrival, and there’s a great
temptation either to have done with the past completely or to cling to old memories
and react with hostility to the new environment.
Later we’ll look in more detail at how far relocation is an experience of uprooting,
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even thoughweknowthatpeopledon’t have roots, theyhave legs.There are significant
differences betweenmigrant groups andbetweenmigrants as individuals,but someof
the general characteristics of the experience of migration are worth examining. Let’s
start by looking at the first generation,beforemovingon to seehow their childrenhave
fared. Imagine the journey through time from a small village community in the Rif
Mountains or Anatolia, for example, to big city life in Amsterdam or Birmingham,
Lyon or Frankfurt. There’s aMoroccan saying about guest workers: ‘By donkey to the
airport.’ It refers to the fact thatmany had not laid eyes on themodern world before,
never having visited their country’s own major cities. In that journey several stages
were missed, and no one should be surprised at the culture shock that resulted.
Weighing against the desire to get ahead was a familiarity with the landscape of
home. Take one characteristic passage from the life story of a migrant: ‘I didn’t really
want to leave. I didn’t talk to anyone about it, but I couldn’t make up my mind. It was
such a huge step. I was a country boy. I loved life there intensely. It was simple, fath-
omable, you knew everyone, you knew what they meant to you. But every day was the
same. You never made any progress. Still, did I dare to head off into the wider world?’
Earlier generations of migrants, leaving Europe for America, often faced a similar
challenge in the transition from village to town. A greater familiarity with the classic
accounts of the past might have helped us anticipate some of the problems of the pres-
ent day. Back in the s, Park described the migrant communities of Chicago, espe-
cially the spectacular growth of ghettos. Tellingly, Chicago’s Little Italy, with fifteen
thousand illiterate peasants from Sicily crammed together in appalling conditions,
was also known as Little Hell.
The immigrants’ lives were affected not only by poverty but by the challenge of cul-
tural adjustment. As far as possible they held the new, unfamiliar world at arm’s
length. Migrants were drawn to each other in specific districts: ‘Our great cities turn
out … to be a mosaic of segregated peoples … each seeking to preserve its peculiar cul-
tural forms.’ Park sums up the different legacies as a conflict between individuality
and communality. ‘Energies that were formerly controlled by custom and tradition
are released. The individual is free for new adventures, but he is more or less without
direction and control.’ He goes on to conclude that ‘the result is a cultural hybrid, …
a man on the margin of two cultures and two societies, which are never completely in-
terpenetrated and fused.’ Park describes this type of person as a ‘marginal man’.
The parallels with today’s migrant communities are obvious. No wonder there are
frictions in societies where so many villagers find themselves living in cities. In fact the
same difficulties can arise in their countries of origin; migrants from the Moroccan
and Turkish countryside have to make complicated adjustments to life in Casablanca
or Istanbul. Even some years ago, the more enlightened residents of Istanbul could be
heard complaining to anyone who would listen about the ‘hordes of barbarians’ from
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Anatolia who had seized control of the capital. They talked endlessly about their many
compatriots who were being carried away by traditional beliefs, and how this was de-
stroying the open atmosphere of their city. When the devout mayor of Istanbul sud-
denly announced proposals to segregate men and women on public transport, the lib-
eral elite felt its most dire predictions were becoming a reality.
Immigration as a threat to tolerance – that’s at the very least an interesting concept,
certainly as a response to those who claim without giving the matter much thought
that immigration enriches society and makes it more open. And this was domestic mi-
gration from rural communities to Istanbul. Inevitably the sense of disorientation is
even more extreme when on top of a transition from village life to the anonymous city
comes the transition to another language and a secular society. The change could
hardly be more abrupt and profound.
It may seem as if migrants have voted with their feet – by leaving home they have de-
clared a preference for life elsewhere – but many had prosperity in mind rather than
anything else. People who wanted to improve their lot economically have now come
to see the norms of liberal societies as tarnishing all that is dear to them. Far from avid-
ly embracing the freedoms on offer, they experience them as a threat. Anyone who
takes the trouble to imagine what most newcomers go through will realize that arrival
in a totally unfamiliar world has a dizzying effect. French historian Gérard Noiriel de-
scribes the feeling of displacement: ‘On top of the shock of transplantation and the
discovery of a new universe characterized by the speed of the assembly line and the
complex topography of metro tunnels comes incomprehension in the face of the new
dominant norms.’
The tensions that arise from the difficulty of settling down in a new country are felt
mainly within migrant families themselves. It’s there that the gulf between newcom-
ers and their adoptive societies is most keenly felt. Farah Karimi, a native of Iran and a
former member of the Dutch parliament makes this point: ‘There certainly is a multi-
cultural drama going on. It plays itself out primarily in the living rooms of immigrant
families.’ A fundamental conflict emerges as traditional beliefs come up against
modern attitudes towards men and women, parents and children, believers and non-
believers. Those involved are deeply affected.
It’s not easy to find a compromise between a fate-based culture and one that puts
individual freedom first. In traditional societies everything is pretty much set in stone.
The class, caste and religion you’re born into mould your life from cradle to grave and
escape is difficult, if not impossible. In the Western world, to an increasing degree
since the Second World War, life is seen as an invitation to self-fulfilment. The notion
that a person must take his fate into his own hands is incompatible with a culture that
lays all the emphasis on the community, in which the individual has little or no room
for manoeuvre.
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Much of the insecurity we’re witnessing now has its origins in this collision be-
tween authoritarian cultures and the relatively liberal societies of the West. The social
divide in Morocco or India is far greater than in Europe, where class differences mani-
fest themselves rather informally, although they certainly do exist. It surely can’t be
easy for newcomers to navigate countries with so many implicit codes.
Kader Abdolah, who arrived in the Netherlands as a refugee from Iran, describes
the confusion beautifully: ‘We had suddenly fallen out of a culture in which every-
thing happened behind curtains into a semi-naked society. I thought I’d better keep
my mouth shut for the time being and watch carefully, listen carefully to the world
around me.’ His family falls prey to the same culture shock; his wife wants less and
less to do with him: ‘I really had nothing attractive to offer her any longer. In my own
country I was a man with a future. My position was clear. But who was I now? An appli-
cant for temporary jobs.’
It’s a story we hear all too often: families come under huge strain because of the fa-
ther’s loss of status. In many migrant families this results in an inverted form of inter-
generational conflict. Instead of children being dependent on their parents, the par-
ents are in many ways dependent on their children. There is something humiliating
about the sight of an elderly-looking man in a caftan standing at the pharmacist’s
counter holding his small son’s hand, needing the help of his child because he hasn’t
mastered the language of the country in which he now lives. It’s especially painful
when he comes from an unambiguously authoritarian culture.
This loss of status among immigrants is another classic theme in the history of mi-
gration. Under the heading ‘the demoralization of the migrant’, Park describes the
way it affects families. How can children believe in paternal authority if it’s personi-
fied by someone struggling to hold his ground at the margins of society? The break-
down of communication in many migrant families is largely attributable to the weak
social position of immigrants, who have often received only minimal education.
Moroccan-Dutch author Hafid Bouazza presents a compelling portrait of the first
generation of guest workers and their isolation: ‘He enjoyed all this, but he didn’t feel
part of it. It existed outside him and would continue to exist without him, and that
made him sad. It was a sadness he shared with other visitors to the tea house, and
which in other men sometimes turned into anger and disgust.’ Indeed, the paths of
melancholy don’t always lead people in the same direction, but usually they will cling
stubbornly to the ways of life they have brought from home, sticking closely to their
companions in adversity, people they can always turn to when problems arise. Anyone
who steps into the hall of a mosque will feel this atmosphere all too powerfully: Turkey
or Pakistan are everywhere, while the Netherlands or Britain seem a distant illusion.
Many immigrants don’t fully command the language of their adoptive countries,
and this adds to their isolation. Post-colonial migrants, who generally did speak the
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language of their former motherlands and knew a fair amount about their future
homes, had an easier time than people who arrived in Germany or Denmark as guest
workers, poorly educated and not expected to have much knowledge of a place that
was offering them a temporary stay and, most importantly for all concerned, dirty,
physically demanding work.
The language, with all its emotional nuances, stands for more than just straightfor-
ward meanings. A German immigrant to America in the early twentieth century
wrote in an autobiographical account: ‘Whenever we must decide quickly we judge
subconsciously. The subconscious life was destroyed and badly disorganized. I never
knew if my reactions would be in line with the new code of conduct and had to think
and reflect… To act instinctively in an American fashion and manner was impossible,
and I appeared slow and clumsy.’
Many of the everyday misunderstandings and conflicts in cities with a high propor-
tion of immigrants arise from this poor command of the country’s mother tongue.
The hesitancy of newcomers is obvious, especially when it comes to expressions with
an ironic slant or a double meaning. The room for anything more than superficial
communication shrinks; if people want to understand each other they must limit
themselves.
Parents’ unfamiliarity with the language of the new homeland affects the future of
their children, large numbers of whom grow up in environments where nobody
speaks the native tongue of the country in which they live. They arrive at school with
considerable language deficits compared to children from indigenous families. Aside
from the impact this has on their performance in school – and it turns out they hardly
ever catch up completely – it’s hard for them to establish contacts outside their own
communities. German-Turkish sociologist Necla Kelek has criticized childrearing in
Germany’sTurkish community. ‘Their parentswereunableorunwilling to teach them
German,since either theyhadn’tmastered it themselvesor theydidn’t feel itwasneces-
sary for their sons to speak the language of the country they lived in.’ She acknow -
ledges the aloof attitude of the receiving society, but concludes that ‘for their part the
Turks – a few exceptions aside – made no effort to accept their second home’.
A reticence towards their countries of settlement can be found in all stories about
first-generation migrants, but this self-isolation is particularly prevalent in Europe,
where many did not initially see themselves as immigrants. All too often a temporary
stay bogged down to become a permanent presence. Whether Algerians in France, Ja-
maicans in Britain, Turks in Germany or Moroccans in the Netherlands, in each case
the notion ‘one day we’ll go back’ gave their lives in the new country a transient char-
acter. They lived with a suitcase in the hall; their real lives had been put on hold in the
expectation of a glorious return. In most cases nothing came of that dream, usually be-
cause they wanted to remain close to their children, who had never lived anywhere
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else. So a child says of his mother: ‘She doesn’t want to go back until her grandchildren
have grown up too. And found their feet. In other words: never.’
Aside from the question of separation, the way back is closed off to most migrants
because, for all their conservatism, their lengthy stay outside their own countries has
changed them. This becomes evident for the first time when they go back on holiday,
staying with relatives. In their home villages it may not be at all natural for women to
go out on the street by themselves to shop, for instance, let alone simply to take a walk.
People would soon start to gossip. They cannot go back. They could never get used to
corrupt officials again, or to police intimidation, or the way society controls them. Too
much of what they once took for granted has gradually become alien, even repellent.
Moving changes people, even though they often fail to realize it. Noiriel poses a
question that at first seems cryptic: ‘Isn’t the paradox of the immigrant that the more
he is one the less he is one?’ He means that the true immigrant, who has settled in a
new country permanently and therefore left behind the ‘myth of return’, is really less
and less of an immigrant, since he’s making every effort to put down roots in his adop-
tive land.
To put it another way, the conservatism of many immigrants is not a permanent
condition. The work of Oscar Handlin, which has been quoted here with approval, is
sometimes criticized for the importance it attributes to alienation in the history of mi-
gration. Later historians, such as Kristian Hvidt, with his study into the backgrounds
of Danish immigrants in America, have shown that Handlin placed undue emphasis
on the transition from the countryside to the city. Although in many cases emigration
did mean exchanging rural life for an urban existence – almost half of Danish Ameri-
cans were initially agricultural labourers – a fair number of newcomers had lived in
towns or cities back home.Another historian, John Bodnar, has argued that Handlin
saw migration too much as a one-way street, from tradition to modernity, producing
an inevitable culture shock.
Important though that transition may be, this book argues more generally that the
conservatism of immigrant communities should be understood as a reaction to the
loss of social and cultural certainties that migration brings with it. Bodnar writes that
migrants ‘had to devise explanations of their status in terms intelligible to themselves
by drawing on folk thought, religion, ancestry, and similar devices close at hand.’
Harking back to cultural traditions was a means of survival in a time of economic
struggle. ‘They had to devote nearly all their attention to that portion of their world in
which they actually could exert some power and influence: the family household, the
workplace, and the local neighborhood or community.’
Alienation should be seen as a phase in the biographies of migrant families. Gain-
ing control in unfamiliar surroundings marked the start of a process of integration.
Mastering a new language, dealing with unfamiliar working conditions, deciphering
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the prevailing rules of etiquette and practicing the old faith in a new environment – all
these things changed their lives, and even more so the lives of their children. The more
time they spent in the new environment, the more treacherous the route back to a re-
membered youth. In Zorgvlied cemetery in Amsterdam a little plot of Islamic grave-
stones is shyly emerging, a literal and figurative ‘we’re never going to leave’, but that
decision – ‘I want to be buried here’ – is a difficult and deeply emotional one. The iso-
lation of many older migrants, tied by their children to the place where they’ve settled
but in their minds still living in their native countries, should not be underestimated.
And who will look after them when they need it? ‘I do secretly hope that my children
will care for me.’
 - 
A skewed relationship with the children is one of the most painful consequences of
migration. This is particularly clear in the case of migrants from Pakistan, Morocco
and Mexico, for example, whose rather conservative lifestyle is now meeting with
growing resistance from their sons and daughters, but in many other cases too the gen-
eration gap is wide, and traditional societies in many countries of origin fail to ac-
knowledge intergenerational conflict. Parents have few means of preparing their chil-
dren for a society whose language and customs remain in many ways strange to them.
Their resignation is all too obvious, as is the sense that everything they once had has
been taken away.
In his novel Judith and Jamal, Fouad Laroui, born in Morocco, describes a father-
son relationship. ‘Abal-Khail loved his son, but he didn’t know how to tell him. He
worried about him, there in that country where he understood so little. It was his fault
that Jamal was growing up in a land of infidels. He had wanted to protect him against
every danger, against the temptations, the traps.’ If anything the boy’s mother has an
even more tenuous connection to the world around them. Can you stay somewhere
and yet not be there? Laroui asks himself, looking at Jamal’s exhausted mother asleep
on the couch. ‘The answer is a sorrowful yes. In the mornings she hurries through the
streets of Paris, wrapped in an exotic djellaba, but what is she actually making of her
life? In all things she’s an outsider, irrevocably an outsider.’
The powerlessness of such parents is obvious. As one of their children has said: ‘It’s
not that they didn’t want to offer us any support, it was simply that they couldn’t. You
can’t give something you don’t have to begin with.’Many are so detached from socie-
ty that they have no idea what their offspring get up to when they leave the house. The
children move between separate worlds: home, school and the street. The norms that
prevail in the family sphere have little to do with the rules that apply outside it and the
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resulting conflict seems almost inevitable. The distances that have to be bridged every
day are simply too great for many parents, and for their children.
One difference between the first and second generations is that for adults the shock
of the new country comes after they’ve already been shaped to a great degree by the
cultures of their countries of origin, whereas the problems of adaptation for their chil-
dren come at a point when they’re in the midst of their personal development. This ex-
plains why children are even more susceptible to the confusion migration inevitably
brings with it. They can’t stand aloof. Their resilience and flexibility are tested, and of-
ten their parents can do little to help them.
Journalist Margalith Kleijwegt has recorded their stories: ‘At home Mehmet never
says anything about school, about what happens there, who his friends are. He claims
he does his homework, but does he? Mrs Demircan has no way of checking. School is
an abstract concept to her. She has no idea where the building is or what her eldest son
does there.’ So the gulf between migrants and society inevitably creates a gulf be-
tween parents and children. Kleijwegt sums up her impressions: ‘For most of the par-
ents, childrearing seems more like staving off catastrophe than something beautiful or
fun that they can enjoy. They lack confidence in themselves, in the world and in their
children. Parents feel pushed into a corner. They react defensively to everything.’
People outside the family are kept at a safe distance as a matter of principle.
Follow the trail in the other direction. Anyone who travels back with a migrant fam-
ily to the place where its older members were born will soon become aware of the im-
mense gulf between here and there. People accustomed to living as part of an exten-
sive family network are suddenly transformed into a nuclear family in a rear apart-
ment on the third floor. Husband and wife living on top of one another – surely that’s
unnatural. The emotional balance is upset; family conventions have to be rethought.
In the new country, relationships are strange: men and women, boys and girls treat
each other differently.
It is of course quite natural for parents to defend their own notions of propriety.
This tendency expresses itself most clearly in traditional beliefs about marriage as a
bond that arises not so much out of love as from a sense of social duty. In her novel
Brick Lane Monica Ali describes the married lives of two migrants from Bangladesh.
Nazneen was given away to Chanu by her father when she was young: ‘Her husband
had a proverb for everything. Any wife is better than no wife. Something is better than
nothing. What had she imagined? That he was in love with her? That he was grateful
because she, young and graceful, had accepted him? That in sacrificing herself to him,
she was owed something? Yes. Yes. She realized in a stinging rush she had imagined all
these things. Such a foolish girl. Such high notions. What self-regard.’ All that’s left
to her is rebelliousness. There’s no way out. ‘If I had known what this marriage would
be, what this man would be…! What? What then? I would have run away?’
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Arranged marriages also reveal clear notions about the role of women, and these in-
creasingly conflict with liberal ideas after fifty years of female emancipation. Fatiha,
another second-generation migrant, says: ‘Mother thinks, like father, that I should
just give up my studies and get married soon. Studying isn’t terribly important in our
family. As a woman you’ve little to gain by it. You’re going to marry anyway and be a
housewife, so working for a diploma is a waste of time.’ Many girls from migrant
families see school as a chance to escape their parents’ plans for them. But how many
women take their lives into their own hands when they leave full-time education and
use the knowledge they’ve amassed to pursue a career?
This collision over marriage is a constant theme in the history of migration. Han-
dlin wrote of European migrants in America that ‘here was the ultimate barrier be-
tween the generations: they would never understand each other’s conception of mar-
riage.’ Getting a daughter to marry young was a way for parents to prevent her being
lost to a liberal outside world that was felt to be a perpetual threat to her chastity. Fati-
ha says: ‘Because of all these things I haven’t spoken to my father for a long time, nor
he to me. I find my parents’ constant distrust of me the worst thing of all.’Yet even to-
day most of these girls, however modern they may appear at first glance, fall back into
a more-or-less traditional marriage.
One of the causes of troubled relationships in many migrant families is that the fa-
ther usually left first. Ten years or so passed before he arranged for his family to follow
him. The children grew up without their father, who visited only at holiday time,
laden with gifts. Indeed the pressure to have his family join him usually arose from the
fact that mothers were being forced to bring up their children alone. Often these holi-
day dads agreed to reunite the family only with some understandable reluctance, since
they’d learned to value the freedom of their new countries in their own way and had
entered into all kinds of relationships. With their wives and daughters came religion
and a more conservative outlook. 
These clashes within families, complicated enough in themselves, are compounded
by a legacy of educational disadvantage. The expectation that children from migrant
families would quickly make their way up the social ladder has met with disappoint-
ment in many cases. The statistics on training and work speak for themselves. The sec-
ond generation is clearly over-represented on the lowest rungs. Exclusion and dis-
crimination are exacerbated by language deficits, a limited range of personal net-
works, inadequate knowledge of the social environment and of course a low level of
education among parents. 
A new social question has arisen. On average, the children of migrants lag behind
their peers significantly in cognitive development and linguistic ability, which puts
the better jobs out of their reach. Researchers have concluded that there is a ‘consider-
able reserve of talent’, yet at the same time that ‘the majority of children from non-na-
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tive families reach a level of education little different from that of their low-skilled par-
ents. Clearly the weak social position of the first generation is being passed on to the
second.’ Not only does their advancement seem less spectacular than expected,
progress in relation to the parents is not what ultimately matters, however valuable it
may be in terms of family history. Children don’t compete within their own commu-
nities but within society as a whole. What counts in the end is whether they have a real
chance in the jobs market.
Amid all this attention to falling behind, we shouldn’t neglect the existence of a
growing middle class of migrants and their children. Migrant communities differ, and
social distinctions within them are bound to increase in the future. Disadvantage
tends to be concentrated in non-Western communities, although many migrants
from Asia are doing extremely well. The impatience of this new middle class is unmis-
takable and its achievements are crucial in determining the degree to which immi-
grants feel their new country is truly their own. A society that affords little space to tal-
ented newcomers will pay a high price.
Good jobs aren’t everything, however. Those who succeed often feel remarkably
uncomfortable. In societies that haven’t yet adjusted appropriately to the permanent
presence of migrants and their children, they soon find a role thrust upon them, as
George Alagiah, a well-known  journalist who came to England from Sri Lanka as
a boy, reflects in his autobiography. ‘I had never asked to be an example to anyone. I
never wanted to be the best black journalist. I simply wanted to be the best reporter
that I could be. Later, I came to understand that I performed a function regardless of
whether I wanted to or not.’
That feeling of continually being judged by where you come from, or are presumed
to have come from, is pernicious, but the reaction of those it affects is ambiguous:
‘Don’t judge me by my background but never forget where I come from.’ The hedge-
hog response comes naturally to people struggling to gain a foothold in a society that
in many respects remains closed to them, and it can lead to willed victimhood among
those not endowed with any outstanding talent: ‘I’ll never fit in.’
The psychology of this middle class of migrants and their children may be compli-
cated, but it’s become impossible to imagine Western countries without them. Any-
one casting an eye across university lecture halls knows that in ten or twenty years at
most, people with a background in migration will be in positions of responsibility of
all kinds. Their presence will seem increasingly natural and the question ‘Where do
you come from?’ will gradually be replaced by ‘What kind of work do you do?’
The lives of children from migrant families can no longer be evaluated using the
common denominator of social disadvantage. This in itself is reason for hope. But a
large group remains that is failing in the education system as it stands, a group with lit-
tle chance of finding decent jobs. What will happen to them? How will they vent their
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frustration in an environment of seemingly limitless opportunity? The trouble they
cause won’t be cancelled out by the success stories that run in parallel with theirs, and
which must also be told.
Most worrying of all is the level of criminality. Even today it’s spoken of with great
trepidation. While we’re all willing to accept that social class is an important factor,
statistics showing high crime rates for certain ethnic groups, among them Moroccans
in the Netherlands, Pakistanis in Britain, Somalis in Sweden and Algerians in France,
cannot be ignored. Spokesmen for these communities are heard to excuse them by say-
ing: ‘We have a crime problem precisely because we’re excluded.’ The perpetrators
become the victims.
It’s unwise to ignore resentment simply because confronting it is unpleasant. In a
fascinating interview, psychiatrist Zohra Acherrat-Stitou described the situation that
people of her generation find themselves in: ‘They’re angry with a society that ex-
ploited their parents, and angry with their parents for failing to put up any resistance.
Many young Moroccans, I notice, see themselves as victims. A victim feels mistreat-
ed, misunderstood, insecure. They’ll have to shake off that victimhood if they’re to
find an identity.’ This is something we often hear discussed by immigrants who are
troubled by the resentment and hostility towards society they detect in their own
communities, especially since many such ‘victims’ quickly build careers for them-
selves as criminals, thereby jeopardizing the opportunities available to fellow mi-
grants.
A high juvenile crime rate among the second generation is nothing new. Research
by Park and his colleagues recorded no fewer than thirteen hundred youth gangs in
Chicago, mostly made up of the children of migrants. His study detected overwhelm-
ing uncertainty among parents about how to handle their children. What were they al-
lowed to do and what not? A Polish woman wrote to her sister about her unruly son,
‘You say, “Beat”. In America you are not allowed to beat; they can put you into a prison.
Give them to eat, and don’t beat – such is the law in America. Nothing can be done,
and you advise to beat! Nothing can be done; if he is not good of himself, he is lost… I
regret that I took the children from our country so soon.’
With a view to prevention it’s important to talk about the background to juvenile
criminality. Crime isn’t imported by migrants, but current crime rates are a product
of the confusion that arises from the contrast between different ways of exercising au-
thority. Young people accustomed to a fairly authoritarian upbringing in immigrant
families laugh at police officers who prefer to negotiate with them than to arrest them,
and they’re not afraid of judges who, with a clear conscience, impose one community
service order after another. The appeal for self-control isn’t working and the unwill-
ingness of migrant communities to take stock of their own responsibilities doesn’t
help matters. Parents who bury their heads in the sand are no doubt prompted to do
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so by shame, or impotence, or apathy, but meanwhile their sons are wrecking the im-
age of the entire community and thereby disadvantaging everyone.
There’s no doubt that some neighbourhoods have developed a subculture in which
both serious and petty criminality flourish, most famously the banlieues in cities like
Lyon and Paris, although comparable stories emerge from other urban districts, such
as Berlin’s Rollberg-Viertel.Lucienne Bui Trong, who for ten years headed the urban
violence section of the French police intelligence service, writes that although the chil-
dren of migrants are involved in crime to a disproportionate extent, ‘the attachment
to a territory seems to be stronger than comradeship based on ethnic origin; a
coloured youth from a different part of town is not regarded as a brother.’ Clearly
crime shouldn’t be perceived as a product of a young man’s country of origin but
rather as an outcome of the violent street culture that turns some deprived neighbour-
hoods into no-go areas.
We’d do better to call the second generation an in-between generation. Its mem-
bers are themselves often unsure where they belong. Although many young people in
Europe describe themselves as Turkish, Bangladeshi or Moroccan, once on holiday in
their parents’ countries they quickly discover they don’t belong. In his novel, Laroui
takes a humorous look at this confusion. When Jamal and his friend pay a brief visit to
relatives in Morocco they’re upset by the arbitrary behaviour of the police and much
else that seems outlandish to them. Back in Paris we’re privy to the following dialogue:
“Didn’t we invent couscous?” “Who do you mean by ‘we’? What are you then, actual-
ly?” “Well, I’m an Arab aren’t I?” “Crap. What on earth do you know about the history
of the Arabs? You don’t even speak Arabic. There’s no way you’re an Arab. That’s what
I think and no one’s going to tell me any different.” “You sure do take the prize for
making simple things complicated. Suddenly I don’t know who I am any more. But
I’m a Muslim anyhow, aren’t I?” “Don’t make me laugh. You? You wouldn’t last fifteen
minutes in Teheran. The only thing that connects you to Islam and the Arabs is your
name. And even that’s nothing but hot air.” “So where aremy roots then, dammit?”
And so on. The misunderstanding is endless. Many children of migrant families
have considerable reservations about the countries in which they were born and
raised. Some are proud of an identity borrowed from their parents’ native land, a place
they can’t really fathom. All this follows a familiar pattern and at the same time it’s a
pity, because clinging to the culture of the country their parents left behind will not
help them to thrive in new circumstances. There are two sides to their reticence, how-
ever. It signifies the gulf that exists, but it also represents the beginning of critical en-
gagement. Indeed, there are some who rise above the idea that they’re not fully at
home anywhere. If asked whether they’d like to go back to their ‘native country’ they
answer with a simple ‘I’m already there’.
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 
Migrants aren’t alone in feeling that a familiar world is being lost. People who in some
cases have lived in the same district for generations have seen their surroundings
changed out of all recognition by the arrival of people from other parts of the globe.
Anyone who chooses to listen can hear countless stories of people who no longer feel
at home in their neighbourhoods. So-called white flight is one result, a phenomenon
associated with all major waves of immigration in Western countries. The steady de-
parture of the original inhabitants contributes to the creation of districts in which the
majority has become a minority and minorities are now the majority. We shall return
with some regularity to the relationship between the two, but now let’s look for a mo-
ment at the unease felt by native populations.
The history of immigration is a history of alienation, Handlin wrote, and this ap-
plies not just to the immigrants themselves but to a fair few of the longstanding inhab-
itants as well. The documentary film All White in Barking focuses on what was once a
traditional working-class district of London. Dave, one of the central characters,
walks through his old neighbourhood and comments: ‘This was the best part of Bark-
ing and Dagenham. Everyone wanted to live in this area; now no one wants to live here.
Well, none of the indigenous population wants to live here now anyway.’ He worries
about those left behind: ‘Clive and Chris, what’s going to happen to them? They can’t
move. They’ve got to suffer it all.’ The film-maker asks him about the town he’s cho-
sen as his new home. ‘It’s a nice place, only your own people there. I just want to move
out of this bloody borough and be safe again, like I used to be.’
Sometimes discontent may arise from rather more symbolic changes to the built
environment. In the Berlin district of Pankow residents rebelled against plans for a
mosque, which was finally built despite years of opposition. It’s a relatively modest
building, hidden behind a Kentucky Fried Chicken, but the people involved in the
protest – whom the mayor of the borough describes as predominantly moderates –
are convinced the new house of prayer won’t be of any benefit to their neighbour-
hood. One reason may be that its imam is fairly orthodox and tries to convince believ-
ers that their German neighbours will one day understand why they cannot shake
hands with women.
Of course it’s perfectly possible to dismiss such experiences as the trivial com-
plaints of citizens who’ve never had it so good – the mosque really is here to stay and
there are more important things in life – but it would be better to listen first. During a
debate in Antwerp several people commented that a third of the city consisted of de-
clared and undeclared xenophobes, since they’d voted for the populist Vlaams Belang,
while others asked why so many voters were refusing to take part in a rational conver-
sation about a changing world. Perhaps it shouldn’t surprise us that people will not be
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favourably disposed towards dialogue if their concerns are dismissed as knee-jerk re-
actions. Besides, does a term like ‘racism’ really increase our insight into the fears of
the native population? No one would deny that xenophobia exists, but British urban
sociologist Ruth Glass opted for a more cautious approach in her early study of Lon-
doners’ responses to the arrival of immigrants from the Caribbean in the late s:
‘The keynote in the situation of the coloured minority in Britain is not inflexible preju-
dice, harsh segregation and discrimination; it is muddle, confusion and insecurity.’
She concluded that ‘the majority have an attitude which can be called “benevolent
prejudice” – a combination of passive prejudice and passive tolerance’.
Shewaswriting about the fifties and sixties, but this undoubtedly applies to present
circumstances too.Avoidanceof suchmonolithic terms as ‘racism’ allows amore accu-
rate picture to emerge. In a speech about race relations in America, Barack Obama at-
tempted not only to find words for the anger and frustration of the black community
but to say something meaningful about the sense of resentment among his country’s
white residents. ‘Mostworking- andmiddle-classwhiteAmericans don’t feel that they
have been particularly privileged by their race…They are anxious about their futures,
and feel their dreams slipping away…When they hear that anAfricanAmerican is get-
ting an advantage in landing a good job or a spot in a good college because of an injus-
tice that they themselves never committed; when they’re told that their fears about
crime inurbanneighborhoodsare somehowprejudiced,resentmentbuildsover time.’
He told his audience that ‘to wish away the resentments of white Americans, to label
themasmisguidedor even racist,without recognizing they are grounded in legitimate
concerns – this too widens the racial divide, and blocks the path to understanding’.
The anxiety Obama talks about has everything to do with a loss of social and cultur-
al certainties. Established populations are reacting in ways that are reminiscent of ear-
lier periods of mass immigration, in America and elsewhere. We have already looked
at the cycle of ethnic relations, in which three stages can be discerned: avoidance, con-
flict and accommodation. In this context, avoidance involves a refusal to accept a new
reality; people deny that anything essential has changed. As long as they never really
meet any migrants, because of segregation in the cities where they live, it may seem as
if the arrival of newcomers hasn’t really affected anything.
Avoidance is often the first phase in a long process of settlement. Research in cities
like Detroit and Chicago – where the one-time majority now finds itself a minority of
the urban population – reveals the unease of white residents. Maria Kefalas describes
an overwhelmingly ‘white’ district of Chicago called Beltway, populated by the lower
middle class and located not far from one of the city’s black ghettos. Her aim is to
chart the aversion felt by its residents, since she is convinced that ‘tolerance only
comes after every voice of dissent is heard’. In her judgment, the defensiveness of res-
idents goes ‘beyond the old notions of racial antagonisms and fears’.
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They are the children and grandchildren of working-class people who struggled to
survive at the margins of society, so home ownership is extremely important to them.
They feel themselves partial owners of their neighbourhood, which is well main-
tained. Graffiti is regarded as a seriously assault on the orderly social environment.
‘Consumption, ritualistic displays of housepride, and a fanatical concern for order
serve as talismans to keep socioeconomic insecurities at bay.’ For many residents,
Beltway represents a last stand. If bad neighbours arrive they have nowhere else to go.
Their lives are far more bound to a specific place than those of the better off.
Their insecurity has to do with both class and colour. Anthropologist John Harti-
gan is firm in his views about white districts of Detroit that feel similarly threatened.
In one case he writes of ‘the interplay of class anxieties and racial confusions at work
in the transformations of this neighbourhood’. The importance of social class is
clear from reactions to white migrants who arrived from the South from the s on-
wards, the so-called ‘hillbillies’, who were far from welcome despite their skin-colour,
in fact they were often labelled ‘white trash’. ‘The overall focus of negative feeling was
on recent arrivals, both white and black, native-born and foreign.’
Clashes such as these, Kefalas says, can be seen as arising from resistance of a kind
that excludes any ‘ambiguity about what distinguishes the garden from the ghetto’.
Ambivalence is a privilege reserved for those who have already secured a place on the
social ladder. ‘Safety, a sense of belonging, security, and undisrupted routines – these
are the things neighbors want to preserve and these are the things they would mourn
if the last garden ceased to exist.’ Hostility towards newcomers – who, as in Detroit,
include white immigrants – is one result. ‘Even though many Beltway residents are the
children and grandchildren of European immigrants, second- or third-generation
Americans demonstrate little empathy for the latest wave of arrivals from Eastern Eu-
rope to settle in Chicago.’
Classic competition for resources lurks behind much of the resistance to further
immigration and no one would deny that it’s especially intense at the bottom of the
labour market, where people are forced out of their jobs by a low-paid and non-orga-
nized work force, or subjected to downward pressure on wages. Perhaps those with
most to lose are the insecure lower middle classes. American economists Timothy Hat-
ton and Jeffry Williamson conclude soberly that hostility today, as in the past, arises
from the admission of large numbers of migrants with little education or training,
leading to ‘rising inequality’ and a growth in the number of ‘crowded-out native un-
skilled workers’. This opposition is made all the harder to ignore by ‘the greater voting
power of those hurt most – the working poor’.
The stories relayed by writers like Hartigan and Kefalas should not be allowed to
obscure the fact that however durable a phenomenon avoidance may be, it represents
an early stage in an ongoing process. A time always arrives when segregation becomes
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untenable. Today, in cities like Marseille, Birmingham, Stuttgart and Malmö where 
per cent or more of residents are migrants or the children of migrants, newcomers
and established residents can no longer avoid one another. Nor can they disregard the
question: How much must we have in common in order to live together in a diverse
but peaceful society? The end of avoidance provokes a good deal of conflict, which is
not to say that integration has failed.
Once the permanence of the changes unleashed by immigration can no longer be
denied, loss becomes tangible on both sides and tensions emerge. To take the enrich-
ment of a society that immigration brings about as a starting point and ignore the dis-
appearance of a familiar world is to demonstrate an inadequate understanding of the
history of immigration. Recognition of the resulting sense of loss opens up the possi-
bility of a rational explanation for many of the accompanying experiences people go
through. Clashes are an integral part of immigration history and they often seem to
help people accept their new social environment. 
The malaise in native populations arises from a sense of insecurity, which has social
and cultural causes. It’s not always easy to distinguish between the two, but whether
it’s a matter of the freedom to publish cartoons that ridicule all that is sacred, the wear-
ing of headscarves by prosecutors and judges, dual nationality, sex education, or the
kind of history taught in schools, each dilemma arrives with cultural or symbolic bag-
gage. Of course people’s living conditions must be improved and access to education
extended, but an important part of the unease felt on all sides is at precisely this sym-
bolic level: ‘We’re losing our culture.’
Since / if not before, opposition to immigration in today’s Europe has been
bound up with the sense of insecurity arising from the emergence of Islam as a major
European religion. In many neighbourhoods, hostility towards newcomers is generat-
ed by the precarious circumstances of residents’ lives, but the debate about the place
of Islam in a liberal society has little to do with class divides or traditional distinctions
between left and right. There’s a widespread belief that the achievements of liberalism
are at stake, from freedom of speech to sexual equality.
Sometimes it’s simply a question of etiquette. A resident of a mixed neighbour-
hood in Rotterdam describes an incident in her own street: ‘Those young Turkish
women don’t say good-day to me. They look away arrogantly if a man comes towards
them. I can’t stand that. Last week I stood talking in my doorway with a Turkish
woman. That was quite something. Later that day I saw her on the street with her
mother. She didn’t say a word. The next day I said to her, “Listen, if you don’t even
want to say hello to me in public, then I don’t need to talk to you indoors any more ei-
ther.” She just shrugged.’ It’s interesting to note that the failure to greet a neighbour
was interpreted as arrogance, whereas it might equally well have been a sign of embar-
rassment or shyness.
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Everyday friction of this kind is common. It may revolve around the withdrawal of
a child from mixed swimming lessons, the introduction of halal food in a staff can-
teen, concern about whether state schools should celebrate Christmas, a firm’s deci-
sion to stop giving piggy-banks as promotional gifts, the provision of separate citizen-
ship courses for men and women, the granting of planning permission for a mosque,
or the refusal of a policeman to shake a woman’s hand because it’s against his religion.
Sometimes a compromise could easily be reached, but when norms are radically dif-
ferent they will collide. 
In the case of Muslim communities, attitudes to homosexuality and unequal treat-
ment of men and women are particular sources of discomfort among their non-Mus-
lim neighbours. Before finding fame in the Netherlands and beyond as a populist
politician, Pim Fortuyn wrote a polemical book about what he called with characteris-
tic hyperbole ‘the Islamization of our culture’. Precisely because he was aware of paral-
lels with the emancipatory struggles of women and homosexuals in the Netherlands –
of which in the latter case he had direct experience – he believed the gains made need-
ed to be defended against ‘a culture of reticence and silence’. He wrote: ‘Emancipation
is a basic right of all those who live here and we have a duty to do all we can to promote
it, in the case of Muslim men and women as well as everyone else.’.
Another bone of contention is the visibility of Islam in public places, as demon-
strated by recent heated debates in Switzerland over a proposed ban on the building of
minarets. The building of a new mosque of any size tends to cause conflict, but this
ban goes far further than the usual objections to the granting of planning permission.
In the autumn of  the proposal won  per cent of votes in a referendum. A major-
ity of those eligible to do so had voted. Its supporters, many of whom thought of them-
selves as moderates, spoke of the way Islam mixes politics and religion. Like the wear-
ing of the burka, which may yet be outlawed in France, the minaret was seen as a politi-
cal statement, a symbol of dominance. This was a reversal of the argument that such a
ban would erode religious freedom; neutrality was clearly far easier before Islam be-
came so noticeable, and its new visibility was now provoking profound hostility. The
abolition of the constitutional right of a minority by majority vote violates a taboo
and should serve as a warning. 
Alongside the temptation to curb religious freedom in the case of Islam, fierce argu-
ments have arisen about freedom of expression, although the temptation in this case
is to limit what critics of Islam are allowed to say. Some governments have tried to in-
troduce new clauses to blasphemy laws, aimed mainly at protecting Muslim commu-
nities and preventing their radicalization, and this too has provoked a good deal of op-
position. In Britain new legislation was proposed that would have tightened the law
governing ‘the intent to stir up religious hatred’. Actor and comic Rowan Atkinson
gave a speech in the House of Lords in which he expressed his opposition to the Racial
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and Religious Hatred Bill, saying: ‘The freedom to criticise ideas – any ideas even if
they are sincerely held beliefs – is one of the fundamental freedoms of society. And the
law which attempts to say you can criticise or ridicule ideas as long as they are not reli-
gious ideas is a very peculiar law indeed. It all points to the promotion of the idea that
there should be a right not to be offended. But in my view the right to offend is far
more important than any right not to be offended.’ The row over Danish cartoons
that ridiculed the prophet Mohammed (which British newspapers unanimously de-
cided not to publish) and the murder of film-maker Theo van Gogh were further oc-
casions for what could be described as secular discomfort. 
Just as racism is a catch-all term and therefore inadequate to describe current hos-
tilities, the overused word Islamophobia can lead people to mistake legitimate criti-
cism of religious intolerance for a rejection of the principle of religious freedom for
Muslims. Especially when equated with anti-Semitism, thereby evoking a whole range
of unjustified historical associations, it blocks the route to any understanding of the
controversies surrounding Islam. The unease created by the emergence of European
Islam requires more detailed examination than this, if only because the threat of ter-
rorism casts a shadow over attempts to see Muslim communities as part of the ‘imag-
ined community’.
The social and cultural dimensions of integration both deserve attention. Current-
ly the experiences of migrants are often interpreted as primarily socio-economic and
those of native populations as cultural in origin. It’s also important to stress that prob-
lems surrounding migration are embedded in general social issues, that they never
arise in isolation but are part of far broader changes to society. The unease felt by es-
tablished residents arises from the general impression that there are more and more
gaps in the social fabric, that neighbourhoods are losing their cohesion. Many citizens
no longer feel they have anyone to protect them.
The fundamental dilemma of our times is the growing divide between social elites,
able to move around at will in a world that has fewer and fewer borders, and an in-
creasing proportion of the population that feels threatened by globalization and is
turning its back on the outside world. A vague and unrealistic concept of world citi-
zenship has encouraged a return to parochialism. While some sing the praises of a bor-
derless world, others are resorting to cut and dried notions of their own identity. Con-
servatism can never be the complete answer and there’s a need to look beyond the self-
affirmation of slogans like ‘my own people first’, but self-abnegation, the dream of a
world without borders where nationality will no longer matter, isn’t a long-term an-
swer either. 
Societies cannot progress from avoidance to acceptance without evolving a new
sense of themselves. What is citizenship and who are our fellow citizens? Avoidance,
conflict and accommodation occur simultaneously, since immigrants continue to ar-
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rive, but societies aren’t fated endlessly to repeat the same clashes. History teaches us
that new groups are continually being absorbed into the imagined community, there-
by enlarging it. There was a time when the Catholic Irish were unwelcome in Protes-
tant America, whereas nowadays we can’t imagine that country without them. Their
history is similar to that of other migrant communities of past centuries, such as the
Italians in France or the Poles in Germany.
During a debate in Amsterdam with representatives of the Surinamese community,
someone said in a slightly injured tone: ‘No one talks about us any longer.’ The cur-
rent focus is on problems involving young Moroccans and Turks. Contrary to the
speaker’s intentions, that complaint was actually an encouraging reflection of immi-
grant history: those once seen as outsiders have become, little by little, established resi-
dents. The Surinamese immigrants of forty years ago have slowly come to be part of
the imagined Netherlands (although there is still some way to go), and in the process
they have changed the country’s image. The search for a sense of who we are today is
never-ending, since new groups of outsiders are arriving all the time.
Genuine acceptance of the changes brought about by migrants does not imply res-
ignation, a sense that things are the way they are and there’s nothing anyone can do. In
every discussion of immigration controls, people in the West are told that they live in a
borderless world and people will come whether they like it or not, indeed that what
they’re experiencing now is only the start of a vast wave of immigration. Statements of
this kind certainly haven’t helped to encourage tolerance. Too much has been ob-
scured by a factual observation: ‘People are increasingly mobile.’
Immigration and integration should be part of a civilized ideal that functions both
as an aspiration and as a subject for public debate. If discussion is stymied by a belief
that globalization means people can no longer shape their own societies, then we
shouldn’t be surprised to see freedoms brought into disrepute. How can anyone value
a democracy that declares itself impotent in the face of the most far-reaching issues af-
fecting citizen’s daily lives?
  -
The movement of peoples over the past few decades has had a considerable impact.
Natives and newcomers often seem far apart, and beneath a veneer of harmony count-
less stories can be heard – by those willing to listen – about daily cultural clashes. A
conflict successfully avoided for years has erupted all the more fiercely. Where silence
reigned for so long, too much is now being said and too stridently. Multicultural diplo-
macy alone will not be enough to build mutual trust, but for a long time few awkward
questions were asked, both because no one was particularly interested in the answers
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and because it was felt too much would be stirred up if they were. Noiriel remarks that
crises surrounding migration ‘are moments in which the social rules for the whole of
the receiving society are ruptured and redefined’.
This process is now well underway. In migrant communities, one generation after
another puzzles over the nature of its relationship not just with the society it finds it-
self in but with its countries of origin. In an autobiographical account Ziauddin Sar-
dar writes: ‘As we, the Asian community, became more British, more rooted in time
and place, here and now in Britain, we also needed to build more barricades against
losing touch with where our parents came from. We needed barricades to protect us
from the increasing sense of being rejected by British society.’
Ambiguity is rife in countries of immigration and it can easily lead to distrust on all
sides. When relations between people are coloured by suspicion, anything anyone
does can be interpreted as malicious: on closer examination an offer of help is mere
meddling, a question can easily sound like an order, apparent uncertainty is taken as
some kind of subterfuge and before you know it all attempts at sincerity have run into
the sand. The conclusion drawn by German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger seems
justified: ‘Today the preparedness and ability to integrate cannot be taken for granted
in any country or on any side. The multicultural society remains an empty slogan as
long as the difficulties the concept raises are declared taboo but not resolved.’
There has been too much avoidance on the part of receiving societies, and it goes
some way to explain the current impasse. The twentieth century was marked by at-
tempts to reduce social inequality and bridge cultural divides; no issue has disturbed
European public life so much as the effort to elevate a whole range of population
groups so that full citizenship would be available to everyone. This determination to
achieve equality of opportunity arose out of a fear of social unrest, but it was also in-
spired by moral convictions.
Generally speaking past efforts to integrate all social groups could be described as
successful. Rank and class lost their edge; people became less and less bound by their
origins. This makes the resigned response to the rise of a new, perhaps more perni-
cious divide seem all the more troubling. Newcomers and their families often lag be-
hind, and at the same time institutions are not sufficiently open to new talent. The ab-
sence of urgency was the product of a consensus that prevailed for decades, the idea
that integration is purely a matter of time, a natural outcome of socio-economic
progress. What’s lacking now is a clear notion of citizenship that goes beyond a plea
for improvements to the position of migrants in the jobs market and in education.
Timidity on the subject points to a more general failing. The call for integration
prompts the response: ‘Integration, fine, but into what?’ A society that has little or
nothing to say for itself will quickly be exposed as flawed. This has not escaped the at-
tention of migrants, who respond with a combination of ‘What do you actually want
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from us?’ and ‘For heaven’s sake leave us alone’. As one student remarked: ‘You never
know where you stand here. What is integration, in fact? What are Dutch or French or
British norms and values? I have a feeling politicians are deliberately vague about
them, so that they can always say: no, that’s not what we meant.’
Such reactions are all too often expressed in aggrieved tones, but anyone aiming to
close the chasm nevertheless needs to come up with a convincing response. ‘Diversity’
is a commonly deployed concept, but it does little to clarify matters. It ought to go
without saying that an open society is characterized by divergent outlooks, lifestyles
and beliefs, but even in a liberal democracy there are limits: not everything that’s dif-
ferent is valuable. Embracing diversity indiscriminately is tantamount to protecting
traditional habits and customs from critical scrutiny. There’s a tendency to address
migrant families as members of the groups to which they’re presumed to belong. This
applies not only to the first generation, which is to some extent preserving the tradi-
tions of its countries of origin, but to the children and grandchildren of migrants as
well. They are regarded as perpetuating a particular culture, whereas it may well be
that many ‘Turkish’ children prefer listening to American rapper Cent than to Turk-
ish pop star Sezen Aksu – quite apart from the fact that many different influences can
be found in Aksu’s work.
There’s another reason why the prevailing view of diversity doesn’t necessarily rep-
resent progress. If minorities continue to see themselves primarily as ethnic groups,
there’s a real danger that majority populations too will increasingly conceive of them-
selves in ethnic terms, especially when in many cities they find themselves outnum-
bered. American sociologist Charles Gallagher has observed: ‘Like it or not, middle-
class and lower middle-class whites see themselves as a minority and have adopted a
posture of being the victims.’ This is the risk we run by emphasizing ethnicity. Why
should one group be allowed to appeal to its own ethnic identity if another group is
not? 
It’s important always to keep in mind the aim of creating a society in which people
are asked how they see their futures, not one in which they’re judged according to
their pasts. Getting there will be a process of trial and error, and all citizens will need to
look beyond ethnic dividing lines.
It’s often argued that integration should engage both newcomers and natives, but
what does this actually mean? Instead of emphasizing the differences between minori-
ties and the majority, we should concentrate on shared citizenship as an ideal to which
everyone can aspire. Migrants can be invited and challenged by a society only if it has a
strong culture of citizenship. Problems surrounding migrants and their children are
general social issues writ large. They concern not only important institutions such as
education but constitutional rights like freedom of expression. This is the reason mi-
gration cuts so deep: it goes to the heart of institutions and liberties.

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 51
The basic principle is simple: native populations cannot ask of newcomers any
more than they are themselves prepared to contribute. Those who encourage others
to see themselves as fellow citizens must have at least some notion of what it means to
be a citizen and, as far as possible, turn that notion into practical reality. Hence the em-
barrassment that typifies debates about integration. An established population that
asks people to integrate will sooner or later find itself facing similar demands. This is
all part of an ongoing quest, a process of social renewal.
Take linguistic skills. There can be no doubt that the command of a country’s offi-
cial language is a prerequisite for all those trying to hold their own as citizens. The
Dutch have therefore talked a great deal over the past few years about language deficits
in migrant families, a problem currently referred to as ‘low literacy’. It was only a mat-
ter of time before people started asking: How good are the reading and writing skills of
the indigenous Dutch population? It quickly became clear that hundreds of thou-
sands are struggling, and initiatives are now being implemented that are aimed at rais-
ing levels of literacy across the board.
This is just one example of how debates about integration can make hidden social
problems visible, introducing issues that go far beyond the emancipation of migrants.
The growing divide between low-skilled and educated people demands attention;
Flemish writer David van Reybrouck regards this as the most important cause of cur-
rent dissatisfaction with democracy. Many people with little more than a basic educa-
tion no longer feel represented: ‘As in the Netherlands, a parallel society has grown up
in Belgium. The low-skilled are in the majority, but they genuinely feel themselves to
be a minority that is subjected to discrimination.’
Integration conceived as a reciprocal process confronts society with profound
questions about what is means to be a citizen. What accomplishments are essential?
What kind of knowledge is required? Those who think migrants should know more
about the development of their adoptive country’s constitution, for example, cannot
avoid the question: What exactly do you know about it yourself? This has revealed an-
other weakness of Western societies. Doubts about the historical awareness of the av-
erage citizen matter, because citizenship involves a realization that something came
before us and something will come after us. It’s hard for any sense of responsibility to
develop unless people see themselves as part of a continuing history.
Which brings us to another series of questions: What image of the past do estab-
lished residents want to present to newcomers? Might there not be a need to discuss
this image with everyone, irrespective of background and origin? Are schoolchildren
taught in anymeaningful sense about colonial history? Is any attentionpaid in schools
tomigration intoandwithinEuropeover thecenturies?Gestures areof littleuse.It’s es-
sential tohanddownas truthful and self-critical an accountof thepast as possible.The
issueof integration has forced many countries to take a fresh look at school curricula. 
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Self-examination is going on outside schools as well. New museums are being es-
tablished, such as the French museum for the history of immigration and the Dutch
National History museum, while those already in existence are reassessing the stories
they tell. The aim is not so much to win people over as to use migration as the starting
point for a re-examination of commonly-held assumptions.
There’s an even more fundamental sense in which the principle of reciprocity
prompts societies to question themselves. It concerns the rights and duties attached to
citizenship. Citizens are now well aware of their rights but far less likely to have been
given a clear understanding of their duties. This is a crucial problem, since freedoms
unaccompanied by a sense of responsibility will start to erode. The issue of religious
freedom illustrates the point. Muslims invoke the right to practice their religion and
that right is non-negotiable, as long as it’s exercised within the bounds of the constitu-
tion, but it also confers upon all believers a responsibility to defend the rights of peo-
ple of other faiths or none.
There’s a need for shared norms to which both the majority and minorities feel
bound, and they include the right to freedom of conscience. The question that needs
to be addressed is: What do the difficulties surrounding integration tell us about the
strengths and weaknesses of society as a whole? The search for ways to live together de-
mands self-examination on all sides. That’s the deeper significance of the reciprocity
we seek: those who ask migrants to take a critical look at their traditions must be pre-
pared to hold their own cherished assumptions up to the light.
Citizens, whether newcomers or otherwise, should not be required to absorb them-
selves into society as it is now but rather to identify with society as it has the potential
to be. Everyone should feel invited to help society move closer to its ideal of equal
treatment. Reciprocity as a basic principle of citizenship means that anyone trying to
combat discrimination against migrants and their children must be prepared to op-
pose forms of discrimination within migrant families, against unbelievers, for exam-
ple, or homosexuals. We can’t pick and choose when it comes to equality. 
This became clear on a visit to a school in Antwerp where a large majority of pupils
are from Muslim families. One commented, as a joke: ‘I’ve counted the Belgians at our
school. There are twenty-three.’ The school has a long tradition and many of the chil-
dren do well, but the teachers say it’s become difficult to talk about evolution in biolo-
gy lessons, about the Holocaust during history lessons and about ‘perverts’ like Oscar
Wilde in literature lessons. A choice has to be made. Should teachers give in to the reli-
gious prejudices many children bring from home or oppose them, with all the pa-
tience and dedication that requires?
The reverse is also true, of course. A society that cherishes the principle of equality
must be willing to listen to those who claim they’ve been discriminated against at
work or in pubs and clubs. Sometimes legal action is necessary, but in many situations
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the key to success is persuasion, not compulsion. Campaigns and rules may help to
combat discrimination, but we all need to confront prejudices publicly, challenging
them as a step towards developing mutual trust. 
Not everyone is favours such reciprocity, as is clear from comments like ‘they came
to us, we didn’t go to their country’? This amounts to saying that the majority has the
power and the right to force minorities to adapt. Such an imbalance of power can nev-
er produce a truly integrated society, if only because the protection of the rights of mi-
norities is a defining element of democracy. The opposite view is equally unproduc-
tive. It often takes the form of claims that there can be no reciprocity while the imbal-
ance between the established and newcomers is as great as it is now. In other words:
‘You can’t ask the same of those at the bottom as you do of those at the top.’ This atti-
tude leads nowhere, except to the paternalistic notion that people in migrant commu-
nities are not responsible for their fate. Shared citizenship means, by definition, that
we are all invited to enter the public arena as equals.
We started by identifying a sense of alienation and loss among both immigrant and
indigenous populations. If the shock of the new can inspire self-criticism and change,
real progress will have been made. Efforts to ensure that people from all regions of the
world can be part of today’s urban society should prompt a reassessment of prevailing
notions. This is not a matter of being disloyal to everything Europe and America have
contributed to the ideal of an open society but of becoming more faithful to that ideal.
In other words, the arrival of migrants is not only irreversible, it offers a unique op-
portunity for introspection. American sociologist Henry Pratt Fairchild was aware of
this almost a century ago. Much of what he wrote is now outdated, but surely he was
right in saying that the degree to which migrants were able to feel part of a new coun-
try was not down to them alone: ‘Before laying tardy assimilation too readily at the
door of the immigrant we should thoughtfully consider whether our own house does
not need to be set in order.’ In short it makes sense to talk about integration only if
it’s seen as part of an effort to improve society as a whole. As Fairchild puts it: ‘If the
immigrant is to love America he must first have the opportunity to experience Ameri-
ca, and having experienced it he must find it lovable. No amount of lecturing, legislat-
ing, and threatening can make the alien love America if he does not find it lovable, and
no amount of original strangeness and unfamiliarity can keep him from loving it if in
the final event he finds it worthy of his love.’
The subject of immigration and integration – and therefore of citizenship – creates
uncertainty because it affects so many areas of life: education systems, welfare provi-
sion, constitutional rights such as freedom of expression. The public debate now un-
derway sparks conflict time and again. This book is an attempt to reach beyond exist-
ing divides. That will be possible only once we’ve explored the causes of discontent
and developed a realistic view of society as it is now, irrevocably altered by migration. 
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Perhaps integration has in fact been successful in recent years and newcomers are
now just as disengaged as the established population. A society without clear ideas
about citizenship will be unable to inspire migrants to see themselves as citizens. It’s
time for some thorough renovation. An open society cannot survive without self-criti-
cism. We must aspire to become what we say we are.
    
This book is the product not just of academic research but of a public debate that
arose after I published an article entitled ‘The Multicultural Drama’. Its conclusion
was: ‘We need a parliamentary inquiry into immigration and integration policy, be-
cause entire generations are now being written off in the name of tolerance. The cur-
rent policy of liberal admission and limited integration worsens inequality and con-
tributes to a sense of alienation. Tolerance is groaning under the burden of overdue
maintenance.’ With some trepidation I added a final sentence: ‘The multicultural dra-
ma now unfolding is therefore the greatest threat to social peace.’
That article, published in January , marked the beginning of a major debate in
the Netherlands and a turbulent period in Dutch politics. People abroad watched in
amazement as this apparently tolerant and laid-back country suddenly turned tense
and resentful. Many saw in that agitation a warning to their own societies. If even the
easy-going Dutch had trouble getting along with their migrants, what did that say
about the rest of Europe? I was caught in the throes of that tumultuous time, and since
this book is informed to a great degree by those experiences, I want to take a moment
to look at my own involvement.
I had plenty of reasons for writing an article about the multicultural drama: the
growing chasm between so-called black and white schools in my home city of Amster-
dam, the unbridled aggression of many young Moroccans, the moral issues thrown
up by both the admittance and the expulsion of asylum seekers, and the degree to
which migrants’ children were lagging behind in education. All this generated a creep-
ing unease: I certainly didn’t feel society was any the better for it.
An article by Anil Ramdas in which he reproached Dutch writers for excluding im-
migration from their literary imaginations was the most direct reason for me to begin
raising questions. Ramdas wrote: ‘Isn’t it a tremendous failure on the part of Dutch
storytellers not to see that the colour and nature of their society have changed drasti-
cally over the past twenty years? While a million citizens swallow their daily doses of
humiliation, Dutch writers look the other way. Surely we must eventually start to at-
tribute this to malice and bad faith.’ There was no arguing with his assessment of
contemporary Dutch literature, but ‘bad faith’ was overstating the case. What could
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be read from our literature was above all that the arrival of migrants was entirely ab-
sent from the lived or imagined reality of most authors. In that sense, I concluded,
writers do not differ greatly from the average citizen.
I took a look at myself, noted that my own tolerance was under strain and decided
to say something in response. The strong emphasis on social cohesion in my article
about the multicultural drama arose from the knowledge that the open society is frag-
ile. The more aware we become of the conflict, I thought, the better able we’ll be to
deal with it. The long tradition of conflict avoidance, which had been so fruitful for
Dutch society, was clearly not a productive response to migration. I was particularly
concerned about social order, believing that immigration would be a severe test of
democratic processes.
Then came / and immediately afterwards the Dutch experienced the rise of Pim
Fortuyn and what I’ve described as a citizens’ revolt. Some commentators and politi-
cians explained the success of Fortuyn’s populism shortly after the turn of the century
as a result of boredom, saying his supporters were simply spoilt, with nothing better to
do than to support a political adventure. Riches had led to this embarrassment, the
reasoning went. That condescending tone is no longer heard. A visit to one of the
many places of commemoration after the murder of Fortuyn was enough to make me
realize that a deep insecurity had been exposed.
After his death in May  I tried to take stock: ‘Fortuyn has shaken things up and
now it’s everyone’s responsibility to settle them down again. It would have been this
way whatever the circumstances. Fortuyn was better at pulling things apart than at
putting them back together. The dissatisfaction he tapped into has been seeking an
outlet for years. The one person with the civic courage to challenge the establishment
with contrary opinions has been stopped short by a violent act. Freedom of expres-
sion has suffered a devastating blow. A great many people have been silenced. All that
remains to them is to vote for a party without a politician, whereas they were intend-
ing to vote for a politician without a party. That makes these elections a soulless exer-
cise.’
In that same article, written a few days before the election that won Fortuyn’s party
a large number of seats in parliament, I wrote: ‘Our image of ourselves as a satisfied
and tolerant nation has started to slip. We need to think again about what binds us to-
gether as a society and there are no easy answers, but avoiding the question has
brought us to the point where an answer that is harsher than desirable lurks in wait.’
To this day, that has been my primary motivation in writing about these issues. It is
precisely the failure to ask questions about the problems all migratory movements of
any size bring with them that has given populism such power. I would have loved to
see the established parties make these issues their own, rather than looking the other
way until a significant number of voters pulled the emergency brake. My articles on

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 56
the multicultural drama were an attempt to stay ahead of such a development by
drawing attention to the problems, but some believe I’ve merely helped to make oppo-
sition to immigration socially acceptable.
Then, in November , came another murder, the shooting and stabbing of film-
maker Theo van Gogh not far from where I live. That evening I read out my response
on television: ‘After Fortuyn another politically motivated murder. It’s difficult to get
one’s thoughts in order, to let it all sink in. This murder too is a traumatic experience,
one that will reinforce the widely held belief that there’s something seriously wrong
with our country. This new murder throws everything out of balance, erodes our self-
confidence, leaves less and less intact of the image we once had of ourselves as an open,
relaxed and tolerant society. A politically motivated murder: a victim and a perpetra-
tor. Then nothing for a long time. A victim and a perpetrator. There’s no such thing as
the collective guilt of Muslims; it would be unforgivable if our rage were to be taken
out on believers who live peacefully in this country. While there’s no collective guilt,
there is a special responsibility. There’s been too much evasion, too much silence in
the Muslim community – too many people who say to me: it’s good that you’re critical
of Islam, it’s so hard for us to bring ourselves to be. That has to end. The ship of silence
has foundered.’
So with varying degrees of success I’ve contributed to the public debate on one of
the most important issues of our day. Many of my experiences are reflected in this
book, making it the product of both dialogue and research, of innumerable debates as
well as solitary hours surrounded by books. One minute there has been the risk of tak-
ing a stand in public, the next the relative safety of the study. Since I published my arti-
cle about the multicultural drama, not a day has gone by without someone speaking
to me about it. I’m not keen to avail myself of the often misplaced word ‘enrichment’,
but I have learned a great deal, including many things about myself. As somebody said
to me, ‘If it isn’t hurting, it isn’t working.’
In the past few years I’ve heard countless stories and witnessed a great many events.
Year in, year out I’ve taken up almost every invitation to a public debate. Along the
way I’ve justified what I wrote innumerable times. I needed to. Every conversation is a
lesson, and in any case I see dialogue as an essential aspect of an open society. Anyone
who has direct access to a newspaper, to radio or television must always remember
that there are many who don’t. The privilege of being able to express an opinion be-
fore a large audience brings with it a duty to expose yourself to criticism from all those
who don’t have a voice in the media. As far as I’m concerned, anyone who limits him-
self to throwing a stone into the pond violates a basic principle of democracy: the obli-
gation to listen to the other side of the argument.
One day I’m strolling through the Aya Sofia mosque on the Baarsjesweg in Amster-
dam. About a hundred predominantly older men sit together in the hall watching
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Turkish television. Tea is served and one conversation flows into another. Along the
passageway that runs through this former garage are small shops selling vegetables
and rice, as well as sombre Islamic reading materials. The atmosphere is downcast. A
longing for past times hangs in the air.
I speak hesitantly with several imams; the translation between Dutch and Turkish
makes the conversation all the more halting. ‘We’ve done what was expected of us,
haven’t we? What do you mean, drama?’ A handful of girls in brightly coloured head-
scarves nod in agreement. But the reform-minded director of the Turkish Muslim or-
ganization Milli Görüs says: ‘My problem is that my people think they’ve fallen be-
hind because they’re not Muslim enough.’ I say that we must get away from thinking
in terms of majority and minority. He replies, ‘Yes, the time will come when in Amster-
dam the majority becomes a minority. I dread the prospect.’
Another day I’m sitting beneath the chandeliers in a convention centre near Rotter-
dam Central Station, at the enthusiastic launch of Alumnia, a network of highly edu-
cated Moroccans. Men in sober suits and dazzling women; not a single headscarf to be
seen. The ambitions are sky-high. Here the willingness to look ahead is more than evi-
dent.
The anger is unmistakable too, come to that, but I think: without ambition there’s
no frustration. Even so, I hear far too much bitterness at the conference table. ‘Every-
thing that comes from far away interests you, except the people.’ At such moments I al-
ways feel constrained by the sense of being an ambassador for the white majority. I
keep having to answer the question ‘What do you want from us? Go on, out with it!’
Suddenly someone at the other end of the table says, ‘In the Netherlands people are
doing with us now what they ought to have done with the Jews: protecting us, hiding
us away.’
One day I’m a guest in the Amsterdam suburb of Bijlmer, in a room filled with Suri-
namers who differ vehemently but cheerfully about the problem of divided loyalty.
Can you be Surinamese and Dutch at the same time and what does that mean in prac-
tice? Only later does it become clear that Surinamers who live in the Netherlands are
not treated very hospitably in Surinam. They’ve become too Dutch. They grumble
that people ought to be punctual; they’re no longer used to petty corruption – prob-
lems like that. The people in the hall think Surinam should be less indifferent towards
its emigrants, but also that Surinamers in the Netherlands ought to do more for their
country of origin. With some envy they talk about the generosity of the Turkish com-
munity after a recent earthquake in Turkey.
I note down disparate comments during the debate: ‘Bijlmer is the first town that
Surinamers have taken from the Dutch.’ ‘I’m sick of the Netherlands with its millions
of petty rules.’ Reactions to my speech range from someone who remarks testily,
‘You’re trying to keep us down’ to another who is convinced: ‘You want to cut a deal
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with us’. Later someone sneers, ‘Look, we’re not a hobby or something.’ I think to my-
self: maybe not, but I don’t want to make a career out of you either.
Another day and I’m in a suburb of Lelystad attending an Islamic mourning ritual.
I sit on a sofa in the living room, while on the carpet in front of me several men pray
fervently in the direction of Mecca. Their foreheads almost touch my stockinged feet. I
nod encouragingly to the Lebanese imam as he reads the fifty-sixth verse of the Koran,
which tells of the last judgment and how infidels will drink hellfire. For someone
who’s not a believer this is a slightly uncomfortable moment, but it pales into insignif-
icance beside the warm welcome.
Afterwards we speak about the tense situation in the Netherlands and someone
says: ‘Muslims are the greatest threat to Islam.’ The words of another imam float up
from my memory. During a debate he put a question to one of the believers who had
just sharply attacked him, a tone of despair in his voice. ‘I say to my brother: Allah is
watching us. Are we good Muslims as we are now? If we feel we’re in a strong position
then we stand up for each other, so shouldn’t we be a model of harmony?’
One day during my endless tour of the Netherlands I’m in a hall in Zwolle address-
ing young people from the Turkish community and I can feel how difficult it is to over-
come their distrust. What are the real intentions of this speaker who emphasizes all
the problems? Why does he keep going on about language deficits? Does he secretly
mean to insult us with this concern of his? ‘You’ve supplied the grain the populists
grind into flour, that’s your tragedy.’ Another says: ‘There’s a big difference between
being accountable and feeling responsible.’
It makes me think of a question put to me by a young Turkish man who was work-
ing as a journalist: ‘What does this country actually have to offer me?’ As he said it I felt
a surge of exasperation. Why do I so rarely hear people say they feel grateful for the
chance to live here, for being able – like me, I should add – to pluck the fruits of cen-
turies of peaceful and prosperous coexistence? Only at the end of a long afternoon
does the air clear and a few days later the organizer writes, in a thank-you note, ‘A
Turkish saying goes: a true friend may speak bitter words.’
Another day on my wanderings I speak to a branch meeting of a political party in
the Slotervaart district of Amsterdam. The hall is deeply divided between longstand-
ing party members and people from migrant communities. A woman whose son is be-
ing terrorized by boys from the neighbourhood says: ‘The Dutch boys have lost con-
trol of the streets to the Moroccans; the payback will come later when they want a job.’
It’s not long after the murder of Theo van Gogh and someone else remarks simply:
‘They’ve gone too far.’
The Moroccans present refuse to take that lying down. ‘When will you start seeing
me as a Dutchman. I’ve done everything I can not to stand out, haven’t I?’ Indeed, the
invitation to migrants to take an active part in society is ambiguous, since for many of
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them silence is a means of survival, a strategy of circumspect assimilation. ‘We’ve had
bad experiences with visibility.’ Remember that contradictory request made by mi-
grants and their children: ‘Don’t judge me by my background but never forget where I
come from.’ On both sides we are prisoners of ambivalence.
Yet another day and I visit a member of parliament and later a professor, both of
whom have received threats as a result of things they’ve said about Islam. Face to face
with a group of security men, feeling my chest tighten, I ask myself what kind of coun-
try I’ve landed up in. The blithe assumption that freedom of speech is valued every-
where suddenly belongs to a distant and improbable past. How could we have felt so
invulnerable? How could two migrants, one from Somalia, the other from Iran, have
managed to confront the country with its own shortcomings like this?
The member of parliament – Ayaan Hirsi Ali – suddenly takes aim at me during our
conversation: ‘I don’t mean it personally, but you always opt for safety, for distance.
Writing articles, giving lectures and always griping about how parliament, our most
vital institution, has fallen into decline. But actually doing something yourself? No,
you stand shouting from the sidelines. Taking a risk. That’s something you people
aren’t much good at.’ I explode. ‘What do you mean “you people”? Can’t we keep this
personal? And who decides what the centre is and where the sidelines are? There are so
many ways of taking responsibility. Perhaps writing is the prime example, because
you’re always the weakest link, you can never hide behind anyone else.’
So it went, again and again: the past few years have been a rough, heart-wrenching
voyage of discovery in my own country – call it the ideal citizenship test if you like.
The countless conversations, letters, debates and critical comments that my ‘multicul-
tural drama’ produced in the Netherlands, and later in other countries, make clear
how concerned and involved many people feel. The reactions, no matter how rude
they may sometimes have been, ultimately inspire hope. In recent years it’s often been
said that immigration shouldn’t become a matter for public debate. The wrong note
would quickly creep in and unpleasant clichés raise their ugly heads. That’s exactly
what happened and it did indeed prove difficult to talk in a reasonably frank way
about the ambiguities of a country in which many newcomers live.
A motley array of critics has mistaken my plea to include people for a desire to ex-
clude them. The appeal for more attention to be paid to the countless problems of ad-
justment the arrival of immigrants brings with it isn’t at all the same as a call to close
the borders. They will stay open, one way or another. Yesterday’s guest workers have
stayed, they have families now, and new immigrants keep arriving. It’s not proximity
and contact that are undesirable but distance and avoidance. While some people are
wary of too much interference in society by migrants and their children, my fear has
always been that the divide will remain too great, that newcomers will keep their dis-
tance for too long.
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Among minorities there’s often a prickly reaction to the debate about multicultur-
alism, revealing an insecurity about their status in the countries where they now live.
Many have only just created a place for themselves in a new land and for perfectly un-
derstandable reasons they don’t want to be equated with disadvantage. At the same
time they come up against researchers and people in authority who in their subtle ap-
proaches fail to appreciate the seriousness of the problems. All this skirting of issues
has created a culture of avoidance. But we can’t keep dodging around each other and
so we must speak in public about the integration of all who live and work in our coun-
tries. It’s not a matter of defending the interests of the ‘indigenous’ as opposed to
‘non-natives’ but of ways in which we can get closer to the ideal of an open society. The
question that has preoccupied me all these years is how we can guard against new
forms of inequality, so that Western nations remain open, to some degree at least, in
their dealings with migrants.
I live in a country of immigration, a place where many people have arrived from far
and wide and where others have lived for generations. The change this produces is a
sensitive matter and the debate is often fierce, because a great deal is at stake. In a reac-
tion to my article about the multicultural drama, Kader Abdolah, an author who came
to the Netherlands from Iran as a refugee, wrote: ‘Paul Scheffer, stand aside. This coun-
try is ours too.’ I answered him by saying there was room for both of us but that I
liked the fact he had said ‘This country is ours too.’ Later it occurred to me that we’d
be a step further along the road if he’d written, ‘This country is mine too.’
But perhaps we are forced to conclude that this country now belongs to fewer and
fewer people, that it threatens to slip beyond everyone’s grasp. Of all those who live
here, how many see themselves as part of society as a matter of course and can claim
without hesitation, ‘This country is mine’? There’s a sense of loss on both sides, so we
can easily be played off against one another. In that sense the changes brought about
by immigration in a globalizing world need to be addressed by everyone.
My search began with the thought ‘this far and no further’, which inevitably be-
came ‘this far and now further’. A typing error helped me along. Somewhere in an arti-
cle I remarked that migrants who will stay in the Netherlands for the rest of their lives
might make more of an effort to master the language. Rereading the draft version I
saw I’d written not ‘the rest of their lives’ but ‘the rest of my life’. I changed it, but now
I think I ought to have written ‘for the rest of their lives and mine’. Only when we take
both points of view seriously can we finally say: the rest of our lives.
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The world in the city
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   
Over the past few decades, street scenes in the major cities of Europe have changed
radically. The arrival of migrants from every part of the world has produced neigh-
bourhoods with a colour all their own. They range from more or less successfully mul-
ti-ethnic areas to poverty-scarred sink estates. Sometimes a district may change be-
yond recognition. Take London’s Notting Hill. In the late s it was the scene of race
riots; now, with its famous carnival, the neighbourhood is decidedly in vogue. There
are plenty of examples of historic districts revitalized by the arrival of immigrants.
Unfortunately there are also many urban areas where changes to the make-up of
the population have placed a severe strain on the quality of life. Which is certainly not
to say that the responsibility for their decline can simply be placed at the door of the
newcomers. The concentration of overwhelmingly poor migrants in these areas re-
sults from a combination of free choice and necessity, since public housing in Europe
and America is almost always built in clusters in certain parts of town, and it’s hard to
blame migrants for the departure of the original residents.
None of this alters the fact that sizeable waves of migration tend to create neigh-
bourhoods characterized by greater than average poverty, ignorance and violence.
Most migrants who succeed in working their way up the social ladder therefore move
out of these problem areas to settle – along with the indigenous middle class – in more
prosperous districts. This process is now in full swing. Amsterdam’s middle-class Suri-
namers, for example, are leaving the city for satellite towns where houses rather than
flats are still available and affordable. In other European countries the picture is no dif-
ferent. 
Those who remain find themselves living, along with the newcomers, in deplorable
conditions. The situation was incomparably worse in the s, when Champigny in
France was the biggest slum in Europe, although in the suburbs of Lisbon, for in-
stance, the hovels that were once so common can still be found. Provision of public
housing has driven out the worst abuses, but even so, living conditions in these areas
could not be described as pleasant or even acceptable, if only because of the latent and
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blatant violence experienced there. It’s clear to everyone that the local authorities are
finding it extremely hard to improve matters. 
Walk through parts of Lyon or Rome or Malmö and you’ll be confronted with al-
most identical images. It’s striking how districts built in the s seem as badly erod-
ed as the grand ideals of that time; everywhere the stairways are covered in graffiti and
the first signs of concrete rot are showing through. Public spaces created as an invita-
tion to social intercourse are poorly maintained. Broken bottles and food waste lie
everywhere – rubbish that would have been cleared away long ago anywhere else in the
city. ‘Indefensible spaces’ is how one city planner has described the open areas in
many modern neighbourhoods, places that no longer belong to anyone, where social
control has fallen away and criminality can become entrenched. All major cities fea-
ture neighbourhoods where aggression hangs in the air, where the police and other
emergency services are inclined to retreat. Eventually they become districts most peo-
ple tend to avoid. French cities are home to perhaps the most famous and infamous ex-
amples, but similarly dilapidated areas can be found in many other countries, even if
outbursts of repressed aggression are rather less frequent there, and less spectacular.
Living in environments like these doesn’t encourage residents to get involved with
the local community. The monotonous high-rise blocks are speckled with satellite
dishes tuned to a different reality. ‘Dish city’ symbolizes a world that’s growing small-
er in both senses, in which technological innovation helps to perpetuate a parochial
way of life. A global village, indeed, but did the people who thought up that slogan
ever consider the ways in which global communications can foster a village mentality?
Migrants often find themselves in the cheapest parts of town, which are also the
worst maintained. That’s the way it’s always been. Most have few means of support
and must start at the bottom. An Indian migrant in London, writing in the s, de-
scribes a fairly typical impression: ‘There were many people, I thought maybe waiting
for me to come, but when everybody went away there was still fifteen or sixteen peo-
ple, Indians, staying at the house. In the front room, two double beds, in the bedrooms
upstairs, each bedroom two double beds and in the small room, one three-quarter bed
and those beds with like the metal springs and big wooden headboards. No carpets in
the house, it was lino in all the rooms. The food was kept under the beds… No hot wa-
ter system, the toilet was outside.’
A close relationship exists between migrants and the city, between immigrants and
urbanization. American historian Lewis Mumford made the connection a long time
ago: ‘Perhaps the most gigantic fact in the whole urban transition was the displace-
ment of population that took place over the whole planet. For this movement and re-
settlement was accompanied by another fact of colossal import: the astounding rise in
the rate of population increase.’ In  London had a population of around
,; sixty years later it had grown to three million. The story of New York is simi-
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lar, although industrialization happened later there: in  it was a city of around
, souls; another sixty years and there were getting on for ten times as many,
some . million. This population explosion and the nineteenth-century shift from
the countryside to the cities also produced huge waves of migration from Europe to
America.
In the developing nations of Africa, Asia and South America, the historical transi-
tion from an agrarian to an industrial society seen in Europe and North America is re-
peating itself along roughly similar lines. Declining job prospects on the land and the
simultaneous rise of modern mass production is causing a great trek to the cities, a
transition entailing social displacement on a massive scale. We are witnessing a histori-
cal reversal. For the first time in history, a majority of the world’s population lives in
cities. This process of urbanization has been extremely rapid. Whereas in  only 
per cent of people were city dwellers, by  they amounted to  per cent and by
 they will account for an estimated  per cent. This growth is not evenly spread.
In the developed world the urban population will stabilize at around  per cent,
while in Africa, Asia and especially South America the growth in urbanization is gal-
loping on apace. Predictions for these continents suggest that respectively  per cent,
 per cent and  per cent of the population will reside in cities by . By that time
there will be twenty-seven mega-cities worldwide with more than ten million inhabi-
tants each, and over five hundred with populations of a million or more.
The expanding cities of the industrial age, where millions of migrants were left to
fend for themselves in heavily polluted environments, were machines that devoured
human beings. Child mortality gives us some idea. In New York the rate doubled in
the course of the nineteenth century: in  there were between  and  child-
hood deaths for every thousand births; by  the figure had risen to .This goes a
long way to explain why at the end of the nineteenth century, when the effects of an
unrestrained market economy were plain for all to see, the first social legislation was
put in place to tackle working conditions and housing.
In his novel The Jungle (), Upton Sinclair paints an unforgettable picture of the
Lithuanian migrants in Chicago who worked in the city’s abattoirs. It was nothing
short of a descent into hell in broad daylight: ‘They were trying to save their souls –
and who but a fool could fail to see that all that was the matter with their souls was that
they had not been able to get a decent existence for their bodies?’Working conditions
may have improved, partly as a result of Sinclair’s novel, but today’s Mexican illegals,
who have followed those Eastern European migrants into Chicago’s meat-processing
industry, still in many respects teeter on the edge of existence.
The city nineteenth-century city was often seen as the triumph of a mechanical
worldview destined to obliterate human relationships, and no one would deny that
outside their much older centres they were often repositories of filth and misery.
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Mumford concluded that social development had not kept pace with mechanical
achievement and scientific knowledge; instead it had been left to chance, ‘as if the sci-
entific habit of mind had exhausted itself upon machines, and was not capable of ad-
vancing further’. He contrasted this with an alternative image of the city as ‘a place in
which the social heritage is concentrated, and in which the possibilities of continuous
social intercourse and interaction raise to a higher potential the activities of men’.
For better or worse, cities are laboratories of change. Their transformation can be
ascribed in large part to waves of migration, which is reason enough to take a closer
look at them and in doing so to examine segregation in particular. Why do we see mi-
grant groups everywhere clustering together in specific districts, sometimes so much
so that whole villages can be found sharing the same street, transplanted there straight
from their home countries? What are the consequences of this spatial concentration
of migrants, for them and for those already in residence when they arrive?
The close link between migration and urbanization makes cities into training
grounds for interaction with strangers. In an essay on the city as a way of life, Ameri-
can sociologist Louis Wirth describes the city as ‘a relatively large, dense, and perma-
nent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals’. The gathering together of
large populations reveals a new human quality: the ability of people of vastly different
origins to live together on small patches of ground.
Many in fact see this as a deficiency. Big cities, with their high levels of anonymity
and superficial contact, are to them the opposite of the traditional community with its
strict social control. The freedom on offer in cities is therefore often seen as the epito-
me of licentious behaviour irresponsibility. Wirth sounds rather ambivalent about
the social consequences: ‘The reserve, the indifference, and the blasé outlook which
urbanites manifest in their relationships may thus be regarded as devices for immu-
nizing themselves against the personal claims and expectations of others.’ They need
to do exactly that, since the increasing scale of cities creates opportunities for a divi-
sion of labour that makes an individual likely to have relatively impersonal relation-
ships with a large number of people.
The city continually forces us into contact with strangers. Of course newcomers
turn up in villages as well, but in rural settings they immediately attract attention,
whereas in cities they are a commonplace. The modern city is the product of unprece-
dented mobility. The lumping together of so many people with utterly different
lifestyles creates a need for special forms of etiquette and for defence mechanisms. Ur-
ban sociologist Lyn Lofland recognizes the benefits: ‘The cosmopolitan did not lose
the capacity for the deep, long-lasting, multifaceted relationship. But he gained the ca-
pacity for the surface, fleeting, restricted relationship.’ Despite this optimistic view,
her study on the subject of the proximity of strangers is above all else the story of in-
creasing spatial separation between population groups in the modern city. In an envi-
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ronment full of strangers, anonymity reigns and people seek ways to reduce the unpre-
dictability that results. We can cope in the city only by learning to read people’s back-
grounds quickly.
Lofland compares interaction between strangers in pre-industrial cities with forms
of interaction in industrial cities. In earlier times appearances were more important,
precisely because in public spaces people and their activities were far more mixed.
Children were taught in the squares and streets, executions were held in public and
trade was carried on everywhere. This degree of spatial integration meant that every-
one needed to be able to distinguish clearly between people by the way they looked.
‘Socially defined differences among persons were emphasized in costuming, in body
markings, and in language.’
In modern cities the opposite applies. We can tell less about people nowadays from
their appearance. Despite the individualism of today’s urban societies, the distinc-
tions visible on the streets are now much reduced. At the same time there’s far more
separation and structuring. The enormous growth of cities makes it possible to divide
public and private space, and to segregate groups more and more into their own
neighbourhoods or districts. Lofland writes that this means people are increasingly
identified by where they live. ‘In the preindustrial city, space was chaotic, appearances
were ordered. In the modern city, appearances are chaotic, space is ordered.’
The up-and-coming middle class plays a crucial role in the evolution of cities; its
desire to steer clear of the underclass or ‘dangerous classes’ is an important stimulus
to segregation. Avoidance is part of modern city living: there’s a place for everyone as
long as everyone knows his place. Looked at in this way, segregation emerges as a far
more deeply ingrained pattern than many of us realize. Acknowledgement of this fact
has important policy implications.
  
Segregation is the product of a strategy for dealing with strangers in a city. Crudely
put, it’s a manifestation of the ‘birds of a feather’ principle: people of comparable
backgrounds are drawn to each other. Patterns of settlement show we are separating
out into identifiable groups. Analysis of Western cities suggests that the crucial factors
are social class and to a lesser extent family circumstances and ethnicity. The rapid nu-
merical increase in ethnic minorities in the wealthier suburbs and satellite towns
demonstrates that socio-economic circumstances weigh heavily. The abandonment
of old city neighbourhoods by the rising middle class of migrants is well underway. By
 a quarter of America’s ethnic minorities were living in the suburbs, rechristened
‘ethnoburbs’, and this has sparked a new ‘white flight’ further out of the city. The will-
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ingness to live in a mixed community is still quite rare among established residents.
Let’s look first at the causes and extent of segregation, before moving on to exam-
ine its social and cultural consequences. Lastly we’ll consider whether deliberate at-
tempts to mix population groups offer any solutions. Social geographer Paul Knox
outlines the motives for the observable desire of minorities to live together in certain
areas: ‘The spatial segregation of different “communities” helps to minimize conflict
between social groups while facilitating a greater degree of social control and endow-
ing specific social groups with a more cohesive political voice.’ Segregation arises
‘from the desire of [a community’s] members to preserve their own group identity or
lifestyle’.  In short it’s all about ‘defence, support, preservation and attack’.
Knox pays little attention to white flight as an explanation. While he sees segrega-
tion primarily as a matter of free choice, with migrants electing to live in certain dis-
tricts and send their children to certain schools, others point primarily to its involun-
tary nature. Behind that distinction lies a difference in how migrants are perceived: as
enterprising individuals who seize opportunities or as people subject to forces beyond
their control. Irrespective of which point of view they take, people have always warned
of the consequences of too great a concentration of ethnic communities. The first 
president, George Washington, was concerned about the migrants of his own time,
noting how they retained the ‘language, habits and principles (good or bad) which
they bring with them’.
A further qualification to place beside Knox’s view is that segregation doesn’t al-
ways solve problems, it can sometimes create them. The separation of different com-
munities may dampen hostilities, since where there’s little contact there will be little
friction, but when the distances become too great they can in themselves become a
source of conflict. Again: avoidance will always end at some point. Social control that
limits deviant behaviour within a particular group can also lead to serious tensions
within that community if more and more individuals decide to follow rules of their
own. There lies the dilemma of all emancipation: the formation of groups may help
but it can equally well be a hindrance, as we shall see.
An outlook in which the separation of groups is seen primarily as a form of self-de-
fence that relies upon the creation of a political force and on social control is a useful
corrective to the view that segregation is attributable above all to the majority commu-
nity’s fear of contact. Both motives come into play – self-defence on the part of new-
comers and avoidance on the part of the established population – and each should be
seen in the context of the other. Only then does the impasse surrounding segregation
become visible.
How widespread is this phenomenon? The concentration of migrants in specific ar-
eas is measured by means of the segregation index, used to determine whether the
presence of a certain group in a given district diverges from its average share of the
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population of the city as a whole. In other words it’s a relative measure. If  per cent
of a city’s population is of Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi extraction, then a neigh-
bourhood where  per cent of residents are from the subcontinent is not particularly
segregated. The index can be criticized on the grounds that it pays little heed to histori-
cal change within neighbourhoods. Residential preference – or more bluntly the flight
of indigenous populations – is based on absolute rather than relative numbers. To see
the real extent of change we need to look at majorities, which is to say at neighbour-
hoods where an indigenous majority has become a minority – areas like Vénissieux in
Lyon, Rosengard in Malmö, Lozells in Birmingham and Molenbeek in Brussels, where
the transformation has taken place within a period of twenty-five years. It’s a perspec-
tive that reveals different patterns altogether.
Nevertheless the index does give us a clear idea of the extent of segregation in cer-
tain districts relative to other places and other times. The classic example of segrega-
tion is the formation of black ghettos in the northern United States after the emanci-
pation of slaves and the subsequent migration of black people from the south. The
segregation level has been measured at forty-six for the year , fifty-nine for 
and eighty-nine for . In the Midwest and the north-eastern states especially, black
people remain highly segregated to this day. For Chicago, for example, the index
stands at eighty. The forty largest cities still exhibit a noticeable degree of black segre-
gation, although in the past twenty years the figure has fallen from about seventy-
three to sixty-four. The index records less extreme levels for other ethnic groups, such
as Asians, forty-one, and Hispanics, forty-six. In New York the segregation of black,
Asian and Hispanic populations has been measured at eighty-two, forty-eight and six-
ty-six respectively.
From all this it is clear that the history of the black population in America – begin-
ning with slavery and forced segregation – is unique, and quite different from that of
migrant groups. Amsterdam geographer Sako Musterd points this out in comparing
the  with Europe. In a general sense the level of segregation in Europe is lower than
in America but, he warns, when we leave aside the extreme segregation of America’s
black population, there is a far smaller difference between levels on the two sides of the
Atlantic. Certain cities in Europe, including Brussels, Rotterdam and Bradford, stand
out as examples of above average segregation.
General agreement exists about the degree of segregation that commonly emerges
and about how persistent it is. Over the past few years, expressions of concern about
the phenomenon have been heard from various quarters, relating both to the trend
that has been identified – an increase rather than a reduction – and to its presumed
impact on integration. The unspoken assumption is that the separation of population
groups – the most visible example being ‘black’ and ‘white’ schools – is detrimental to
the social advancement of migrants and adversely effects the extent to which they feel
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part of society. The findings of a Dutch parliamentary committee of investigation in
 were hesitant: ‘The Committee concludes that the concentration of ethnic mi-
norities reduces their chances of contact with the indigenous population, but that
concentration has no clear influence on an individual’s level of education or position
in the jobs market.’ This last phrase was then further refined: ‘It is not inconceivable
that reduced socio-cultural integration leads on to reduced socio-economic integra-
tion.’
Issues surrounding segregation and its consequences demand more thorough
treatment than this. Before taking a closer look at its cultural effects we must turn our
attention to a social issue: does life in a neighbourhood where many people are poor
increase an individual’s chances of becoming stuck, like them, at the bottom of the so-
cial heap? In a fairly general sense there is evidence of increasing polarization in major
cities; a clear rift has emerged between those who make the leap to join the middle
class and those at risk of forming an underclass, with all the troubled family relation-
ships, above average crime, and poverty passed down from generation to generation
that characterize such a phenomenon.
The same goes for migrants. Sizeable groups come onto the jobs market insuffi-
ciently qualified. There’s a clear divide between work for a highly skilled elite and un-
complicated jobs for short-term employees who can easily be laid off. The formation
of a social underclass creates an environment in which less than fully integrated mi-
grants can survive, and such an underclass tends to perpetuate itself. British re-
searcher Peter Hall concludes: ‘The good news, if any, is that the cities will be where
some of the more exciting new economic developments are taking place. The bad
news is that these groups may not be playing much role in them… [Planning faces] a
nightmarish return of the oldest of urban problems, which more than any other origi-
nally brought it into being and gave it its legitimacy: the problem of the urban under-
class.’
It’s important to ask whether segregation contributes to social inequality. Opin-
ions on this point differ quite markedly. Some researchers dismiss any link as relative-
ly unimportant while others suggest a strong connection exists. American sociologists
Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton summarize their research into the formation of
ghettos in the United States as follows: ‘Racial segregation is the institutional nexus
that enables the transmission of poverty from person to person and generation to gen-
eration, and is therefore a primary structural factor behind the perpetuation of the ur-
ban underclass.’A concentration of poverty and inequality has its own independent
effect on the opportunities open to individual residents of these neighbourhoods. Ir-
respective of talent or personality, people who live in areas of enduring poverty are
more likely to become mothers at a young age, to cut short their schooling premature-
ly and to have low incomes.

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 72
According to Massey and Denton a culture develops in such neighbourhoods that
defines itself in opposition to middle-class conventions, departing from widely ac-
cepted norms in its attitudes to marriage and success at school, for example. They
point out that at the level of language a growing divide can be seen between black and
white America. The black dialect that has developed in the ghettos has less and less in
common with standard English. ‘Thus black educational progress is hampered not
only because segregation concentrates poverty within ghetto schools but also because
segregation confines blacks to an isolated linguistic community.’ America’s black
ghettos are perhaps an extreme example, but they may well illustrate a general prob-
lem: segregation has a real impact on social mobility.
America differs in various ways from Europe, where social inequality is tempered
by highly developed welfare states. But those welfare states, while guaranteeing a sub-
sistence-level income, have brought with them widespread inactivity. This is particu-
larly noticeable in migrant communities, which have relatively high levels of unem-
ployment. Low labour participation rates in former guest-worker communities in
particular have stood in the way of integration, with inevitable consequences for chil-
dren growing up in them.
Sociologist Eric Maurin concludes that, in France at least, the formation of ghettos
in areas of public housing contributes to social inequality. Social and ethnic segrega-
tion in French cities has persisted over the past twenty years. Social mixing is a univer-
sally accepted ideal, but the actual behaviour of the middle classes and social elites is
another matter. Maurin describes this as ‘ghettoization from above’ and ‘ghettoiza-
tion from below’. He talks of a three-way split in almost all major cities: the elites in-
stall themselves in the old city centres – where prices have shot up since the s –
while the middle class moves to single-family dwellings in the suburbs and the lowest
educated remain stuck in high-rise housing estates.
On the positive side, ethnic neighbourhoods are seedbeds of entrepreneurship.
The concentration of migrant communities enables them to organize all kinds of serv-
ices geared mainly to their own consumers. Shops selling Indian cuisine or halal meat
immediately spring to mind, followed by businesses offering cheap international
phone calls and bookshops stocking Islamic reading materials. The list is endless, but
this ethnic economy thrives by virtue of a certain amount of segregation. Sociologist
Jan Rath believes that diversity has economic value and sees it not as a passing trend
but as a consequence of the changes to Western cities brought about by globalization.
‘The commercial use of ethno-cultural diversity, or more specifically the rise of
“coloured neighbourhoods” as places of entertainment and consumption, is not an
isolated phenomenon but part of the economic change that cities are currently going
though.’
A great deal has been written about the economic significance of ethnic enclaves.
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Based on examples both from the past (Manhattan’s Jewish community and the
Japanese on the West Coast) and from our own time (the Koreans in Los Angeles and
Cubans in Miami), Alejandro Portes and Robert Manning conclude that such en-
claves can present significant economic opportunities. There are a number of pre-
conditions, however, including the presence of a considerable number of migrants
with experience as entrepreneurs in their native countries, and the availability of suffi-
cient capital and manpower. Most migrant communities have labour to spare but they
often lack capital and entrepreneurial skills.
However prosperous some ethnic enclaves may become, the question remains:
How far can emancipation through your own economic networks take you? Do they
offer a starting point from which you can conquer the wider world or does the ethnic
economy also represent a self-limitation that is ultimately involuntary? The picture is
mixed. There are many new enterprises but also many bankruptcies; high ambition is
accompanied by the exploitation of workers from the same community, who have
nowhere else to turn. Sad stories about the Chinese restaurant business are familiar to
us all. The trade in ethnic products and services presents opportunities, but the risk
that migrants will become shut into an exotic niche in the name of a celebration of di-
versity is a real one, however fascinating the Chinatowns of Sydney or London may be.
In the end the main route to emancipation for the majority of migrants and their chil-
dren surely lies in participation in economic life of a broader kind, where a person’s
descent is irrelevant.
An extensive comparative study of the second generation in New York lends weight
to this suggestion. Dynamism is not created by a ‘retention of identity’. As the authors
put it: ‘This rapid incorporation into American life does not stem from the second
generation’s maintaining social or cultural ties with the parents’ immigrant commu-
nities. The group experiencing the most dramatic upward mobility – the Chinese – is
actually the least likely to retain the parents’ language.’ They conclude: ‘Members of
every second generation group who work in predominantly ethnic work sites earn less
than those who work in mainstream settings.’ This is not to say, in the researchers’
view, that such children rebel against their parents’ culture. Rather, their social ascent
takes place largely outside their own communities.
The upshot of all this is that while the outcome of segregation for social inequality
is far from unambiguous, in areas where population groups live apart according to
both class and colour, a ‘culture of poverty’ may develop, adversely affecting people’s
chances of social advancement. We can deduce as much simply from the avoidance of
such districts by those who are doing rather better, whether natives or newcomers. As
soon as a good opportunity presents itself, they flee the area. Other motives are at
work here besides a desire to escape social disadvantage, motives that have to do with
the quality of life in a more general sense. Neighbourhoods of this kind often struggle
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with above average crime and aggression. Increasing isolation and frustration seek an
outlet; the trouble caused by many children of migrants must have its origins some-
where.
 
Along with forms of social exclusion, cultural alienation is often a feature of the neigh-
bourhoods where immigrants end up living. It’s expressed in ways that have now
claimed everyone’s attention. Take the riots in the French banlieues in the autumn of
. They were prompted by a single incident. In the night of  October in Clichy-
sous-Bois, two teenagers running from the police hid in an electricity substation and
were fatally electrocuted. Their deaths triggered disturbances that spread across
France like an ink blot, especially after the future president, Nicolas Sarkozy, dubbed
the rebellious youths racaille (variously translated by English-language media as rab-
ble, ruffians or scum).
This outburst of disaffection and violence surprised no one; the public housing es-
tates of France had been the setting for ferocious clashes several times over the previ-
ous quarter century. Lucienne Bui Trong has listed no fewer than forty-seven distur-
bances of varying degrees of severity between  and  alone. But this was differ-
ent from previous riots. The uprising in Minguettes in , for example, had been
seen as a sign of hope – not long afterwards the children of North-African migrants
held a protest march and were received by President Mitterrand. This time the distur-
bances were interpreted as above all an expression of nihilism, not just because of the
extent of the violence but because the rebellion was not marked by concrete desires or
specific demands. The arsonists had no message and no doctrine. Not only were thou-
sands of cars torched, institutions whose very existence was intended to improve life
in the banlieues were destroyed too, including schools and libraries. Much was
wrecked and little was said.
Once the initial shock had passed, there was a need to contemplate why the aggres-
sion had erupted. The silence called for subtitling. While politicians talked at length
about a social problem (‘fracture sociale’), most commentators took a different tack,
describing a cultural or ethnic conflict. Sociologist Jacques Donzelot wrote that the
ethnic background of the youngsters involved was undoubtedly one reason for their
marginalization, while economist Yann Moulier Boutang compared the disturbances
with race riots in America: ‘The young people of the banlieues of Europe are on their
way to becoming the blacks of the United States.’
Other commentators too detected a deep malaise in the indiscriminate violence of
that autumn and felt that choosing to see it mainly as an outcome of poverty was an in-
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sult to the many families on the bottom rungs of the social ladder who, despite diffi-
cult circumstances, bring up their children to be respectable citizens. They discerned
increasing cultural disengagement, one indication of which, as they saw it, was the lan-
guage of the banlieues. Initially the backslang seems relatively innocent, playfully
transforming français into céfran or noir into renoi. This could be regarded as an at-
tempt to make a virtue of necessity: you may have absolutely no status in society, but
at least you can be lord and master in the universe of your own language. Nevertheless,
violent rap lyrics reveal a mental detachment, which does not bode well. Psychiatrist
Theodore Dalrymple’s interpretation of it is apt: ‘Having been enclosed in a physical
ghetto, they respond by building a cultural and psychological ghetto for themselves.’
In these areas the family-school-work triangle no longer functions as a social
framework. The breakdown of communication in families is the main focus of atten-
tion. Rootless youths are growing up in the inner suburbs of Paris and Lyon with insuf-
ficient parental support. Their fathers have lost all authority and feel constrained by
the many people watching over their shoulders as they bring up their children. Harsh
disciplinary measures are no longer permitted and nothing is available to replace
them. It all seems very familiar – in some parts of Bradford or Brussels the situation is
much the same. 
The development of a ghetto culture in America was described as far back as the
s. In his study of the Jewish ghetto, Louis Wirth quotes Israel Cohen, who
analysed in detail the mechanisms of closing off and shutting out: ‘Ignorance of the
language of the new country, of its labour conditions, and of its general habits and
ways of thought, as well as the natural timidity of a fugitive from a land of persecution,
compels the immigrant Jew to settle in the colony of his co-religionists.’ Their settle-
ment in the ghetto was usually a transitional phase between the old world and the new,
a temporary refuge, even though some might live there for many decades. 
According to Wirth the ghetto isn’t just a physical reality, it’s a state of mind. The
narrower the gateway to the outside world, the easier it becomes for a community to
stick to its own norms and to obstruct individuals within that community who try to
take their lives into their own hands. The freedom of the community is in many re-
spects inseparable from the lack of freedom of the individual. Nevertheless, Wirth val-
ued the emotional certainty the ghetto could offer its residents: ‘Here he could relax
from the etiquette and the formalism by which his conduct in the gentile world was
regulated.’ The price was perhaps high, especially for unbelievers or apostates who
were despised and ostracized, but the attractions of that intimate world where people
had an unambiguous status were a counterweight to those of the wider world, which
seemed from a distance to offer immense freedom. ‘What it lacks in breadth of hori-
zon, the ghetto life makes up in depth of emotion, in strength of familial and commu-
nal ties, and in attachment to tradition, form, and sentiment.’
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Jewish experience is illustrative in a number of respects. ‘The history of the Jews
and the history of the ghetto are in essence a history of migrations.’ In areas of West-
ern cities that are populated by migrants we see the same national and religious fault-
lines. The search for a form of leadership that works in the new circumstances, which
is to say for leaders who have their origins in the new country, is familiar too, and once
more we come upon the moral constraints of orthodoxy: ‘The synagogue and the rab-
bi … leave scarcely a single phase of the life of the congregation free from their con-
trol.’
So to some extent the formation of ghettos has to do with a particular mentality. As
soon as we take a broader view, rather than looking purely at economic disadvantage
in the groups involved, we begin to see how segregation impacts upon the integration
of migrants. If in turning our attention to patterns of social integration we ask how
great the chances are that natives and newcomers will come into contact, then we ar-
rive at some firm conclusions about the consequences of segregation. Dutch re-
searcher Jaco Dagevos sees a connection: ‘Immigrant groups with a strong tendency
to keep away from the native population are generally also living at quite some remove
from the values bound up with the process of modernization that Western societies
have been through.’He believes there’s a real danger that ‘separate worlds’ will devel-
op, affecting opportunities for finding good jobs: ‘A strong focus on one’s own group
hampers socio-economic integration.’
Quite apart from the need to improve prospects for the population groups con-
cerned, the vitality of democracy is at stake. A city can cope with the existence in its
midst of small, isolated communities, but not when half the population shuts itself off
from the wider environment. This is a question not just of the advancement of ethnic
communities but of society as a whole. It’s all about the degree to which a new social
fabric can grow. If ethnic minorities lead separate lives, their emancipation may well
be limited, but perhaps even more importantly, segregation will eventually under-
mine a society’s capacity for peaceful conflict resolution. Most researchers look only
at the material advancement of migrant groups, paying no attention at all to this as-
pect of the multicultural drama.
Muslim communities in many major European cities have created a space of their
own. Flemish journalist Hind Fraihi, born to Moroccan parents, offers a touching por-
trayal of the Muslim community in the old Brussels district of Molenbeek: ‘Ever since
childhood I’ve been coming here with my parents. Like so many Moroccans, they do
their shopping in this Muslim village in Brussels where the prices are low, a cheerful
chaos prevails, the main language is Arabic and the meat tastes halal. Shopping in
Molenbeek is like spending the summer in a sunless Mediterranean.’ In the midst of
this beguiling jumble, social problems mount up and with them an aversion to Bel-
gian society: ‘Youth unemployment is astronomical, good for some per cent. In cer-
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tain districts the figure is as high as  per cent. And it shows. Just look at the young-
sters loitering in the cheerless streets.’
In environments like this, a ghetto culture develops. Reliance on welfare is the
norm and, as usual, dependence leads not to gratitude but to resentment. A coherent
community of faith can quickly become a second home, all the more so when the
parental home has little to offer. Parents don’t have much to set against the street, with
its freedom without responsibility, other than responsibility without freedom. No
wonder they lose control of their children.
One of those to whom Fraihi spoke, a young man who hangs around at a metro sta-
tion and lives from street robbery, said: ‘See those rails, and the sleepers the rails are
bolted to? Well, that was my father’s job. He worked his fingers to the bone here, so
that the Belgians could be transported about like rats under the ground. The Belgians
think we, the children of hardworking fathers, are going to get our hands dirty too. But
they’re wrong.’ He and Muslim youngsters like him pose as victims of colonial ex-
ploitation on a small scale, an outlook that neatly coincides with the indictment of
full-scale imperialism that turns Muslims into victims in the world at large.
Concerned voices are being raised in Germany too, with talk of ‘parallel societies’
(Parallelgesellschaften), especially in areas where Turkish migrants are concentrated.
Researcher Bassam Tibi, originally from Damascus, writes: ‘Within these parallel soci-
eties, poverty is in reality bound up with religion and ethnicity, and it therefore stands
in the way of integration. This form of migration therefore manifests itself as the eth-
nicization of the culture of poverty, producing an enormous potential for conflict that
forms a significant threat to the security of the host society.’He is not at all confident
that the migrant diaspora will eventually connect with the European environment, es-
pecially since the isolation of part of the Muslim community is accompanied by an on-
going international confrontation.
In essence this has to do with an age-old dilemma faced by all emancipation move-
ments: the strength of the community is based on the weakness of the individual.
Group thinking can function for a time as a bulwark against a hostile environment,
but what is often seen as a temporary refuge or a springboard to advancement can eas-
ily degenerate into narrow-mindedness. In his novel The Human Stain Philip Roth
sums up this form of oppression perfectly as ‘the tyranny of the we and the we-talk
and everything that the we wants to pile on your head’. What matters to Roth in the
end is the liberation of the individual, who is ‘free to enact the boundless, self-defining
drama of the pronouns we, they, and I’.
These are all aspects of the way migrants are drawn to each other in specific dis-
tricts of their adoptive cities. It’s a form of self-defence that can easily turn into isola-
tion, such that the outside world grows increasingly distant, and where social inequali-
ty and cultural unfamiliarity already exist, the growing apart of population groups
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can further estrange them and make barriers more durable. Segregation should not be
seen purely in the context of worsening social inequality; we must also be willing to
perceive urban life as a training ground for democracy.
‘’  ‘’ 
In schools segregation has taken a very stark form indeed. Is the emergence of ‘black’
and ‘white’ schools problematic? Or should we see ethnic dividing lines in education
as temporary phenomena of little real consequence? It’s worth looking again at the
French banlieues. In these areas of social housing, school is the vital institution as far
as integration is concerned, if only because schoolchildren from migrant families re-
ceive little support from home in finding their way in mainstream society. Many if not
most schools in these neighbourhoods are unable to cope with their task. The most
important route to social advancement is therefore closed off and we should not un-
derestimate the frustration this causes.
A book by Karen Montet-Toutain called Et pourtant, je les aime [all the same, I’m
fond of them] is the account of a committed teacher who was stabbed by a pupil some
years ago during a lesson. As a young art teacher she had deliberately chosen to work at
a troubled school in a poor district on the outskirts of Paris and she soon encountered
a climate of threat. At first it was merely a matter of sexual intimidation during lessons
– ‘I want to **** you’ – but a year later came the attack that almost cost her her life. She
describes her work at the vocational secondary school with great affection and clearly
states that schools in the banlieues are all too willing to see their pupils as problem chil-
dren, keen to be rid of them at the earliest possible opportunity. Their diplomas are no
longer worth very much, a fact not lost on potential employers. She’s convinced
there’s ‘buried treasure’ in this generation of migrants’ children, and that it’s now go-
ing to waste: ‘There is no poor soil, only poorly irrigated soil.’
She describes in detail a general malaise. The building is inadequately heated and
poorly maintained. At her introductory meeting she’s advised not to wear jewellery,
and to hide her mobile phone. In fact her colleagues feel it’s altogether a bad idea for a
young woman to stand in front of the kind of class she’s about to encounter. The scis-
sors used in lessons have rounded tips as a safety precaution. ‘Teaching under the per-
petual threat of an incident is exhausting,’ she remarks. The pupils know there’s lit-
tle future for them and this translates into an atmosphere of aggression, with teachers
continually running the gauntlet: ‘We have to choose our words carefully to avoid be-
ing accused of racism, even though we’re bombarded with the worst kind of abuse all
day long.’
Keeping order under such circumstances is often more important than actually
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teaching anything. After the attack, in which she was stabbed seven times with a
kitchen knife, Montet-Toutain felt abandoned. Her book is therefore also an indict-
ment of a climate of wilful indifference. She comes to the conclusion that those who
report problems keeping order to school administrators merely raise doubts about
their own capacities. Add to this the policy many schools have of hushing up violent
incidents for fear of a bad reputation and all the conditions are in place for a culture of
silence, a silence she was hoping to break with her book.
Her school in a district of Paris could stand for many in European cities. Every-
where we see ethnic minorities becoming a majority at specific schools. What moti-
vates white families to remove their children? It begins with the assessment that
school is the most significant factor in the struggle for social advancement, a place
where crucial decisions are made about a person’s future. ‘White flight’ reflects the im-
portance of school: parents fear their children will adjust downwards if they attend a
‘black’ school, so they move to ‘white’ enclaves. Maurin talks about ‘intimate fears and
ambition’ as the motives behind this avoidance. It’s interesting to note that the
switch from ‘white’ to ‘black’ lies somewhere around the point where one third of
pupils are the children of migrants. This appears to be a critical threshold; in schools
parents are voting with their feet on the issue of mixed classrooms.
Too little thought has been given to the fact that the meritocratic society – in which
everyone is judged on his or her merits – has a merciless side to it. As education be-
comes increasingly important and access to the better schools increasingly competi-
tive, we see the best educated trying to distance themselves as far as possible from the
least educated. A meritocratic society means stricter selection, and this is reflected in
the growth of ‘black’ and ‘white’ schools. Patterns of segregation are far more deeply
ingrained than many people realize. Parents make every effort to give their children
the best possible start in life, even if it means committing fraud when filling out appli-
cation forms, or moving house. British research shows that house prices are strongly
influenced, to the tune of some  per cent, by the quality of the schools into whose
catchment areas they fall.
Dutch researchers have concluded that ‘as soon as the proportion of weaker pupils
tends towards  per cent, the positive effects on socially weaker pupils disappear,
while the performance of “white” middle-class children declines significantly’. This
means that in cities where the majority of school-aged children come from low-
skilled migrant families, the avoidance of ‘black’ schools by the middle class (irrespec-
tive of origin) is an understandable choice in itself. Yet the most profound conse-
quences of ethnic segregation in schools impact upon the children of migrants. Segre-
gation has a negative effect on their opportunities in life.
As well as ‘white flight’ we need to look at another cause of segregation, namely the
rise of religious schools in countries including the Netherlands and Britain. They are
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still relatively few in number, but they amount to the expression of a desire in some mi-
grant communities for seclusion among their own kind. The constitutional guarantee
of freedom of education in the Netherlands gives religious communities the right to
found their own schools, but this only reinforces segregation according to class and
colour.
Amartya Sen regards the policy of the British government, which plans to give state
support to religious schools for Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus, as a great mistake. It
means children will continue to be poured into the mould of a religion before they are
old enough to judge for themselves. ‘The importance of non-sectarian and non-
parochial school education that expands, rather than reduces, the reach of reasoning
(including critical scrutiny) would be hard to exaggerate.’ Nobody whose attitudes
are rooted in the principle of freedom can want young children to have a choice thrust
upon them. They ought to come into contact with a number of different worldviews.
The fundamental debate on this issue has been avoided up to now, but sooner or later
it will have to take place.
Looking at schools, we are forced to conclude that generally speaking segregation
by class and colour is already far advanced. Take the statistics from Amsterdam that
give the proportion of primary school pupils with low-skilled parents from non-West-
ern backgrounds (they are registered as such in the Netherlands, since for many years
almost twice the usual resources were allocated to them):  of the  primary
schools in Amsterdam have a concentration of such pupils of more than  per cent
and in  (in other words, half of all the city’s primary schools) more than  per cent
of pupils are the children of immigrants of this type. In some districts this applies to
all schools.
In discussions about the consequences of the way schools are growing apart, two is-
sues become intertwined: how do pupils perform in these schools and what are the so-
cial consequences of groups of pupils growing up separately? Opinions differ widely
as to the results in performance terms. One Dutch study calculates that the difference
between black and white schools is around  per cent. Maurin estimates the effect
of school segregation in French cities at around  per cent of academic perform-
ance. It seems safe to conclude that discrepancies do exist and that attending even a
slightly less successful school can have a significant effect on the rest of an individual’s
life. After all, even a minor reduction in exam results can determine the choice be-
tween a track to basic training and the route to a rather more ambitious form of high-
er education. Exams are therefore decisive for later careers. The early consignment of
many children from migrant families to the lower streams of education is undeniably
a huge problem in cities where such children form a majority of school-aged young-
sters. Societies cannot afford to lose the ‘hidden treasure’ Montet-Toutain talks about
– and that’s exactly what’s happening now.
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Researchers looking at effects like these always apply a corrective for socio-econom-
ic background. A statistical bias will of course be produced if, in attempting to judge
the significance of ethnic differences, we compare the child of two doctors with the
offspring of unskilled workers. But this correction threatens to obscure the real situa-
tion in schools. For research purposes we may want to filter out of our analysis differ-
ences based on class, but in the day-to-day reality of a school, the overrepresentation
of children from disadvantaged backgrounds clearly has an effect on academic per-
formance and on the atmosphere in general. 
Questions about the consequences of ethnic segregation are often avoided because
head teachers are apprehensive about the demotivating effects of linking colour with
poor performance. But surely the first priority is to understand exactly what’s going
on. Researchers have concluded that there is a connection between ethnic and social
segregation. Migrants’ children have measurable language deficits, partly as a result of
the fact that many grow up in areas where hardly any indigenous children live. This
has led to calls for pre-school reception classes and extra coaching for children from
migrant communities. 
There is less disagreement about the adverse consequences of school segregation in
a socio-cultural sense. Studies in the Netherlands have reached some unambiguous
conclusions: ‘Mixed schools are a crucial means of passing on middle-class norms
and attitudes. In other words, mixing helps children to get on in life.’ A school is
more than a factory for learning; it’s an exercise in living together for children from di-
verse backgrounds. The ability to interact across social and cultural divides is impor-
tant for society as a whole, and apart from the neighbourhoods in which people live
and grow up, school is the only place where children can relate to each other in a natu-
ral way. The results are obvious. Dagevos sums them up as follows: ‘For the Nether-
lands as a whole it has recently been established that over the past ten years the tenden-
cy of people belonging to minorities to have circles of friends composed of members
of their own group has steadily increased. The main reason for this seems to be greater
segregation.’
Comparable findings have been reported elsewhere. Almost all Western Europe’s
major cities abound with stories about ‘black’ schools. One disturbing example is the
Rütli school in Berlin, where over  per cent of pupils are of Turkish or Arab descent.
In some areas of the city, including the northern part of Neukölln, the Arab popula-
tion has become larger than the traditionally most strongly represented migrant
group, people of Turkish extraction. In the spring of  teachers at the Rütli school
wrote a desperate letter about the impossible situation in their classrooms: ‘We are at
our wits’ end. In many classes behaviour is characterized by a complete rejection of
the material and by inhuman behaviour.’ They used three key words to describe the at-
mosphere at their school: aggression, disrespect and ignorance. 
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The letter provoked a debate in the Federal Republic about the integration of chil-
dren from migrant communities. There was criticism of the ‘multicultural language
police’ who had obscured all these problems for years, and the real-life police pointed
to the large proportion of migrants’ children in crime statistics. It was proposed that
an upper limit of  per cent should be set to the number of pupils of foreign origin.
Questions were also raised about the future of the type of school represented by the
Rütli, the Hauptschule or vocational secondary school, which has in reality come to
function as a social dumping ground. As someone remarked, ‘Vocational schools are
losers’ schools.’ It’s clear that a concentration of migrants’ children from socially dis-
advantaged backgrounds presents schools with serious problems. The teachers at the
Rütli school wrote: ‘In most families our pupils are the only ones who get up in the
mornings.’ What are the staff supposed to tell those children about the importance of
going to school?
The Rollberg-Viertel, where the school is located, is a district where thirty different
nationalities live, many of them Middle Eastern. A large majority of the pupils who
register at its schools have a poor command of German for their age. In these and oth-
er areas a counter-culture is developing, breaking free little by little from the majority
culture, and within it success at school has become the exception. As in the French
banlieues, the language – ‘Kanak Sprak’ – is a mixture of cheerful provocation and far
less cheerful intimidation. Clearly people can always find ways to survive in a niche,
but the drawbacks are obvious, as Polish writer Ryszard Kapuściński observed. This
kind of separation is ‘also a way of creating a climate of self-veneration for yourself,
since a niche offers one great advantage: we can fill it entirely with ourselves, which
protects us from the plague of confrontation, from comparison, from the judgement
of others’.
Again and again we come up against the same reality. The over-representation of
migrants in specific districts is a phenomenon seen throughout the history of migra-
tion. Often such areas have been jumping-off points for people on their way up, but
now there are indications that a good many children remain stuck in them. There’s a
real danger of creating a permanent underclass of migrants’ children. Although many
have managed to overcome depressing circumstances and do well at school, for a con-
siderable proportion of the second generation – in some cities, including Amsterdam
and Lyon, perhaps even a majority – things are not looking so good.
  
It’s important to reach this diagnosis independently of ideas about ways in which the
situation can be changed. Segregation is not easy to influence, if only because immi-
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gration over past decades has brought with it an irreversible change in the composi-
tion of populations. In quite a few cities a majority of school-aged children come from
migrant families. Furthermore, the separation of population groups by social class
has become deeply entrenched. The whole world has arrived in our cities and avoid-
ance is one result. It’s disturbing to note that wherever you look, people are withdraw-
ing. Many do not feel at home in a globalizing world and want to build walls around
themselves, both figuratively and literally.
This is clearly illustrated by the recent history of Rotterdam. The atmosphere of the
Afrikaander district emerges in countless interviews with native Dutch residents. One
says, ‘Why I want to move? Because it’s a lousy neighbourhood these days. It used to
be really friendly here and now it’s ruined. What ought to change around here? I want
it to be reasonably normal again, reasonably respectable. To have few Dutch shops
around again. There’s not a single Dutch shop left. Every time a Dutch shop goes, a for-
eign one opens in its place. I’ve got nothing against foreigners, but it’s not Rotterdam
any longer.’
In recent years greater attention has been paid to this kind of reaction. In , in
an attempt to justify a newly restrictive policy towards the arrival of low-skilled mi-
grants, the city council wrote: ‘The absorptive capacity of certain districts is being ex-
ceeded by a continual influx of underprivileged people and the departure of the better
off, who can afford to go and live somewhere else. Along with nuisance, illegality and
criminality, this is the essence of the problem we face.’ It emphasized that ‘colour
isn’t the problem, but the problem has colour’ and concluded that ‘the speed of inflow
and outflow makes it hard for the residents of Rotterdam to develop a bond with the
city and with each other’. In twenty years from now a majority of the city’s current res-
idents will in turn have been replaced by newcomers. The most controversial aspect of
Rotterdam’s plan was a proposal to restrict settlement in certain districts to those with
a specified minimum income – per cent of the legal minimum wage – so as to put a
brake on the influx of people dependent on welfare.
The agonizing that has gone on in Rotterdam, an international port that would pre-
fer to have city walls, shows how immigration places cities under strain. Rotterdam is
far from alone in this. Some years ago the mayor of Malmö appealed for a temporary
halt to all immigration. This and other attempts to implement an immigration policy
at a municipal level can be seen as indicating that too much is being asked of residents
and that they no longer feel protected by their national governments.
All over Western Europe in the past few decades, there have been attempts to pro-
mote the mixing of populations by establishing numerical limits to the number of im-
migrants in given neighbourhoods or schools. In the s, for instance, the British
minister of education set a limit of  per cent to the number of children from mi-
grant families in any one school. In the s, Rotterdam set the maximum number of
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migrants in any given neighbourhood at  per cent, a proposal blocked by central gov-
ernment on the basis that it conflicted with the principle of non-discrimination. The
move had been prompted by riots in the Afrikaander district in the summer of 
that targeted Turkish guest workers. In West Germany at around the same time a cap
on immigration, the so-called Zuzugssperre, was proposed for the five largest cities. It
was to come into force as soon as the total proportion of migrants in their populations
passed  per cent. More recently there have been attempts in France to oblige the bet-
ter-off suburbs to build social housing until it made up at least  per cent of the total,
in the hope that this would bring about a dispersal of the migrant population.
It’s clear that each of these attempts has failed. Enforced dispersal either proves im-
possible to implement or is condemned as discriminatory. Everyone feels that disper-
sal ordered from on high soon comes into conflict with constitutional rights such as
freedom of settlement or the freedom to choose a school for your child. Indirect meth-
ods of mixing populations seem to work better. By demolishing cheap rental accom-
modation and building more expensive owner-occupied dwellings, local authorities
are attempting to nudge areas towards greater diversity. This approach is currently be-
ing tried in many European countries, and in America. Some say the best idea is to cre-
ate a greater ethnic mix by explicitly encouraging residents of other neighbourhoods
to move into areas where many migrants live. Others have set their sights on social di-
versity instead and are concentrating on trying to persuade middle-class migrants to
stay in their neighbourhoods, providing better housing to dissuade them from mov-
ing out. Whichever priority is uppermost, population policy in one form or another
lurks behind recent urban construction projects.
The thinking that inspires these initiatives is in itself perfectly defensible. The accu-
mulation of disadvantage is to no small degree the result of well-intentioned city plan-
ning, which made social housing so predominant in certain areas that the result was
the opposite of the emancipation intended. In large-scale housing projects the cluster-
ing together of problem families meant that the districts they lived in quickly deterio-
rated. There are countless examples, the best known being Pruitt-Igoe, a project in St
Louis that won a prize when it was completed in  but within seventeen years had
turned into an uninhabitable no-go area and in the end was literally wiped off the
map. Or take the Amsterdam suburb of Bijlmer. On completion in the mid-s it
was praised as a dream neighbourhood. Twenty years later it had descended into a
downward spiral of poverty and violence.
Processes like these have been experienced everywhere and they have not escaped
the attention of observers such as Peter Hall: ‘The evidence was accumulating in the
s that the underclass phenomenon, once thought a product of the Anglo-Ameri-
can deregulated economies, was appearing also in very different kinds of society and
kinds of city: large public housing projects in Paris and Amsterdam were increasingly
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populated by the structurally unemployed and their children, and – just as in their
New York and London equivalents – violence was simmering just below the surface.’
It’s therefore high time to take a close look at the unintended consequences of the
disproportionate amount of social housing in major cities. Here lies one of the keys to
change. Increased home ownership will strengthen ties with the city and encourage a
mixed composition of neighbourhoods. In countries like the Netherlands or Sweden
especially, where home ownership in the most important cities is extremely low – in
Amsterdam, for example, less than a quarter of dwellings are owner-occupied – such
interventions can help to create more balanced neighbourhoods. 
Yet this approach too has its limitations. We tend to assume not only that mixing
boosts the economic vitality of a neighbourhood, providing it with of a thriving mid-
dle class, but that it stimulates social interaction as well. Is this actually how it works?
Attempts to create mixed communities are often prompted by the simple idea that fa-
miliarity breaks down barriers; as people get to know each other they’ll become more
tolerant. American urban sociologist Herbert Gans, however, believes that a ‘balanced
community’, one whose composition reflects that of the population as a whole, is in it-
self problematic. He writes: ‘The balanced community would probably experience in-
tense political and cultural conflict.’
Up to a point, imbalance within a population can actually be helpful in everyday
life, and indeed there is something to be said for the notion that segregation has
damped down conflict over many years. Different groups had barely any contact with
each other and when they did the indigenous population voted with its feet. The fact
that even the middle classes are now being affected by immigration has undoubtedly
contributed to a change over the past few years; the extent of immigration is such that
leading separate lives no longer works as a way of avoiding conflict. This is not to say,
however, that combining populations by housing rich and poor or black and white
next to each other will produce integrated neighbourhoods.
Sociologist Jan Willem Duyvendak points to a real problem with the attempt to cre-
ate more socially diverse neighbourhoods by means of demolition and reconstruc-
tion: ‘The weakest groups of residents then run the risk of being forced out of the
neighbourhood “for their own good”.’ If you speak to council leaders in the western
suburbs of Amsterdam or in Rotterdam neighbourhoods like Charlois, they continu-
ally bring up the subject of public support for reconstruction, since feelings of unrest
and discomfort have been created among many residents, who have the impression
they’re being cleansed out of their own neighbourhoods. You hear comments like:
‘Along that way you’ll find new privately-owned houses. Sorry to be so blunt, but
that’s an enclave of high-income whites in what’s really a ghetto for immigrants.
Groups shut themselves off. No one has anything to gain by it.’
These are all useful qualifications to set beside attempts to encourage local resi-
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dents of different social and ethnic groups to mix, initiatives that run the risk of dis-
rupting more social networks than they create. Large-scale interventions do perk up
the appearance of a neighbourhood, but that’s not to say social relations will improve
very much in the long term, one reason being that a neighbourhood is more impor-
tant to some of its residents than to others. There are those who want to make inten-
sive use of the area they live in, while for many a home may be not much more than a
base of operations. So it’s only partly true to say that a neighbourhood is a communi-
ty; people who live in cities increasingly have relationships that extend far beyond
their own part of town. The notion that local communities have gradually fallen apart
is based on more than nostalgia alone.
There’s another factor to bear in mind. Much of the recent reconstruction of urban
areas has been prompted by concerns about public order. This in itself is nothing new,
in fact it’s an aspect of all urban planning: the established middle class wants to pre-
vent the emergence of an underclass, fearing social tensions and the creation of crime-
infested neighbourhoods. But striving for the maintenance of public order is not the
same as wanting to live together. People are keen to do away with ‘ghettoization at the
bottom’ while not really wanting to change ‘ghettoization at the top’. The better off
would in fact like to see dispersal without too much mixing. Of course this is a rather
self-contradictory desire, but it demonstrates that a conflict of interest has come into
play, in which the boundaries of class and colour soon become hard to tell apart.
The middle classes have an increasing tendency to isolate themselves. Why else do
we see more and more ‘gated communities’, small fenced-off welfare states with their
own security arrangements that look much like mediaeval fortress towns? Anthropol-
ogist Setha Low has researched the phenomenon in the country in which it has grown
most rapidly, America, where as long ago as the late s more than sixteen million
people lived in twenty thousand of these settlements.
People’s motives in opting for this kind of self-imposed isolation have to do prima-
rily with the quest for a safe community. ‘It transforms Americans’ dilemma of how to
protect themselves and their children from danger, crime, and unknown others while
still perpetuating open, friendly neighbourhoods.’ At the root of this self-seclusion
lies a fear of the rapidly increasing social and cultural differences we see in today’s
cities, but there’s also, Low says, a longing to replicate childhood memories imbued
with emotional certainties and a sense of protection. Closing off a neighbourhood by
building a fence around it, with private security guards at the entrance, reduces indi-
vidual freedom and opportunities for easy access, but that’s a price people are happy
to pay for enhanced social control. Of course one of the effects of this kind of privati-
zation is that it reduces residents’ sense of responsibility for security in society at large.
Dislike of ethnic minorities is one factor in the decision to live in a gated communi-
ty. By shutting themselves off, people are attempting to preserve some degree of ho-
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mogeneity and to secure control over who can settle in their immediate vicinity. As a
result, the ability of others to build a community is undermined, that is to say ‘com-
munity in the sense of an integration of the suburb and the city, community in terms
of access to public open space, and community within the American tradition of
racial and ethnic integration and social justice’
Here we see, in a magnified form, the impasse that segregation has created. The
middle classes react with fear to the formation of ghettos housing primarily low-
skilled migrants, but they regard the mixing of schools and local populations as a
prospect no less threatening. In cities where the majority of school-aged children be-
long to migrant families, dispersal imposed from above elicits yet more avoidance
strategies among members of the ‘white’ and ‘black’ middle classes. They can easily
leave. By doing so they undermine attempts to achieve mixed communities. Clearly,
along with the rebuilding of neighbourhoods, the positive effects of which relate
mainly to economic capacities and the safety of residents, other means must be sought
to encourage and enable people to live together.
    
In a time of globalization, not all cities are places of freedom and experimentation,
and those that are will not automatically remain so. Indeed, the cultural differences
that characterize all major cities today may make us wonder what can possibly hold ur-
ban communities together. Communities are never boundless; they are always demarc -
ated in some way, and it’s in the city that the perpetual tension between heritage and
openness is most obvious. Historian Piet de Rooy writes: ‘It will be possible to recover
cohesion in urban society only if we can develop new ideas about the citizenship of a
city.’ That will not be easy in places where more than a hundred different nationali-
ties are required to live together.
Countless cities in Europe and America are trying to find solutions. Social interven-
tions have been set in train, but patterns of segregation are stubborn, especially in
neighbourhoods where a large majority of the population is composed of migrants.
These patterns cannot be swept away completely, or even largely, by the interventions
of planners. The renovation of entire districts will end in huge disappointment if the
social environment – as manifested above all in schools and the jobs market – doesn’t
change at the same time. Donzelot is right: What is the point of replacing the stairs
and the lift in a high-rise block if it’s impossible for residents ever to climb to a higher
social level?
This is generally recognized. But there is more. The debate sparked by the riots in
the French banlieuesmade clear, if nothing else, that urban societies are divided along
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cultural as well as social lines. We need more than just attempts to give neighbour-
hoods and schools a more mixed character and to improve social mobility through ed-
ucation. The ‘cultural pillar’ has been neglected, the idea that a handing down of cul-
ture in the broadest sense is essential for the preservation and development of an ur-
ban society.
The first generation of city planners clearly believed in the connection between ur-
ban planning, social integration and cultural advancement. The garden city move-
ment, which marks the beginning of town planning in its modern form, was inextrica-
bly bound up with social issues. The background to this movement in Britain was
plain to all. The indescribable poverty and chaos in the slums of London, a city of mil-
lions, was seen by Victorian England as a moral scandal and at the same time as a
threat to social order. One feature of the garden city movement was a culturally moti-
vated distrust of the city, which was blamed for the decline of civilization. By contrast
the healthy countryside was regarded as an environment in which traditional norms
and values flourished. The best aspects of city and countryside could be combined in a
new project: the garden city. Small, self-sufficient towns were created outside urban
areas. In the words of the movement’s founder, Ebenezer Howard, these were intend-
ed ‘not as a temporary haven of refuge but as a permanent seat of life and culture, ur-
ban in its advantages, permanently rural in its situation’.
The old social question was addressed not merely through social regulation and
house building – those initiatives were embedded in a civilizing offensive that we’d
now no doubt be quick to label patronizing. In early twentieth-century Amsterdam,
councillor Floor Wibaut said: ‘The starting point for an enhancement of civilization
among the working classes must lie in the improvement of housing.’ At the same time,
however, he recognized that it would also be a question of ‘stimulating and strength-
ening the desire for a more elevated life’ among members of that working class. Plan-
ning was advocated by urban elites that adhered to clearly defined cultural ideals.
This attitude should be revived. Writing about life in modern cities, sociologist
Manuel Castells explains why. ‘It opposes the cosmopolitanism of the elite, living on a
daily connection to the whole world, … to the tribalism of local communities, re-
trenched in their spaces that they try to control as their last stand against the macro
forces that shape their lives out of their reach.’We need to let that phrase about ‘their
last stand’ sink in. What we have too easily dismissed as nostalgia is in fact an attempt
to regain a grip on the huge and therefore anonymous forces that increasingly affect
daily life. Opposition to further immigration among a significant majority of the pop-
ulation can be seen as an indication of this. Castells is entirely correct in concluding
that ‘the most important challenge to be met in European cities … is the articulation
of the globally-oriented economic functions of the city with the locally-rooted society
and culture’.
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How we can reconcile these two worlds? How can ties to the city be reinvented and
social cohesion strengthened? How can the sense of being part of an urban communi-
ty take root? The desire to achieve all this forms part of a broader reassessment. The
mass demolition that once accompanied urban renewal has been replaced by inter-
ventions that show more respect for the historical stratification of the city. This way of
dealing with a city’s history could become a guiding principle, helping city dwellers to
see themselves as residents of an environment that existed before them and will con-
tinue to exist after them.
In European cities, history is everywhere. In some we find relics more than two
thousand years old. Architectural historian Leonardo Benevolo stresses the signifi-
cance of the physical presence of past generations: ‘Coexistence with the “ruins” of
the ancient world would remain a constant of European civilization and transmitted
the physical sense of another, ever-present civilization, both foreign and familiar at
the same time. It also inspired a series of general reflections on the fragility of human
works and on those great forces – the ravages of time, the fickleness of fortune – which
have long accompanied both the individual and collective European sentiment.’
History understood in this way is not an invitation to arrogance or hubris but rather –
above all, perhaps – to modesty and moderation.
Why are children told so little about the history of their cities? Why do they learn
nothing about the stories behind the buildings and the streets, about manners and
customs? Why are children not encouraged to develop a historical sensibility by look-
ing at paintings or other works of art? British urban sociologist Ali Madanipour
writes: ‘The question of social exclusion and integration, it can be argued, largely re-
volves around access. It is access to decision-making, access to resources, and access to
common narratives, which enable social integration.’ The emphasis is always placed
on the political aspect, access to decision-making, and the economic aspect, access to
means, whereas in fact the cultural aspect of integration, access to shared stories, is no
less crucial.
There is a need to create a new majority among city dwellers, made up of those who
feel responsible for the future of the city, a majority that straddles the dividing line be-
tween indigenous populations and newcomers. In doing so more attention must be
paid to the rising middle class of migrants, in short to those with the greatest potential
for citizenship. There is so much to be gained here, even though a great deal of suspi-
cion will have to be overcome. A deliberate effort needs to be made to broaden the ur-
ban elite; it often fails to care enough, but at the same time, too little is asked of it. Writ-
ers, artists, entrepreneurs – the possibilities are endless. They should all be invited to
think for themselves about the way the urban fabric can be strengthened. 
Over the past few years much has been said about the creativity of cities, and clearly
those urban conurbations that have more technology, talent and tolerance do better
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than those with less. The tension between creativity, pre-eminently the province of in-
dividuals, and cohesion, a matter of communities, is something cities will have to ad-
dress in a time of globalization. In these new circumstances we must reinvent the city
as a place where new ways are constantly being found of combining creativity and con-
tinuity. This will be possible only if we understand that freedoms can sometimes fall
into disrepute. There’s no guarantee that tolerance can be preserved in cities that ac-
commodate vast social and cultural differences.
Some say diversity is valuable in itself and talk of a ‘diversity dividend’. We hear lit-
tle about the cost. American researcher Robert Putnam concludes from one study that
diversity certainly comes at a price. Although in the long term today’s immigration
brings new opportunities with it, in the short term the costs and benefits look rather
different. ‘In highly diverse Los Angeles or San Francisco, for example, roughly  per-
cent of inhabitants say they trust their neighbours “a lot”, whereas in the ethnically
homogeneous communities of North and South Dakota - percent of the inhabi-
tants say the same. In more diverse communities, people trust their neighbours less…
People living in ethnically diverse settings appear to “hunker down” – that is, to pull in
like a turtle.’He therefore advocates ‘more opportunities for meaningful interaction
across ethnic lines where Americans (new and old) work, learn, recreate, and live’.
Research shows that cities that are ahead in a technological sense do not score high-
ly on measures of social capital. The latter refers to things like the degree to which peo-
ple join clubs or do voluntary work. Clearly the new elites that populate the creative
city are less tied to a specific place, preferring to operate in quasi-anonymous sur-
roundings. This disengagement at the top of the social spectrum is matched by alien-
ation at the bottom. More and more people feel neither at home nor represented.
Odes to the creative city notwithstanding, the questions raised by Putnam continue to
dog us. How can we ensure that cities remain places where, despite being surrounded
by strangers, we can live with a reasonable degree of trust and confidence?
A city of creativity and freedom cannot exist in complete isolation. It requires the
context of a society that can answer the questions thrown up by migration in a more
or less balanced manner. Particularly in a time of speculation about ‘the abolition of
distance’, there’s a need to understand the boundaries within which people move. In
the globalizing world of the internet and other means of mass communication, dis-
tance seems less and less important, and it’s all too easy to assume that the spatial di-
mension will slowly dissolve into a general mobility of increasingly footloose citizens.
This is to overlook something: the city walls of old were not just a way of protecting
a place against intruders from outside, they also enclosed a community, an animated
inner space, as the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk describes it. He points to a
need to animate a large number of people within a ‘sphere of significance with shared
motives and unified spatial concepts’.The walls that shelter us are growing ever thin-
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ner in a world where borders are fewer and people have been set adrift. Sloterdijk
writes of a ‘globalization drama’: the social ties that protect people are gradually
dissip ating without anything new arising to take their place. Modern man is suffering
moral panic, finding himself a kind of vagrant in a chaotic world.
The turnover rate of people, goods and ideas is increasing all the time and in re-
sponse the need for spatial and mental anchorage has grown. The urban environment
has a major impact on all this. In a global economy there’s nothing natural about open
cities. The problem for elites is that they have not yet found ways of relating to the inse-
curity many citizens feel and their resulting tendency towards self-isolation. It doesn’t
help to remind people that they’ve become citizens of the world unless at the same
time we look for ways to answer their need for continuity and a sense of community.
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
The great migration
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   
On the borders of the affluent world, the dramas come thick and fast. People risk liter-
ally everything for a share in prosperity and freedom. On the Mexican border illegal
migrants lose their way in the desert cauldron and die of thirst. In the Mediterranean,
people attempt the crossing in unseaworthy small boats and drown. Sometimes the
bodies wash up, spotted from afar by holidaymakers settling down for a day at the
beach. A horrified reaction follows every time, then ebbs away until the next disaster
grabs our attention.
On  June , British customs officers found fifty-eight Chinese illegals in the
back of a Dutch lorry. They’d died of suffocation. The driver, who had Dutch identity
papers, was arrested on suspicion of agreeing to hide them for a fee and eventually sen-
tenced to fourteen years in prison. The stowaways had probably put their fate into the
hands of professional people smugglers. Estimates suggest that since the mid-s
some seven thousand deaths occurred in the cat-and-mouse game between border
guards and illegal immigrants.
We’ve stepped into a new world, but far from everything we’re experiencing is new.
On October  customs officials in the port city of Fremantle on the west coast of
Australia found fifty-four Chinese stowaways in one of the ballast tanks of the Dutch
ship SS Almkerk. They’d hidden there intending to come ashore unnoticed. The air in
the tank was so stale that eight were dead by the time they were found. The rest had
lost consciousness.
People have been crossing borders, legally or illegally, throughout human history.
What we now call globalization – its most visible feature being widespread human mi-
gration – is the latest manifestation of a long process of interconnection. It was the
colonial expansion of Europe, beginning with the discovery of America in , that
created today’s boundless network of economic and cultural interdependence. Immi-
gration into the Western world has a prior cause: if it hadn’t been for the overseas pos-
sessions of European colonial powers, the inhabitants of those other worlds would
not have been cut adrift so soon.
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Globalization as expressed in widespread migration is not a steadily advancing
process. It has peaks and troughs. There was mass migration from Europe to America
between  and , and in terms of the numbers involved that period was remark-
ably similar to our own, but the intervening years saw a deep dip. Between  and
, .million people emigrated to America, whereas between  and  only .
million crossed the Atlantic permanently. At the end of the twentieth century, immi-
gration equalled and surpassed the level it had reached just before the First World War,
producing nine million new Americans between  and .
Migration experts Stephen Castles and Mark Miller point to an historical continu-
ity in immigration trends, but at the same time they indicate what’s new about our
own era. ‘While movements of people across borders have shaped states and societies
since time immemorial, what is distinctive in recent years is their global scope, their
centrality to domestic and international politics and their enormous economic and
social consequences.’ They predict a further ‘globalization’ and ‘politicization’ of the
issue as more and more countries are affected by global waves of population move-
ment and at the same time the impact of migration becomes so great that it sparks po-
litical conflict.
Estimatesof thenumberofmigrants in theworld todayare inherentlyunreliable. In
 several reports stated that over millionpeople had spentmore than a year out-
side their own countries. It has been estimated that in  this figure, which includes
illegal migrants, will pass the  million mark. Distribution across the continents is
roughly as follows:Africa million,NorthAmerica million, SouthAmerica a little
under  million, Asia  million,Western and Central Europe  million, Eastern Eu-
rope and Central Asia million, the Middle East million and Oceania million.
As a proportion of a rapidly expanding world population, the rise in migration in
the years  to  from . to . per cent may not have been spectacular, but the
average for the richer parts of the world – Europe, North America, Japan, Australia
and New Zealand – rose enormously. In - it stood at half a million per year, in
- at . million. The figure is expected to fall back to . million a year for
-. In the case of Western Europe it actually increased more than threefold be-
tween  and  to around  per cent, meaning that in terms of the influx of new-
comers, this region now differs little from the United States. Moreover, the proportion
of total population growth in the rich world attributable to immigration has in-
creased enormously, from one eighth to more than two thirds. In Europe it’s as high as
three quarters. Were it not for the arrival of migrants, Europe’s population would now
be falling. Together with a rise in average age and changes in ethnic composition, this
lends a considerable emotional charge to the issue of immigration.
The number of people fleeing their own countries grew particularly rapidly in the
s and the first half of the s, reaching ten times that of a decade earlier. There

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 96
was a fresh peak around the turn of the century, then the figure stabilized and measur-
ably decreased before slowly rising again over the past few years. The number of
refugees worldwide is estimated at fifteen million, with a majority still in their home
regions. Almost half of all requests for asylum made in the West in - were re-
ceived by the three largest European countries: Germany, France and Britain. Given
the environmental disasters now predicted, it seems logical to assume that more peo-
ple will be forced to leave their native countries in the not too distant future.
Globalization has undoubtedly brought about a politicization of migration.
There’s a need to find democratic ways of influencing worldwide flows of humanity.
Of course there’s a tension between calls for more effective controls on human mobili-
ty and attempts to create an open economy sustained by cross-border trade and in-
vestment. If economic liberalism is to be consistent, it cannot favour the free move-
ment of goods and capital alone but must aim to dismantle barriers to the free move-
ment of people. Few liberals, though, are willing to live up to the creed they espouse.
It’s often said that immigration is out of control. Historians Piet Emmer and Hans
Wansink write: ‘Little can be done to prevent the arrival of migrants. The fact is, rich
countries are the favoured destination for immigrants from poor countries.’ If they
aren’t allowed in legally, they’ll come illegally. Yet the conclusion reached in their book
is that ‘only a fraction of intercontinental migrants can be allowed into Europe as legal
migrant labourers, and if we don’t succeed in allowing the best to come in, we’ll have
further problems’. This illustrates a profound feeling of uncertainty. How can it
make sense to opt for selective labour migration if all controls are doomed to fail and
‘little can be done to prevent the arrival of migrants’?
Emmer and Wansink are not alone in thinking this way. All too often a decision in
favour of more relaxed immigration laws is presented as simply inevitable: in a time of
globalization, we’re told, border controls are pointless. Before considering the ethics
of control measures we need to ask whether governments, including those of demo-
cratic countries, are capable of intervening effectively. Recent history shows that gov-
ernment intervention certainly can have a significant impact on migration. Take Ger-
many, where generous asylum legislation allowed the number of refugees arriving to
rise extremely rapidly, reaching , in . After the laws were tightened up, the
figure dropped dramatically to stand at , in . Tougher asylum laws in the
Netherlands, introduced at the start of the twenty-first century, had a similar effect.
The number of asylum seekers has fallen by between  and  per cent since the mid-
s. Another example is the French approach to immigration from Algeria, making
it progressively more difficult in the s. The numbers quickly fell, especially after
Tunisia and Morocco closed their borders.
Conversely, governments can have a decisive effect in attracting immigrants. This is
clear from the number of guest workers who arrived in northern Europe in the s

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 97
from countries like Portugal, Turkey and Morocco. Without support from govern-
ments in the countries that received them, the flow of migrant workers would never
have started. In classic countries of immigration like Canada and Australia, govern-
ments have played an active role in attracting precisely the type of migrants they be-
lieved were needed. In many cases, Australia even paid their travel costs.
There’s another sense too in which government decisions can have a significant im-
pact. American researcher Myron Weiner concludes that ‘much of the world’s migra-
tion today is the result of the policies and actions of states that directly or indirectly en-
courage, induce, or force their citizens to leave.’ So while decisions at a national level
are crucial in determining which migrants will be admitted, governments also have a
huge influence on the decisions made by their own citizens to depart. Sometimes they
may promote the idea of emigrating, as European governments did in the s when
they encouraged farmers to leave for Australia and Canada, on other occasions they
may use threats and force, one example being the expulsion of the Asian minority in
Uganda by President Idi Amin.
In some parts of the world outright expulsion is fairly common. In the Gulf states
migration is strictly regulated. Temporary guest workers from the Philippines have far
fewer rights than they would in the West; they are forbidden to start families and they
have no prospect of a status that could lead to citizenship. The authorities there often
refer to the European experience, which in so many cases saw a temporary stay turn
into permanent residence, as one they have no wish to repeat. At fairly regular inter-
vals, entire categories of guest workers are simply ejected. The same happened to tens
of thousands of Egyptian migrants in Libya in the s.
Such measures are almost unthinkable in liberal democracies, where political inter-
ference in migration flows is constrained by constitutional norms, but this does not
mean politicians are powerless in the face of mass migration. German political scient -
ist Christian Joppke poses a rhetorical question: If immigration can no longer be con-
trolled, why do states in the Middle East and South East Asia not do as the Western
world generally does? Why don’t they respect the rights of immigrants? He points out
that the limited sovereignty of a liberal democracy is a self-imposed restriction. Pres-
sure from the judiciary, which demands that the rights of migrants should be both re-
spected and extended, has been the main obstacle to the many attempts by politicians
to cut migration drastically.
In reality, Joppke says, after the economic crisis of  all immigration was undesir-
able, but as a result mainly of interventions by constitutional courts like the Conseil
Constitutionnel in France and the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Germany, initiatives
that would have put a brake on family reunion, for example, were blocked. These self-
imposed limitations on sovereignty as a result of the separation of powers – in other
words the independence of the judiciary – cannot be taken to suggest that govern-
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ments, as a result of globalization, no longer have any means of controlling their bor-
ders.
There’s another sense too in which the actions of states can have a direct impact on
the flow of migrants. Look at Haiti. It was partly because of the swelling flood of peo-
ple fleeing the country that the  government decided to intervene militarily. This is
not the only example of migration influencing international relations. The presence
of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon created consid-
erable tensions in those countries. Countless Palestinians were forced to leave
Lebanon, since they were prolonging the civil war there.
In fact there are few large migratory movements in which governments have not
been directly involved. Many of those who talk about the futility of trying to control
mass migration undermine their own argument by talking scornfully at the same time
about a ‘fortress Europe’ that’s pulling up its drawbridges. The image of a fortress is at
odds with that of powerless states unable to do anything to control immigration.
Controls are certainly needed, since there’s every reason to assume that pressure to
admit migrants will continue into the foreseeable future and indeed increase. The
contrast between demographic trends in developed and underdeveloped countries is
striking. While in some parts of the world populations are aging, elsewhere a youthful
surge is taking place. Meanwhile the gap in living standards between North and South
is still considerable, and there’s a constant demand for cheap labour. This is at its most
stark in countries like Mexico and the United States, or Morocco and Spain, where the
two worlds meet at a common border.
A great deal is at stake. Along with measures to control immigration, the social
compromise is up for discussion. The idea is gaining ground that with the rise of low-
wage economies like China and India the prosperous world is being forced to give up
much of its social safety net. In the West there’s a clear conflict of interest that makes
controlling immigration more difficult. The demand for cheap or even illegal labour
is now a matter of global competitiveness, and this has created a shadow economy that
affords its employees little protection. They’re in a vulnerable position, at risk of be-
coming victims of exploitation of a kind we hoped had been eliminated after a centu-
ry of emancipation.
Western governments reached deeper and deeper into the lives of their citizens
over the course of the twentieth century. Concerns about interference aside, this repre-
sents progress towards greater civilization, in the sense that sickness, unemployment
or old age no longer necessarily mean a descent into poverty. Nowadays efforts to
achieve equality are at odds with the liberalization of economies and the retreat of
governments, which are steadily relinquishing the idea that society is malleable. This
is to the detriment of parliamentary democracy, since citizens still have high expecta-
tions of their governments, despite today’s reluctance to regulate economic life.
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The credit crisis of the past few years has made the consequences of these develop-
ments startlingly clear; the deregulation of financial markets now confronts us with a
question of confidence: To what extent can people rely on important institutions such
as banks, or indeed their regulators? A lack of responsibility has led much-maligned
governments to become caught up in a financial support operation the like of which
the world has never seen. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, banks every-
where are either being nationalized or going into receivership. No-holds-barred liber-
alism has undermined itself. 
A further question arises. How much faith is it possible to have in national govern-
ments now that we’re so aware of the impact of distant events? Some institutions have
suddenly turned out to be far more vulnerable than anyone imagined. The effects will
undoubtedly make themselves felt, since without strong institutions and a democratic
culture able to straddle national borders, globalization will end in crisis and conflict.
It has happened before. On the eve of the First World War an optimism prevailed
about the growth of economic interdependency that bears comparison with today’s
expectations. Those hopes were cruelly shattered. International trade collapsed. It
took until some time in the s for the world’s economies to become as interwoven
as they were prior to , in fact between the wars there was a sharp decline in both in-
ternational economic activity and migration. 
Without shared democratic norms, neither a common market nor greater mobility
will be possible in the long term. The beginnings of a backlash are already visible, with
the rise of all kinds of populist movements born out of hostile responses to globaliza-
tion. We’ve seen outbursts of discontent not just in the West but in Asia as well. In the
late nineties, against almost all expectations, an economic crisis erupted in the Far
East where for decades economic growth had seemed boundless. A photograph from
those days shows a group of students stamping furiously on a pile of ballpoint pens.
The students were from South Korea, the pens from Japan. Their grim faces make
clear this was not merely youthful indignation – it looks more like a magic ritual to
ward off disaster. ‘Buy Korean’ was their slogan. Old accounts were being settled, since
current accounts were not looking too healthy.
It’s an image that captures the sense of powerlessness which overcame one of the
much-praised economies of Asia when the financial markets suddenly threw a series
of nations into a state of crisis. Powerlessness seeks redress. The anonymous forces
that controlled the world market had to be given a face: Japan, concluded those Kore-
an students; the Jews, the Malaysian prime minister was quick to presume; the Chi-
nese, was the widespread belief in Indonesia, prompting acts of aggression against
that minority; Westerners, many others cried, since the rescuers parachuted in by the
IMF and the World Bank are generally white and unrelenting.
The globe is fragile, as the Korean students’ pen-dance demonstrated. The interna-
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tionalization of the economy can be jeopardized by violent conflict and social imbal-
ance. The world market can’t be left to its own devices; it relies on stable relationships,
both national and international, which need to be regulated. It may often seem as if
politics has lost out to the economy, but moments of public crisis prove otherwise. In
short, the liberal utopia, in which peaceful international relations are an automatic re-
sult of shared trading interests, can be cruelly disrupted by national or ethnic conflicts.
Current agonizing over immigration should be understood against the back-
ground of tensions like these. Westerners are trying to find a new balance, but all too
often they’re told that because of immigration, which can’t be controlled, the differ-
ences within countries are increasing even as the differences between countries de-
crease. If we accept this line of reasoning, then it would be a good idea to take a closer
look at the consequences. Unlimited immigration means the contrasts that exist in
the world at large will be seen in the West’s major cities. As well as poverty and igno-
rance, ethnic conflicts and religious extremism will permeate liberal democracies.
Some believe that the West’s middle class can’t survive without an underclass and
that nowadays that underclass must be imported, since social advancement means
cheap labour is no longer available within richer countries. Over past decades we’ve
begun to anticipate where this could lead. The answer to the growing interdependence
of nations surely doesn’t lie in isolation; Europe is part of the world economy. But how
wide can social and cultural divides become as a result of globalization before they
start to destroy the trust citizens have in each other and in their representatives?
    
Economic globalization and the immigration that accompanies it cry out for regula-
tion. The pressure on Western societies is huge. As they face the despair of those seek-
ing their fortunes in the prosperous regions of the world, receiving societies are com-
ing up against increasingly vocal opposition to immigration. Surveys suggest that a
majority of people in the member states of the European Union believe immigration
should be more strictly limited. We see the same phenomenon in the traditional coun-
tries of immigration. The Australian government has been trying to reduce the flow
of new immigrants since the mid-s.
Those critical of more restrictive policies often point to a fundamental contradic-
tion between the generally recognized freedom to leave one’s own country and tight
restrictions on entering someone else’s. Globalization makes the discrepancy between
freedom to depart and limits on access all the greater. Residents of the rich world can
move around at will, but they think it more or less self-evident that residents of poorer
countries should be confined as far as possible within the boundaries of their own re-

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gions. British economist Philippe Legrain calls this a form of ‘global apartheid’ and
describes it as abhorrent and indefensible.
Limits on access don’t usually apply to highly educated migrants, who are scarce
and therefore welcome whenever shortages arise within their professions. Think of In-
dian computer specialists or nurses from the Philippines. Most arguments concern
low-skilled workers and their families. They are seen as a burden on the welfare state
and there’s less optimism about the social advancement of their children than there
once was. This has led most European governments to take steps to keep them out.
Yet there are those who advocate encouraging the migration of unskilled labour,
for a variety of reasons. At one end of the spectrum people talk about safeguarding
prosperity at home: there’s a demand here; we need these people in order to maintain
our way of life. At the opposite extreme people point to global inequalities, saying it’s
not so much a matter of demand for cheap labour as of supply, a result of the chasm
between North and South. Free-market thinking and cross-border solidarity come to-
gether in a plea for more migration.
Let’s look first at the economic incentive before turning to the moral argument.
What does the receiving society have to gain from low-skilled migrants? In many Eu-
ropean countries the results of post-war immigration are themain factor encouraging
restraint. One Dutch study states: ‘The net benefit of total immigration for an econo-
my like that of theNetherlands is small in current circumstances, if not negligible.’ In
Germany too there is growing scepticism about the costs and benefits of immigration.
A recent report speaks of an ‘unfavourable economic balance at present’ and adds that
it will only get worse ‘if the status quo is perpetuated over the coming years’.
As we shall see, in other countries too the economic yield of post-war immigration
has been disappointing. The conclusion drawn from this finding by a government ad-
visory body in the Netherlands is typical of the mealy-mouthed attitude that charac-
terizes so much of current policy: ‘As to the expectation of remaining a country of im-
migration, it is worth pointing out that this is a factual statement, not a statement
about its desirability as an outcome.’ But politics is all about whether given develop-
ments are desirable or not. This kind of self-declared impotence has done more to un-
dermine public acceptance of fresh waves of migration than to encourage it.
We cannot escape the question of what kind of immigration is desirable. The con-
clusions of another study are clear: ‘For the labour market no positive effects of large-
scale immigration are to be expected.’ This assessment takes account of Europe’s ex-
perience with guest workers, people brought to countries including France, Germany
and the Netherlands as a result of pressure from a business community that allowed it-
self to be guided by a need for cheap and eager workers. There were many unintended
consequences, which are still making themselves felt. Guest workers started families,
or reunited their existing families, so that today some six hundred thousand people of
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Turkish or Moroccan descent live in the Netherlands, that is to say ‘ten times the maxi-
mum number of guest workers then working in the Netherlands at any given mo-
ment,’ as sociologist Han Entzinger writes. In twenty years from now, both these eth-
nic communities will have doubled again, amounting to over a million people.
Given the long-term consequences of labour migration, we need to look not just at
the interests of business, legitimate though they are as such, but at the social costs that
arise as soon as migrant labour is no longer needed, as was the case after the oil crisis of
. British demographer David Coleman sums up the expense involved in this kind
of immigration: ‘The total cost of the integration process, and of associated immigra-
tion and race relations business, the cost of meeting the special education, health and
housing needs of immigrants, the net effects upon the education of ordinary (sic) chil-
dren in immigrant areas, the permanent need to “regenerate” urban areas of immi-
grant settlement instead of demolishing them, issues of crime and public order, and
the multiplier effect on future immigration.’
Faced with pleas from various sides to allow in more low-skilled workers – the key
terms being ‘seasonal labour’ and ‘cyclical migration’ – we need to ask ourselves
whether the branches of business that rely so heavily on minimally educated and often
illegally resident migrants have any future in the West. Take labour-intensive horticul-
ture. Globalization means that fruit and vegetables from all over the world are avail-
able all year round. Why would rich nations want to compete with low-wage countries
that are perfectly capable of supplying such products and would aid their own devel-
opment by doing so? It’s a thorny issue, but dependence on low-paid workers raises a
suspicion that this branch of business has no long-term future in countries with sig-
nificant exports in the agrarian sector. It would surely be better to anticipate that fu-
ture than to resort to indefensible strategies involving subsidies and import tariffs, ac-
companied by illegal migration – quite apart from the high environmental costs of
sustaining glasshouse cultivation, for example, in its current form.
The consequences of low-skilled migration can be problematic in the long term.
For a start, this kind of migration reduces pressure on businesses to innovate. It pro-
longs thedeath throesof non-viable industries.This creates short-term jobopportuni-
ties, but it’s highly questionable whether it truly benefits the economy overall.Histori-
an JohnHighampresents evidence that inAmerica restrictive immigration laws from
the early s onwards necessitated greater investment: ‘To the extent that the decline
of immigration after thewar encouraged capital investments inmachinery, restriction
probably stimulated thewhole upward trend.’ GérardNoiriel cannot escape the con-
clusion that in France the influx of low-skilled labour had a dubious effect on industri-
alization. It certainly helped to plug the gaps in heavy industry and agriculture, but at
the same time it stifled innovation, the mining industry being one example.
Another reason why the benefits accruing from migration often fail to meet expec-
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tations is that with permanent settlement the centre of gravity shifts from the active to
the inactive. The first generation of guest workers is initially extremely productive,
but the children, women and elderly who come to form an increasing proportion of
the migrant community often bring social costs with them. A positive balance can eas-
ily tip over into a negative one as the years go by. The Turkish community in Germany
illustrates this. In , when  per cent of West Germans were in work, the figure for
Turkish migrants was an astonishing  per cent, but by  labour participation had
swung round in favour of the indigenous population, with  per cent in work as com-
pared to  per cent of Turks. Participation in the workplace by Turkish migrants con-
tinued to fall, until it stood at less than  per cent, half the rate of thirty years earlier.
It’s not so much that newcomers take jobs from the existing labour force. In a
booming economy the existing population actually benefits as far as that goes, since
activity by migrants creates new jobs, but American economist George Borjas has
shown that current immigration, in the United States and elsewhere, exacerbates so-
cial inequality: prosperity flows away from employees, who are competing with immi-
grants, towards employers and others who use migrant labour. His succinct conclu-
sion is: ‘Workers lose because immigrants drag wages down. Employers gain because
immigrants drag wages down.’ There are important choices to be made here. It all
depends what kind of society we want.
We need to ask whether reliance on low-skilled migrants is compatible with a com-
prehensive welfare system. Immigration in the era of the welfare state is an unprece-
dented phenomenon. Never before have migrants been able to rely on a high degree of
protection. The problem is not so much that generous social provision attracts mi-
grants, since people don’t take the risk of leaving hearth and home in order to live on
state benefits. No, they come here to work and then get caught up in the welfare safety
net. Whatever their original motives, this outcome is not a happy one, say Dutch re-
searchers Han Entzinger and Jelle van der Meer: ‘As a result of the coincidence of the
open immigration society with the closed welfare state, forms of dependence arise
that nobody actually wants and that can be costly too.’
The incompatibility between a country of immigration and a welfare state has led
some to conclude that migrants ought not to be allowed to claim social benefit pay-
ments until a certain amount of time has elapsed. Since , immigrants to the Unit-
ed States have been eligible for welfare only after a legal residence of at least five years,
although the law is not applied very consistently, while in Australia the period is two
years, the idea being that migrants who do not have jobs must either survive inde-
pendently or go back. If this restriction had been applied to guest workers in the past,
however, the outcome would not have been greatly different. Most guest workers be-
came unemployed only after ten to fifteen years of productive labour and would there-
fore have qualified for full welfare payments under this kind of system.
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Some claim that new migration is unavoidable because Western societies are aging
and their social security systems will come under increasing pressure as a result. De-
mography, which concerns itself among other things with prognoses for future popu-
lation trends, is a creditable but uncertain business. We have to live with that uncer-
tainty, and it’s true that an increase in the number of elderly people is bound to change
the relationship between those aged fifteen to sixty-five and the over-sixty-fives. The
welfare state was built on the unspoken assumption that the ratio would need to be
roughly :, which is to say five people in work for every one person reliant on a pen-
sion, but already the ratio in Western Europe is : and over the coming half century it
will shift in the direction of :. There will be fewer and fewer workers to support those
dependent on them.
Pensions are therefore at risk, especially in countries such as Germany that have a
pay-as-you-go system, meaning those in work pay to support the elderly in the expec-
tation that their children will do the same for them. This ‘contract between the genera-
tions’ is premised upon a growing population, not one that is shrinking. Whereas only
one in ten German women born in  remained childless, one in three of those born
in  will not have children. By the proportion of people aged over sixty will
have risen from its  level of . per cent to . per cent, while that of the under-
twenties will have fallen over the same period from . to . per cent. 
Demographers Michael Teitelbaum and Jay Winter correctly state that ‘the coinci-
dence of below-replacement fertility and large-scale immigration makes population
politics an explosive issue’. The term ‘replacement fertility’ simply refers to the fact
that each couple must produce at least two children in order to replace itself. In a gen-
eral sense, almost all developed countries have a fertility rate below the replacement
value of ., which means their populations will fall if there is no immigration. Fertili-
ty rates in Western Europe have dropped precipitately. If we compare the averages for
- with those for - we see a strong downward trend everywhere: in
France from . to . children per couple, in Spain from . to ., in Germany
from . to ., in Britain from . to . and in the Netherlands from . to ..
In the industrialized world, then, a demographic revolution is underway, and it is
changing the population profoundly. One of the first countries to witness this phe-
nomenon is Japan, where predictions suggest that between  and  the popula-
tion will fall from million to million. In Western Europe too the trend is unmis-
takable. In Italy, for example, experts predict a fall in the same period from  to mil-
lion inhabitants. These figures are staggering.
The combination of low fertility and high immigration means that new migrants
account for a larger and larger proportion of any population growth developed coun-
tries canmuster. In  natural increase was responsible for roughly half the growth
of populations in countries likeWestGermany, immigration for the other half. In 
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practically all German population growthwas attributable to immigration, and devel-
opments in other European countries show the same pattern. It is less true in the case
of America: in one eighth of  population growthwas the result of immigration
andby  this had risen toone third.Figures forCanada are comparable to the: in
 a tenth and thirty years later almost half its population growthwas attributable to
the arrival ofmigrants.As formore recent trends, theEuropeanUnion,with its twen-
ty-seven member states, saw a rise in total population of . million in , taking it
to million, an increase of which  per cent was attributable to immigration.
Behind moves in some countries to increase the birth rate, France being one exam-
ple, lies a resistance to the colouring of the population. The slogan used by one Ger-
man politician was quite explicit: ‘Kinder statt Inder’, which roughly translates as: let’s
have more children of our own rather than importing computer specialists from In-
dia. That’s not a sensible starting point when so crudely expressed, but the underlying
question has to be asked. What does a low birth rate say about the dynamics of a socie-
ty? Must we simply accept that European societies are about to shrink, at least as far as
their indigenous populations are concerned?
Whatever we may think about immigration, the cultural changes that low birth
rates represent are unique. Never before have we seen a population shrink in peace-
time. We can only speculate what the cultural consequences of an aging population
may be, but it’s fair to assume that a less dynamic society will result. German demogra-
pher Franz-Xaver Kaufmann remarks that such a trend could easily lead to serious
tensions, not so much between the social classes as between generations. There’s a sig-
nificant risk that demographic stagnation will be accompanied by economic crisis
and that societies will become more inflexible. While globalization is placing increas-
ing pressure on them to adapt, demographic decline is reducing their ability to do so.
This revolution, which will have a profound effect on European lifestyles and on so-
cial stability in the near future, cannot be counterbalanced by migration from coun-
tries outside Europe. The United Nations institute charged with population prog-
noses presented detailed calculations in a report called Replacement Migration that
shocked its readers when it was published in . To keep the pressure of an aging
population at its present level until , net migration into Europe would have to
reach a total of  million a year – almost fifty times the present rate. Over a period of
fifty years some . billion migrants would be needed, double the population of Eu-
rope as it now stands, after which the problem of an aging population would manifest
itself again as the first of those migrants reached old age. More modest ambitions ren-
der up migrant numbers that are less astronomical but still problematic: merely keep-
ing Europe’s population stable would require a net total of two million immigrants a
year. In short, the aging of established populations can never in itself amount to an ar-
gument for permitting the immigration of unskilled workers on a large scale.
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Furthermore, in attracting low-skilled migrants, rich countries would be ignoring
their existing potential workforces of people with little in the way of higher education
or training. The current and future expansion of the European Union to include coun-
tries further east, in due course perhaps Turkey among them, will release an enor-
mous pool of cheap labour. This flow of newcomers, who after an initial transition pe-
riod will be given freedom of movement, makes the call for immigration from outside
the expanding union premature to say the least. The number of migrants from Poland
who arrived in Britain as new citizens of the EU, to take one example, exceeded all ex-
pectations. Tens of thousands were expected; hundreds of thousands came.
Putting out another appeal for guest workers, even if we now call them seasonal
workers, represents the line of least resistance. As we shall see time and again, the de-
bate on immigration and integration confronts societies with their own failings. Im-
porting cheap labour would be a way of sidestepping the problem of inactivity among
a proportion of people of working age. This becomes clear from reading Emmer and
Wansink, who rather unceremoniously write off the one and a half million people in
the Netherlands who are dependent on social insurance payments: ‘A large propor-
tion of those drawing state benefits are people who no longer have any chance in the
labour market.’ Elsewhere they remark that it’s not so much a question of a lack of
opportunities as a lack of will: ‘Dutch people feel themselves too good for such jobs, so
without immigrants this kind of work is unaffordable.’ They have in mind the car-
ing professions, and horticulture.
In that ‘unaffordable’ lies a recognition that it’s not so much a matter of the indige-
nous population not wanting to do certain work as that this group will no longer work
for the wages on offer. American researcher Thomas Sowell concludes that ‘there are
very few occupations that can be dispensed with entirely’. Were it not for immigra-
tion, ‘many jobs would have been filled with natives at higher wage rates’. In short,
work such as cleaning is often performed by immigrants, but this doesn’t mean that
without migration there would be no cleaners. In countries like Japan, which has few
immigrants, people pay more for certain services. Might it not be a good idea to re-
move the causes of inadequate participation in the jobs market before resorting to mi-
grant workers?
Numerous economists insist that the increasing educational level of the popula-
tion has created a shortage of low-skilled workers. But what about the second genera-
tion, the children of guest workers? Currently half of all Turkish and Moroccan young
people in the Netherlands leave school with only the most basic qualifications. Econo-
mist Arie van der Zwan is forthright: ‘By making labour migration easier you are im-
plicitly saying that our huge reserves of poorly educated and minimally integrated
non-native residents now on welfare or in receipt of other social benefit payments will
never find jobs. That is the tragedy of our major cities.’ Most Western European
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countries have considerable reserves of low-skilled labour, and those that haven’t suc-
ceeded in creating work for their existing unemployed should have no illusions about
the prospects for a new generation of migrant labourers.
That question resonates all the more loudly when we consider that for every mi-
grant, several relatives will arrive, meaning that limited labour migration can produce
large ethnic communities within one or two generations. These long-term conse-
quences are rarely taken into account. Given the problems of integration European
cities face now, it would not be wise to opt a second time for large-scale immigration
by people with little schooling. That would mean writing off many citizens prema-
turely, whereas in fact the social contract needs to be reassessed. A welfare state should
confer obligations – a very different thing from bobbing on the currents of globaliza-
tion.
   
In the debate about the economic benefits of immigration people invariably point to
the classic countries of immigration: America, Australia and Canada. We are told that
clearer demands are made of migrants there, with the result that they arouse far less
opposition than in Europe. The comparison is certainly worth making, partly because
it draws attention to the fact that in those countries too a fierce controversy is raging as
to the benefits of migration. The opposition to immigration they are experiencing
bears comparison with the discontent felt in today’s Europe.
The classic countries of immigration have all been through similar stages of devel-
opment. The first obvious thing about them is that, when still sparsely populated, they
were opened up by deliberate efforts to attract migrants. They all have a history of dis-
placing and eliminating the original inhabitants, and their identity has been formed
in part by the experience of the ‘frontier’. One new generation of migrants after anoth-
er has helped to conquer the land from nature, by laying railways, for example. In
America, Australia and Canada, immigration was crucial to nation building.
The immigration histories of these countries have other features in common. It’s
clear that their migrants came primarily from certain regions. In reality, and as amat-
terof policy,migration fromEuropewasgiven free reignuntil the s,whereasmuch
was done to dissuade people from other parts of the world from making the voyage.
One of the first laws adopted by the Australian parliament after independence from
Britain in was the ImmigrationRestrictionAct,which specified that those coming
to Australia must not be a burden on the public purse or on charitable institutions.
This law,which remained in forceuntil , implicitlydefined theWhiteAustraliaPol-
icy: coloured people were not welcome.This was never stated in somanywords, but it
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was put into practical effect by means, among other things, of the ‘dictation test’,
which Australian immigration historian James Jupp has called ‘probably the most
hypo critical invention in the long history of Australian immigration’. It took the
form of a five-hundred-word dictation exam that enabled an immigration official to
seewhetherapersoncould readandwrite.The testworkedasadeterrent.Itwasclear to
everyone that migrants from outside Europe had no chance. So they didn’t come.
Like Australia, Canada applied racial criteria for many years in selecting its mi-
grants. A government document from  is quite explicit: ‘It is the policy to do all to
keep out of the country undesirables.’ How were undesirable immigrants defined?
‘Those belonging to nationalities unlikely to assimilate and who consequently prevent
the building up of a united nation of people of similar customs and ideals.’ There
was particularly strong opposition to Asian migrants. Time has caught up with the
words of Premier Mackenzie King in : ‘Large-scale immigration from the Orient
would change the fundamental composition of the Canadian population.’
We will look at American immigration history in a separate chapter, but here we
should note what has been called the ‘love-hate relationship’ between Americans and
immigration. The United States began to impose restrictions at an early stage. At first
controls were fairly minimal and aimed mainly at preventing immigration from Asia –
the Chinese Exclusion Act of , for instance, which was not repealed until .
Around the turn of the twentieth century traditional migration from Britain, Ireland,
Germany and the Scandinavian countries was overtaken by new immigration from
countries such as Italy, Poland and Russia, and from the Balkans. In those years more
broadly based opposition to immigration began to emerge, eventually leading to the
 Immigration Act, which attempted to consolidate the ethnic balance by favour-
ing migrants from Western Europe and the Nordic countries. A statement by Presi-
dent Calvin Coolidge sums up the climate that prevailed at the time: ‘There are racial
considerations too grave to be brushed aside for any sentimental reasons… The
Nordic races propagate themselves successfully. With other races, the outcome shows
deterioration.’ The  legislation largely achieved its intended effect and it re-
mained in force for many years.
Partly as a result of the Civil Rights Movement and criticism of colonialism, Ameri-
ca relinquished these racial criteria bit by bit from the s onwards. The conse-
quences for the magnitude and composition of immigration flows were spectacular.
In , . per cent of Australians were born outside the country, a slightly lower fig-
ure than in  but still higher than for Canada and the United States, where the pro-
portion of foreign-born residents is around . and . per cent respectively. In
Australia and Canada, Asian migration predominated from the late s onwards.
Today the proportion of immigrants to these countries who were born in Asia is
around  per cent. The population of Sydney is now one third Asiatic.

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As well as immigration from Asia, America has seen a considerable influx of mi-
grants from Latin America since the s, more specifically from neighbouring Mexi-
co. The assumption is now that by the middle of this century around a quarter of the
 population will be made up of so-called Hispanics, a term that covers all migrants
from the Spanish-speaking world. In Canada, Australia and the United States, Euro-
pean migration has fallen to around  per cent of newcomers. All three countries,
once a product of British colonialism, are therefore slowly but surely breaking away
from their origins. They have become nations that encompass more or less the entire
world, although they receive relatively few migrants from Africa and the Middle East.
This social transformation has met with resistance and everywhere there are clear
signs of opposition to new migration.
It’s often assumed that the classic countries of immigration have been making
much clearer demands of people who want to immigrate than European countries
have done up to now. In practice rather less planning seems to have been involved,
aside from the racial criteria we have already examined. In fact only since  in Cana-
da and  in Australia has much attention been paid to qualifications. With the abo-
lition of Europe-oriented migration policies, other criteria gradually came to apply.
In a sense these countries moved from one form of selection to another: economic cri-
teria replaced ethnic criteria. The emphasis on economic usefulness intensified in the
s. If we look at three categories of immigrant – family members, those with skills
to offer and asylum seekers – then it’s clear that in Canada there has been a strong shift
away from the family and towards skilled labour. This is part of an attempt to tackle
the swelling crisis of legitimacy surrounding migration, which now stands at over
, new residents a year. In the late s Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka
described this crisis as follows: ‘Canadians’ former sense of confidence and optimism
that our problems were manageable has been replaced with the feeling that things are
out of control.’
The same shift took place in Australia in the mid-s, but in contrast to Canada,
total immigration fell to less than , a year. Australia, which according to Jupp
has ‘one of themost restrictive control systems of any democracy’, has used a points
system for economic migrants since , such that educational qualifications, age,
knowledge of the English language and suitability for understaffed professions are
central. There was a good deal of controversy about the way the system was imple-
mented,mainly because a commandof English soon came toweigh less heavily.Histo-
rianGeoffrey Blaineywarned in themid-s thatwhile inadequate commandof the
language entails high economic costs, the social costs are evenhigher: ‘confusion, lone-
liness, misunderstanding and prejudice’. He expressed a belief that the reuniting of
families was receiving undue emphasis, allowing too many uneducated migrants to
enter the country. Such criticismwas taken seriously and gradually admission require-
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ments were tightened. The government also extended the period during which new
migrants were denied access to welfare benefits from six months to two years.
Over the past few decades America has developed rather differently, although there
too, since the new immigration act of , migration has been predominantly about
the formation and reunification of families. This accounts for some  per cent of the
total. The United States differs from Canada and Australia in that it was not until the
s that it cautiously began to promote immigration by qualified workers and pro-
fessionals, and it did so in addition to family-based migration rather than as an alter-
native to it. Along with ethnic interest groups, in America it’s often religious groups
who defend immigration by family members, as part of an effort to preserve tradition-
al family values. 
The important point here is that aside from the past few years, in none of the classic
countries of immigration have migrant labourers formed a majority of those enter-
ing. As a result, assessments of the economic importance of immigration over recent
decades have been tentative. An Australian report from , written before policy was
steered in the direction of ‘economic rationalism’, states: ‘Using immigration as a tool
of macroeconomic policy is ineffectual … as it does not influence the main economic
variables.’ According to Jupp, this is a fair summary of the debate in that country,
and in Canada a government economic advisory body came to a comparable conclu-
sion in : an annual rise of , in the number of migrants would contribute lit-
tle to the economy. Sociologist Peter Li sums up the main thrust of the Canadian study
by saying that immigration has produced ‘a moderate positive or neutral economic ef-
fect on Canada in the post-war period’.
As to the economic benefits of immigration in the United States, the verdict of Bor-
jas, who originally entered the country as a refugee from Cuba, is fairly outspoken. In
his book Heaven’s Door, which has become a classic, he analyses the waves of immigra-
tion seen in the s, which included many well-educated Europeans and Canadians.
Their arrival was beneficial, but the immigration of the s and since, mainly involv-
ing low-skilled Asians and Hispanics, has been far less profitable. His carefully rea-
soned estimate suggests that ‘the annual net gain is astoundingly small’. Had the
Canadian points system been applied to all immigrants to the United States, Borjas
calculates,  per cent would not have been allowed in. Such a measure would have
had widely divergent consequences for the different immigrant groups: of English mi-
grants only  per cent and of Indian migrants  per cent would have been turned
away, whereas  per cent of Portuguese and three quarters of Mexicans would have
found themselves refused entry.
In the classic countries of immigration, as elsewhere, there has been a fall in the ed-
ucational level of immigrants and at the same time a rise in government expenditure,
partly because of the relatively high cost of newcomers in state benefits and in educa-
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tional initiatives for children who do not speak the language well. Whereas in America
in migrants earned an average of . per cent more than people born in the coun-
try, this had been reversed by , with immigrants earning .per cent less. In an as-
sessment of two centuries of mass migration, economists Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey
Williamson point to a discrepancy in performance on the jobs market between estab-
lished residents and newcomers. The gap has certainly widened rapidly. It increased in
the late nineteenth century too, but it became markedly greater in the half-century af-
ter  than in the half-century after . Since welfare payments are relatively mod-
est, the number of migrants in work is higher in the United States than in most Euro-
pean countries. This is an important difference. Nevertheless, in the classic countries
of immigration as in Europe, a fierce debate is going on and a desire for restrictions on
new immigration dominates public opinion.
In the same period a polemic has developed in the United States concerning prima-
rily Mexican immigrants, many of whom are in the country illegally. Attempts to in-
troduce legislation that would give official residence status to its estimated thirteen
million illegals have so far failed. Opposition among the public at large to the rapid
growth in the number of newcomers, which we shall look at in more detail later, shows
that there is nothing natural about openness even in a ‘nation of immigrants’ such as
America claims to be. On the contrary, at various points in its history campaigns
against immigration have arisen and restrictive laws have been passed. We are now
witnessing a fresh episode of this perpetually recurring opposition.
One obvious conclusion is that, generally speaking, there is a clear preference for
well-educated migrants. No fewer than  per cent of today’s immigrants to Canada
have academic training, although many are working below their level of competence,
since the qualifications they earned in their own countries are not recognized. A wry
joke says that Toronto has the best educated taxi drivers in the world. The incommen-
surability of diplomas is a problem in Europe too; if no adjustments are made, the tal-
ents of highly educated migrants will go to waste.
The decision to permit more immigration isn’t just a means to financial gain, it’s a
matter of identity. The essential question in the end is whether Europeans want to de-
velop according to the pattern of countries like the United States, Canada and Aus-
tralia. If they choose that option, will they regard the result as an improvement to their
societies? Canada and Australia, with their highly organized immigration policies –
think of the points system – might serve as examples to Europe. The relatively liberal
policy of America, which admits a large number of migrants every year without re-
quiring them to meet particularly strict standards for entry, seems less attractive. We’ll
return to the question of whether continuing to admit a vast number of newcomers,
with first-generation immigrants accounting for  to  per cent of the population, is
economically and culturally beneficial.
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  
Now that we’ve weighed up the economic case for encouraging immigration we can
turn our attention to humanitarian arguments. Recognizing that on balance Euro-
pean societies have little to gain by the arrival of large numbers of low-skilled mi-
grants from developing countries, many of those appealing for more freedom to mi-
grate choose a different starting point. It’s not what the receiving society needs that
counts, they say. Instead they argue for the opening of borders as a way to improve the
lot of the migrant. In their view, allowing immigration is a form of development aid.
A pamphlet called People Flow lays out this line of reasoning: ‘It seeks to manage the
movement of people by taking their needs and purposes as a starting point.’ The ar-
gument is based on a recognition that migration is transforming Western societies,
but the authors add matter-of-factly: ‘We propose “simply” to take this loss and try to
turn it into a gain by letting go of an identity that has escaped us anyway.’ Their ap-
proach has the great merit of presenting a clear choice. If the narrowing of the gulf be-
tween North and South brings with it a relocation of poverty and illiteracy, then that’s
something we just have to accept. A choice made on this basis amounts to the moral-
ization of migration.
The confusing thing here is that the practical consequences of these decisions
based on humanitarian motives are the same as those of taking the immediate eco-
nomic self-interest of the richer part of the world as a starting point. As we have seen,
some say that a highly developed middle class can’t do without an underclass of low-
skilled migrants to provide menial services. Moral principles can easily merge with
self-interest. Multiculturalism and market liberalism have a great deal in common in
that they both seriously call into question the value of the social compromise within
the borders of Western countries. This is something Legrain makes explicit with his
call to ‘let them in’, addressed both to devotees of the free market on the right and to
internationalists on the left of the political spectrum. In the immigration debate, tra-
ditional political boundaries become blurred.
Aside from the desirability or otherwise of this option for developed nations, the
question arises as to whether such an approach would in fact help poorer countries.
Many uncertainties surround the link between development and migration. The argu-
ment that emigration from developing countries amounts to a brain drain should cer-
tainly be taken into account. It’s a cause for concern, at the very least, when twelve
hundred South African nurses come to the Netherlands, apparently because the
Dutch feel such work is beneath them, while those same nurses are sorely needed in
their home country. President Nelson Mandela of South Africa has complained about
the departure of medical personnel. Over  per cent of the best qualified citizens of
the Caribbean and  per cent in the case of Gambia work in the richer regions of the
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world. The same goes for a quarter of highly educated people from Ghana, which has
six doctors per , inhabitants whereas countries like Britain and Canada have
around .
Castles and Miller write about Egypt, which sees most of its emigrants leave for
Saudi Arabia: ‘Labour emigration undoubtedly relieved chronic unemployment, but
it also stripped Egypt of much needed skilled workers.’ Qualifications aside, it’s usu-
ally the more enterprising who have the courage to set out for an unknown destina-
tion, people whose energies might otherwise have benefited economic life in their
own countries. Their departure may amount to a safety valve for social tensions – a
large population of frustrated young people can cause great unrest – but migrants
take away with them much of a country’s willingness to reform.
On the other hand, money flows back from migrant communities to their coun-
tries of origin in the form of what are known as remittances. Officially registered pay-
ments of this type amounted to  billion dollars in  and their true extent is no
doubt far greater. Important recipient countries include India, at  billion dollars a
year, Mexico,  billion, and the Philippines, at  billion. In the case of Lebanon, pay-
ments sent home by migrants are equivalent to the country’s entire export income.
In ,  billion euro was transferred in the form of remittances from workers in the
European Union, of which . billion remained within the Union while . billion
went beyond its boundaries. So for the countries of origin, considerable financial in-
terests are bound up with migration. By any measure, as a worldwide phenomenon re-
mittances far exceed official development aid. In , registered money transfers
alone came to . times the total amount given in aid that year.
British economist Nigel Harris regards these payments as representing a huge op-
portunity and he stresses that opposition to immigration increases inequality in the
world: ‘Immigration controls in the developed countries impose very heavy costs on
the developing countries.’ He presents calculations showing that as a result of the
emigration of  per cent of employees from developing countries, a sum of between
 and  billion dollars flows back to them annually. His conclusion: ‘Perhaps the
greatest opportunity for the eradication of world poverty lies in opening up the
labour markets of the developed countries to workers from the rest of the world.’
So there’s a great deal to be said for the notion that migration is a form of develop-
ment aid, and far more effective as such than the activities of governments and aid or-
ganizations, because the money reaches families directly rather than having to be dis-
tributed by expensive aid workers or corrupt governments. All the same, there are
those who question whether remittances really contribute significantly to develop-
ment in poorer countries. Some would claim that money received from relatives in
distant countries is not productively invested but instead mainly goes on consumer
goods. Others, though, have demonstrated that money sent back to the countries of
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origin leads to children staying on longer at school, since they aren’t called upon to
start work so soon to supplement the family’s income.
The discussion about the desirability or otherwise of migration from developing
countries rightly places the gap between North and South at the centre of attention.
It’s often said that inequality in the world has increased enormously in recent years.
Australian philosopher Peter Singer presents evidence suggesting otherwise. He
points to a reduction in the difference in buying power between the poorest  per
cent and the richest  per cent of the world’s population. He also looks at life ex-
pectancy in developing countries, which by the turn of this century had risen to over
 per cent that of the industrialized world. In  it was considerably lower, at only
per cent of life expectancy in Western countries. Still, however we weigh up the in-
equalities in the world, it’s clear that the pressure to migrate is considerable, especially
in regions with large differences in income that border each other, such as Mexico and
the United States, or Europe and North Africa. Closing national borders to the vast
majority of low-skilled migrants and their families does bring other obligations with
it.
The main issue here is not development aid – of which the total amount spent has
now fallen to around a quarter of one per cent of the gross domestic product of the
rich countries. The West’s main responsibility concerns trade policy. Serious thought
should be given to the need to open up Western markets and to adjustments that
could be made to the international division of labour. No one wishing to ease the con-
stant pressure to admit migrants can ignore the need to reduce European trade bar -
riers, so that prosperity can develop elsewhere in sectors such as agriculture. Europe’s
horticulture is currently sustained by artificial means in every sense, whereas all kinds
of fruits, vegetables and flowers would flourish far more naturally under, for example,
the North African sun. The World Trade Organization has reported that the richer
countries subsidize their own agricultural products to the tune of at least a billion dol-
lars a day, more than six times the amount they give in development aid to poor coun-
tries.
Allow the products to come here, so that the people can stay there. Unfortunately
even this is not as straightforward as it sounds. It seems unlikely that opening up West-
ern markets would reduce migration. There are few things economists agree on about
the connection between migration and development, but none doubt that in its initial
phase economic progress would in fact lead to more migration. It’s rarely the poorest
who emigrate; they lack the financial resources to do so. British philosopher Michael
Dummett writes that ‘the first result of a serious attempt to relieve [a] country’s desti-
tution may be to increase, not decrease, the number of those who leave it for more
prosperous lands’. After migration from the countryside to the city comes migra-
tion to Western countries. This is demonstrated by emigration from the Chinese
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coastal province of Fujian, which has increased enormously with the rapid economic
development this region is now achieving.
In the longer term, however, development is bound to result in reduced levels of mi-
gration. We see this in the European Union, where freedom of movement has not led
to huge waves of permanent migration, despite the fact that before it expanded east-
wards, differences in income between member states were as high as  per cent. Mi-
gration isn’t triggered by absolute differences in prosperity but to a far greater extent
by the lack of prospects people perceive in their own countries. If they see signs of
durable progress at home, then eventually they’ll be less likely to feel the urge to leave,
even if the gap between people in poorer countries and citizens of the Western world
remains appreciable for the time being.
All too often, those who focus on the relationship between immigration and devel-
opment try to add weight to the moral argument by conjuring up visions of an in-
escapable threat. They emphasize not so much the unfairness of the situation as the
impossibility of putting a stop to the great migration that is now underway. They
point to demographic data. In  the total world population was around . billion
and average estimates suggest it will reach . billion by . A full  per cent of this
growth will take place in what used to be called the third world. Developing countries
are experiencing a truly enormous increase, while the developed world struggles with
declining growth or even shrinking populations.
These contrasting developments could in theory be evened out by a stream of mi-
gration from South to North. Historian Paul Kennedy understands the objections to
such a massive shift in population but suggests that ‘the imbalances in demographic
trends between “have” and “have not” societies’ probably mean we will see huge
waves of migration over the coming decades. He is convinced the population explo-
sion will have far-reaching consequences for the environment, not just in the coun-
tries affected but in more prosperous nations as well. ‘The environmental issue, like
the threat of mass immigration, means that – perhaps for the first time – what the
South does can hurt the North.’ Kennedy predicts that developed countries will find
themselves ‘under siege’ by millions of migrants if developing nations remain in the
poverty trap.
French writer and former government adviser Jacques Attali subscribes to the same
diagnosis. ‘Mass immigration from Africa, coupled with the flood of hard-pressed
Eastern Europeans into Western and more prosperous countries, will prompt the con-
struction of a new Berlin Wall, one that prevents people on the periphery from seek-
ing their fortune in the centres of the affluent North.’ If nothing is done, then wars
and violence will scar the periphery of the rich world. This is an appeal to enlightened
self-interest. Western countries will have to intervene to create a fairer relationship be-
tween North and South, since through migration the South can cause disruption in
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the rich world. In other words, migration flows have increased the interdependence of
the world to such an extent that the North will have to pay attention to the problems of
the South to some degree, simply in order to avoid a ‘state of siege’.
Attali and others who present such threatening scenarios do so for understandable
reasons. They want Western countries to take a hard look at their responsibilities, if
not on ethical grounds then for their own good. The resentment now spreading
through poor parts of the world can’t be held at bay for ever. A combination of moral
considerations and fear of social insurrection was once the motivation for a redistrib-
ution of wealth between rich and poor within European countries. Why should such a
redistribution not be repeated on a global scale?
In reality there haven’t yet been nearly as many opportunities for poorer countries
to put rich countries under pressure as some people claim. In any case, experience in
major world cities like New York and Rio de Janeiro shows that extreme social differ-
ences can exist side by side. If rich neighbourhoods can shield themselves from poor
neighbourhoods that lie within walking distance, then the rich ‘districts’ in the ‘global
village’ surely can too. Migration undoubtedly creates new forms of dependency be-
tween North and South, but the Western world has innumerable ways of defending it-
self against the disruption these writers predict. In other words, we must take serious-
ly the moral questions thrown up by immigration and not simply rely on self-interest
to produce the right outcome.
Threatening scenarios and predictions of a ‘state of siege’ won’t make attitudes any
more open. Citizens will merely dig in their heels even more. The whole world pours
into our living rooms through modern media, and as a result too much is asked of us.
A torrent of bad news weighs on our consciences, obliging us to act even though the
opportunities to do so are limited. The claims made upon us by a morality that choos-
es to see the world as a community of fate can easily tempt us to reject all sense of obli-
gation.
It’s far harder to extend the range of our responsibility permanently than to arouse
fleeting sympathy. How can we promote a growing consciousness of our vulnerability
that translates into openness rather than self-isolation? There is an obvious need for
protection against undesirable waves of migration and at the same time for progress
towards a fairer system of world trade. Driving back protectionism in agriculture will
be painful and the same goes for the cancellation of debts entered into on clearly de-
fined terms. But there’s no other way, if we want to reconcile a cautious immigration
policy with a growing responsibility for the world around us.
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The central question is: How can an open society exist in a world without borders? At
first sight this seems puzzling. Surely the fewer borders there are and the greater each
individual’s freedom of movement, the more open a society becomes? In reality that
openness cannot be taken for granted and the rise of movements brandishing slogans
like ‘full is full’ or ‘close the borders’ are an early indication of this. Such slogans lead
into an impasse and can never serve as guidelines for dealing with migrants or
refugees. They do, however, make a problem visible.
There are two conceivable threats to the open society. One is the risk that the move-
ment of peoples will exceed its ability to adapt, both socially and culturally. There are
limits to what existing populations can and will accept, no one should have any illu-
sions about that. The other risk is that the means by which immigration is controlled
will be incompatible with the basic principles of a liberal constitutional state. Nobody
wants to live in a country where they come up against police surveillance, identity
checks and strict border controls at every turn.
Will the West succeed in finding a viable compromise between humanitarian obli-
gations and concern about the pressures caused by migration? It must begin by refus-
ing to see globalization as a natural state of affairs. We often hear that resistance to cer-
tain outcomes of the world economy is as futile as opposition to the weather. By exten-
sion there’s a tendency to think it’s impossible to influence the movement of people:
legal or illegal, migrants will keep coming to the rich centre of the world from its poor
periphery. The facts don’t support such reasoning. This more intimidating side to
claims about globalization must be challenged.
There’s a need for a morality of mobility. If no way can be found of dealing with
those cast adrift by world disorder after they arrive in Western countries – refugees,
wandering adventurers, reunited family members and illegally resident foreigners –
then any pretence at promoting amore or less equitable state of affairs outside the bor-
ders of the world’s richest countries will be regarded as a smokescreen.The norms the
West holds out to the world will be plausible only if they’re evident in the way its soci-
etieswork.The reverse is not the case:more rigorous formsof equality canbe achieved
within those borders than Westerners can hope to bring into being outside them.
Today’s migration flows do indeed raise important moral questions. Here we’ll lim-
it ourselves to the following dilemmas: Should states be permitted to refuse entry to
citizens of other countries who wish to emigrate? How will it ever be possible to deter-
mine who is truly a refugee? And should a blind eye be turned to illegal migration or
should everything be done to prevent it? These are all questions that haunt Western
countries and often lead people either to avert their eyes out of indifference or to lose
themselves in moralizing pronouncements.
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First let’s look at the arguments of those appealing for open borders as a matter of
principle, such as Michael Dummett. He claims there’s a glaring contradiction in in-
ternational law. The universal declaration of human rights states that everyone has the
right to leave his country and return to it. At the same time, nowhere is it laid down
that a general obligation exists to take in people who have left their home countries,
unless they qualify as refugees. In other words, the choice to emigrate is a universal hu-
man right, but it runs up against restrictive immigration policies that still fall under
the heading of national sovereignty. Dummett concludes that sovereignty must give
ground, that the burden of proof ought to lie with countries wishing to exclude mi-
grants: ‘The principle of open frontiers ought to be accepted as the norm: a norm
from which deviation can be justified only in quite exceptional circumstances.’
The idea behind this argument is that indigenous populations do not have any spe-
cial rights as compared to newcomers. What are the grounds for a ‘right of the first-
born’? Why should a country belong to its inhabitants? The heritage of past centuries
is for everyone to use to his or her advantage. Why should those who happen to live in
prosperous and peaceful nations be able to claim a special right to that heritage? Are
we not all newcomers to the countries into which we’re born? This is reminiscent of
proposals made in the past to impose an inheritance tax of up to  per cent. Why
should children have a right to the wealth their parents have accumulated? By a simple
analogy: Why should the indigenous have a right to the wealth earned by their distant
ancestors? Having a particular place of birth surely cannot have any moral signifi-
cance, Dummett argues. But this conflicts with the idea that society is based in part on
a contract between generations. It’s no surprise to discover that those who appeal for
open borders talk only of rights; anyone who’s dismissive of a society’s historical di-
mension will lack a sense of the obligations that flow from it.
Every community exists by grace of its borders. They can have varying degrees of
openness, but it’s impossible to do without demarcation of some kind between resi-
dents and outsiders. American philosopher Michael Walzer emphasizes this point:
‘The distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure and, without it, can-
not be conceived as a stable feature of human life.’ He adds that members of a politi-
cal community have a collective right to determine who will or will not be allowed in.
Nation states are internally inclusive, but towards the outside world they are exclu-
sionary, or at least they do not adhere to the principle of equal treatment. If they did,
then everyone who wanted to enter would be allowed in.
If states were to abolish all distinctions between their own citizens and others, there
might be far more random exclusion and protection at a lower level. Walzer speaks in
this context of a ‘thousand petty fortresses’.The first intimations of such a world can
be seen in the rapidly growing phenomenon of ‘gated communities’, walled-off hous-
ing estates with their own private security services. We see similar signs of withdrawal
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in the attitudes of cities like Rotterdam and Malmö, where in various ways attempts
are being made to give shape to a municipal immigration policy – for example by ban-
ning all immigration, or all low-skilled immigration, for five years – because people
don’t feel their national governments are protecting them adequately.
Open societies aspire to be faithful to democratic principles. This puts them in a
position to argue for selective immigration policies. Myron Weiner recognizes that
‘there is often a conflict between the moral obligations of governments to ensure the
safety and well-being of their own populations and a more universal ethic that values
the well-being of all humankind, irrespective of where people live’. But this doesn’t
mean it’s in any way improper for governments to be concerned about the conse-
quences for their own populations of the extent and nature of migration flows. Wein-
er adds: ‘A lack of generosity is not the same as immorality.’
So if we measure the ideal of open borders against democratic standards, there are
good reasons for allowing a distinction to be made between established residents and
newcomers. Policies limiting entry for those who are not citizens are morally justifi-
able. This is not to say that states have no binding obligations towards people beyond
their borders at all. The refugee issue shows that people in the West do accept this re-
sponsibility, however difficult it may be in everyday practice.
Anyone trying to determine whether an individual qualifies for refugee status in-
evitably stirs a hornets’ nest. How can we ever judge with any confidence a story told
by a refugee? Moreover, it’s fair to ask whether the Refugee Convention of , which
in many respects was grafted onto concerns about human rights under communism,
is now out of date. Why should only those persecuted by their own governments quali-
fy as refugees and not people who fall victim to civil wars or natural catastrophes?
Why for example is famine not seen as a legitimate reason to flee?
There’s little eagerness to start a debate about the Refugee Convention. Some fear a
reassessment would lead to more restrictions on asylum-seekers, while others fear
their opportunities might be increased. So the status quo remains in force, even
though everyone can see that it’s lost much of its validity in our own era. The way it
works now comes down to saying that everyone who manages to get into a more pros-
perous country – whether with the aid of people smugglers or not – and stand on his
or her own two feet there for a while has a good chance of eventually being given offi-
cial leave to remain. There’s usually great reluctance to deport failed asylum seekers.
The preferred solution is to make the whole drama as invisible as possible by either
turning people back at the border or deciding almost instantly whether or not they’ll
be allowed to apply for asylum.
Another dilemma arises from the fact that countries with a tendency to accept
refugees may become accessories to oppression elsewhere. The support offered to
refugees from Kosovo helped the Serbs in their efforts to drive out the Albanians. In
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the early s Sadako Ogata, High Commissioner for Refugees, posed the following
question: ‘To what extent do we persuade people to remain where they are, when that
could well jeopardize their lives and liberties? On the other hand, if we help them
move, do we not become an accomplice to “ethnic cleansing”?’
After a rise in the number of refugees in the s European policy became, general-
ly speaking, more restrictive. In  Canada granted refugee status to around  per
cent of asylum seekers from Sri Lanka, whereas in the same year Britain accepted hard-
ly any applications for asylum from nationals of that country, despite basing its deci-
sions on the same Refugee Convention. European countries, and Australia too, have
introduced countless measures aimed at stemming the flow of refugees. In Australia
asylum seekers were interned in appalling conditions in far-flung Woomera and in
August  the government’s stringent policy led to a refusal to allow the Tampa, a
ship full of refugees, to moor at the coast. In response to international protests, the
Australian government hurriedly reached an agreement with Papua New Guinea,
which agreed to take the stranded refugees in return for payment.
The humanitarian questions thrown up by the right to asylum are extremely prob-
lematic. If refugees are allowed to go through an often slow and lengthy procedure and
spend years in reception centres, in many cases along with their families, then it be-
comes increasingly difficult to remove unsuccessful applicants from the community
and send them back. There’s an ethical dilemma here, since the more carefully the au-
thorities weigh up whether or not to allow someone to stay, the smaller the chance
they’ll actually be removed from the country if the decision goes against them. Asy-
lum policies turn refugees into illegals, with all the attendant consequences.
One telling example was the situation that arose in the Netherlands when the gov-
ernment tried to expel unsuccessful asylum-seekers from the country. There was
widespread opposition. A campaign called ‘, Faces’ attempted to bring the
refugees out of the shadows by depicting them as individuals. To take one example:
‘Hazrat will be nine in two months from now. For as long as he can remember he’s
lived in centres for asylum-seekers. When he was three his parents fled the Taliban in
Afghanistan. His entire family is now in the Netherlands. His grandparents and two
uncles have refugee status but Hazrat’s father does not.’ The request for asylum was
declined and the family ordered to leave the country: ‘Hazrat is in year five at a Chris-
tian primary school and he prays every day. “I ask God to let me stay.” He demon-
strates how he prays, as a Muslim, his little hands open. “I never ask for anything
else.”’ Confronted by so many human tragedies, the next Dutch government to be
elected eventually introduced an amnesty. The problem, however, is that every legisla-
tive change renders up new exemptions and raises the prospect that at any moment a
fresh amnesty might be announced.
Finally, we need to look at the issue of illegal immigration. Its extent is of course
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hard to determine, but the number of applicants when amnesties are declared gives us
some idea. In America offered illegals the opportunity to apply for residence per-
mits. Almost three million people seized their chance, the majority of them Mexicans.
This initiative did nothing to reduce the number of illegal residents. On the contrary,
after the general amnesty far more migrants without permits arrived than before. The
number is now estimated at twelve to thirteen million.
In  and  Italy gave legal residence status to a total of , illegal immi-
grants. In  Spain made a similar move and , people applied. In total the
number of illegal immigrants living in Europe is somewhere around eight million,
and rough estimates suggest that between , and , are added to this fig-
ure annually. We are therefore talking about a considerable number of people. Partly
because of the influx of illegals, the nations of southern Europe, once a source of mi-
grants, have become countries of immigration since the s. In the case of Spain the
illegals are mainly from Latin America and they have fewer problems adjusting than
other immigrant groups, since they already speak the language. But when a mass
amnesty led to a huge influx of African illegals via the Canary Islands, the government
became wary of too lenient a stance towards migrants without residence permits.
Some people believe that a generous attitude towards migrant workers will help to
prevent illegal migration. The underlying idea here is that legal and illegal immigra-
tion are in some sense communicating vessels: when one column rises the other falls.
But what does the enrolment of a computer expert from India have to do with a deci-
sion by someone from Senegal to cross the Straits of Gibraltar in a leaky boat? What
does the recruitment of low-skilled migrants have to do with the people smuggling
that led to the death by suffocation of fifty-eight Chinese illegals in the back of a lorry?
Not much, as demonstrated by the ultimate country of immigration, America, which
has a relatively liberal immigration policy and, as we’ve seen, a great many illegal im-
migrants. 
Illegals have become commodities. The journey made by a woman called Quiru
Liao has become typical of the kind of people smuggling organized in China by crimi-
nal go-betweens with the revealing name of ‘snakeheads’. ‘For reasons that ultimately
she alone knows, she borrows the money for the journey (, yuan, well over
, euro) from the boss of a clothing factory whom she knows well. She pays half
the cost of the voyage to snakeheads she found through local fishermen. In the har-
bour at Guangzhou she hides in the belly of a freighter. She spends four weeks at sea.
The only place she’s aware of the ship stopping during the voyage is Shanghai. One
day the ship docks at Rotterdam. There, the smuggler says, pointing north, is China-
town. She starts to walk. It’s the first time in her life that she’s been outside Guang-
dong.’ Quiru Liao is one of many millions of illegals and the reception they’re given
is lukewarm.
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Governments are wavering uncertainly between the extremes of a general amnesty
and a large-scale expulsion of illegals. This hesitancy is motivated far less by moral
considerations than it might appear. Everyone knows that illegals are extremely vul-
nerable; they can easily become trapped in a criminal milieu. One researcher has been
seduced into calling this ‘survival-criminality’. Quite apart from a reluctance to ex-
cuse crime in this way, there can be no justification for allowing illegality to flourish.
Ultimately that would be an attitude of ‘let them rot in privacy’, a decision to look the
other way as long as they don’t bother us. If we don’t want to insist the law must be en-
forced – and that certainly seems to be the position in most countries – then the only
way out is to introduce general amnesties for illegal immigrants periodically. One seri-
ous disadvantage of this is that it tends to encourage rather than deter people smug-
gling.
America clearly exemplifies the problematic nature of general amnesties. In the
mid-s it reached a compromise: a  law granted legal residence status to illegal
immigrants while at the same time introducing tougher sanctions against employees
who used the services of illegals. In practice the second part of the legislation was not
implemented, since the interests of agriculture in the south, for example, meant sanc-
tions were resisted. Here again we see a marriage of convenience between those who
want to leave illegals in peace for humanitarian reasons and employers acting out of
blatant self-interest, no longer able to manage without labourers who will work for a
pittance and who have no rights.
We could say the same of France, for example, where there’s an obvious unwilling-
ness to punish firms that employ illegal immigrants. Historian Patrick Weil writes
that in the s the authorities knew the whereabouts of illegal sweatshops in the tex-
tile trade, but the police and the labour inspectorate didn’t intervene. ‘They could
therefore have been dismantled, but that did not happen, because there was a consen-
sus among the various stakeholders that the law should not be applied.’ A blind eye
is turned to illegality because it works as a lubricant, easing friction in the jobs market.
The solution chosen in France consists not of a general amnesty but of individual
amnesties that can be given to thousands of people a year without attracting attention,
thereby avoiding serious political controversy.
Something essential is at stake here. The third world has been set adrift and it’s an-
choring itself to the first world. We can’t hope to succeed in bridging the gulf between
North and South to such an extent that the desire to migrate will decline in the near fu-
ture, and perhaps migration can’t be reduced in any other way either, primarily be-
cause the political will is lacking. If the movement of peoples does indeed prove un-
controllable, then it’s fairly safe to assume that disorder around the world will cause
serious polarization in Western societies. This could place a permanent strain on
democracy.
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In recent years the Dutch have seen how the immigration impasse can lead to severe
political shocks. It could be argued that this is simply a sign the country has moved
closer to the majority of its neighbours and is starting to look more like the European
average. Denmark, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway and Austria are all relatively small
countries in which populist parties have gained the support of a considerable propor-
tion of voters over the past few years. But in larger countries too, including Italy and
France, we’ve seen a similarly rapid growth in aversion to the established parties.
Political scientist Pippa Norris has investigated support for these parties across the
Western world and she sums up the motives involved. First of all there’s a fear of a loss
of social status among vulnerable groups such as small-scale entrepreneurs, indeed
even among low-skilled workers. Yet the habit of seeing these voters as losers in the
process of globalization is no longer convincing. The better-off middle classes too
have cast a large number of votes for parties with a populist message.
Motives other than an awareness of occupying a weak position in society must
therefore be important in prompting people to vote for parties like Vlaams Belang in
Belgium and the Front National in France. These voters turn out to have less faith than
average in the functioning of representative democracy, but Norris warns against in-
terpreting this as purely a product of resentment. Their far from positive attitudes to
the political system may be a result of unwillingness among the established parties to
take account of their wishes. She points to another motive too, namely a perceived
need to protect the home culture, the decisive factor being a dislike of mass immigra-
tion and the policies of multiculturalism that go with it. There’s no straightforward
connection between the number of migrants and the size of the populist electorate,
but it’s clear that cultural ‘protectionism’ weighs even more heavily than a fear of slid-
ing down the social scale.
Comparative research confirms that today’s unease about democracy flows from a
cultural rather than a social fault-line, although the two are of course related. It’s sure-
ly food for thought that in a fairly relaxed and open society like the Netherlands, a citi-
zens’ revolt was able to spread so rapidly. After many years of economic prosperity,
too. Within a few months, during the elections of , a single politician with a pro-
gramme opposing further immigration and favouring measures to strengthen public
order became the second largest political force in the country. No one can say how far
Pim Fortuyn might have got if he hadn’t been stopped in his tracks by a violent act.
Perhaps the novelty would soon have worn off, but as someone remarked: after such a
death the novelty never will wear off.
This reversal in voter preferences demonstrates first of all the self-correcting poten-
tial of an open political system. Before loudly condemning these new political move-
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ments, we would do well to understand their vitality as a democratic force. As West-
erners come face to face with the frictions in society associated with large-scale migra-
tion, it would be more useful to interpret the rise of politicians such as Dewinter,
Haider, Blocher and Le Pen as an invitation to critical self-examination. 
There’s no doubt these events are an illustration of how democracy is able to pro-
duce its own correctives, and that’s a reassuring thought, but perhaps there’s more go-
ing on here. Perhaps democracy is truly in danger in these times of globalization. In a
succinct and uncompromising essay on ‘the end of democracy’, French writer and
diplomat Jean-Marie Guéhenno explains the deeper background to the uncertainty:
‘The year  marks the end of the era of the nation state.’ Since that year of revolu-
tions the market economy has been able to move ahead without restraint and it’s clear
to everyone that national governments and parliaments no longer have a grip on rap-
idly increasing global economic interdependence.
Why does the slow death of the nation state mean the end of democracy as we know
it? Guéhenno indisputably touches the core of the matter when he remarks that until
now all forms of representation of the people have been tied to a clearly defined terri-
torial base. In other words, democratic institutions are grounded in specific places.
The logical consequence of globalization is that ‘the solidarity of communities, which
relies upon a shared territory, disappears and in its place temporary groupings emerge
based on shared interests’. We are moving step by step into a ‘post-political’ world, he
says, in which democracy falls away and is replaced by non-transparent networks that
reach far beyond national borders.
Against Guéhenno’s vision of doom it could be argued that he overstates the radi-
cal novelty of economic globalization, that in abruptly announcing the end of the na-
tion state he goes too far. But the increasing problems states are encountering in keep-
ing order are part of a discernable trend. It’s extraordinarily difficult to get a grip on
the global problems that arise out of a combination of the population explosion, the
destruction of the natural environment, the gap between rich and poor and the migra-
tion flows that result. This has provoked a hostile reaction in many liberal democra-
cies.
A book by Filip Dewinter gives readers an idea of the thinking that goes on within a
Flemish political movement called at the time he was writing the Vlaams Blok and
since renamed, after a politically-motivated ban by the courts, Vlaams Belang. He ap-
peals above all for a right to self-determination. Sustained migration, more than any-
thing else, Dewinter writes, is at odds with the ‘cultural individuality and identity’ of
Flanders – an extremely sensitive issue in itself, given the long domination of Belgium
by its other, French-speaking region. ‘After  years of the Flemish Movement, after
more than a century and a half of the struggle for cultural emancipation, the essence
of our nation is under threat once more.’
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A substantial proportion of the book is taken up by a sober assessment of the costs
and benefits of recent immigration. The main difference between it and the beliefs of
the parties at the political centre lies in its interpretation of cultural differences, which
Dewinter, brandishing among other things the views of Samuel Huntington on the
‘clash of civilizations’, sees as unbridgeable. In his emphasis on cultural identity he is
consistent: ‘Foreigners continue to organize themselves as if still living in their coun-
tries of origin. From a human viewpoint this is understandable. People have their own
identities and they want to preserve them.’
The Belgian experience offers a clear lesson, he says: ‘How can we expect to estab-
lish a multicultural society here with people and cultures from all over the world,
when at the same time we are forced to conclude that not even the bicultural society of
Flemings and Walloons can be run according to the normal democratic rules of the
game?’ Dewinter claims the history of Flanders teaches us that societies with more
than one culture will always produce a struggle for power: ‘The French-speakers have
tried to dominate and even to eliminate the Dutch language and the Flemish cultural
heritage.’Paradoxically, that traumatic experience is the key to his politics of integra-
tion. The foreigners in Flanders must be faced with a choice: ‘assimilation or re-
turn’.In his judgment, that is the only means the nation state has of asserting its right
to self-determination in the face of a growing number of migrants: ‘The way in which
nationality is hollowed out to become a free scrap of paper, the leniency with which
the demands (sic) of illegals are met, the lack of the political will to tackle criminality
among foreigners, the even greater lack of will and/or fear when it comes to defending
the external borders of Europe: each and every one of these is symptomatic of a crisis
of civilization.’
To this populist challenge, which has been asserting itself since the s, European
elites have reacted with uncertainty, at first unable to think of any better solution than
to declare these parties beyond the pale on grounds of racism. That was not a success.
Subsequently, in countries including the Netherlands and Austria, there has been a de-
cision to draw such parties into government, with the responsibility that entails, while
in Flanders a cordon sanitaire was placed around the Vlaams Blok and in France
around the Front National.
The same uncertainty can be seen in the work of Flemish commentator Manu
Claeys. He is aware that the absorption of such a large number of migrants remains
‘an experiment’ and he has recommended among other things that ‘citizenship must
be sought halfway between the soul of the nation and the foreign culture’. What ex-
actly this would look like we are not told. He is clear about the Vlaams Blok, however.
He advocates a ban on the party: ‘Politicians should not flinch from admitting that a
prosecution of a party of the extreme right is a political prosecution, since it is in the
interests of society as a whole, even if it does confer martyrdom upon that party.’
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This is the dilemma that has held Flanders in its grip for some twenty years. In that
sense it is not alone.
The fact that immigration has become a major issue in the Western world is perfect-
ly understandable. The image of a human migration that no one can stop has come to
represent a world-wide disorder that is creeping closer and closer, creating division in
a relatively harmonious society. If, as research suggests, a majority of citizens in the Eu-
ropean Union are of the opinion that the limit to how many migrants their part of the
world can absorb has been reached, then this amounts to more than simply saying ‘no’
to asylum-seekers, or to labour migrants, or to those seeking to build or reunite fami-
lies. More profound feelings of insecurity and unease are being expressed, and they
need to be taken seriously.
This has not happened enough. The democratic debate has always rendered up ma-
jorities reluctant to agree to large-scale immigration, but at the same time the out-
come of the process of political compromise has often failed to reflect the majority
view. According to Joppke this is because the costs of immigration, such as downward
pressure on wages or investment in remedial language teaching, are shifted onto socie-
ty as a whole, while the benefits of immigration, such as cheap labour or the reuniting
of families, accrue to specific groups. The clientism of immigration politics leads to a
growth in immigration. Most of the rights that migrants now have were accorded to
them not in the open arena of democracy but after agreement behind the closed doors
of ministerial bureaucracy, or as a result of court decisions. This democratic deficit is
provoking opposition.
Rapid demographic change in many Western European societies has caused a sense
of alienation that can easily be exploited. In the past ten years we have seen this hap-
pening all over Europe, and in Australia, for example. In his All for AustraliaGeoffrey
Blainey, the Australian historian mentioned earlier, criticized the taboo on the debate
about the advantages and disadvantages of Asian migration to his country: ‘The social
tension does not stem primarily from the controversy. The social tension arises from
an immigration programme that ignores public opinion.’ As a result, tolerance,
which had actually increased after racial criteria were dropped from immigration pol-
icy, was being endangered: ‘People are therefore entitled to inquire whether the dis-
tinctive character of their nation will remain if people from very different cultures are
encouraged to come and, as far as possible, to maintain their own cultures.’
Thinking about immigration and asylum is influenced far too much by the notion
that it’s uncontrollable. This self-declared powerlessness has far-reaching conse-
quences for democratic culture. Anyone who pronounces himself no longer compe-
tent in such a vital area undermines the notion of citizenship. If people regard it as im-
possible any longer to have control over something as essential as the question of who
should be allowed to stay in the country and who should not, then a call to ‘close the
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borders’ will never be far away. Such slogans lead nowhere, and they demonstrate the
impasse that has grown up around immigration. The unspoken promise is that if only
the authorities can be strict enough, the streets will again look the way they used to.
This points back to a time when the presence of guest workers was easy to ignore. The
fact that migrant workers suddenly had families and wanted to stay is something
those who cling to a desire to ‘close the borders’ have not fully taken on board.
Europe is now a common market that allows freedom of movement. This increased
freedom has brought new security problems with it. After the abolition of internal
borders, the pressing questions Europeans are asking themselves now are: How can
they protect their shared external borders? How can they combat cross-border crimi-
nality and terrorism in a Europe where everyone can more or less move around freely?
And how can they prevent countries like Spain, Italy, Greece and Poland from becom-
ing transit ports for illegal immigration? Each country currently pursues its own poli-
cy. Whereas in the Netherlands the government made a huge effort over several years
to expel around five thousand failed asylum-seekers – an attempt that was finally
abandoned for reasons of both principle and practicality – Spain has unilaterally de-
cided to grant residence permits to , illegals.
A consciousness is growing that now its internal borders have been abolished, pa-
trolling the external borders is of crucial importance. Resistance to this is fairly strong,
since border controls are still seen as the responsibility of individual nations. There
now exists something called the Agency for the Management of Operational Coopera-
tion at the External Borders. The long-winded title is not particularly reassuring, and
it demonstrates what a loaded issue this is. Such worries add to the problems of legiti-
macy affecting the European Union, which is seen by many of its citizens, especially af-
ter its recent expansion, as a source of insecurity rather than protection.
The challenge Europe faces now is to defend its borders while remaining conscious
of being part of a wider reality. Immigration is a continual reminder of poverty and
deprivation in the wider world that can easily make unwelcome demands upon Euro-
peans. How can they reconcile their responsibility for their own societies with the
growing interdependence of the world? The way migration is dealt with is becoming a
test of the resilience of democracy in an era of globalization.
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A culture of avoidance, the Netherlands
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A society’s reaction to the arrival of migrants reveals its strengths and weaknesses. In
the case of the Netherlands, fierce clashes of opinion about newcomers over the past
decade contrast with a pragmatic tradition of give and take. In fact its peaceful history
is the country’s most inviting feature; violent conflicts within its borders can be count-
ed on the fingers of one hand. The Dutch have a talent for mediation and compromise,
which is a wonderful thing.
This pursuit of pacification has a long history. From its founding in , the Dutch
Republic’s regents succeeded in maintaining social peace without amassing all power
at the centre or persecuting religious minorities – and this at a time when absolutist
monarchies and religious conflict were setting the tone in Europe. The Republic was
exceptional in many respects and contemporaries saw it as such. Numerous thinkers
who suffered censorship in their own countries, including John Locke and Pierre
Bayle, worked or published in Holland.
A connection is often made between this tradition of consultation and the battle
with rising floodwaters. The Dutch had to cooperate or drown. Indeed, their earliest
systems of democratic government grew out of the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century
water boards. This was once called ‘the democracy of wet feet’. The Dutch later came
to describe their form of consultative democracy as the ‘polder model’ and if there is
indeed such a model, then its origins lie in the bodies set up to control water levels. In-
creasing mastery of water led to a powerful sense that the world was malleable and
could be regulated, a feeling reflected in the famously admiring comment ‘God made
the world but the Dutch made Holland’.
Dutch society has a great ability to blunt sharp edges. The desire to avoid conflict is
undeniable, but the shadow side to this attitude generally escapes attention: the avoid-
ance of conflict can all too easily lead to avoidance of a more general kind. The Nether-
lands lacks a culture of debate, whether in parliament, academic life or literature, since
the life of the mind is permeated by that same sense of give and take. This has turned
out to be a weakness in dealing with immigration. 
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Historian Ernest Kossmann once tried to define the nation state. The nation, he
said, is ‘the continuous conversation we have with each other in our own language’.
But how can any conversation take off in a country that in his words is continually
seeking a ‘middle way’? The Netherlands is far less easy-going than many people
think; in fact it’s a relatively conformist country.
This became obvious in the s. After ten years of social conflict the new norms
were accepted to such an extent that many critics felt they had no option but to sit
things out until events proved them right. Conservatives stood on the sidelines and
there was no open debate. Those who thought differently were denounced or ignored.
One of the country’s most important post-war novelists, Willem Frederik Hermans,
who had violated the cultural boycott of South Africa, was given to understand by the
Mayor of Amsterdam that he was no longer welcome in the capital. For a long time
Dutch conformism was difficult to identify as such, since it presented itself to the
world as free-and-easy liberalism. American historian James Kennedy has expressed
his astonishment at this radical turnaround in the climate of opinion, which he ex-
plains as evidence of a desire for consensus. When broadly held attitudes are over-
turned, a large majority will fairly quickly fall into line. It happened in the s and
the same pattern can be discerned in the early years of this century. Open debate, with
different ideas going head to head, is therefore remarkably rare: ‘In such a culture op-
posing visions are not played off against each other, they follow one after the next.’
The view of a relative outsider like Kennedy is revealing. The Dutch have a saying
that translates literally as ‘strange eyes compel’, meaning that it sometimes takes a
fresh pair of eyes to put things into perspective. An open society must be able to take
on board critical or astonished observations by others. We often hear positive remarks
about a tolerant country with a liberal drugs policy and an annual Gay Parade along
its capital city’s main canals, but a good many books have been published in recent
years that present a contrary view. Their tone is by no means always flattering, as some
of their titles demonstrate: Het verdriet van Nederland [the sorrow of the Nether-
lands], Een vis verdrinken [drowning a fish], Een land om bij te huilen [a country to
weep over].
For too long the Dutch have wallowed in their own tolerance when they ought to
have listened rather more closely to critical comments like these. Some observations
come up time and again, and a discussion has arisen about what’s referred to as the
‘moral geography’ of the Netherlands. Many writers have addressed one question in
particular: What is the effect on Dutch customs and mores of the concentration of a
large number of people on such a small area of land?
Take a description of the country by French journalist Christian Chartier: ‘The
Netherlands is an astonishing accumulation of trifles, which have the subtle charm of
a neatly maintained doll’s house but at the same time explain why this country some-
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times gives the impression of being rather restrictive.’ That image of an immaculate,
somewhat scaled-down place is universally shared. So much so that one nineteenth-
century traveller exclaimed in despair: ‘There is bound to come a day when the for-
eigner travelling through the Netherlands suddenly feels an irresistible need for some-
thing tall, at which he can look up, for bends, across which his eyes can jump and wan-
der, for forms that can inspire the imagination.’
The rectilinear and uniform nature of the country strikes the visitor immediately
and seems to characterize not only the exterior of the Netherlands but its interior life
as well. All those asides about the flatness of the place. How strong is the urge for free-
dom, in fact, in a country that values consensus so highly? Chartier tries to unscram-
ble the contradiction: ‘Might this be the secret key to the Dutch ant heap? The herd
mentality silently dictates behaviour and the tribesmen, despite liking to see them-
selves as anarcho-individualists, do nothing that could threaten the general unity.’
The Netherlands is engaged in a perpetual quest for moderation. Extremes don’t
take root, as Anil Ramdas observes: ‘The bourgeois mentality tolerates neither extrem-
ism nor eccentricity.’ But Dutch moderation has contradictory results: ‘It explains the
paradoxical situation in which fanatical racists in the Netherlands have just as much
difficulty penetrating the realm of middle-class culture as foreigners with non-stan-
dard cultural customs. Racists and foreigners alike deviate from the norm, from all
that is ordinary, decent and fitting.’
Precisely because of this tendency towards the mean, the much-praised tolerance
of the Dutch has its limits, and we often encounter aspects of the country that call it
into question. British cultural historian Simon Schama describes the ‘mass devotion
to purity’ in the Dutch Republic: ‘To throw a dead cat in the canal, to harbor an illegal
immigrant, or to neglect one’s duty of washing the pavement were all tantamount to
delinquency – as if one had opened the gates to an army of infected marauders. Con-
versely, to be clean was to be patriotic, vigilant in the defense of one’s homeland,
hometown and home against invading polluters and polluted invaders.’
Many observers have been struck by this reticence in the face of everything that
comes from abroad. Portuguese author Rentes de Carvalho was extraordinarily bitter
in his comments: ‘But nothing, no one, no information at all will be strong enough to
drive back the pernicious sense of superiority the Dutch person assumes as soon as he
comes into contact with a foreigner who has the misfortune to have been born in one
of those countries where the sun is the greatest source of income and who does not go
about the place as a tourist.’ The Dutch are far less accommodating than they think
they are. In daily life foreigners experience considerable pressure to assimilate.
Belgian writer Geert van Istendael issues a paradoxical declaration of love for his
country: ‘I love Belgium because it has none of the Dutch arrogance, self-satisfaction,
tactlessness, aggression and blank incomprehension of everything beyond its own
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borders.’ This touches on an important failing. The self-image of a country that
thinks of itself as having no borders often masks a lack of interest in what is actually
happening abroad. Only those who know where the boundaries lie can try to move be-
yond them. Another Belgian, Eric de Kuyper, who has lived in the Netherlands for
many years, keeps bumping up against this concealed haughtiness too, in his own way:
‘If I tell my non-Dutch friends the Dutch premier lives in an ordinary terraced house
they don’t get it. “How arrogant,” they say. “What a display of false modesty!”.’
The Dutch spent many years convincing themselves that theirs is an easy-going
country. They were not alone. The image of a tolerant Holland was often adopted
wholesale abroad. All this has come into question in recent years. Two political mur-
ders and the reactions to them have shattered a cherished illusion about the Nether-
lands in the rest of theworld.Headlines like ‘Hatred engulfs a liberal land’ (TheTimes)
and ‘Haines raciales en terre de tolérances’ [racial hatreds in a landof tolerance] (Libéra-
tion) heralded the end of a distinctly superficial reputation. In foreign coverage of
thosedramatic events,schadenfreudeand fear jostled forprecedence.Peoplehadoften
been annoyedby theprideof theDutch andnow that perpetually raised finger stuck in
their throats.Magdi Allam, deputy chief editor of the Italian newspaperCorriere della
Sera,who isEgyptianbybirth,came to adevastating conclusion: ‘Everyonenowagrees
that indifference camouflaged by tolerance has breathed new life into the colonial
apartheid regime, based on the separation of races, in the heart of the motherland.’
There were many who tried, as he did, to look behind the façade of Dutch society
and who retrospectively shook off an excessively idealistic view of the Netherlands.
The disillusionment, if nothing else, was clear. The recurring question concerned the
meaning of tolerance. How could it have tipped over into indifference like this? British
historian Jonathan Israel offered a caustic diagnosis of the Dutch malaise. It wasn’t so
much the fundamentalists who presented a challenge to the country, he said, rather it
was the social elite, which had committed ‘cultural suicide’. Having blatantly neglect-
ed its history, that elite had no right to complain about ‘the sudden rise of a new bar-
barism and fanaticism’.
The speed with which the established image of the Netherlands was overturned
was remarkable. Further examples of intolerance followed in quick succession. The is-
sue of whether or not Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a critic of Islam, should have her passport with-
drawn was seen exclusively in that light. Author Mario Vargas Llosa, for example, de-
nounced the way the government had acted: ‘With the same clarity with which on oth-
er occasions I have applauded Holland for the reforms it has pioneered – euthanasia,
de-criminalization of drugs, gay marriage – I now declare my disappointment at this
shameful surrender on the part of government and public opinion in a democratic
country against the blackmail of terrorist fanaticism. In recent times, moral courage
and civic integrity seem to be sharply on the wane in the land of tulips.’This view has
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stuck and today’s commentators are mainly interested in confirming it, just as they
once served up any example of unbounded tolerance they could find.
Over the past few years the failure of the Dutch ‘model’ has been postulated time
and again. In France and Britain especially, events in the Netherlands were seen above
all as confirming those countries’ own beliefs about integration. Yet unease about the
murder of Theo van Gogh remained. If even the Dutch, with their long tradition of
moderation, had not found a way to get along with migrants, what hope was there for
countries whose histories were far more deeply marked by conflict? This undertone
came through particularly clearly in much of the German and Italian coverage, but it
could be heard in other countries as well. As a German politician put it: ‘The Nether-
lands is everywhere.’ Whatever was happening among the Dutch, it should clearly be
of concern to everyone. 
   
The Dutch for their part need to confront the image outsiders have of their country. In
fact they’ve no choice, now that so many new questions have been raised by the arrival
of immigrants. Self-examination, embodied in the question ‘Who are we now?’, has
become unavoidable. This in itself entails change, since for a long time that question
was answered with a shrug. The Dutch always claimed, with apparent modesty, that
they were unusual in not having an inflated view of themselves – but they sure did
show off a lot about their aversion to showing off.
Meanwhile it’s become clear that the denial of their own national identity was a
cunning way of acting as a model for other countries to follow.After all, Holland was
not like other nations, which tie themselves in knots worrying about who they are or,
evenworse, show insouciant pride in their heritage.There’s a telling example of this at-
titude in an article by Kossmann: ‘Why would we need to use pompous terms like na-
tional identity,heritage, mentality? A country like ours has no use for such rhetoric.’
The stance of an elite that dislikes making things too explicit is understandable,
since everyone knows that in a solid self-image lies the beginning of dogmatism. An
emphasis on history can quickly become prescriptive; settling upon a national identi-
ty is often the easiest way of excluding certain groups. Long experience with conflict
avoidance lies behind this resistance to words like ‘heritage’ and ‘identity’, but Koss-
mann’s rejection of such notions is at the same time a sign of self-conceit: we don’t
need bombastic language; others apparently do. 
None of this arose by chance. It’s a result of the country’s generally peaceful history.
True, the turbulence that lasted for almost half a century between  and , from
theBatavianRepublic to theBelgianRevolt,wasnosmallmatter,andtheGermanoccu-
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pation and the loss of theDutchEast Indies bothhad adeep impact aswell.Apost-war
sloganran: ‘Indiëverloren,rampspoedgeboren’ (roughly: theIndies’ losswillbringforth
chaos).Yet arguably the history of the Netherlands has taken a relatively harmonious
course ever since it was recognized as an independent nation in . It has generally
beenahaveninstormysurroundings.TheNetherlands isoneof thefewcountries inthe
worldwithundisputedborders.Therearenominorities insideoroutsideits territoryto
call themintoquestion,noindependencemovements like thoseof theBasques inSpain
or theFlemings inBelgium,andnooppressed fellow-countrymenabroad comparable
to theHungarians inRomania or theAlbanians inKosovo. It is a ‘satisfiednation’with
little understanding for countries that suffer from far greater internal tensions.Dutch
people are no different from anyone else, but the conditions that have created the
Netherlands are different, which is to say they are generally favourable.
History therefore explains a great deal about this relaxed self-image, one that can
easily topple over into self-delusion. A useful measure of the prevailing attitude is the
way the Dutch treat their own language. In the early twentieth century, author Carry
van Bruggen wrote in jest: ‘There is nothing distressing or disconcerting about the
thought that in a century or two Dutch will no longer be spoken. We haven’t used tow-
ing barges or built step gables for a long time either. The attachment of the Dutchman
to his language is of an order no higher than that of the Volendammer to his baggy
trousers.’ If Van Bruggen had been right, the Dutch would now have difficulty reading
her prediction without an English translation. 
There’s a long tradition of such comments: What’s so special about this language of
ours? Another example of an apparently open attitude is an essay by anthropologist
Peter van der Veer called ‘Nederland bestaat niet meer’ [the Netherlands no longer ex-
ists]. In his breezy polemic he addresses the claim that Dutch culture has been ab-
sorbed into a transnational entity. A typical sentence runs: ‘My prediction is that
Dutch will meet the same fate as the Groningen speech of my youth – it will become a
sentimental dialect.’ To him the acceptance of English as a medium of communica-
tion looks like progress, since compared to the vast body of Anglo-Saxon writing,
Dutch literature doesn’t amount to much.
Despite these dismissive remarks, there is strength to be drawn from the combina-
tion of particularism and openness. About the advantages of having a distinct nation-
al language, Johan Huizinga wrote: ‘It may hamper us in getting what we say across to
the world, but it keeps us impartial, gives us our own mirror in which to capture an im-
age of that which is foreign.’ We might debate just how impartial the Netherlands
was or is, but there’s a kernel of truth in what he writes, which comes close to saying
that the nation amounts to a continuous conversation in your own language.
Downplaying the importance of a national language can easily spill over into a
form of exclusion. What does such an attitude mean for the Dutch literature arising
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from migration? It’s true that all important literature is world literature in the sense
that authors have always borrowed from each other across borders, but anyone who’s
dismissive of his own language isn’t going to bother finding out what questions are be-
ing asked by new writers about the prevailing self-image. Continental Europeans
should be grateful to all those newcomers who have taken the trouble to add some-
thing to their literatures, to all those who have not decided they ought to concentrate
on writing in English.
This self-negation has perverse consequences, even for those it’s intended to serve.
Time and again people were told: it’s not particularly important for migrants to learn
to speak Dutch. In fact education in their own language and culture was promoted, of-
ten with the argument that it would make learning a second language easier. There’s
nothing wrong with bilingualism – on the contrary, multilingualism is a vehicle of civ-
ilization – but in reality many migrants and especially their children command only
half a language, being fully at home neither in the language of their country of origin
nor in that of the place where they live. Whether or not they really become better at
learning Dutch once they’re fluent in their parents’ language is an open question.
A lack of command of the official language makes entry into public life difficult.
Languages involve conventions and manners, emotional nuances and references to
the past. A person who doesn’t speak the language well can’t take a full part in society
as a citizen. Many struggle with this handicap, which can be blamed in part on the
nonchalant attitude of many Dutch people towards their mother tongue. French-
Dutch commentator Sylvain Ephimenco had this in mind when he wrote: ‘It is indeed
hard to expect of newcomers that they will emulate with enthusiasm an indigenous
population that enthusiastically repudiates its own identity.’One telling example is a
remark that appeared in the Dutch press a few years ago: ‘Surely you’re not going to
bother Turkish children with the years ’-’?’ This casual attitude to history does
nothing to help migrants become discerning citizens.
The self-image of a community of world citizens can be found in the work of count-
less academics who assume that the era of nation states lies behind us. Yet although the
media bring events from all over the world into our living rooms every day, the major -
ity of citizens still live in cultures that have developed in the context of nation states.
British anthropologist Ernest Gellner concludes soberly: ‘For the average person, the
limits of his culture are, if not quite the limits of the world, at any rate the limits of his
employability, social acceptability, dignity, effective participation and citizenship.’
For as long as the nation state demarcates citizenship, we would do well to take
proper care of existing institutions. Involvement in a society means understanding
that something came before us and something will come after us. This too requires
people to put themselves into perspective, but in a way that demonstrates genuine
modesty by acknowledging they’re part of an ongoing history.

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That shared history ultimately creates a specific way of living together, which is not
set in stone but subject to amendment by new religious groups or social strata. We
need only look at Catholic emancipation or the rise of the Dutch working class. The
same goes for migrants, who will undoubtedly help to shape the Netherlands as a na-
tion, just as past newcomers influenced the self-image of Dutch society. European na-
tions are now being invited to re-examine themselves. This creates uncertainty, yet the
need to ask ‘who are we?’ can be felt all across the continent. That quest for a new ‘us’ –
which applies to the migrant communities that have arrived over the past fifty years as
well as to indigenous communities – will never end, since it must always remain open
to the future.
It’s important to ask whether immigration will be seized upon as an opportunity to
contemplate a new ‘us’ or regarded as the end of any such concept. We should under-
stand the nation as an ‘imagined community’, in the way anthropologist Benedict An-
derson proposes. He rejects the image of a population group held together by blood
and soil. It simply doesn’t reflect reality. Instead we should think of the nation as an
imagined community, a human invention that’s continually being reshaped, the prod-
uct of concerted efforts over many generations.
The Netherlands is a clear example. Many years passed before the inhabitants of
this country started to feel part of a national community. Geographers Hans Knippen-
berg and Ben de Pater write: ‘The building of a nation – a mental development and
therefore much more difficult to discern – lagged behind the building of a state. Many
people who were Dutch citizens in a formal sense remained wholly or partly outsiders
to the nation. Among them were some at least of the Catholic community, the lower
classes and the residents of far-flung rural areas.’ Gradually the country was linked
together, by railway lines, for example, and the synchronization of clocks that train
timetables necessitated. It was increasingly united in its mentality too. One new group
after another became part of the ‘imagined community’, thereby transforming it.
That history is now being carried forward. With the arrival of large numbers of im-
migrants who are changing the country significantly, there’s a pressing need for new
voices to help reshape Dutch ideas about who they are in an era of globalization. As
Jan and Annie Romein remark in Erflaters van onze beschaving [legators of our civiliza-
tion], ‘Even in the established State, the Nation is still in the making.’ Integration is
never complete, since new desires are continually becoming part of the imagined com-
munity. The country’s second religion is now Islam and as a result its view of itself has
been transformed. This is just one example of the many changes triggered by the ar-
rival of people from all over the world.
Another is the appointment of Ahmed Aboutaleb as mayor of Rotterdam. The sec-
ond city of the Netherlands is now led by a first-generation migrant from Morocco, a
situation without precedent in continental Europe. Such a result would have been un-
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thinkable had it not been for those heated debates about integration. At difficult mo-
ments, Aboutaleb has always been able to articulate tough questions aimed at native
Dutch society, and he has not been afraid to confront his presumed following with
thorny issues. In the pressure-cooker that is Rotterdam, developments have accelerat-
ed.
It’s fascinating to see how the Dutch self-image has been challenged by large-scale
migration over recent decades. In this chapter we’ll examine a number of lasting char-
acteristics of the way conflict has been avoided in the Netherlands. In looking at differ-
ences of opinion, it becomes clear that an imagined nation is always a divided nation.
Whether it’s a question of how the country has dealt with contrasting attitudes (toler-
ance) or with power politics in the wider world (neutrality) or with religious settle-
ment (compartmentalization), all are forms of conflict avoidance. Each of these ap-
proaches has influenced the way the Netherlands manages the issue of migration as a
new source of conflict. At the same time its traditions have inevitably been altered by
those clashes, if only in that they were found wanting in various ways.
Of course Dutch political culture can’t be summed up in a single word: avoidance.
There are many ambiguities here. Tolerance literally means putting up with someone;
a majority creates room for minorities in its midst. Endurance of this kind always im-
plies inequality, since the space given to those we tolerate can always be taken away.
Traditional Dutch compartmentalization (for which they have an untranslatable
word, verzuiling, sometimes rendered as ‘pillarization’), was a form of ‘each to his
own’ that kept contrasting religious and ideological groups apart. Yet within the dif-
ferent compartments people were remarkably submissive. In their foreign policy,
meanwhile, the Dutch have always tried to hold themselves aloof. As far as relations
with the rest of Europe went, the Netherlands was a neutral country for many years,
but of course the same did not apply in colonial politics. In the colonies interference
was the norm and restraint rare.
   -
How did these features of Dutch political culture affect the country’s post-war deal-
ings with migrants and how did its traditions change as a result? Tolerance is the most
frequently used and abused word in the discussion of migration. Many people have
forgotten the history of the concept in the Netherlands, where it originally meant
turning a blind eye to things that were forbidden. One early example concerns what
are known as conventicles, hidden churches where clandestine religious meetings and
services were held. In Protestant Holland, worship by Catholics was banned, but it was
tolerated as long as they didn’t draw too much attention to their gatherings. This re-
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sulted in the building of churches that are indistinguishable from other frontages on
the street side.
In our own time tolerance usually exists independently of any prohibition. The im-
plications of the word now generally sound inviting: we must show respect for things
that in the first instance seem strange to us; it’s wise to suspend judgment, since if
we’re not too quick to apply our own norms, then understanding for the lifestyles and
worldviews of others, including those of migrants, will grow. But the question is: Why
should anyone show respect for those who can’t muster any respect for people with
whom they differ profoundly? Where do the limits of tolerance lie?
Of course this immediately raises another question: How tolerant has Dutch socie-
ty actually been over the centuries? A whole gamut of critical remarks about the
Netherlands suggests that its openness was rather more limited than its inhabitants
believed. True, in the seventeenth century many Huguenots were allowed into the
country, as were many Portuguese Jews, but there are plenty of examples of less ac-
commodating attitudes. A famous play by Gerbrand Bredero, The Spanish Brabanter
(Spaanschen Brabander, ), gives a wonderful impression of daily life in Amster-
dam. Jan Knol, rather laughingly presented as a ‘patriot’, makes profoundly dismis-
sive remarks about the German newcomers in the Dutch capital (‘moffs and poops’),
who were all said to live by begging: ‘Yes, the Almshouse regents would feed them, /
And twenty of our burghers’ children would gladly show the way. / But our poor,
they’re too proud for that, / While moffs and poops are eels just bred to beg.’
The Dutch need to re-examine their history. Many trace the origins of today’s toler-
ance back to the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic. There is something to be said
for this notion, certainly in view of the situation in other countries at the time, but we
should bear in mind that the religious freedom of the period was fairly limited by to-
day’s standards. If we look at the separation of church and state in the seventeenth cen-
tury, then it turns out to have been remarkably incomplete, if it can be said to have ex-
isted at all. It became permanently entrenched only with the  constitution. The
seventeenth century was a time of struggle between the principle of freedom of con-
science, embraced at an early stage, and the notion of the Reformed Church as the
‘public church’ of the Netherlands. Although not an official state church, it received
preferential treatment from the Dutch government. The title of a study by historian
Enno van Gelder speaks for itself: Getemperde vrijheid [tempered freedom]. 
One lesson from this period is that the separation of church and state is intended
not only to protect the state against interference by the church but equally – and some-
times to an even greater extent – to protect the church against meddling by the state.
Hugo de Groot (known to the world as Grotius) advocated the ‘absolute sovereignty
of the state’. A community can have only one supreme authority, so the church must
be subordinate to the state, which is the guardian of the public interest. This idea was
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expressed in countless practical regulations affecting the churches. No meeting of the
general synod could be held without the assent of the States General, which was not
readily given. Similarly, prior approval by government was required for ecclesiastical
appointments. Van Gelder summarizes the result by saying that the Reformed Church
‘felt above all unfree’.
If even members of the dominant church felt constrained by government, how
much more so minorities, such as Catholics and Jews? Catholic services were forbid-
den in all parts of the country, even after the end of the Thirty Years War in , al-
though they were tolerated in some places in return for a fee. Members of minority de-
nominations, including Catholics, were banned from holding official government
posts until . There was freedom of conscience, but in general this did not mean
permission to speak freely in public. Freedom was limited in other spheres of life too.
Marriages between Christians and Jews were forbidden, for instance. Historian Piet
de Rooy remarks: ‘The extent to which sexual relations between Jews and Christians
were discouraged is striking. Jewish men were not allowed to marry Christian women
and they were even forbidden to visit Christian prostitutes; they alone were systemati-
cally prosecuted for buying sex and severely punished.’
The general conclusion can only be that while the seventeenth-century Dutch Re-
public was certainly ahead of the rest of Europe by the standards of the time, for many
years the separation of church and state was controversial, and in practice it was not
respected at all. This more realistic view of history matters in the Netherlands today,
because norms are often held out to others as standards to be met without any aware-
ness of just what an uphill struggle it was to establish them, and therefore without any
real understanding of their fragility. 
This historical digression is intended above all to indicate that tolerance as prac-
ticed in the Dutch Republic should not be regarded primarily as a moral principle.
Historian Arie van Deursen reaches a measured verdict: ‘The famous Dutch tolerance
therefore involved a fair amount of opportunism. This was in fact the reason for its
considerable success. It was a typical product of Holland’s pragmatic culture. Never-
theless, it undoubtedly included a principled element; the old instinctive aversion to
restraint of conscience is institutionalised within it.’
Nor should tolerance be too readily equated with individual liberalism. The tolera-
tion that typified Dutch society was exhibited by groups. It was not an individual ac-
complishment, let alone a widespread, general characteristic; it had to be organized
and carefully sustained by rulers who were aware of the precarious nature of social
peace in a country that was home to religious minorities. Another historian, Remieg
Aerts, writes: ‘The same civilized ideal that regarded tolerance as a virtue also encom-
passed modesty and decorum, in other words conformity to the established order and
training in its conventions.’
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In recent decades this attitude has come to be regarded as a type of conformism
that needs to be tackled. The pendulum has swung so far that tolerance is increasingly
understood as licence, as a form of laisser-faire. This has its attractive sides, but the un-
willingness to pass judgement on other people’s beliefs and behaviour can actually un-
dermine tolerance, which has gradually subsided into indifference. Those who de-
mand nothing expect nothing. They have forgotten the words of Huizinga: ‘However
contemptible it may sound to anyone who feels zealous and brave, as a nation and as a
state we are simply in a certain sense satisfait, and it is our national duty to remain
so.’ In those words lie historical experience and wisdom, and above all the insight
that relaxation requires effort. The satisfied nation needs continual upkeep and can
never be taken for granted. There has been too great a tendency to think of Dutch soci-
ety as invulnerable.
It’s clear that in times of large-scale immigration tolerance is put to the test. Innu-
merable people have arrived in the Netherlands after growing up in unfree societies.
Clashes with orthodox members of the Muslim community in particular are illustra-
tive of the resulting uncertainty. Sometimes conservative Muslims express beliefs that
were commonplace some forty years ago, but that doesn’t make them any less disturb-
ing in the here and now. This was clearly demonstrated by a case known to the Dutch
as the el-Moumni affair. A Rotterdam imam at the An-Nasr mosque, who had been
banned from preaching in Morocco because of his radical beliefs, caused a huge stir
when he delivered a sermon in which he said of homosexuality, among other things:
‘If this sickness spreads, everyone will be infected and that could lead to us dying out.’
He did add that violence against homosexuals was unacceptable, but at first no one
noticed that qualification. It then emerged that in earlier sermons he’d described Eu-
ropeans as lower than ‘dogs and pigs’ because they permitted homosexuality.The re-
actions were harsh; there were even calls in parliament for el-Moumni to be expelled
from the country.
Suddenly a conflict had arisen between two minorities: Muslims and gays. This was
rather confusing for those in the habit of regarding the oppressed as always in the
right. How should we judge imams who preach intolerance for homosexuals? For a
start, the same way as we judge the Dutch bishop who a few years ago described love
between men as ‘a neurosis’. His statement caused immense indignation, but for un-
derstandable reasons no one called for his deportation. The same should apply to the
imam.
The question keeps coming back: How tolerant should anyone be of intolerance?
Of course those in authority don’t need to settle every conflict publicly, but defence of
the norms of an open society is one of the essential tasks of government. Faith in the
self-regulating effect of democracy means restraint in the use of coercion and reliance
on the power of words against words. So it’s good that the Rotterdam imam was ac-
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quitted in a case brought against him for what he had said. A ban would only have driv-
en religious beliefs like his, which are no doubt shared by countless Muslims, back un-
derground.
It’s not difficult to be tolerant among the like-minded. True toleration is all about
dealing in a peaceful manner with profound differences of opinion. In other words,
strict orthodox beliefs have their place in an open society. This way of maintaining so-
cial harmony is quite a different matter from living in a society in which everyone
sticks to the multicultural etiquette, not daring to express a judgment about anything.
A host of taboos can never serve as a basis for tolerance.
Governments are continually trying to avoid conflict, so they have a tendency to
limit freedom of expression for pacification’s sake. We saw this after the murder of
Theo van Gogh, when the Dutch government suddenly dusted off an old law against
blasphemy. Its attempt to placate the Muslim community should be recognized as an
encouragement to the radicals, who can then say, ‘See, we really are being insulted, the
government itself says so.’ The Dutch queen too, in her Christmas message, was tread-
ing the outer boundaries of freedom of speech when she referred to ‘the sensitivities
that can touch people at the very deepest level’. 
Freedom of expression is ultimately limited by laws against incitement to violence,
rather thanby any senseof affront apersonmayhave. It’s not amatter of having a right
to offendpeople – anyonewho takes that as his startingpoint belittles his ownmotives.
The point here is that criticism is often felt to be insulting, especially by deeply reli-
gious people who believe their God is immaculate. In many respects avoidance has
turned out to be counter-productive as a way of ensuring peaceful coexistence. This
doesn’t imply endless freedom todo as you like – not everything that can be said needs
to be said – but theNetherlands is changing.Cultural divides have deepened. In the fu-
ture they’ll lead to much fiercer differences of opinion than they have in the past.
In many areas of life avoidance is clearly being mistaken for tolerance. The fact that
only  per cent of Moroccan and  per cent of Turkish immigrants and their chil-
dren are in paid work justifies the general assertion that in the name of tolerance an
entire generation of migrants has been written off. Native or newcomer, it makes no
difference: all have indulged in a form of nonchalance, and an endless reliance on wel-
fare is one good example. This has not escaped the attention of migrants. Hafid Bouaz-
za’s verdict is harsh: ‘People were exhorted to get themselves fired, since no Muslim
should work for unbelievers; they were told to convert others and spend as much time
as possible in the mosque. That was the famous “backache period,” when many first-
generation Moroccans took disability pay.’ Whether religion was the decisive factor
here or laxity in enforcing the rules, or vague physical symptoms, the outcome is well
known. A large number of migrants vanished into the margins of society, which had
negative consequences not only for them but for their children.
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Tolerance has been eroded by lax law-enforcement, for which the Dutch have an-
other untranslatable word, gedogen, an officially sanctioned form of permissiveness. It
can sometimes be defended as a transitional phase between an outdated ban and fu-
ture legislation. If abortion is about to be made legal, for example, then it may make
sense to allow the practice even before the new law comes into force. In the Nether-
lands, however, such permissiveness often becomes permanent. Ignoring existing leg-
islation over an extended period undermines faith in the rule of law, making society as
a whole less free by openly giving sanctuary to those with the least scruples. Intoler-
ance has nestled into the space left open by lax government. Tolerance cannot flourish
in a climate of inequality before the law.
It should surprise no one that newcomers, many of whom come from societies
with far stricter penal codes, are not impressed by this type of law-enforcement cul-
ture. Currently around half the population of Dutch prisons is made up of people
from migrant communities. Criminality is proportionately high among Moroccans
and Antilleans, but in other migrant communities too, among Turks and Somalis for
example, it’s above average. The clash between different ways of imposing authority is
characteristic of all migratory shifts from traditional to modern societies, but the un-
certainty is reinforced in this case by the rather informal way the Dutch interact with
those in authority.
Inconsistent application of the law has had unfortunate results. It’s easy to under-
stand the Turkish father who says angrily: ‘You’ve messed my son up.’ A Moroccan fa-
ther who came to the Netherlands in the s says the same thing in a slightly more
roundabout way: ‘It’s not our fault, but more or less the fault of the government,
which I think is far too mild. In this respect the Netherlands is an unclear country to
me. There are enough rules, but there are all kinds of ways of getting around them. To
be honest I don’t understand this system at all.’ Of course in the end it’s the responsi-
bility of parents and the children themselves to make sure they don’t enter into a life of
crime, but the Netherlands is indeed ‘an unclear country’, which doesn’t help. Many
of the classic countries of immigration, unsurprisingly, have societies that are much
more rule-based.
The arrival of migrants has caused a certain notion of tolerance to founder. This
may in fact assist society in moving forward, by forcing it to reconsider attitudes that
have always seemed self-evident but are no longer productive. It’s impossible for a
government that wants more than anything to avoid conflict to promote true toler-
ance, and newcomers can’t work out where they stand in a society that gives in more
often than it gives back. So the price of avoidance is paid by all. Tolerance is possible
only in an open society, where opinions can collide freely and where at the same time
everyone realizes that social peace requires observance of the laws of the land – and
self-control, not to be confused with fear.
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 
It’s time to look at how the Dutch custom of compartmentalizing the beliefs of differ-
ent groups (in other words verzuiling, or the existence side by side of different confes-
sional pillars) influences the way migrants are treated, and at how the arrival of a new
religion has made this tradition problematic. There was once an expectation that the
integration of ethnic minorities would take roughly the same course as the peaceful
reconciliation of religious groups in the Netherlands. Each ‘pillar’ would have its own
broadcasting organization, its own trades union, its own schools and – why not? – its
own sports clubs. As always it would be a matter of accommodation, adaptation, give
and take, negotiation and evasion. This traditional approach manifests itself above all
as a boundless faith in elites, which are not only assumed to be willing to lead ‘their’
communities but to be able to control their followers.
The coming of Islam to the Netherlands – after a long history of Dutch coloniza-
tion of the largest Muslim country in the world, present-day Indonesia – took the
form of the arrival of guest workers from Turkey and Morocco in the s and ’s.
Initially there were few visible signs that a different religion was taking root. It was
some time before money could be collected for the building of mosques and in any
case, only when guest workers brought their families to join them did religion assume
a major significance in their lives. It’s important to bear this history in mind when
considering whether the old remedies still work in new circumstances.
The use of the compartmentalizing approach to enable the Muslim community to
integrate into Dutch society was felt by many to be a logical continuation of an old tra-
dition by new means. Sociologist Anton Zijderveld wrote in the early s: ‘Certainly
for the Catholics, pillarization was the pre-eminent route to emancipation, allowing
them to integrate into society while maintaining their own identity. Given this suc-
cessful process of emancipation and integration, we should clearly call on the Mus-
lims in our country to emancipate themselves via their own pillar and by so doing to
integrate.’ He was not the only one to think this way.
So the reaction to the new religion took its lead from the past; many believed the
old rules and customs of reconciliation would curb the new discord. But they were
overlooking a chapter called ‘Sense of national solidarity’ in a classic book by Arend
Lijphart. The conclusion he comes to in his assessment of the Dutch political system is
as follows: ‘The strength of Dutch nationalism should not be exaggerated, but there
can be no doubt it exists.’ All those pillars supported one and the same roof, which
explains why religious and ideological ‘apartheid’ never degenerated into violent con-
flict.
Attempts to settle religious disputes peacefully actually contributed to a sense of
solidarity. Many historians have made a connection between the nation’s division
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into different ‘pillars’ and Dutch nation building. It’s interesting to note that in the
late nineteenth century the beginnings of compartmentalization coincided with the
rise of strong cultural nationalism. Differences in beliefs and attitudes fell within a
shared history, were kept in check by a broadly accepted constitution, and could be de-
bated in a single language.
The Dutch now find themselves with a new religious community in their midst,
and this time history, language and the constitution can’t be assumed to serve as ties
that will mitigate division. In the past it was possible to find shared points of reference.
This was not always obvious. In his lecture Het vergruisde beeld [the shattered image],
Jan Romein describes an argument about how the Dutch Revolt should be interpret-
ed. He is typical of writers on the subject in emphasizing the differences to such an ex-
tent that he fails to notice the common ground, which to him is self-evident. The con-
flicting beliefs he writes about relate to a major historical event, the revolt against
Spanish rule, which although subject to various interpretations is seen by every school
of thought as of essential importance in the emergence of the Dutch nation. In an era
of migration it becomes harder to fall back on a shared history.
We have already looked at the significance of language. The extent to which the
Dutch underestimate the command of a common tongue as one of the essential
sources of mutuality available in their fragmented country is remarkable. Just look at
the problems faced by countries like Belgium and Canada, which are still struggling,
many years after independence, with the existence of two linguistic communities in a
single nation state. In the Netherlands today, the Dutch language cannot be taken for
granted as a shared vehicle, given many immigrants’ limited proficiency in it.
Finally, we should be clear about the fact that the Dutch constitution is a product of
conflict mediation. Article , which says that schools founded by religious communi-
ties will receive state funding, is one example. The compromise over education was
the outcome of a history to which all religious and secular movements had con-
tributed, so it could be used as a basis for settling future conflicts. Nowadays Muslim
appeals to the right to found their own schools are a bone of contention, since they
were not involved in the conflict appeasement that produced this constitutional provi-
sion.
In other words, there were specific conditions that prevented disputes between the
pillars of Dutch society from degenerating into civil war, conditions that are not auto-
matically available to help reconcile current religious differences. A shared history can
no longer be taken for granted, a shared language requires more effort to sustain than
it once did, and the constitution is no longer seen, either by the established population
or by newcomers, as a framework for solving contemporary problems. The age-old
way of living together in peace will not automatically work in entirely new circum-
stances. It will have to be reinvented.
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There’s another sense too in which traditional Dutch conflict resolution through
pillarization no longer works. The Muslim community is far less internally cohesive
than the Catholic and Protestant communities were. One significant new element is
the existence of ethnic divisions: in daily life a Turkish Muslim has little contact with a
Muslim from Morocco or Surinam, even though they may run into each other on a
pilgrimage to Mecca. Zijderveld recognized this problem: ‘For purposes of pillariza-
tion, religious identity must be able to transcend ethnic differences. Pillars cannot be
constructed on an ethnic basis.’ It has indeed proven extremely difficult to create a
Muslim consultative body and almost impossible to bring together diverse Muslim
groups that are organized along national lines. The Muslim broadcasting organiza-
tion, which had blocks of time on the public networks, recently broke up as a result of
profound differences of opinion. 
This pattern is familiar from the history of immigration in America. It was a long
time before Irish, Polish and Italian Catholics, for example, began attending the same
churches. Their initial impulse was to worship in congregations of their own national-
ity. The church was among other things a means of breathing fresh life into the every-
day customs of the country of origin on foreign soil, so the social significance of Amer-
ican migrant churches was at least as great as their religious significance. Something
similar applies to Muslims in the Netherlands and other European countries. Perhaps
eventually their ethnic differences will fall away, but there is no sign of that as yet.
As well as significant ethnic division, the one-sided social composition of the Mus-
lim community is clear for all to see. The pillars that once made up Dutch society were
themselves socially mixed, each including both business leaders and common labour-
ers. The socially weak position of Dutch Muslims is of course a result of the low social
status of the original guest workers. Migrant labourers are by no means a reflection of
the population of their countries of origin, rather they are a specific group, mostly
drawn from poor rural districts. It’s no surprise to find that Muslim schools are al-
most entirely populated by children whose parents have little schooling. This has
prompted a Protestant politician to remark that this type of school threatens to be-
come ‘a prison of poverty’.
One of the problems within the Muslim community in the Netherlands is the weak-
ness of its elites. There are simply too few well-educated people, especially in the first
generation. The model of pillars, with their fairly authoritarian leaderships, relied
upon powerful elites. Perhaps these will be produced by the children of the migrant
generation, but one of the striking things about members of that second generation is
their lack of any explicit ambition to take charge of the communities to which they’re
assumed to belong. On the contrary, members of the second generation often want to
free themselves from their fellow countrymen or fellow believers, finding such associ-
ations too constraining. Moreover, it’s precisely the most liberal Muslims who are
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least likely to organize. Those who set themselves up as leaders of the Dutch Muslim
community, a few exceptions aside, represent conservative forces.
Commentator August Hans den Boef concludes: ‘Integration via the mosque
means integration within religious communities that are divided along national and
regional lines and led by their conservative male segments, which largely consist of
people from rural tribal cultures who have little education. In Dutch Muslim commu-
nities most children attend black schools, or Islamic schools that are an extension of
the mosque.’ He believes the emphasis on the mosque as an instrument of integra-
tion – a minaret among the pillars – not only leads to a decline in ‘social cohesion with-
in the city as a whole, it reinforces social control within Muslim communities’. He is
right to speak of communities, emphasizing the plural. Plainly there is no such thing
as ‘the’ Muslim community. It’s not a cohesive entity with its back turned to society
but a group of believers that’s deeply fragmented along ethnic, generational and reli-
gious lines, composed of people trying to find their way in strange surroundings. It’s
the weakness rather than the presumed strength of the Muslim segment of society
that presents a problem to those in search of a compromise.
Here we come up against another important difference between the old, compart-
mentalized Dutch community and efforts to create a society based on the same model
in our own time. The traditional ‘pillars’ represented religions that had existed side by
side for many years and had been forced to defend themselves against sometimes
stinging criticism. We can by no means be certain that Islam will succeed in claiming a
place for itself as a minority religion in a liberal and secularized society, if only because
Islam has always been in a majority or even monopoly position in the countries of ori-
gin.
A nation that enjoys freedom of religion can make room for Islam only on condi-
tion that the vast majority of Muslims accept their duty to defend that same freedom
for people with whom they fundamentally disagree. This attitude is lacking in many
mosques, where the principles and institutions of liberal democracy are questioned
and in some cases rejected. Governments have looked away for a long time, not want-
ing to cause conflict. On this point too Hafid Bouazza injects a note of urgency into his
criticism: ‘If Muslims get their sense of superiority from anywhere then it is from the
fact that they have been able to play so many tricks on these Dutch people and been
patted on the head in return.’ His sombre conclusion: ‘I foresee an infernal split in this
small but miraculous country.’
In most countries of the Islamic world, with the important exception of Turkey,
Islam has never needed to prove itself in open confrontation with other religions or
secular beliefs. Muslims in the West tend to have difficulty facing up to criticism of
their faith. Too often they adopt the stance of victims, looked down on by the society
around them. How often do we see criticism of religion stamped as racism? It isn’t, of
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course. The religious choices made by Muslims and others are subjected to exactly the
same kind of criticism as Catholics faced in the s. Criticism of religion, however
narrow-minded it may sometimes be, should never be confused with ethnic or racial
prejudice.
Research shows that in general young Muslims in the Netherlands have the same
views about democracy as their counterparts in the rest of the population. Only when
it comes to freedom of expression do significant differences emerge: no more than a
small minority of Turkish and Moroccan young people are in favour of press freedom
if it means a religion can be ridiculed. This is another indication that the integration
of Islam by the pillarization route will be less easy than it was in the case of religions re-
quired to hold their own for many years in open rivalry in a democratic environment.
During the rapid secularization of Dutch society over recent years, the divide be-
tween the worldview of the average Dutchman and the faith-based outlook among
Muslims has only increased. Comparative studies demonstrate that few countries
have detached themselves from God so quickly and radically as the Netherlands. It
therefore seems strange that in a landscape where the confessional pillars are rapidly
disappearing, the Muslim community is being invited to form a pillar of its own. As a
liberal politician once remarked: a Muslim pillar would make a rather lonely impres-
sion in a flat Dutch landscape in which all the other pillars have disappeared. It is a
vivid image.
Finally, pleas for a Muslim pillar neglect the fact that Islam in the West is developing
as part of an international climate of conflict, with radicalization of a kind that has al-
ready led to violence in Europe and America. The vast majority of Muslims in the
Netherlands undoubtedly want to live in peace, but at the same time many are person-
ally affected by the conflict between political Islam and Western society. There’s a real
danger that with the arrival of so many Muslims in Europe the conflict in the Middle
East will be brought to cities elsewhere. Already, in Antwerp, Lyon and Amsterdam,
for example, the tension between Moroccan and Jewish communities is palpable.
Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are often seen as expressions of one and the same
worldview. The underlying thought is: ‘We know how history turned out; what hap-
pened to the Jews might happen to the Muslims tomorrow.’ Geert Mak has written by
way of warning: ‘I walked along the Weesperstraat in my own city, a bleak thorough-
fare of office blocks. I visualized the same street two generations ago, a busy, narrow,
popular shopping street similar to the Utrechtsestraat. All those people who walked
around here were murdered, eighty thousand in Amsterdam alone, and it all started
with language, with words, with slogans like “national”, and “pure”, and “them” and
“us”. May we please remember that?’
His concern is understandable, but raking up this tragedy and making connections
with our own time only obstructs the debate about Islam. There’s no indication that a
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reaction against the presence of Muslims in Western society is emerging of a kind that
in any way resembles what happened to the Jews. Although there are certainly groups
that wish to deny Islam a place here – and which must therefore be powerfully contra-
dicted – there are opportunities to build mosques and schools, and many Muslims ex-
ercise their right to vote either passively or actively. The comparison with the fate of
the Jews reinforces many people’s sense of victimhood, which is something that must
not be allowed to happen.
A few days after the murder of Theo van Gogh, Ahmed Aboutaleb (at that time an
Amsterdam alderman) gave an unambiguous speech in the El Kabir mosque: ‘There is
no place in an open society such as the Netherlands for people who do not share the es-
sential core values of that society. All those who do not share these values would be
wise to draw their conclusions and leave. We cannot accept that anyone among us de-
mands that we respect his views and at the same time is not prepared to respect the
views of others.’
To equate criticism of Islam and its more radical believers with anti-Semitism is to
ignore the acts of terror that have taken place, on September  and since. They fuel -
led unease about Islam enormously. In the streets of Amsterdam a murder was com-
mitted that caused great social unrest, on a par with reactions to the murder of a
young black man called Kerwin Duinmeijer in August . There is therefore a con-
text of violence, one without any parallel in the history of the Jewish population of the
Netherlands in the s. After the attacks of  on commuter trains in Madrid, Syl-
vain Ephimenco called upon moderate Muslims to speak out more clearly: ‘Asking for
a verbal response from Muslims is not the same as demanding that the innocent exon-
erate themselves from crimes others have committed. It’s a matter of active participa-
tion in the struggle against blind violence, a conscious act of opposition to the dark
forces that have broken into the house of Islam.’ Indeed, why was it so quiet and why
did we hear only protests in support of Hamas on Dam Square in Amsterdam?
The radicalization we’ve seen involves rancour towards the Jews, something that’s
unfortunately all too tangible, despite many well-meaning attempts at rapproche-
ment. We must never mistake earnest criticism of the state of Israel for anti-Semitism,
but neither should we forget that the letter Mohammed Bouyeri left on the body of
Theo van Gogh included an anti-Semitic tirade. If Muslims distance themselves from
that, living together will be easier. No collective guilt falls to Muslims for the violence
committed by a few in the name of Islam, but that violence does confer on them a spe-
cial responsibility to oppose radicalization in the circles in which they move.
We are therefore facing new questions, and dividing society neatly into ‘pillars’
won’t help us find the answers. The Muslim community has certain specific character-
istics that make it quite different from the religious and secular communities of the
past. Moreover, the Netherlands has changed. Secularization has continued. As we
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shall see, it’s possible to seize upon the arrival of Islam as a way to start a discussion
about what is left of ‘pillarization’. In a time characterized by large-scale immigration,
social peace in the Netherlands cannot simply be perpetuated using the old methods. 
- 
Lastly, a long tradition of neutrality in international politics has affected the way the
Dutch deal with ethnic communities. Neutrality was for many years the means by
which their country avoided becoming involved in international conflicts, the s
included. Of course it’s possible to see in this the inherent interests of a small nation,
one that has nothing to gain from power politics. But that neutrality was also the
source of many illusions, as a marvellous statement by leading Dutch politician Johan
Rudolf Thorbecke from  illustrates: ‘Dutch Politics, itself free of the lust for power,
is the most equitable judge of the lust for power in others.’
What arrogance, we immediately think; it sounds like an early version of ‘Neder-
land gidsland’ (‘the Netherlands, model country’), a s slogan. The words ‘itself
free of the lust for power’ were written in the first half of the nineteenth century, when
the Dutch colonial empire, despite some shrinkage, was still of considerable magni-
tude. It reveals a split in the Dutch self-image: on the one hand a vulnerable country
on the European continent at continual risk of being overrun by nations like France
and Germany, and on the other a colonial power, which in establishing and maintain-
ing its rule over the Dutch East Indies and Surinam took little heed of the norms it
brandished as an example to others.
Historian Henk Wesseling writes that ‘long-drawn-out wars such as those the
Dutch fought against Aceh, Bali and Lombok were pursued unscrupulously’. A sol-
diers’ song from the time of the Aceh war of the s goes: ‘Roeit uit dat gebroedsel,
verneder die klant / Met Nederlands driekleur ‘beschaving’ geplant.’ (‘Wipe out that ver-
min, humiliate their nation / Plant in them the Dutch tricolour that brings civiliza-
tion.’) That was the dominant mood of the military campaign in the far off East In-
dies. It emerged only fairly recently that Hendrikus Colijn, later to become prime min-
ister of the Netherlands, was an officer serving in the Lombok expedition at the end of
the nineteenth century and that under his orders atrocious killings took place. His bi-
ographer quotes from a letter sent by Colijn to his wife: ‘I’ve had to gather together 
women and  children, who begged for mercy, and have them shot dead there and
then. It was unpleasant work but there was no other way. The soldiers relished spear-
ing them with their bayonets.’ His letters contain not an inkling that the colonial
wars might be unjust.
In a more general sense too we can say that the Netherlands has had great difficulty
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in facing up to its colonial past. The wars fought between  and  in opposition
to Indonesian independence are to this day referred to as ‘police actions’. This seems
an extraordinarily veiled term for a conflict that went on for years and claimed around
, lives among the native population. No less telling is the fact that until recently
the Dutch were extremely reluctant even to acknowledge the anniversary of Indone-
sia’s declaration of independence on August .
This evasiveness in dealing with colonial history shows through in the treatment of
ethnic minorities in the post-war Netherlands. Many of the migratory movements
that followed the Second World War had their origins in decolonization. In the twenty
years after Indonesia became independent, most members of the ‘Indisch Dutch’
community were forced to leave. This meant that for the first time in its history the
Netherlands was faced with a considerable ethnic minority in its midst. Many of the
, who settled in the Netherlands after the war of independence of -
thought they knew exactly where they were going, but they were disappointed by the
country they encountered in everyday life.
Although the Dutch did not welcome these migrants, they did feel bound by prom-
ises made. Their country – like France and Britain, as we shall see – was hostage to its
colonial past. In his history of this wave of migration, Gert Oostindie concludes that
‘in all cases there was social and political opposition in the Netherlands to extensive
post-colonial migration, sometimes embedded in statements that would strike us as
racist, but the most essential point is that in none of the three cases was the right of ac-
knowledged citizens of former Dutch colonies to settle in the Netherlands ultimately
removed. All postcolonial migrants therefore had the same civic rights and duties as
other Dutch people.’
Despite this formal equality, the ambivalent attitude of the receiving society left its
mark. ‘Indisch Dutch’ immigrants met with little in the way of Dutch goodwill and
many felt treated as second-class citizens. Author Tjalie Robinson observed: ‘We’re a
bunch of stand-in Dutch who aren’t part of the most important patterns of life here
and indeed understand bugger all about them.’ They were seen as a separate group
by those they lived amongst, and indeed felt more comfortable within their own cir-
cles. That feeling would last for many years; some say it remains true for the first gener-
ation even today.
The loss of the East Indies was a heavy blow for many, especially the ten thousand
or so Moluccans who never truly said goodbye to their homeland but dreamed of re-
turning to an independent Ambon. As time went on that hope faded and their grow-
ing frustration was expressed in a series of violent campaigns. Moluccan terrorism in
the Netherlands in the s – especially the hijacking of a train and the simultaneous
holding hostage of a school class – made clear that the colonial past was not about to
disappear of its own accord.
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Initial incomprehension can be excused to some extent in light of the hardships of
those immediate post-war years. Everyone was concentrating on the future after the
privations of wartime and they had no desire to look back. If it had been a little more
open to the experiences of these first post-war migrants, Dutch society might have
been rather better prepared for what was to follow. There would have been more un-
derstanding for the sense of loss that is an aspect of all migration, especially when de-
parture is not a matter of choice. In his  novel Vergeelde portretten [yellowed por-
traits], Rob Nieuwenhuys describes the repatriated. ‘Thousands live as they do in The
Hague alone: East Indies emigrés and the uprooted. Some sit aimlessly at windows,
looking out at the wet streets and bare branches and thinking of their plantations of
fruit trees and melati bushes, of flowerbeds and palms. They are homesick, with pangs
of longing for their East Indies, and they say to each other: “A shame things ended this
way; it used to be so good there.”’
Immigrants from the former East Indies were a lasting reminder of a lost war no
one any longer wished to think about. They carried a stigma, since the Dutch looked
back with increasing shame at three hundred years of colonial rule. Those who em-
bodied that time found themselves on the wrong side when the historical balance was
made up. As a result a fault-line appeared and many important memories of the colo-
nial period, the manner in which Islam was handled in the East Indies for example,
passed into oblivion.
In the mid-s, sociologist Jacques van Doorn published a study of how the colo-
nial heritage makes itself felt in the way minorities are treated in the Netherlands. He
speaks of indecisive manoeuvring ‘between the Western civilizing mission and a well-
intentioned respect for the indigenous culture’. He sees the same wavering between
the pursuit of assimilation and the recognition of cultural differences in post-war pol-
icy towards minorities: ‘It’s no exaggeration to say that government policy in the East
Indies accentuated cultural pluralism to a greater extent than the policies of other
colonial nations, and that the Dutch government now does more than the govern-
ments of other countries of immigration to support ethnic communities.’
Despite this continuity, it’s clear that in the s the policy towards those repatriat-
ed from the East Indies was focused on assimilation, whereas later policy towards mi-
norities can be summarized as ‘integration with the retention of identity’. The settling
of accounts with centuries of paternalism and oppression in the colonial period was
undoubtedly one reason for the evasive attitude towards migrants who came to the
Netherlands from the s onwards. The Dutch could not have taken leave of the
white civilizing mission more wholeheartedly.
Edgar du Perron’s memories of a childhood in the East Indies, as described in the
 classic of Dutch literature Het land van herkomst (published in English the same
year as Country of Origin), convey cautious criticism of colonial relations: ‘Even my
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parents never questioned the fact that in many respects the Javanese are more appeal-
ing than Europeans. But even now I don’t believe that they are superior in every re-
spect and that, therefore, it’s our duty to be sympathetic to every Javanese. All I know
for sure is that if I ever go back to their country, I will have infinitely more sympathy
and attention for them than I used to have.’What in Du Perron’s case was a still hesi-
tant reconsideration of the issue became in the s an increasingly vehement con-
demnation of the colonial past.
This became all the clearer after the arrival in the Netherlands of a second group of
post-colonial migrants, the Surinamers who emigrated after their country became in-
dependent in . Some , now live in the Netherlands and with their arrival
the colonial past was dredged up once again. At their insistence, bitter memories are
gradually penetrating the collective consciousness. The slavery memorial erected a
few years ago in Amsterdam is one highly visible example.
Migration from former colonies changes a country’s self-image and it can make
that society more open. In any case the Dutch could not simply go on polishing up the
seventeenth-century Golden Age in the hope that everyone would be dazzled by it.
The shadow side of that renowned era demanded attention; their view of the Dutch
Republic had to expand to include not just the great masters with their brushes but the
slave masters with their whips.
To anyone who allows all the agonizing over slavery to sink in it’s clear that histori-
cal insight reveals the fragility of civilization. Historians talk of a moral deficit and de-
scribe how the Netherlands played a pioneering role in the rise of slavery and the slave
trade. When the Dutch stopped trading in slaves in  it was not by choice but be-
cause Britain enforced a ban. The question of why the Netherlands abolished slavery
relatively late, in , whereas Britain and France took that step in  and  re-
spectively, remains a source of discomfort. Oostindie offers one explanation: ‘The late-
ness of abolition by the Dutch can be explained by the absence of a strong anti-slavery
movement in the Netherlands. And by tight-fistedness: the issue of compensation was
complicated.’ He’s referring to slave-owners who were compensated for their losses;
the slaves themselves were left with nothing but their hard-won freedom, generally in
appalling circumstances.
There were those who did voice opposition and press for the abolition of slavery at
an early stage. One example is a treatise about the slave trade published in  by Hen-
drik Constantijn Cras. His position was clear: ‘All people, whichever region of this
earth they inhabit, however different they may be in the shape of their bodies, the
colour of their skin or the capacity of their minds, however diverse in the stage of civi-
lization reached, they all have the same nature as ours and the excellence of that nature
must extend to them a guarantee that they will not be subjected to anyone’s arbitrary
rule against their will, far less degraded to such a level that others can enter into agree-
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ments and bargains over the buying and selling of them as they do over animals and
inanimate things.’
We must be aware of this history in its full magnitude. The monument and the an-
nual commemoration represent not just division but a shared investigation. It’s not
easy to come to terms with slavery and the effort to do so can slip into insincerity. Peo-
ple who grow up in the Netherlands with a feeling that they can derive rights from the
sufferings of past generations and therefore have no sense of obligation towards the
society that caused those sufferings are above all doing themselves and their children a
disservice. Being nourished by the past is quite different from being consumed by it.
Is there a chance that a new ‘us’ might emerge, bringing together the heirs of colo-
nial rule and the descendants of slaves? Many say not. How can we build a bridge be-
tween perpetrators and victims? But for how many years can the sins and sufferings of
earlier generations be handed down? How long do they remain a living experience
and when do they become a borrowed one? For how long will we emphasize difference
and when does it become possible to transform yesterday’s horrors into today’s moral
strengths?
The history of Dutch colonization and the migration that flowed from it are part of
a story that must be passed on to future generations. A failure to revise traditional
views of the past and the ways we memorialize it will not only devalue historical
knowledge, it will gradually cause narratives about that past to lose their significance.
We would be wrong to commemorate slavery out of a need for self-pity or self-chas-
tisement. It’s essential to make clear that in Dutch history too, civilization and bar-
barism overlap.
  
The upshot of this brief exploration of Dutch political culture is that the temptations
of avoidance have not gone away. The strength of a country with a long peaceful tradi-
tion shouldn’t be underestimated, but we would do well to ask whether the means by
which that peace was preserved are as effective now as they once were. Compartment -
alization is no longer a useful response to the emergence of a new religion; in fact
more should be done to question the legitimacy of the confessional pillars of Dutch
society, which continue to exist to some degree in a secular age. Tolerance must be re-
defined and above all liberated from the indifference with which it has become too
much identified. Finally, we must learn to see that behind a façade of neutrality lies a
colonial history whose legacy is at best confusing.
The old answers are inadequate and they’ve thrown the country off balance. Dutch
elites feel insecure, since the space in which they operate is being profoundly changed

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 155
by globalization. The social and cultural divides that need to be bridged are wider
than they once were and it’s clear that any attempt at integration under these circum-
stances can easily lead to restrictions on freedom. The ideal of an open society must
not only be articulated more precisely, it must be defended with greater sensitivity to
the fragility of all such ideals. This is essential, since the words of Huizinga still apply:
‘It is not our own merit but a benevolent fate that has spared us the causes and conse-
quences [of rampant nationalism, PS].’The phrase ‘not our own merit but a benevo-
lent fate’ is particularly thought-provoking. We have already looked at the compara-
tively comfortable circumstances that enabled the Dutch to have a relaxed national
consciousness.
In times of mass immigration there’s a risk societies will grow more rigid and in-
ward-looking. The Netherlands needs to come to terms with the prognosis that by
 around  per cent of its population will consist of migrants and their descen-
dants. Bearing in mind that such predictions are tentative, if we add the third genera-
tion then by the middle of this century perhaps as many as four out of ten of its inhabi-
tants will have their origins in post-war immigration. The standard Dutch surnames
will be increasingly scarce. The image of the ‘average’ Dutchman will have changed be-
yond recognition in the space of a century. This is a delicate matter, and it doesn’t take
much imagination to see a danger that some parts of the population will turn their
backs on that new reality. 
Current demographic change cannot be evaluated in isolation, since it’s embedded
in a process of globalization that undermines many other certainties as well. We’re liv-
ing through a transition period; institutional façades look the same as ever, but be-
hind them a great disengagement is taking place. A recent study revealed what at first
seems a peculiar picture of the state of the nation. The attitude of most of those ques-
tioned could be summarized as ‘things are going fine with me but badly with us’.
This unease about societal issues is by no means limited to the Netherlands. It can be
felt right across Europe. 
Many are looking for a certain idea of the Netherlands. The word ‘certain’ is am-
biguous of course. It suggests predictability, whereas everyone knows there can never
be any guarantee of certainty while the world is in such turmoil. In an open society in-
security is a permanent feature, if perhaps unevenly distributed. Some people are do-
ing well as a world economy emerges. Others are in danger of becoming the losers.
There’s nothing inevitable about openness in a time of globalization.
Although borders are clearly losing their significance, we continue to talk about
changes to communities each of which has an ongoing and recognizable history. Will
it in fact be possible to re-imagine our national communities? Amsterdam historian
Niek van Sas thinks it will: ‘The Netherlands is busy reinventing itself again. As at earli-
er critical moments, like the periods around  and , its reinvention once more

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 156
takes the form of a dialectic between particularism and openness.’ The established
order is creaking under the strain and there’s little certainty as to what will replace it,
but Van Sas believes this is nothing new.
That sounds more reassuring than it actually is, because particularism and open-
ness don’t necessarily go together. The reconciliation of these ill-assorted goals as-
sumes favourable circumstances, along with a good deal of self-confidence and regu-
lar maintenance. The Netherlands, convinced it had history on its side, accepted im-
migration with apparent ease. This explains the attitude of its elites, which believed
that ‘a country like ours’ should not lose itself in self-reflection, in examining its own
identity. The notion that foreigners could disrupt their way of living together simply
did not occur to them.
The Netherlands is less and less able to screen itself off from turbulence in the wider
world. When the Kurds’ struggle for independence spills over into Dutch cities, events
in Turkey have repercussions there, as was demonstrated by the attack on the Kosedag
family in The Hague in  in which a mother and five children died. The same ap-
plies now that Islamist terrorist networks have a foothold in Dutch Muslim communi-
ties. Author Ian Buruma reaches a similar conclusion: ‘Although Theo van Gogh was
Dutch and was killed by a Dutch citizen, in the end this is not just a Dutch story but a
Middle Eastern one imported to the heart of Europe.’
Faith in the familiar patterns of adjustment and compromise has clearly declined.
Does current uncertainty about what’s often regarded, explicitly or not, as the charac-
teristic feature of the Netherlands go some way to explain why it’s becoming less open
to the rest of the world? Seen from this perspective, the debate about the integration of
migrants is one focal point in a far more general Dutch quest that has produced ap-
peals from all sides in recent years for ‘the passing on of the core values of the Dutch
constitution, social structure and history’, as a parliamentary commission put it. This
could be a change for the better if it means a new balance can be found between at-
tempts to contemplate objectively the questions raised by contact with other cultures
and a need for self-assurance, an understandable response to a turbulent world.
A reassessment of this kind arouses powerful emotions, which are no less under-
standable. The emphasis on identity can easily lead to the exclusion of people or ideas
that are felt to be foreign. At the same time the neglect of a cultural heritage can pro-
duce a less cohesive society, one that no longer has citizens but merely consumers. So-
ciety as a marketplace or meeting point may be an attractive metaphor to some, but it
would be a rather barren outcome to a national history spanning centuries.
An example of this search for a new balance between heritage and openness is the
debate that arose over plans to renovate the most important museum in the Nether-
lands, the Rijksmuseum. The building required substantial repairs, but as a result the
contemporary significance of this national symbol, which dates from the nineteenth
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century, came up for discussion. Contrasting attitudes went head to head. On one side
people argued that in a world without borders no embodiment of a national culture
or history can be anything more than an anachronism, that these days there’s no such
thing as a coherent story a museum can tell. Typical of this view were statements like
‘The myth of the nation and nationalities sounds less and less convincing’ and ‘The
Rijksmuseum should no longer advertise itself as the “National Treasure-House”’.
Opposed to this repudiation of national identity as a future context for the
Rijksmuseum were many who believe that identity should be its starting point. Their
reasoning is that in a globalizing world contemplation of specific cultural histories
will increase, since so many people are looking for shelter and for something to cling
to. This produced statements such as: ‘The grand gesture, even that of the building it-
self in all its glory, emphasizes the importance we attach to our cultural heritage’ and
‘A national museum must have the ambition to develop a clear vision in response to
the sensitive question: What is the specific, characteristic identity of Dutch culture?’
Is it possible to unite these two views of the museum? At first it seems not, since the
relativism of one is all but diametrically opposed to the self-affirmation that the other
hankers after. Words like ‘pride’, ‘heritage’ and ‘identity’ are hard to reconcile with
‘hot air’, ‘myth’ and ‘elitism’. Yet it must be possible to overcome these antitheses and
to see the questions asked so obtrusively as we deal with our past as an invitation to
take that past seriously in a contemporary sense. This is illustrated by the ways in
which the colonial era is dealt with today. Why would we need to commemorate slav-
ery if the history of which the trade in human beings is part had lost all significance?
A cultural transformation is underway that perhaps has to do with the seculariza-
tion of society. Interest in the past has become a non-religious way of maintaining a
connection between the living and the dead. Perhaps that’s the reason the need for a
historical consciousness is growing. Van Deursen expresses it in his own way: ‘History
is about love for our fellow man. Love does not end in death. This is why we must con-
tinue to pay attention to the past, not because it makes us any better. If it does so as
well, then that’s a bonus.’ In a time when the religious worldview has lost much of its
eloquence, a return to history is perhaps the best way to establish a ‘contract between
the generations’. One indication of this is the growth of interest in genealogy. People
increasingly feel a need to discover a connection with those who went before them.
This could be seen as a sign of nostalgia, but another conclusion is possible: the desire
to get to grips with the boundary between life and death has found secular expression
in a cherishing of the past. The point has been made more succinctly: ‘Without God
nothing remains but history.’
Out of these discussions have come initiatives that will lead to the building of an en-
tirely new museum elsewhere, dedicated to national history, and to the compiling of a
‘canon’ of key events in that history for use in schools. Some see their fears realized, be-
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lieving that with such a museum and such a canon a one-sided view of history will be-
come generally accepted. Others recognize an opportunity to elicit self-critical opin-
ions about the past, thereby contributing to an open attitude that always keeps an eye
on the future.
The work of no less important a Dutch author than WF Hermans can be taken as
demonstrating that a knowledge of literary history will not necessarily lead to patriot-
ic bombast. In one of his novels, published in , the protagonist says: ‘Every Dutch-
man detests Holland. That is our cardinal national characteristic.’ He scoffs at this
dismissive attitude, but at the same time he baldly declares that the quality of Dutch
literature is mediocre, beginning with the famous Vondel. No literary canon exists,
since there haven’t been enough achievements to fill one. In truth, all important writ-
ers criticize the nations that produced them. Hermans is far from alone in that. Atten-
tion to the literary past cannot easily be turned into a form of cheap self-affirmation.
Time and again we’re called upon to put into words the things that bind us and the
things that divide us. Citizenship has to do with a willingness to contribute to the
wider surroundings. That effort will be made only by people who are convinced
they’re part of a continuing history, since what is citizenship in the end but the insight
that something has gone before us and something will come after us? We cannot pre-
vent a rancorous turning away from the outside world by neglecting the past, only by
reflecting upon it. Heritage and openness should not be experienced as opposites; in-
stead we should always be looking out for new ways to combine them.
Today’s unease about democracy is different from that of the s. Then people
worried about the freedom of the citizen, whereas now they tend to feel impatient
about a perceived lack of security. Anyone seeking an explanation for increased ag-
gression in public places has to consider the one-sided emphasis on rights over past
decades. The space demanded by each individual has grown enormously and every vi-
olation of it is experienced as a personal insult. The emphasis on individual freedoms
has its dark side, as we have seen.
Behind the conflict over integration lurks an uncertainty that has descended upon
the Netherlands as a whole about the norms deemed desirable. The murder in The
Hague in  of deputy headmaster Hans van Wieren by a Turkish schoolboy re-
vealed a more general shortcoming. It was rightly observed that this murder should be
seen against a background of growing aggression in the classroom. Murat D, the boy
convicted, is the product of a society struggling to decide how authority should be ex-
ercised. That’s not to say he was a passive victim – an exception was made in his case
that allowed him to be tried in an adult court – but the conclusion drawn on various
sides was that aggression is threatening to become commonplace.
Change is now in evidence; people everywhere pine for ‘social control’. Wherever
you look, whether in psychiatric institutions or housing corporations or schools, at-
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tempts are being made to tackle intimidating behaviour and to formulate rules of con-
duct. People have become suspicious of the habit of turning a blind eye, which is seen
as symbolizing a time of indiscriminate tolerance. After so many years in which indi-
vidual autonomy was given priority it can do no harm to talk once more about our de-
pendence upon one other.
The civilizations we inherit can’t be taken for granted. We’ve come upon plenty of
examples of despotism and intolerance in Dutch history. We must continue to ask
how it’s possible to pass on the story of a community without turning our backs on
the outside world. The formulation offered by Jan and Annie Romein that we looked
at earlier may be one place to start: ‘Even in the established State, the Nation is still in
the making.’ In that idea lies an invitation to migrants and their children as well as to
the rest of society. The conflict surrounding newcomers may prompt a reassessment
of the meaning of citizenship in an interdependent world. Clearly avoidance is not the
answer in a time of immigration.
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
European contrasts
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   
Unlike Americans, Europeans do not regard immigration as an important part of
their history, indeed they generally ignore the fact that over the years millions of peo-
ple have arrived from beyond their borders. The contrast can be explained. The story
Americans tell about their origins and development is woven around the idea of their
country as a ‘nation of immigrants’. In our part of the world migrants have not played
such an important role in the formation of nation states. For a long time migration in
Europe was seen as the exception to the rule.
This self-image is open to challenge, since the crossing of borders has in fact been
an essential part of European history. Gérard Noiriel points out that in the interwar
years the percentage of foreigners was greater in France than in America. The scale of
immigration into France in those years may have been exceptional, but migration has
been significant all across Europe since early modern times. Dutch historian Jan Lu-
cassen has studied seven distinct patterns of migration in seventeenth- and eight -
eenth-century Europe. In total some , migrant workers were on the move
every year, often travelling hundreds of kilometres. Tens of thousands left the poorer
mountainous regions of the Massif Central, the Pyrenees and the Alps to head for
Paris, and Irish migrants fanned out eastwards across Britain in considerable num-
bers.
Much has been written about the Hollandgänger, Germans who travelled to the
wealthy coastal provinces of Holland and Friesland where they helped with haymak-
ing or the heavy labour of cutting peat. Conditions in the ‘peat colonies’ were tough,
with sixteen-hour working days and high mortality from disease. German migrants
worked in Dutch cities as well, as servants or maids, or were employed in merchant
shipping and the Dutch colonial army. This particular type of migration peaked in the
second half of the eighteenth century, with some forty thousand Hollandgänger arriv-
ing annually. Jan Lucassen and Rinus Penninx conclude: ‘For centuries past, large
numbers of newcomers have been coming to the Netherlands, perhaps more than to
any other country in north-western Europe.’
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In the nineteenth century too, many people left their homes in search of a better
life. The large population of Italian migrants in France is one obvious example, as are
the many Irish and Poles who moved to other European countries. It says a great deal
that the lives of their compatriots in America have been far better recorded, although
the deficiency has been rectified to some extent in recent years.
There are early examples of refugee movements too, border crossings that were not
a matter of choice. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the new arrivals were
mainly communities expelled for their religious beliefs, probably the best known be-
ing the half-million French Huguenots persecuted by French Catholics. These were
highly skilled people and cities in the Netherlands competed to attract them, partly by
offering tax breaks. Later displacements were increasingly political in nature. Many
people fled Poland as a result of the revolutions of - and , and most could
count on a fair degree of sympathy. The Russian Revolution produced colonies of ex-
iled and impoverished aristocrats in Berlin and later in Paris.
There is another way in which great historical events turn people into migrants.
Take the exchange of populations in the s when the Greek inhabitants of Turkey
and the Turkish inhabitants of Greece, a total of more than two million people, were
forced to move to their ‘own’ countries. The British diplomat who negotiated this eth-
nic cleansing was well aware of the moral catastrophe that population transfers repre-
sented, describing them as ‘a thoroughly bad and vicious solution, for which the
world will pay a heavy penalty for a hundred years to come’. Another low point was
the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia after the Second World
War, which troubles relations between Germany and the Czech Republic to this day.
These are merely a handful of examples from a long history of flight, expulsion and
deportation that assumed unprecedented proportions in the post-war period. The
number of people displaced by the Second World War has been estimated at fifty to
sixty million. It would not be overstating the case to describe the twentieth century as
the ‘century of the refugee’. Saskia Sassen has concluded that these refugee move-
ments were partly a product of nation building, which meant not only that people
moved across borders but that borders moved across people. The founding of new
states turned majorities into minorities overnight, like the Germans who suddenly
found themselves living in a newly independent Poland.
Migrant labourers and refugees helped to make Europe what it is today, so we
should examine this aspect of European history more closely. Which developments
are still ongoing and where do the discontinuities lie? In this chapter we will look at
the three most important countries in Western Europe – France, Germany and Britain
– and make a series of comparisons. Are we witnessing a gradual convergence of ideas
on the subject? What impact does the current agonizing over migration have on the
process of European integration?
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First a quick and inevitably rough sketch of immigration over the past two cen-
turies, focusing mainly on two discontinuities and two rather more enduring aspects.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Europe was the jumping-off point for
a vast intercontinental migration that saw a net total of around forty-five million Eu-
ropeans move to the New World. After the Second World War the flow changed direc-
tion and north-western Europe in particular, then southern and later central Europe
became the destination for a growing number of migrants. This represents a great his-
torical reversal. Another change concerns the role of the state. Klaus Bade is among
those who suggest that the First World War marks a turning point. For most of the
nineteenth century governments were reluctant to become involved in migration is-
sues, but the end of the Great War signalled the rise of state intervention. Govern-
ments were suddenly eager to exercise more influence over the movement of people
across borders.
The main reason why Europeans were set adrift in the nineteenth century was the
transition from an agrarian to an industrial society, which produced a flow of people
from the countryside into the cities. The rationalization of agriculture, along with the
inability of cottage industries to compete with factory production, caused a dramatic
decline in employment in rural areas. The countries that were first to industrialize
were also the first to see large numbers of citizens leave for distant lands; Britain is a
prime example, later followed by Germany. The same rule applies to regions that in-
dustrialized earlier than others: northern Italy initially led the way; emigration from
the south began later.
Industrial expansion went hand in hand with astonishing population growth.
Around  Europe’s population stood at roughly  million and a century later it
had risen to  million. Then the truly explosive growth began. The first half of the
nineteenth century saw a rise of  per cent, the second half  per cent. On the eve of
the First World War there were  million Europeans, even though some  million
had emigrated.
An influential work by Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the
Masses (), makes continual reference to this population explosion. The author
stumbles over his fellow citizens everywhere: ‘Towns are full of people, houses full of
tenants, hotels full of guests, trains full of travellers, cafés full of customers, parks full
of promenaders, consulting-rooms of famous doctors full of patients, theatres full of
spectators, and beaches full of bathers. What previously was, in general, no problem,
now begins to be an everyday one, namely, to find room.’ This enormous volume of
humanity placed a huge strain on society, and the migration of millions to the New
World functioned as a safety valve.
Europeans poured out across the globe, but most went to America and later to
Canada, Australia or New Zealand. Argentina and Brazil were important destinations
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as well, especially after the United States implemented a much more restrictive policy
towards European immigrants in the s. Ireland, Poland and Italy were among the
main countries of origin. Between  and , no fewer than .million Italians left
for America and even more, .million, for destinations within Europe.
History is repeating itself. With a similar population explosion and depopulation
of the countryside taking place outside Europe, considerable flows of migration to-
wards the old continent have developed over the past half century. Europe once sent
its excess population to settle abroad and now many countries in what used to be
called the third world are doing likewise. Having been a point of departure, Europe is
now the destination for many migrants. In a sense this is a reversal of what happened
decades ago. Migratory patterns in our own time have a great deal to do with our colo-
nial history; Europeans, uninvited, interfered in other societies for centuries and now
millions of inhabitants of what were once European colonial possessions have moved
to their former motherlands.
Europe’s immigrants can be placed under four main headings. First there are the
post-colonial migrants, such as the Surinamers who now live in the Netherlands, the
Pakistanis in Britain, the Algerians in France and the Angolans in Portugal. The old
colonial relationshipshadoftenprepared themforwhat to expect.Manyalready spoke
the language of the old-and-new country.Then there were the workers brought to Eu-
rope in years of rapid economic growth, especially the s when the number of mi-
grants living in the European Economic Community doubled from . million to .
million. Up to a point they too were from former colonies, like the Moroccans who
moved to France. Their presence turned out to be permanent and with them came a
third category of migrants, familymembers,whonow form the largest category of im-
migrants inmostWestern European countries. Lastly, Europe has seen the arrival of a
large number of refugees. This group is the most nationally diverse and relationships
with the receiving countries are the least clear cut. A sense of humanitarian duty to-
wards refugees is the decisive factor and in countries like the Netherlands we now see
rapidly expanding communities of people from, for instance, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran,
Somalia and Vietnam. Germany is home to a relatively large number of people from
former Yugoslavia.
This transformation of a continent of emigration into a continent of immigration
brings us to another important discontinuity, namely the increasing tendency of state
governments to steer migratory movements. The First World War marks a break with
the liberal optimism of the turn of the twentieth century, when cross-border econom-
ic traffic increased enormously and people were extremely mobile. In the years before
the Great War there were no passport controls. The few that had been in force were
abandoned – France, for example, abolished its passport requirement for entry in 
– and hundreds of thousands of migrants moved back and forth in an unregulated Eu-
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ropean labour market. Many Italians worked in France, Poles in Germany and Irish
people in Britain, and then there were the Belgians and Poles in France and the Dutch
and Italians in Germany. It was generally a situation of laisser-faire, entirely in accor-
dance with the spirit of the times.
It would nevertheless be a distortion of history to say that governments of the peri-
od left migrants entirely to their own devices. In  relatively liberal naturalization
laws were introduced in France, but in  Germany opted for more restrictions on
access to state citizenship. Britain passed an Aliens Act in , making it easier to de-
port undesirable foreigners. Wars repeatedly made aliens into suspected fifth-colum-
nists of some kind. All German males living in Paris at the start of the Franco-Prussian
War in  were ordered to leave the city within three days, and between  and
France expelled some sixteen hundred immigrants on suspicion of anarchism, in
response to the murder of President Sadi Carnot by an Italian anarchist in June .
Yet despite these earlier interventions it remains true to say that the influence of
governments on the movement of individuals increased significantly in the years after
the First World War. The immediate cause of this change was the economic crisis,
which motivated governments to protect their own populations, often by preventing
the entry of too many migrants in times of unemployment and economic downturn.
Germany introduced a practice called Inländervorrang, meaning that priority was giv-
en to the indigenous population. In France, entire professions were closed to mi-
grants, despite an otherwise fairly open immigration policy that remained in place un-
til  and which we will look at shortly. The time of free ‘proletarian mass migra-
tions’, as Sandor Ferenczi calls them, was over. Restrictions were placed on access not
just to Europe but to the United States and emigration from Europe to America
reached its lowest level for a century.
After the Second World War the development of welfare states, which guarded citi-
zens against the consequences of illness, unemployment and old age, necessitated an
even greater degree of control. As more rights accrued to citizenship, access to it be-
came more significant. Equal treatment for those within a nation’s borders was predi-
cated upon unequal treatment at the borders. It was impossible to allow open access to
societies that were becoming complex welfare states offering an unprecedented de-
gree of protection to their populations.
Twentieth-century nation building made the boundaries between natives and for-
eignersmore clear cut. The sharpening of the distinction can be seen as the price paid
for an increase in citizens’ rights. Immigration historians concentrate primarily on
the problematic side of the break with nineteenth-century liberalism and most are
critical of state influence on migration flows. Sassen’s view typifies this attitude: ‘Al-
though immigrants and refugees at various times reached significant numbers and
were seen as “others” even if European, the experience of “invasion” and flows that are
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out of control donot seem tohavebeendominant imagesuntil the aftermathofWorld
War I. The formation and strengthening of the interstate system brought to the fore
questions of border control andnationality…Thewill to regulate and to “nationalize”
all spheres of activitymarks this new era in the history of the state.’Bade too is dismis-
sive in his judgment of what he sees as a dual strategy of inclusion and exclusion. He
underestimates the fact that efforts to make people integrate are a natural result of
state support,which protects residents but inevitably excludes non-residents, protect-
ing those inside while creating obstacles for those outside. The welfare state is an im-
portant contributory factor in generating opposition to immigration in our time.
When migrants were thrown out of work en masse after the economic crisis of ,
their above average reliance on welfare payments undermined arguments for more
immigration. Migrants were still arriving, however, since one of the paradoxical con-
sequences of the economic crisis was that their communities settled in for good. At
precisely the point when the oil crisis put an end to Europe’s need for migrant labour-
ers, guest workers brought their families to join them and their stay became perma-
nent. The reunification of families not only made immigrants more visible, it altered
the balance of cost and benefit. The original guest workers had been young men at the
height of their productive powers, but as soon as they brought their families to join
them the proportion of children, women and the elderly in immigrant communities
increased.
 
Alongside these major changes, certain patterns repeat throughout the history of Eu-
ropean migration over the past two centuries. Clearly migration within Europe has al-
most always been of greater magnitude than immigration from the rest of the world,
and opposition to migrants emerges time and again. As Lucassen has shown, the new-
comers of the nineteenth century were hardly welcomed with open arms. There were
riots in  when the residents of Stockport near Manchester attacked Catholic mi-
grants from Ireland, and in violence against Italian migrants in the salt mines of
Aigues-Mortes in  several people were killed. Countless incidents like these illus-
trate the uneasy relations between natives and newcomers.
Between the mid-nineteenth century and our own time there were several major
migration flows and the three most important countries of origin within Europe were
Ireland, Poland and Italy. Migration from these countries continued in the twentieth
century, although in the case of the Irish and Italians the numbers fell significantly in
the s. Polish migration has increased since the fall of the Berlin Wall in , an in-
dication that the iron curtain shielded Western Europe from migration from the east.

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Sassen emphasizes the limited scale of international migratory movements. ‘Both
emigration and immigration always encompasses only a small fraction of a country’s
population.’ This is certainly true of the receiving nations, but when it comes to the
countries the migrants left behind, her assertion is disputable. The extent of emigra-
tion from Ireland and Italy was truly immense. As we have seen, . million Italians
left for other European countries and millions more crossed to the New World. The
scale of Irish emigration in relation to the population as a whole was even greater. In
 two thirds of all people born in Ireland lived elsewhere.
It is interesting to consider whether these countries benefited from emigration on
such a scale. Sassen thinks not: ‘But it is clear that for Italy and Ireland, even if now
they receive immigrants, the fact of two centuries of labor exporting was not a macro-
economic advantage.’ Most research into migration looks at the phenomenon from
the perspective of the migrants and says little about the consequences for their native
countries of their departure, although we are often reminded that migrants tend to be
relatively enterprising and that their emigration deprives a society of reformers and
entrepreneurs.
Let’s examine for a moment the extent of Italian, Polish and Irish migration.Look-
ing just at the Italians who moved to France it becomes clear that before the First
World War the numbers were well into the hundreds of thousands: in , , Ital-
ians were registered as French residents, in , ,. Whereas in  the Belgians
were much the largest immigrant group in France, by the turn of the twentieth centu-
ry the Italians had overtaken them. They were active mainly in the building trades and
as seasonal workers in agriculture. In cities like Nice and Marseille they made up
around  per cent of the population.
The scale of migration out of Poland was astonishing as well. Between  and 
around two million Poles emigrated. Along with economic misery the population was
having to endure foreign rule. Since the late eighteenth century Poland had been di-
vided up between the three great powers that bordered it: Prussia, Austria-Hungary
and Russia. From the Prussian-held region a huge number of Poles left to work in the
expanding mining industry of the Ruhrgebiet in western Germany, especially in the
years between  and . On the eve of the First World War the presence of some
half a million ‘Ruhr Poles’ was recorded, and in towns like Bochum, Gelsenkirchen
and Dortmund they made up around  per cent of the population. In a juridical
sense the Ruhr Poles were not immigrants, since until  they were citizens of the
German Empire, but in a socio-cultural sense they are a clear example of an ethnic mi-
nority.
Finally, Ireland was a disaster area, where the famine of the s (known as ‘the
hungry forties’) claimed countless victims and forced many to flee abroad. Between
 and , .million people left the island, the majority bound for America. While
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neighbouring countries were experiencing demographic growth, the Irish population
declined sharply. Estimates suggest that between  and  a total of some five mil-
lion Irish people moved to England, Scotland and Wales. The numbers peaked be-
tween  and , when half a million crossed to cities like Liverpool, Dundee and
Glasgow, where they made up around a fifth of the population.
Lucassen has compared these three migrant groups in an attempt to answer the
question of whether the integration of today’s migrants from Turkey, Algeria or the
Caribbean really is much more problematic than the challenge of absorbing the Irish,
Italians and Poles around a hundred years ago. His general conclusion is that we have a
tendency to see the past in a positive light and the present in a negative one: ‘Many ele-
ments that are considered crucial stumbling blocks on the road to integration of pres-
ent-day migrants, … such as a threatening religion, homeland politics, transnational
ties, (low) social status, and criminality are not as new as we might think.’
Lucassen’s research shows that integration was actually more difficult in the past;
the three immigrant communities moved up the social ladder much more slowly than
we tend to assume. Although details about the second and third generations are ex-
tremely scarce, his considered judgment is that social advancement was limited. The
Poles and the Irish in particular had great difficulty extricating themselves from a life
in the underclass. The Italians did rather better, a result Lucassen attributes to the rela-
tively inviting attitude of the French government, as demonstrated by more liberal
naturalization laws.
These turn-of-the-century migrants aroused considerable opposition. Lucassen
presents evidence that the sense of threat many people feel now was just as acute a cen-
tury ago, when the migrants in question came from other parts of Europe. He identi-
fies three sources of conflict between the three specific groups we have looked at and
the countries in which they settled. In France it was mainly a matter of social tensions.
The Italians were seen as strike-breakers and as cheap workers who put downward
pressure on wages, which is of course true to some degree of all labour migration.
There were frequent conflicts, on one occasion leading to a mass attack on Italians
known as the ‘chasse à l’Italien’.
Such tensions were palpable in the mining regions of northern France. A series of
articles in the socialist daily Le Reveil du Nord gives a vivid impression of the mood on
the eve of the First World War. There are complaints about migrants who come to
earn a bit of quick money: ‘The instability of many foreigners is a notable fact. The
Germans, the Italians, the Austrians are the most nomadic… They save their little pile
of coins, denying themselves everything in order to save the sum they have dreamed of
collecting. Then they say goodbye to the mine.’ This tendency to avoid spending any-
thing had its consequences: ‘The need to save … forces the foreigner to lead a sordid
life. Spaniards, Italians, Turks, Germans, Austrians present the signs of the blackest
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misery and the most disgusting filth. What a striking contrast to our French miners,
whose concern about cleanliness is such that they wash in their tubs on returning
from the mine and do not come out before having “freshened up”.’
The newspaper, aimed at a readership of local French labourers, is perturbed not
only by the nomadic lifestyle of the guest workers of a century ago but by the crimes
they are said to commit: ‘The arrival of these strangers has coincided with an upsurge
in brawls and violent incidents. It is not unusual after eight in the evening in mining
country to hear shots fired… Take a look in the public courtrooms of mining regions.
People with exotic silhouettes can often be seen sitting in the dock… Thefts increase;
company guards dare not intervene in certain cases for fear of cruel reprisals.’
Social tensions certainly affected Irish and Polish immigrants, but they were com-
pounded by religious differences. Catholic migrants were not at all welcome in over-
whelmingly Protestant England and Scotland. Serious conflict erupted in the years af-
ter , when the Catholic episcopal hierarchy was restored by the Pope, but religious
riots were not confined to that decade. There was great hostility towards the illiterate
and religiously rather conservative Irish, which on the Irish side led to an increased
consciousness of what they as a people had in common.
The combination of nationalism and Catholicism had enormous cohesive power
for most Irish migrants, with the exception, naturally, of the Protestants among them,
who identified with Britain. This helped to create political organizations such as the
Irish Nationalist Party, which held seats on Liverpool City Council for several years.
But as Irish historian Gearoid O Tuathaigh remarks: ‘The dominance of the “national
question” in Irish immigrant political behaviour severely retarded, indeed almost en-
tirely precluded, significant Irish participation in domestic British politics for the
greater part of the nineteenth century.’ Irish nationalism, coupled with a deep aver-
sion to Catholicism, did indeed arouse fierce opposition.
Alongside all this, the social impact of migration created unease in the native popu-
lation. Immigrants competed mainly at the bottom of the labour market and there-
fore depressed wages. The notorious description of Irish immigrants by a youthful
Friedrich Engels in his The Condition of the English Working Class in  speaks for it-
self: ‘For work which requires long training or regular, pertinacious application, the
dissolute, unsteady drunken Irishman is on too low a plane. To become a mechanic, a
mill-hand, he would have to adopt the English civilization, the English customs, be-
come, in the main, an Englishman.’ Engels feared that the English working class
would be adversely affected by the presence of immigrants: ‘For when, in almost every
great city, a fifth or a quarter of the workers are Irish, or children of Irish parents, who
have grown up among Irish filth, no one can wonder if the life, habits, intelligence,
moral status – in short, the whole character of the working-class assimilates a great
part of the Irish characteristics.’
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The history of the Poles in the Ruhrgebiet renders up another example of social and
religious differences compounded by a conflict of loyalty. Germans greatly feared Pol-
ish nationalism. Under Bismarck Germany waged a fierce cultural battle with the pri-
mary aim of Germanizing the Polish-speaking population. Priests were ordered to use
the German language and required to pass an exam in German literature and culture.
Some issues are older than we think. Exactly the same demands are now being made of
Islamic leaders in countries like France and the Netherlands.
Polish immigrants were greatly distrusted, as demonstrated by the increasing in-
volvement of the police, who tried to nip nationalism in the bud. In  Heinrich
Konrad von Studt, Oberpräsident of the Province of Westphalia, gave a clear impres-
sion of the mood of those years: ‘If nothing is done to stem further political develop-
ments, the time will no longer be far off when the Poles will be elected onto their own
separate local councils with a majority that will give them dominance on the Munici-
pal Council… Under such circumstances that movement could become, in unsettled
times, a threat to public order.’
Such suspicions had unintended consequences, just as they had in the case of the
Irish: nationalism in Polish migrant circles only increased and one expression of such
sentiments was the establishment of a Polish miners’ union. The existing social-demo-
crat and Christian trades unions did not treat Polish immigrants as equals, because of
what the historian Christoph Klessmann calls their powerful ‘national loyalty’. He
goes on: ‘For their part the Catholic Poles could rarely overcome their deep-seated
reservation towards the “German socialists”. Despite the class position shared by Ger-
man and Polish workers, the national question therefore formed an obstacle that was
hard for either side to overcome.’
Lucassen examines this kind of social, religious and nationalistic conflict partly
with an eye to the present day. There are indeed innumerable parallels between histor-
ical and contemporary migrations, and past conflicts confirm the general impression
that immigration always leads to clashes. Conflict should be seen as part of the history
of integration and clearly the most explosive situations arise when social tensions are
combined with religious or national division. Take the riots in Marseille in , when
smouldering resentment towards Italians erupted in the context of an international
dispute between France and Italy over Tunisia. When returning French troops entered
the French port city, people in the crowds that had turned out to watch claimed they’d
heard disapproving whistles coming from the Italian Club. A violent reaction ensued.
In widespread rioting that continued for two days, Italians were hunted down. Three
people died and some twenty thousand Italians left the city in the aftermath of the dis-
turbances.
Such incidents demonstrate that international conflicts can have direct conse-
quences for relations between immigrant groups and native populations. It therefore
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takes little imagination to see the risks posed by the combination of integration prob-
lems affecting Muslim communities in the Western world and a flaring up of hostili-
ties between the West and political Islam in the Middle East. International tension of
this kind can lead to conflicts of loyalty in migrant circles as well as to suspicion in ma-
jority communities, which regard every sign of protest as a warning of treachery to
come.
The underlying suggestion in Lucassen’s work is that the frequency of such con-
frontations down through history means today’s conflicts are nothing out of the ordi-
nary. This emphasis on historical continuity is perfectly legitimate as long as it doesn’t
create a nonchalant attitude of ‘all’s well that ends well’. In the long run a settlement is
generally found, but the fact remains that problems of adjustment can be persistent
and intense. Although history teaches us that every integration process is accompa-
nied by conflict, this is not to say that a harmonious outcome is guaranteed under
present circumstances. There is considerable uncertainty, as the story of post-war im-
migration in France, Germany and Britain makes clear. All three countries are experi-
encing profound changes in the composition of their populations, and everywhere
the traditional answers are proving inadequate.
 
France’s immigration history is characterized first of all by exceptional demographics.
Almost a century earlier than in other European countries, a rapid drop in the num-
ber of births caused the population to shrink – in a deeply Catholic country at that.
This says a great deal about the discrepancy between religious doctrine and real life; it
seems Catholic teaching about marriage and reproduction did not fall on fertile soil.
These extraordinary circumstances forced the country to resort to immigration at an
early stage, so that it could continue to industrialize in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. Migrants were sought mainly in neighbouring countries such as Italy
and Belgium, but many more came from Poland and Portugal.
The composition of the population is not the only unusual thing about France; its
political principles mark it out as well. After the Revolution of , for all the tragic
oppression and violence that ensued, it aimed to set an example as a modern nation
based on the principle of equality. The French republican tradition is similar to that of
America with its  Declaration of Independence. Both countries see themselves as
the bearers of universal ambitions. Yet in contrast to America, the revolution in France
initially resulted in a more divided nation. Efforts to establish the republican ideal as a
shared horizon only really took shape in the final quarter of the nineteenth century.
France’s immigration history therefore begins at the intersection of two develop-
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ments: demographic decline and the rise of republican thinking. Demographic stag-
nation was at odds with its lofty ambition. Noiriel speaks of the paradox of a ‘complet-
ed’ nation with a shrinking population. Ironically, while France was building a colo-
nial empire, the population back home could be sustained numerically only by immi-
gration. Sooner or later colonialism and immigration were bound to influence each
other.
Let’s look more closely at French immigration history before moving on to ask how
republican ideals influenced the integration of the country’s many newcomers. From
the late nineteenth century onwards there was an urgent need not only for foreign
workers but for soldiers. At the start of the twentieth century France signed agree-
ments with countries including Italy and Belgium, and with the lands that became the
independent states of Poland and Czechoslovakia. A considerable number of immi-
grants arrived between  and  alone – in total more than a million newcomers
were registered in that decade. The Société Générale d’Immigration was set up in
 to guide the flows of migration in a favourable direction, assuming responsibility
for selection and medical examinations, and for organizing transport and regulating
the distribution of groups of migrants across the companies offering to employ them.
This is similar in every respect to the post-war history of guest workers.
After the Second World War the situation was not significantly different. Once
again France was struggling with a demographic deficit that could be resolved only by
immigration. Within the Haut Comité de la Population a debate raged about the num-
bers required. Political and economic incentives overlapped, but they were not identi-
cal. Considerations of power politics led to persistent efforts to expand the popula-
tion, whereas economic demand for migrants fluctuated according to market trends.
Weighing up these interests, France settled on a target figure of one and a half million
migrants for the five years beginning in .
An interesting debate ensued about how to select immigrants. Georges Mauco, a
leading figure in the Haut Comité, was an advocate of the American model, which dis-
tinguished between migrants according to ethnic origin. Based on the assumption
that certain groups would assimilate far more readily than others, he wanted to ex-
clude migrants from North Africa and Asia. Mauco’s recommendations, which were
taken up by President De Gaulle, include the assertion: ‘It is necessary to limit the en-
try of Mediterranean and oriental people. They have changed the population struc-
ture of France profoundly over the past half-century.’ In his discussion of this
episode, historian Patrick Weil emphasizes the contradiction between the republican
ideal of equality and the proposed ethnic selection of immigrants. In the end the eth-
nic guidelines did not pass into law. After intervention by the Conseil d’État, all refer-
ences to the selection of immigrants were removed.
Decolonization was to be the next test of the equality principle. Like Britain, France
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was ensnared by its own colonial ambitions, with the ultimate outcome that from 
onwards Algerians were officially categorized as French citizens and therefore had a
right to freedom of movement between the colony and the motherland. Because of
this commitment the colonial question had a major impact on the politics of immi-
gration, as illustrated by the words of a young parliamentarian of the time, Jean-Marie
Le Pen, the future leader of the populist Front National. During a debate in  he re-
marked: ‘What should be said of the Algerians is not that they have need of France but
that France has need of them… I contend that there is nothing in the religion of Islam
that, from a moral point of view, prevents a believing or practicing Muslim from be-
coming full French citizen… I conclude: offer the Muslims of Algeria entry and inte-
gration into a dynamic France.’
From the moment the influx began, France tried to dissuade Algerians from com-
ing, but the country was hostage to promises made and after decolonization it had a
struggle on its hands to impose any restrictions at all. Not only did French leaders try
to reduce the number of immigrants, they were worried about the rights accruing to
them. Their presence was supposed to be temporary and their attitudes were closely
monitored. During the struggle for Algerian independence, Algerian immigrants
were denied the right of association for many years. When in the s they were final-
ly granted permission to organize, it was the Algerian government that raised objec-
tions, since it feared they would find their own voice and anticipated political prob-
lems. Weil points to an incentive to sustain the flow of migrants while at the same time
restricting their rights, an incentive shared by entrepreneurs, the government of the
country of settlement and the government of the country of origin.
The s and ’s were decades of large-scale labour migration, but after the eco-
nomic crisis of , France stopped recruiting workers from abroad. Virtually all
Western European countries made the same decision. At that point there were . mil-
lion foreigners in France, the largest groups being , Portuguese and a roughly
equal number of Algerians, half a million Spaniards, slightly fewer Italians and a quar-
ter of a million Moroccans. One might say that until the mid-s immigration into
France was primarily a Mediterranean affair. Clearly geographical proximity was of
crucial importance to post-war as well as to pre-war migration flows.
As in surrounding countries, the effect of the decision to end migration to France
was counter-intuitive. While there was no longer any economic need for migrants, the
reuniting of families and not long afterwards the formation of families became major
factors, bringing millions more migrants to France. Of all European countries, France
made the most tenacious efforts to send them back, especially the Algerians. Begin-
ning in , it negotiated with the Algerian government to arrange for the return of
the ,Algerian migrants who at that point did not have French nationality. Par-
liament decided that , migrants would be returned annually, by force if neces-
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sary. Countless diplomatic agreements and economic support measures later, the
French concluded that their efforts had run into the sand. The Algerian government
was deploying a combination of diplomatic delaying tactics and appeals to the former
colonizer’s sense of guilt.
Those years saw innumerable attempts to regulate family reunification and family
formation, but intervention by the courts showed such rights to be inviolable. The Al-
gerian government, incidentally, was not at all happy to see families reunited, since it
meant the permanent settlement of migrants in France and therefore a reduction in
transfers of money to the home country. Also, and not without cause, it predicted that
the children of migrants would slowly become estranged from Algerian culture. The
accuracy of this prediction was demonstrated in a way no one had expected. France
and Algeria agreed that young people with dual nationality should undergo national
service in their parents’ country. It soon emerged that the Algerian army was experi-
encing great difficulty with young recruits who had grown up in France and were in
many respects both unwilling and unable to adjust to the traditional practices of the
Algerian armed forces.
Once the realization finally dawned that it was illusory to expect migrants to return
and that attempts to limit family reunification had failed, France began working on
improvements to their social and legal position. From the early s onwards, restric-
tions on further immigration were coupled with policies designed to promote integra-
tion. The same happened in Britain and Germany, but ideas about integration dif-
fered between the three countries. The republican equality principle and resistance to
the formation of ethnic groups were crucial to France’s efforts to merge newcomers
into French society.
We need to look more closely at the history of republican thinking in order to un-
derstand the strengths, and indeed the weaknesses, of that tradition where it relates to
the position of migrants. The lost war with Prussia of -was followed by an age of
modernization. France continued to centralize and the state was increasingly seen as
the embodiment of an emancipatory ideal. Victory over the powerful regional orien-
tation of its citizens and the adoption of a standardized language that steadily sup-
planted regional dialects were important steps towards the creation of the modern
French nation. From this perspective, France’s ‘crucible’ was initially a means not so
much of assimilating newcomers as of absorbing Bretons, Basques and other popula-
tion groups into the French state.
Schools were crucial to these efforts to unify and assimilate. Education became
compulsory for French children in , beginning with those aged six to thirteen. For
the children of migrant families the rule applied only from  onwards. The state
school, as defined by Jules Ferry, Minister of Education when the act was passed, is a fa-
miliar concept in France. As well as handing down knowledge it was explicitly intend-
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ed to create citizens who would identify with the republican ideal and therefore free
themselves from group cultures, whether regional or foreign.
The main focus of republican thinking was a belief that each new generation must
pay its debts to previous generations. Everyone is born into a world shaped by the ef-
forts of those who have gone before; all newcomers, whatever their backgrounds, are
presented with a legacy. Clearly this debt cannot be repaid to former generations; in-
stead it imposes a duty on everyone to make an effort to help the community. Aware-
ness of this was hammered into the citizens of France: ‘The right of one is the duty of
another.’
Large-scale immigration in the late nineteenth century meant that migrants
helped mould republican thinking. France did not really see itself as a nation of immi-
grants, rather, as sociologist Dominique Schnapper puts it: ‘Unity was professed,
sought and valued all the more as reality became more diverse.’ In this sense immi-
gration reinforced republican thinking. The French nation was multiform in a cultur-
al sense, but it strove to bind its diverse beliefs and lifestyles into a common project.
This concept of citizenship brought with it liberal ideas about the naturalization of
newcomers, and access to French nationality became easier. The first major legislation
dates from . Its inspiration was twofold. Firstly, a relaxation of the conditions for
naturalization was prompted by a need to maintain the number of conscripts. With-
out new Frenchmen there was a risk the army would decline in strength, and irritation
had arisen about migrants who’d resided in the country for years but could not be
called up for military service. The second explicit aim of the new naturalization laws
was to prevent the formation of ‘foreign nuclei’ (noyaux allogènes). Even at this early
stage there was a fear of segregation and of the consolidation of ethnic groups. It’s in-
teresting to note that towards the end of the nineteenth century the French govern-
ment actually started encouraging immigrants to reunite their families or to create
families by marrying women from their home countries, since the nomadic lifestyle of
Italian migrants was regarded as incompatible with efforts to integrate them. Mem-
bers of the Italian migrant community had a strong tendency to return to their native
land. Bringing a wife and children to join you is indeed a form of permanent settle-
ment.
The thinking behind naturalization shifted away from an emphasis on blood rela-
tions towards a stress on an individual’s place of birth. In other words the ius sanguinis
was replaced by the ius soli. The ius soli already had a long history. The connection be-
tween nationality and territory had been recognized before the French Revolution,
which introduced the new criterion of blood relations in determining a person’s na-
tionality. In the sixteenth century the emphasis on links with the soil had meant subju-
gation to the ruling prince, but by this point, at the end of the nineteenth century, a
person’s place of birth had gained a more emancipatory significance.
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There were limits to the elevation in status brought about by naturalization, how -
ever, since the new French did not have the same rights as established citizens in every
respect. They were not eligible to vote until they had resided in France for ten years,
and from  onwards all kinds of obstacles were thrown up to prevent naturalized
French people from joining professions such as the law and medicine. This distinction
between the native and the naturalized was of course a fundamental violation of the
republican ideal of equality. At the time of the Vichy Regime it would lead to the rever-
sal of naturalization for many thousands of Jews. This is one more argument against
ever placing such limitations on citizenship; naturalization should be an irreversible
step that dissolves all distinctions in law between newcomers and the indigenous pop-
ulation. Only in the late s and early s were all restrictions on naturalized
French citizens finally lifted.
Although the past few decades have seen fierce arguments about whether all chil-
dren born in France to foreign parents should automatically be accorded French na-
tionality, the principle of ius soli has never again been seriously contested. The under-
lying idea is that a lasting stay on French soil ensures people absorb local habits and
customs. School-aged children in particular are drawn into the history of the republic,
which they increasingly experience as their own history. So much for the theory.
Nowadays people are beginning to wonder whether that is still the way it works. The
self-confidence of the French has been visibly eroded.
Ever since the early s, Dominique Schnapper has been convinced that integra-
tion is in full swing: ‘The massive fact, confirmed by all the research, is the accultura-
tion of children schooled in France who come from migrant families and their willing-
ness to integrate.’ Others question whether such a willingness exists and see the peri-
odic outbursts of violence in the banlieues since the early s as indicative of a far
broader alienation. There is much more going on, says philosopher Jean-François
Mattéi. The crisis in the banlieues ‘shows us the failure of the French social model and
of the pretence of being a cultural exception’.
The malaise many migrants find themselves in goes right to the heart of the equali-
ty model of the republican state. It’s not hard to understand why, after the umpteenth
riot on France’s urban housing estates, people in authority prefer to stick within the
confines of a social issue and avoid any talk of an ethnic conflict. The republican ideal
of equality, after all, rejects the whole concept of ethnic minorities or subcultures,
since the recognition of group cultures is incompatible with the equal treatment of all
individuals irrespective of faith, colour or class. This could be described as a tradition
of openness. France has a relatively high rate of mixed marriage and of naturalization
among migrants. Yet many believe the republican solution is no longer working and
are beginning to wonder whether positive discrimination might provide a solution.
To republicans, who reject any form of ethnic registration, this is sacrilege.
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Here two lines of thinking diverge, representing the flexible and the punctilious in-
terpretation of the republican ideal, a division nowhere better illustrated than in deal-
ings with Islam. One consequence of that ideal is the separation of church and state.
The neutrality of the national government is a precondition of equal treatment for dif-
ferent religions. This is a general principle of all liberal democracies, but in France it
has acquired a unique character through fierce confrontations with the ubiquitous
Catholic Church. A hundred years later, that conflict is affecting relations with a new
religion: Islam.
Ideas about the separation of church and state vary. The more liberal interpretation
rejects the political pretensions of the churches but is in no sense hostile to religion as
such. Opposed to it is a more coercive approach which, as philosopher Marcel
Gauchet remarks, seeks to marginalize all religion. There’s a great temptation to de-
clare the state sacred, as a counterweight to the sacredness of religion. The desire to
banish all expressions of religious faith to the margins of society in the name of reason
and progress has always been present in France but rarely dominant.
All attempts to establish a state monopoly in education ultimately failed. In the
words of a senator representing the radical side of the argument, a monopoly was
needed because ‘no one should be allowed to bring up future generations in ways that
are against the general interest’. This exclusion of alternatives was advocated in the
name of freedom, but the fundamental question was of course whether room should
not also be made for worldviews that are opposed to the liberal way of thinking.
The battle against the Catholic Church in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies culminated in new legislation in . It left little opportunity for the state to in-
terfere in religious life and at the same time the Catholic Church lost its dominant po-
sition. Yet in a book that offers a balanced history of the secular principle, Jean
Baubérot argues that after  Catholicism was certainly not banished to the private
sphere. The church hierarchy played a lesser role from then on, but Catholic associa-
tions flourished. Think of the young Christian workers’ organization, the Jeunesse
Ouvrière Chrétienne (JOC), which had more than a hundred thousand members in
the s. The  law did not create a Catholic nation, but neither did it found a re-
publican religion, rather it signified an acceptance of pluralism.
Now that secular traditions are being challenged by Islam, which arrived in France
through immigration, liberal and strict interpretations of the separation of church
and state have collided once again. The boundaries of state interference are being ex-
plored in the face of demands from Muslim communities. As in the Netherlands, the
establishment of a consultative body of Muslims has been accompanied by robust
governmental interference.
The rigorous defenders of the secular principle present important reasons for strict
adherence to it. Jeanne-Hélène Kaltenbach and Michèle Tribalat, both of whom have
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been members of the Haut Conseil de l’Intégration, believe that the banishment of the
Catholic Church to the private sphere has been so effective that vigilance has weak-
ened in the face of the pretensions of Islam, which is now laying claim to the public
sphere. From everything they have written about the wearing of headscarves in
schools – which they vehemently oppose – it’s clear that their concept of neutrality is
distinctly normative. They believe that schools have an explicit aim and that it necessi-
tates restrictions on the manifestation of religious identity: ‘If freedom of conscience
is no longer the goal that schools, because of the secular principle, are expected to help
achieve, then it is unclear what could now constitute their emancipatory mission.’
Kaltenbach and Tribalat are concerned about a lack of resilience in the face of what
they call a ‘communitarian derailment’, namely the concessions the French govern-
ment has made to Muslim communities: ‘We no longer know in the name of which
overriding reasons it would be justifiable to ask of Islam the same efforts as were once
demanded of the Catholic Church.’
They seem to have found widespread support for their views. Baubérot for one is
against a ban on the headscarf in schools, but a majority has decided otherwise. The
French have chosen to forbid expressions of religious belief in state schools partly be-
cause behind the headscarf lie other demands by traditionalist Muslims, such as re-
strictions on physical education, adjustments to lessons in religion and history,
changes to sex education and much else besides. To combat this ‘communitarian pres-
sure’ a line had to be drawn somewhere, said the committee that drew up the bill.
Fragile relations with migrant communities demonstrate the degree to which the
integration model has come under strain. There are certainly great merits to republi-
can thinking – everyone is equal irrespective of faith or ethnicity – but its weaknesses
have now become clear. Periodic outbreaks of violence in the banlieues reveal the
chasm between the ideal of citizenship and what it means in practice on urban hous-
ing estates. The republican model has lost some of its power to bind people together,
but in France there are not many workable alternatives as yet. Here and there appeals
can be heard for the introduction of positive discrimination in some form and the al-
location of public subsidy for the building of mosques.
France is now reconsidering its unique position. The Europeanization of the coun-
try is experienced as a painful adjustment, but there is no other way out of the current
impasse surrounding immigration. This is equally true of other countries where simi-
lar difficulties have arisen. It would be to the advantage of all if that self-examination
were accompanied by a sharing of experiences across borders, starting with the coun-
try with which France allied itself in its efforts to make the unification of Europe a real-
ity after the war: Germany. It would then become clear that a lack of self-confidence
can be found elsewhere too, despite the fact that historical experiences have affected
relations with post-war migrants in diverse ways.

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  
However much Germany wants to see itself as a normal country, there’s no escaping a
sense that it’s far from normal, if only because the word ‘normal’ is so often heard.
Germany’s history is actively present in heads and hearts, including those of the post-
war generation. There can be no denying that the proximity of its terrible past under
Hitler makes it an exception. No other country has engaged so conscientiously and
persistently with the most damning aspects of its own history, the results of a racial
worldview, and Germany’s dealings with immigration have been powerfully influ-
enced by the settling of accounts with that past. 
Since the unification festivities at the Brandenburg Gate, if not before, two views of
the future of the nation have stood in opposition. On one side are Germans who long
for the country’s normalization. Finally a line can be drawn under its wartime history.
Germans have given sufficient account of themselves. On the other side are those who
believe that because of Auschwitz the Germans have more or less forfeited their right
to self-determination. A people capable of plumbing such depths can no longer be left
to its own devices. Only if Germany is irreversibly bound to Europe will it have armed
itself adequately against a return to the past. Normalization versus mistrust – the same
feelings about Germany switch back and forth outside the country as well.
In the turbulent years that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, the stance of those
who looked upon the new Germany with trepidation seemed justified when a series of
attacks took place on centres for asylum seekers. In those outbursts of the early s
several people were killed. German migration expert Christian Joppke calls the wave
of violence ‘the most serious domestic crisis’ Germany has had to deal with in the
post-war period. The violence began in the former East Germany, when crowds in
Hoyerswerda and later in Rostock-Lichtenhagen cheered as centres for asylum seekers
were attacked by extremist right-wing youths. This series of violent incidents and es-
pecially the inability of the police to come up with a convincing response brought
back memories of the unstable Weimar Republic. The arson attack in Mölln in which
a Turkish family died and violence towards foreigners in Solingen produced outrage
across Europe and further afield.
After the attacks there was heightened suspicion, as illustrated by books such as
Wird Deutschland wieder gefährlich? [is Germany becoming dangerous again?] by Jew-
ish author Ralph Giordano. He describes how for over a year ‘at the heart of Europe …
an area of near-lawlessness’ existed. He does not believe the old demons have re-
turned to Germany, but still, what will happen when the generation that can remem-
ber the war is no longer around? Could it be that ‘efforts to shake off the dark episode
in German history will find particularly fertile soil? Such a break with the history of
National Socialism would amount to a re-entry of the “Auschwitzlüge” through the
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back door’. Is there really a slippery slope such that the desire for normalization in-
evitably leads, via suppression of the memory of recent history, to outright denial of
the holocaust (the Auschwitzlüge)? Every attempt to bring about a balanced relation-
ship with the past risks accusations of disavowing that past. And every debate about
asylum and migration in Germany becomes tangled up with what happened during
the war.
One of the country’s young authors, Bodo Morshäuser, has shrewdly exposed this
attitude as unsustainable. He describes the shadow boxing between ‘national pride’
and what he calls ‘negative nationalism’. ‘Why is it impossible for many people to ac-
cept that others are proud of their origins? And why do those others have to say that
they are proud? Their statement derives its effect from the backgrounds of all those
who are ashamed to be German.’ During the period of violence against foreigners,
demonstrators marching in Berlin appealed to immigrants: ‘Don’t leave us alone with
the Germans in this country.’
Over the border in the Netherlands, many people shared these suspicions. A mil-
lion Dutch citizens sent postcards expressing their ‘fury’ after the attacks in Mölln and
Solingen – the assumption being that the majority of Germans would not have been
able to reach a comparable conclusion on their own behalf. No one wanted to ac-
knowledge what lay behind the crisis surrounding the right to asylum in Germany.
For a start, the country had the most liberal asylum laws possible. The famous Article
 of the post-war German constitution states in four words, without any proviso at
all: ‘Politisch Verfolgte geniessen Asylrecht’, meaning that anyone suffering political per-
secution has a right to asylum in Germany. Those who drew up the article were aware
of the consequences of such an open formulation, but they regarded the clause as
penance. Joppke writes that the German constitution is in fact quite extraordinary,
since the first seven articles place universal human rights above any duty to German
citizens. The rights of the individual are paramount and those rights are guaranteed ir-
respective of nationality.
Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Thomas Schmid, both of whom were responsible for inte-
gration policy in Frankfurt in the early s, point out that ‘enforced generosity’ as
laid down in the constitution is a contradiction in terms, since generosity has to be a
voluntary gesture. Openness cannot be decreed by law. Housing asylum seekers in
small towns and in problem districts within major cities had the opposite of the in-
tended effect. It’s undeniable, they write, that through ‘the presence of asylum seekers
– in already disadvantaged areas in particular – the quality of life for residents can de-
cline appreciably’.
This proved true in the years that followed German unification. The direct cause of
the asylum crisis was the size of the influx of migrants and asylum seekers. Between
 and  the recently united country had to deal with around three million. The
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fact that the asylum crisis coincided with the years of unification was the result of a
number of factors. In some ways it was coincidental, in others not. The coincidental
aspect was that floods of refugees were produced by, among other things, the civil war
in Yugoslavia, but of course it was no accident that many went to Germany. They
chose it because of its generous asylum laws. Add to this the streams of other newcom-
ers from Eastern Europe and it becomes clear that migration was placing an increas-
ing strain on Germany and that this was a contributory factor in hostile reactions to it.
After the attacks in Mölln and Solingen there was great embarrassment. Everything
that people had come to believe in recent years was suddenly up in the air again. The
agonizing of Germans about Germans is still going on, and of course migrants have
not failed to notice. Necla Kelek writes about the ‘nature conservancy’ (Naturschutz)
under which Germany places everything that is culturally different. She criticizes the
vicious circle of ‘misplaced tolerance and silence as an expression of solidarity’ among
those aware of abuses in minority circles.Given all the post-war evidence of good be-
haviour, it should indeed be possible for Germans to address immigrants in their own
country with rather more candour.
They would have to start by taking stock of the complicated history of immigration
in Germany over recent decades, which involves two very different groups of newcom-
ers: the ethnic Germans who poured eastwards after the war and the guest workers
who arrived from countries like Italy and Yugoslavia and later from Turkey. The con-
trasting treatment of the two groups can be understood only by looking at the extraor-
dinary history of divided Germany, since the West German constitution imposed a
special duty towards those of German descent who found themselves living outside
the borders of the Federal Republic. They were allowed immediate access to citizen-
ship, whereas guest workers and their families were given only very limited opportuni-
ties to acquire German nationality. The obligation to accommodate the German dias-
pora was not a dead letter, quite the reverse. Between  and  the country ab-
sorbed fourteen million ethnic Germans. In the year the Wall fell, around a quarter of
the German population had its origins in this form of immigration, whereas only
around  per cent was without any German ancestry.
A substantial proportion of those fourteen million were what were known as
Heimatvertriebenen, ethnic Germans who had lived in Eastern Europe, often for many
generations, and were no longer welcome there after the war. Their expulsion went un-
mentioned for many years; Germans were perpetrators, not victims. German histori-
an Guido Knopp describes how the so-called Sudeten Germans were expelled by
brute force after the liberation of Czechoslovakia. The first step towards their expul-
sion was the introduction of white armbands with a large N on them (for Nĕmec, the
Czech word for German), which they were forced to wear. Not long afterwards, fami-
lies that in many cases had lived in Bohemia for centuries were driven out. They left all
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their possessions behind, if they escaped being killed. This form of revenge was accept-
ed by the Allied powers.
Stories like theirs explain why Germany’s nationality laws could not be changed un-
til after . The division of the country into East and West meant that the duty to-
wards ethnic Germans elsewhere was beyond dispute. Only after unification were
quotas placed on this group, which in recent decades has been arriving mainly from
the former Soviet Union. Currently no more than , such migrants are admitted
each year.
At the same time the conditions for acquiring German nationality were changed.
While in most European countries and in America official residence for five years is
sufficient to qualify a person to apply for citizenship, in Germany a reform of the law
reduced this period from ten years to eight. The children of migrants, if they were
born in Germany, do now have much easier access to state citizenship. This step was
unavoidable, since the results of the nationality law were becoming steadily more
grotesque. Descendants of the Volga Germans, for example, who often did not speak
the language and lacked any understanding of the country they were moving to, were
immediately recognized as citizens, whereas the children of Turkish migrants, born in
Germany, were categorized as foreigners. Until  no more than fourteen hundred
non-German migrants were naturalized annually. One consequence was that the civil
service, where employment is open only to holders of German passports, had always
been off-limits to immigrant job applicants.
Germans generally saw post-war labour migration as a temporary phenomenon,
as did the new arrivals, who clung to the myth of return for far too long. The provi-
sional nature of their presence, compounded by the fact that it was virtually impossi-
ble for them to become German citizens, contributed significantly to the sense of
alienation in the large Turkish community. Research by Wilhelm Heitmeyer shows
that no fewer than three quarters of young Turkish people polled agreed with the state-
ment ‘we can never feel like Germans because we don’t belong’.
The recruitment of guest workers began in the late s but it was boosted by the
building of the Berlin Wall, which sharply reduced the number of migrants from the
east. Workers from the south were needed to sustain the country’s astonishing eco-
nomic growth. The first agreements were made with Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, Portugal
and Turkey. By  , guest workers were living in Germany, by  there were
,, in  ,, in  . million and by  . million. In the s be-
tween five and six hundred labour exchanges were engaged in attracting willing and
cheap labour to the dirtiest and toughest jobs in the country, often in metalworking
and construction.
Cohn-Bendit and Schmid comment that the recruitment of guest workers was the
lazy way out. The arrival of foreign labour undoubtedly contributed to a delay in bad-
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ly needed innovation. This is the most commonly expressed criticism of the labour
migration option: downward pressure on wage levels enables enterprises using out-
dated means of production to sustain their output, although usually for a limited peri-
od. When rationalization is finally implemented, as it was in the car industry between
 and , a loss of jobs results, mainly affecting foreign employees. These authors
are right, by the way, to say that the term ‘guest worker’ has ‘a totally unbearable un-
dertone of generosity’, since this type of labour migration could equally well be re-
garded as a form of ‘foreign development aid for Germany’. At least, they’re correct
as far as the first few decades are concerned. The economic balance of labour migra-
tion has since tipped the other way and the benefits are declining before our eyes.
After the economic crisis of , in Germany as in France, there were attempts to
reduce immigrant numbers, but as elsewhere the newly restrictive policy actually
prompted people to make the decision to stay. Generally speaking, efforts to persuade
guest workers to return came to nothing and the same can be said of moves to limit
family reunification. In  this led to a political crisis. Over the preceding three years
almost half a million family members had arrived, mainly from Turkey. The govern-
ment stated frankly that Germany felt no responsibility for the children and grand-
children of the original migrants. As in France and Britain, politicians were sensitive
to growing opposition to continued migration, but the courts set themselves up as lib-
eral defenders of the constitution.
One important exception in the German case concerns the right of migrants from
outside the European Union to vote in local elections. In contrast to countries like
Sweden and the Netherlands, Germany refused to go down this route. The same is
true of France, where in  the idea of introducing a right to vote in local council
elections was briefly entertained but then abandoned. This means there is a distinc-
tion between migrants from countries within the European Union, who do have such
voting rights, and migrants from outside the Union. Constitutional expert Josef
Isensee has presented several arguments in support of his belief that giving non-natu-
ralized migrants the right to vote is a bad idea. It devalues state citizenship, since it
means naturalization confers few exclusive rights. It also means creating a distinct
type of citizen, since unlike the indigenous population, migrants can retreat from the
consequences of their own voting decisions by returning to their countries of origin.
He regards a migrant’s right to vote as ‘freedom without responsibility’.
Despite its outcome, the debate surrounding the rights of migrants demonstrates
that guest workers had increasingly converted their temporary stay into permanent
settlement, as reflected in the famous dictumof the Swiss writerMax Frisch: ‘Man hat
Arbeitskräfte gerufen, und es kommen Menschen.’ [We called for workers, and we got
people.] The composition of migrant communities changed.The Italians, initially the
largest group,were replaced by Turks,who at .million are now by far the biggestmi-
grant community in Germany.
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Much has been written about the Turkish community and of the more critical writ-
ers several stand out, among them Necla Kelek and Bassam Tibi. Both believe that in
the majority of cases the integration of Muslims in Germany should be regarded as a
failure up to now. They say there’s a significant risk that society will split into a series
of ‘parallel communities’, separate ethnic enclaves that have little contact with the
wider environment. In several of these niches – most famously in Hamburg – the at-
tacks of  September were prepared.
Tibi comes originally from Damascus, and he makes no secret of his disappoint-
ment about various features of the receiving society, but he directs his main criticism
at the aloof or even dismissive stance of many Muslims and the naive reaction of
gullible Germans, often with a Protestant background (Deutsche Gutmenschen), who
try to compensate for the past by embracing all things foreign. Germans renounce
their own identity while going out of their way to protect the identities of migrants.
Tibi claims there’s insufficient awareness of the fact that the individualism of the Eu-
ropean Enlightenment tradition can easily come into conflict with the attitudes many
migrants exhibit: ‘In Islam there is for instance no concept of individual identity.’ A
clearer orientation is needed in Europe, Tibi writes. In cases of conflict, basic Western
values should take precedence over those of Islam.
The increasing importance of Islam in the lives of guest workers should also be seen
in the light of family reunification. With the arrival of their wives and children, men
were reminded of their duty to defend their families against what was seen as a hostile
environment of lax morals. The guest workers became Turks and the Turks became
Muslims, and this was not simply a result of how they were seen by the Germany ma-
jority society.
Kelek has written extensively about family relationships in the Turkish community,
relationships that make it all the more isolated from German society. The practice of
importing brides is flourishing. Girls are ‘sold’ and Germany itself, with all its oppor-
tunities, is the real bride price. Often given in marriage at an early age, they lead an ut-
terly isolated existence in their new country. Most are kept out of sight so that they in-
convenience the men as little as possible and cannot tarnish the family’s honour. Kelek
paints a sad picture, saying that for many girls human rights simply do not apply. She’s
equally worried about the sons, since no one has taught these ‘lost boys’ to question
their fathers’ authority, to be critical in their dealings with people in positions of pow-
er. There’s no culture in which they can seriously learn about their own responsibili-
ties; they simply submit to the orders of the family.
Kelek passes harsh judgement on parents who refuse to recognize that they need to
prepare their children for life in a new environment. Why don’t they send their chil-
dren to kindergarten, where they’d come into contact with other children and learn
the language through play? Instead they opt for the Koranic school. Her conclusion is:
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‘Anyone who, having lived in Germany for thirty years, still presents Turkey to the chil-
dren as their true home and brings them up according to the maxim “en büyük türk”,
the Turk stands above all others, discredits his own path in life as a mistake.’After all,
why would anyone choose to live in surroundings they profoundly despise? It’s an atti-
tude she illustrates with a remark by one of her interviewees: ‘We’ve got everything
here, we don’t need the Germans.’
Almost all studies show that nationalism in the Turkish community is strong, de-
spite the fault-lines that divide it, such as the ethnic distinction between Turks and
Kurds, the political distinction between Kemalists and Islamists and the religious dis-
tinction between Sunnis and Alevis. It’s a fragmented community, but one in which a
clear majority of parents and children have explicit religious and nationalistic beliefs.
Heitmeyer’s research reveals attitudes that do not belong in a liberal democracy. Two
thirds of young people questioned, for example, dismiss adherents of other religions
as unbelievers, more than half believe Islam is superior to other faiths and a quarter
endorse the use of violence in defence of Islam. The powerful nationalism that Heit-
meyer encountered as an accompaniment to this religious stance is discomforting,
given his respondents’ rejection of the majority society and indeed of other minori-
ties.
In attempting to explain the findings of his research, which was carried out in the
mid-s, well before /, Heitmeyer says among other things that many young
Turkish people have low self-esteem and Islam has the effect of raising their status.
Many of the children have little in the way of educational qualifications and their am-
bitions have not been realized. It doesn’t help that the majority population persists in
an attitude that sees young people who were born and brought up in Germany as for-
eigners. He makes a connection between a prevalence of extremist beliefs and ‘mod-
ernization’s losers’, who are present in above average numbers in migrant communi-
ties.
Heitmeyer is one of many who warn against the development of parallel societies,
saying that most of the Turkish community has isolated itself from the majority popu-
lation. He adds: ‘The necessary recognition of the Turkish population group as a nor-
mal part of society has a “downside” in that it involves a more critical attitude towards
that group.’This remark shows once again that it’s still difficult to carry out this kind
of research without immediately being accused of stigmatizing others.
Quite apart from the country’s traumatic history and the specific issues surround-
ing Muslim communities, the entire debate about immigration and integration in
Germany has been heavily loaded for another reason. The country is struggling more
than most with the effects of an aging and shrinking population. The indigenous pop-
ulation now has a fertility quotient of ., which is low even by European standards,
certainly compared with, for example, more than . in the case of France, which as we
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have seen was faced with demographic decline even in the nineteenth century and in-
troduced corrective measures long ago. 
Hans Magnus Enzensberger sets the fear of population shrinkage beside the fear of
too much migration. We are continually hearing that ‘the boat is full’. An odd image,
he says, in the sense that the native inhabitants draw a comparison that makes them
seem like ‘boat people’, in other words refugees, but odder still in that according to de-
mographic trends the established population is aging and therefore declining. ‘The
idea that at one and the same time too few and too many people are living on the same
territory causes panic – a form of suffering that I would propose calling demographic
bulimia,’ he comments sarcastically.
Yet the two questions that lurk behind this psychological disorder – namely how
should we deal with a shrinking population and how much immigration can we han-
dle? – are real enough, all the more so in combination. The population is aging and
changing colour at the same time. Population growth in Germany is entirely attributa-
ble to immigration. Moreover, the origin of migrants is increasingly diverse. As in oth-
er countries of immigration in Europe, the resulting unease is tangible and it’s seeking
a political voice.
Author and politician Peter Glotz wrote a sombre account of the issue even before
German unification. He detected deep fears of Überfremdung in the population, in
other words a loss of identity through immigration, and warned against an ‘all too re-
laxed liberal cosmopolitanism’. Decades later populism has still not really broken
through in Germany, in contrast to many of its neighbours, but the possibility hangs
in the air, especially in the former East Germany. The debate about immigration re-
mains circumspect but it has produced a number of important adjustments, for ex-
ample to the naturalization laws. The issue that lies behind all this – how to deal with
both a shrinking population and growing immigration – has yet to be resolved.
   
The shadow of history hangs over post-war immigration in Britain too, but a history
of a very different kind, that of decolonization. The unforeseen arrival of colonial mi-
grants went hand in hand with a proclaimed farewell to an imperial illusion. Pro-
found changes to Britain’s role in the world set in motion a stream of new Britons
from the West Indies, West Africa and the Indian subcontinent. From the start the de-
bate about the place of the ‘coloured minorities’ in British society was part of a broad-
er search for a new place for Britain in the world.
Not that people were quick to reach the conclusion that the end of the British Em-
pirewas at hand.Evenwhenmany colonieswere granted independence in the decades
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after the war, Britain tried to pursue its worldwide role by other means. Indian inde-
pendence in  led to the founding of theCommonwealth, a loose agglomeration of
countries that had once been part of the British Empire.The laws on British nationali-
ty introduced in describedevery citizenof theCommonwealth as aBritish subject
and provided for their freedomof movement as a logical outcome of that status. So in
theory any resident of India or Jamaica could settle in the ‘motherland’.Of course they
werenot expected todo so,but theprinciple of equal treatment for all ‘subjects’was es-
sential to the dream of a continuing British role in an era of decolonization.
This is the irony of the post-war immigration debate in the United Kingdom,
which is comparable to the French experience in the sense that again it was the most
determined defenders of the imperial tradition who tried longest to uphold the right
of people from the former colonies to settle in Britain. In the mid-s journalist El-
speth Huxley wrote: ‘Here crops up, again, the image of the mother who has sent forth
her sons and mustn’t slam the door in the face of any who want to come home.’ It
was precisely that enduring memory of the worldwide mission of the British that un-
intentionally encouraged the permanent settlement in the motherland of so many mi-
grants from the colonies. In this sense the ‘multiracial’ nature of Britain is to some ex-
tent the result of an inadequate grasp of reality on the part of those who tried to hold
on to the imperial idea long after it had passed its sell-by date.
The beginning of this type of immigration is symbolically marked by the arrival of
the SS Empire Windrush, which docked at Tilbury on  June  with over four hun-
dred West Indian passengers on board. A considerable proportion of them had fought
for Britain during the war, some as RAF pilots, many as ground staff. They arrived in
the motherland with high expectations, regarding their trip in a sense as ‘going home’,
a voyage to the country whose praises they had sung every day as schoolchildren. Sam
King, from Jamaica, remembers: ‘So your whole outlook was British oriented, because
they rule. The schoolbooks, the missionaries and everything was the British mentality.
You could not be good on your own. Your good was not good. Your good had to be
British.’
They were so favourably disposed towards the motherland that ultimate disap-
pointment was inevitable. The cold shower came quickly. The arms-length reception
they received was particularly shocking to those who had fought alongside the British
and been welcomed affectionately at that time. How come they now found not the
slightest sign of gratitude? Then there was the question they were continually being
asked: ‘When are you going home?’
Migration brought the Windrush generation another disturbing but salutary expe-
rience. In the colonies they’d come into contact only with the British elite – if they had
any contact with the upper echelons of society at all – but in daily life in British cities,
still peppered with bomb sites, they clashed with the working classes. The shock of see-
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ing a white woman sweeping a station concourse was incalculable. They’d never seen
English people working with their hands. An encounter with an illiterate white man
would shatter a long-cherished illusion.
VS Naipaul, who arrived from Trinidad a few years later, would always remember
his disillusion at the motherland of his dreams: ‘So I grew to feel that grandeur be-
longed to the past; that I had come to England at the wrong time; that I had come too
late to find the England, the heart of empire, which (like a provincial, from the far cor-
ner of the empire) I had created in my fantasy.’ In search of a centre that no longer ex-
isted, the young Naipaul retained a burning ambition, as he reported to his father: ‘I
have got to show these people that I can beat them at their own language.’
But no one was truly eager to welcome him and the government reacted less than
invitingly to the arrival of the first immigrants. In parliament the minister responsible
declared he had been unpleasantly surprised by the Windrush and ordered an investi-
gation into who was to blame for the influx of migrants: ‘The arrival of these substan-
tial numbers of men under no organised arrangements is bound to result in difficulty
and disappointment.’ In retrospect such concern about a few hundred immigrants
seems disproportionate, but this was in the context of the immediate post-war years,
when there were significant shortages and therefore a compulsion to leave nothing to
chance. His response is still regarded by some as understandable.
Whatever the case may be, those uninvited migrants met not only with coolness
but with hostility, especially in the impoverished districts where they ended up. Forms
of segregation in neighbourhoods and schools soon emerged and the newcomers
were conspicuously avoided in everyday life: ‘When the bus fills up and you find
you’re the last one to have somebody beside you, then you know something is wrong.
You say to yourself: come on, be yourself, be strong,’ Tryphena Anderson recalls.
Despite opposition, a surprising number of these early immigrants – most of them
young single men – entered into mixed marriages. West Indians in particular had a
strong tendency to marry British women. Reactions from the community were fierce-
ly antagonistic, as mixed couples remember. They were ostracized. ‘White people
would never speak to you. As they used to pass you, they used to spit. It was terrible.’
Fantasies about the sexuality of black men knew no bounds and women were the prize
in a contest, which was also about access to homes and jobs. On the lowest rungs of the
social ladder battle commenced over the place immigrants were to occupy. There was
a high level of interference by others in the community. Michael Banton describes the
reactions: ‘The coloured people in Stepney and elsewhere allege that individual police
officers go to great lengths to try to separate the women from the men when opportu-
nity arises.’Although he also looks at the stereotypical image migrants had of the av-
erage Englishman, Banton is forced to conclude that the greatest obstacle to integra-
tion was the hostile attitude of white people towards coloured immigrants.
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There were attempts to deter potential migrants. One intriguing example is the
 series Going to Britain? (), used by the British government to inform poten-
tial migrants, from the Caribbean for example, but at the same time to discourage
them. In the inimitable  English of the day, the commentator asks: ‘Are you pre-
pared for this kind of cold climate with its icy winds, its sleet and snow?’ This particu-
lar episode continues, far from invitingly: ‘Whenever you are inclined to get angry
when a person is staring at you, remember that English people are ignorant of your
ways and habits. From the time you start to live in England it is as if a sea of white faces
is always around you.’ The warning words had little effect.
Calls for more restrictive laws therefore grew, but as long as the number of
‘coloured’ migrants remained relatively small, a succession of governments declined
to introduce new legislation. Until the early s non-white immigrants made up no
more than one quarter of one per cent of the population. There was much talk on the
subject in the mid-s, but in the end nothing was done. It was not until  that the
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was introduced, aimed mainly at regulating immi-
gration by ‘unschooled’ migrants, the unspoken assumption being that the main ef-
fect would be to limit the number of non-white newcomers.
There was a profound fear of the sort of trouble America was experiencing, with
black ghettos and race riots. In light of the images coming out of the American South
in the s, this seems hardly surprising. As early as  there had been racial conflict
in a number of British port cities, with five dead and many more injured. In  the
powder keg ignited in both Nottingham and London’s Notting Hill, as groups of
white youths, cheered loudly by bystanders, looted and trashed coloured districts.
After the Notting Hill riots, a number of Conservative MPs introduced a motion
aimed at limiting immigration. One of them, Martin Lindsay, explained the back-
ground to their initiative: ‘We all know perfectly well that the whole core of the prob-
lem of immigration is coloured immigration. We would do much better to face that
and to discuss it realistically in this context… We must ask ourselves to what extent we
want Great Britain to become a multiracial community.’ They faced fierce criticism
from all sides, even though Lindsay tried to distance himself from discriminatory atti-
tudes: ‘One of the difficulties about discussing this problem is that we are all a little
scared of being thought to be illiberal… I could not find any excuses whatever for any-
one who believed in a colour bar in any community where black and white have to co-
exist. That, however, is altogether different from changing the nature of a communi-
ty.’ Few at Westminster were convinced by his argument. 
British historian Ian Spencer argues that if anything the riots delayed the passing of
new laws, since the government did not want to reward the rioters. But there remained
a concern that large groups of migrants would cause social conflict.The official justi-
fication for the laws that were eventually passed lay in ‘the strains imposed by
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coloured immigrants on the housing resources of certain local authorities and the
dangers of social tensions inherent in the existence of large unassimilated coloured
communities’.
Innumerable commentators, such as Clifford Hill, claim to have identified a spuri-
ous argument in this fear of social conflict. Britain has never had a mature policy on
the issue, he claims, because ‘politicians have always been glancing over their shoul-
ders at the racial attitudes in the country and have allowed these to influence their im-
migration policy’. The essential question, however, is: Should governments take ac-
count of the possibilities and impossibilities surrounding integration when confront-
ed with choices surrounding immigration? Surely they ought to consider not only the
migrants involved but the attitude of the receiving society. That would seem to be the
natural starting point in a democracy.
Other interests and principles counterbalanced the fear of racial tension. Succes-
sive governments were apprehensive about the repercussions that restrictions on im-
migration might have for their relationships with the countries of the commonwealth.
An end to freedom of movement would seriously detract from the legitimacy of ef-
forts to perpetuate Britain’s global role. This was an anxiety voiced again and again in
government circles. As we have seen, it was precisely the more conservative advocates
of empire who felt a need to defend post-colonial migration.
Alongside these ‘imperial’ interests, the principle of equal treatment weighed heav-
ily. Historians often point to the hypocritical attitude of a series of British govern-
ments, which outwardly condemned discrimination while behind closed doors ac-
tively reining in ‘coloured’ migration. Many would have liked nothing better than to
limit the number of colonial migrants, regarding their arrival as problematic, but it
was a long time before governments took steps to do so and one reason for the years of
hesitation was a reluctance to trample too casually on the principle of equal treatment.
A cabinet memorandum from the s sums up the thinking nicely: ‘There is no ef-
fective means of stopping this influx without legislation… There could be no ques-
tion of seeking such power to deal only with coloured people.’
The multiracial Britain that emerged was the product of such considerations.
Spencer claims that the composition of the British population would have been fun-
damentally different had the government intervened in the mid-s.When restric-
tive laws were introduced in the early s, they prompted an influx of immigrants
who wanted to get in before the borders closed, the so-called ‘beat-the-ban rush’. It
was self-perpetuating or chain migration that eventually created an urgent need to
implement the new law. The opposition, with Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell as their
main spokesman, argued against the bill in the parliamentary debate of . He too
was concerned primarily about numbers: ‘It is, in my opinion, an utter and complete
myth that there is the slightest danger or prospect of millions and millions of brown
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and black people coming to this country.’ When he spoke those words there were
around a quarter of a million Caribbean, African and Asian immigrants in Britain.
Twenty years later they and their descendants numbered . million, by  the fig-
ure had risen to . million and today it stands at over  million. When the Labour
party took power, incidentally, not long after the  Commonwealth Immigrants
Act was passed, it reversed its policy and tightened up the immigration laws consider-
ably.
Even before this, the trades unions had been struggling with an angry white mem-
bership; they could not afford to be too generous. In the backs of union leaders’
minds, American tensions between white and black served as a warning. After the Lon-
don riots of , for example, a report about districts where many migrants had taken
up residence states: ‘In these places, settled communities have had their established
way of life disturbed by the superficial imposition of alien patterns of behaviour. The
significant word is “alien”, not “black” or “inferior”.’
The rapid growth in the number of migrants from former British colonies leaves
no room for doubt that the new immigration law of  was less draconic than is of-
ten assumed. The level of immigration remained fairly constant in the years that fol-
lowed, at somewhere between thirty and fifty thousand a year. The new legislation ac-
tually marked the start of multiracial Britain rather than its end.
How is this possible? Ian Spencer offers various explanations as to why, in his view,
the immigration laws produced the opposite of the intended effect. The long lead-in
time of the new law accelerated the influx of new migrants. In the two years before it
was adopted and came into force, the black and Asian population doubled. The law
opened up opportunities for family reunification and family formation, and it was in-
terpreted generously, so Asian immigrants in particular invited their families to join
them. In any case, the  legislation was not particularly restrictive, since there were
still opportunities for educated migrants to come to Britain. In the years that fol-
lowed, restrictions on immigration were further tightened by governments of every
stripe. The final legislative change was the British Nationality Act of , which re-
placed the  law. This meant saying farewell to the old broad definition of the
British subject. The collapse of the empire had been internalized and illusions about
the Commonwealth abandoned. British citizenship was brought in line with Euro-
pean norms.
The British example once again demonstrates that a relationship exists between im-
migration and integration, since along with the introduction of more restrictive laws,
a Race Relations Act was passed to combat discrimination. As time went on, hand in
hand with measures to regulate immigration further, anti-discrimination legislation
was given a broader remit and its implementation made more coercive. Since the mid-
s Britain has had a Commission for Racial Equality, which recently became the
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Commission for Equality and Human Rights. The new name is a sign of a change in at-
titude; people are now concerned about all forms of discrimination and no longer
want to place a special emphasis on racial exclusion.
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act by no means silenced the debate about non-
Western immigration. The line taken by the prominent Conservative politician
Enoch Powell in the late s created a particularly fierce storm of reactions. It was a
speech he gave in Birmingham in April  that caused the biggest fuss. Classicist
Powell painted an apocalyptic picture of racial conflict, commenting: ‘It is like watch-
ing a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre… As I look ahead, I am
filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see “the river Tiber foaming with
much blood”’. It would go down in history as the ‘rivers of blood speech’. A Times edi-
torial accused him of preaching a ‘new tribalism’, but there was considerable support
for his ideas among the population as a whole. When the Conservative leader sacked
Powell from the shadow cabinet, dockworkers demonstrated in his support.
Reading the text from a contemporary viewpoint it’s clear that he was primarily
putting himself forward as a spokesman for a silent majority of ordinary citizens
whose voices were being ignored. He tells of a meeting with a man in his constituency,
who thinks that within twenty years ‘the black man will have the whip hand over the
white man’. Powell comments: ‘Here is a decent, ordinary fellow Englishman, who in
broad daylight in my own town says to me, his Member of Parliament, that this coun-
try will not be worth living in for his children. I simply do not have the right to shrug
my shoulders and think about something else.’
His words still echo, and they will always resurface in the collective memory when
serious riots break out, as they did in the early s in Brixton among other places,
and again in the s and since. It was the second generation of Caribbean and Asian
young people who rebelled, refusing to resign themselves to frustrations over high
youth unemployment, school drop-out rates and continuing discrimination. The
children react differently from their parents. As Mike and Trevor Phillips put it: ‘The
difference in the generations was that Caribbean migrants in the late fifties and sixties
were usually willing to take the potential for racial conflict out of the situation. For in-
stance, when kids reported that they were being discriminated against at school, par-
ents would typically reply with an exhortation to work harder or see protest as some
cover for laziness.’
A slogan of the first generation, ‘come what may, we’re here to stay’, certainly ex-
presses determination, but it also implies a subcutaneous fear that sooner or later the
day might come when they would have to leave. It was a long time before that fear sub-
sided – ‘Enoch Powell terrified us’ – but the new generation finds its parents’ or grand-
parents’ slogan simply incomprehensible: What do you mean ‘here to stay’? Where
else could we go? This is where we come from, isn’t it?
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With the permanent settlement of migrants and their descendants, strikingly di-
verse developments took place within and between the different migrant communi-
ties. As in many other European countries, there was soon a strong polarization be-
tween a new middle class and a sizeable underclass. Ziauddin Sardar sees a growing
identification with Britain among the children of the original migrants, of which he is
one: ‘My generation was part of a full-blown dress rehearsal. We were British – but
there was always this unease, a slight uncertainty, some hesitation in seeing ourselves
as truly, fully British… The new generation of Asians are the real thing. They are as
naturally British as eating Balti. They have changed, and are changing, their own com-
munities, constantly reinventing themselves while remaining the same.’
His optimism is not equally valid across the spectrum. Of the various communities
in Britain the Indians are doing the best by far, better even, on average, than the white
population, whereas things are going less well for the descendants of Caribbean mi-
grants and of those from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Not only do clear differences in
economic performance exist between different groups, cultural preferences are di-
verse too. At an early stage Michael Banton discovered a correlation between resist-
ance to integration and the degree of cohesion within the various communities. He
writes of a series – Sikh, Pakistani, Somali, West African, West Indian – each of which
has less internal coherence than the one before and therefore a greater willingness to
be part of the wider environment. He also detects in this sliding scale ‘the extent to
which European influences have disrupted the culture of the country of origin’.This
view is generally shared. Caribbean migrants had a weak identity and were very much
oriented towards British society, whereas at the other extreme Pakistanis generally
tried harder to hold on to their own traditions.
Sardar too remarks on the degree of segregation in cities like Bradford and Old-
ham, which is very high by European standards. In a sensitive portrait of the ,
Pakistani migrants in Bradford he shows that practically all have their origins in one
particular region, Mirpur. Their social life in their new country is still dominated by
clans, known as biradari. These represent networks of mutual aid but they also control
everything members do. Despite his optimism about new generations, Sardar is
forced to conclude that ‘this tradition comes with consequences. It is not only charita-
ble solidarity that was revitalized in different circumstances, but the pernicious and
inhumane aspects.’ He is thinking of honour killings, which occur at regular inter-
vals, but he is also referring to forms of radicalization, to which young people of Pak-
istani origin seem particularly susceptible.
The image the British have of themselves as a successful multicultural society is not
entirely convincing. Its most striking feature is the preoccupation with racial differ-
ences. Frequent use of terms like ‘multi-ethnic’ and ‘racial equality’ gives an outsider
the sense of a distant echo from an imperial past. The attention paid to ethnicity may
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have been given a positive spin in a concept like ‘multiracial’, but in essence it’s simply
the same old over-estimation of the significance of skin colour.
A slightly arrogant assessment of British society as a model to hold up before others
is a feature common to past and present. Sometimes it would be nice to hear more of
the mild scepticism of Elspeth Huxley. In the mid-s she wrote a series of journalis-
tic articles about the new migrant communities. In her conclusion she sums up the
half-hearted attitude of her compatriots: ‘Immigration is like a wet day. We don’t real-
ly want it to happen, but know it’s good for the gardens, and anyway, we can’t stop it,
so might as well make the best of things. And once we’ve got it, we must be fair. The
newcomers must be treated decently: no incipient ghettos, segregation, colour bar –
in theory at least.’
As in the immediate post-war years, there’s a discrepancy between the self-image of
Britain as the ‘motherland’ and the realities of everyday life. Now as then, for example,
the image London is keen to present to the world belies the considerable ethnic ten-
sions that still exist in Britain today. Furthermore, it’s rarely pointed out that British
multiculturalism is accompanied by an island mentality. Unlike most continental
countries, Britain clings anxiously to its borders.
Under the surface just as much violence is brewing as in many other countries, per-
haps even more. The race riots of recent years in cities including Bradford and Birm-
ingham, and especially the bomb attacks on the London underground of  July ,
have seriously damaged Britain’s self-confidence. More and more critical voices are
making themselves heard, connecting the growing segregation and alienation of Mus-
lim communities in particular with multiculturalism. One example is a partly autobi-
ographical book by George Alagiah, which includes numerous sobering observations
about the separate lives lived by immigrants and the rest of the population: ‘If these
findings can be extrapolated, they give the lie to one of the most commonly accepted
views about what happens to immigrant communities – that they become more inte-
grated with every new generation.’ He concludes that the fostering of ethnic differ-
ences must give way to an emphasis on shared citizenship.
   
This exploration of immigration in the three most important countries in Europe sug-
gests that all models have been found wanting. So it’s no surprise to find that doubts
have set in everywhere. After all, the social reality in Malmö, say, does not differ greatly
from that of Bradford, Marseille, Rotterdam or Frankfurt. Thinking in terms of mod-
els contributes to the tendency for experiences to remain locked in behind national
borders. In France people are happy to talk of the failure of ‘the Dutch model’ or ‘the
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British model’. This is simply a way of saying: what’s going on there proves we’re right,
or at any rate doesn’t apply to us. Yet it must be possible to make shared experiences in
Europe visible to all, as the first step in finding a way forward.
It begins with a recognition that problems surrounding immigration and integra-
tion cannot be viewed in isolation. Adrian Favell remarks that ethnic minorities in
each country are the ‘symbolic vessels for larger issues concerning … national unity
and social order’. We have only to look at Flemish, Scottish and Basque nationalism
to see these other forces at work, putting the old nation states of Europe under pres-
sure from within at the very time when immigration is raising difficult questions
about their identities. More generally, as we have seen, the debate about integration is
part of a search for the meaning of citizenship in a highly individualized society. 
Despite diverse traditions, attention everywhere is beginning to be focused on citi-
zenship. Joppke and Morawska characterize this reversal of thinking as ‘a turn away
from multicultural and postnational perspectives toward a renewed emphasis on as-
similation and citizenship’. This attitude has become central to European thinking,
but it exists elsewhere too; even in Australia, a classic country of immigration, think-
ing is moving away from official multiculturalism. Attitudes have shifted. Whereas the
emphasis used to lie on cultural differences, the quest for social integration is now the
main concern.
Everywhere we see similar pleas for a more self-conscious way of dealing with dem-
ocratic traditions. The vulnerability of an open society in a time of large-scale migra-
tion is becoming more broadly recognized. In Britain especially, the disenchantment
is palpable. A  Home Office study known as the Cantle Report offers a clear de-
scription of how communities are growing apart, showing that Pakistani young peo-
ple in particular are developing in ways that are clearly problematic. The compilers of
the report declare themselves unpleasantly surprised by ‘the depth of polarisation of
our towns and cities’. The lives of residents from different communities ‘often do not
seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful inter-
changes’.
Thinking has not stood still on the other side of the English Channel either. In
France, after the riots in the banlieues that made the malaise of many migrants and
their children visible once again, the debate on integration is in full swing. The govern-
ment has gone so far as to establish a ministry responsible for ‘immigration and na-
tional identity’, a linkage that illustrates the insecurity involved in the quest. Mean-
while in Germany too, in the context of new laws on labour migration, a great deal of
thinking is going on about how to include newcomers and their children. Everywhere
we see an emphasis on integration, the aim being to keep diversity within the bounds
of liberal democracy.
With the abolition of internal borders in the European Union there are signs of
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some convergence of views on integration. How far this will go is uncertain. It’s doubt-
less true that some form of European citizenship would make integration easier, since
it would have a great deal more to offer than national citizenship. Here lies one essen-
tial difference between Europe and America. The United States is a continental power
with which immigrants can easily identify, whereas independent European countries
have less to offer newcomers. It makes a good deal of difference whether a Turkish mi-
grant is asked to become a Dane or an American, since English is a passport to the
world, Danish or Dutch are not – quite apart from the size of Turkey in comparison to
the smaller nations of Europe. Until talk about European citizenship becomes a reality
it will be harder here than in the United States to give immigrants a sense that their
horizons are expanding.
We have to be realistic. It will be a long time yet before Europe is in a position to
qualify as a truly transnational society. There’s profound disagreement about how to
establish a common language alongside the national languages. A shared public life
and therefore a lively democracy are simply impossible with the language barriers that
currently exist. Only when it becomes natural for people to work, marry, engage in de-
bate and pay taxes across national borders will we have any chance of creating a
transnational citizenship.
Sociologist Abram de Swaan refers to ‘expanding circles of identification’ which in
theory can include the whole of mankind. Yet he is forced to conclude that such supra-
national identifications are fragile. It’s possible that in the future Europe will offer
opportunities for such a broader identification, but getting to that stage will be a
lengthy process. The quest for European unity now finds itself in deep water for this
very reason. Societies are being profoundly changed by immigration – in several
member countries one in four, perhaps one in three of all residents will be migrants or
the descendants of migrants by the middle of this century. Over the coming decades,
European countries will need to open up to each other.
This dual task of integration is raising questions about national identity every-
where and we could well see majorities turning against the outside world. European
societies are going through a delicate process of change that is forcing them to rethink
the fundamentals of an open society. Self-examination is underway and it requires a
Europe with the ambition not so much to replace national sovereignty as to facilitate
the continued existence of its member countries as robust democracies under the rule
of law and as welfare states. The hope is that European cooperation will go some way
towards absorbing the shocks of world disorder. 
This makes a shared immigration and asylum policy essential. Sassen argues that
migratory movements from specific countries have a beginning and an end: ‘Migra-
tions do not assume the form of invasions; they did not in the nineteenth century
when border controls were minimal or nonexistent, and they do not today.’ Yet it is
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by no means certain that without border controls the current migration trends from
south to north and from east to west would not take the form of a vast movement of
populations. In a world made far smaller by mass communications and where differ-
ences in prosperity are so visible, it seems improbable that migration would regulate
itself without interference by states.
What began as a common market has expanded in just a few decades into a large
union offering considerable freedom of movement. The right to settle in other mem-
ber states was put in place at a time when there were no longer any mass migration
flows within the European Union. Where they did threaten to occur, as the Union ex-
panded eastwards for instance, transition periods were laid down for new members.
With the abolition of internal borders, citizens of each member state have gained the
freedom to settle in whichever of the others they choose. That freedom means that the
countries of the EU have a natural interest in knowing who is being allowed in and ex-
actly which laws govern naturalization. No agreement has yet been reached as to what
the consequences of this increased freedom of movement ought to be for legal mi-
grants who have lived in countries of the Union for many years. Exactly what rights do
they have?
With the expanding geography of immigration in Europe, more and more coun-
tries are being forced to cooperate. Nations like Spain, Italy and Greece, once coun-
tries of emigration, have been transformed into countries of immigration in the past
ten to twenty years. Central European nations too, such as the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary and Poland, will be increasingly affected by worldwide migration. They are per-
haps still seen as places people leave from, but within the next decade they will find
themselves becoming recipient countries. Migration from south to north will inter-
connect with migration from east to west. Klaus Bade points out that two thirds of mi-
grants in Western Europe now come from the east and only a third from the south.
All this migration reminds us that Europe is surrounded by turbulent regions and
its aspiration to be and remain a secure community means it must formulate answers
to the increasing problems on its external borders. Anyone looking at the geographi-
cal position of America and comparing it to Europe can only conclude that the Pacific,
with its growing economies, China in particular, presents far more opportunities than
the Mediterranean region, where Europe is faced with a band of countries stretching
from North Africa via the Middle East to the former Soviet Republics, practically all of
which are stuck in a deep malaise.
If we take stock of these crisis areas on the borders of Europe, then the remarks of
former Dutch prime minister Jan Peter Balkenende seem inadequate: ‘It isn’t “us”
against “them”. Not “Europe versus the United States” or “Europe versus the Islamic
world”. Europe must not cordon itself off against others but against the ghosts of its
own past.’ Certainly, we must not close our minds to the outside world, but we do have
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to protect ourselves against problems that arise, of which radicalization in Islamic
countries is one of the most worrying. This requires a more focused awareness of the
dangers threatening democracy. Balkenende was right to say: ‘The Union as a defensi-
ble community under the rule of law has a moral charisma in the world.’ But Eu-
rope’s defensibility depends upon creating a community with a common border,
which is impossible without a common approach to immigration and refugee flows.
The creation of a union that can take care of its own security needs would be a radi-
cal break with the past. European history is imbued with war and the memory of war.
It’s not hard to find evidence to support the suspicion that wars are of all times and all
places, a core feature of human society. All borders set residents against outsiders. The
formation of groups all too often carries within it the germ of violence of a kind that
grew to unprecedented proportions in the era of nation building, when entire popula-
tions were mobilized in devastating wars.
The First World War brought an end to the belief in progress that characterized the
long nineteenth century. As Paul Valéry famously said: ‘We civilizations now know
ourselves mortal.’ After that war, nothing would ever be the same again; doubts
about the values of liberal culture increased and were compounded by the ending of
the civilizing mission to the colonies that people had assigned themselves. In the final
volume of Pat Barker’s First World War trilogy, images of a hospital for wounded sol-
diers are interspersed with notes in the margins of an anthropological study into the
habits and customs of a primitive tribe in a remote region of Polynesia, which is still
practicing headhunting. The anthropological question – what is the difference be-
tween the killing in the trenches and the bloody rituals of a primitive tribe? – becomes
an indictment of the hypocrisy of the British Empire, which allows the mass slaughter
of the Somme to continue and at the same time tries to stamp out ritual killing in its
colonies, condemning it as uncivilized behaviour.
It would be too easy to fall into a state of cultural pessimism, as many have done
and still do, based on the countless examples of barbarity in European history. True,
Europe’s past is full of war and oppression. At the same time, over the last half century
it has determinedly reasoned against the inexorability of fate. By trial and error it has
launched nothing less than an attempt to realize Immanuel Kant’s vision of ‘eternal
peace’. The liberal hope of the years prior to  is now being carried forward by oth-
er means. Nevertheless, the bulk of history weighs against this belief in human mal-
leability and it is well worth giving further thought to the fundamental conflict be-
tween these two visions of the world.
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
The cosmopolitan code
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  
With its great voyages of discovery and the building of colonial empires, Europe made
a decisive contribution to global cohesion. The heirs to Columbus and Magellan were
undoubtedly driven by curiosity and the pursuit of profit, but they also had a civiliz-
ing mission. The racial and religious motives behind that mission can be criticized on
all sorts of grounds, but the fact remains that few cultures managed to escape it entire-
ly. Ever since, the world has been bound together by a discordant network of relation-
ships.
It all began with the seizure of the North African coastal town of Ceuta in , a
Spanish enclave in Morocco to this day and now a transit point for desperate migrants
looking for a backdoor route into Europe. Next the New World and soon afterwards
the Far East were opened up by a long series of voyages of discovery. Successful naviga-
tion across the oceans meant that scattered empires could be formed. Conquest had
previously been limited to neighbouring regions. The voyages of discovery created
connections that literally spanned the globe.
This major historical change was set in motion by a small number of European
countries that between them covered no more than . per cent of the earth’s surface.
The British Empire stands out in every respect; at its peak Britain’s worldwide posses-
sions amounted to a quarter of the earth and its population. It still seems astonishing
that eight European countries – Portugal, Spain, France, Britain, the Netherlands, Bel-
gium and later Germany and Italy – managed to subjugate such a large part of the
world for more than three centuries. In  the United Nations had  member
countries, of which no fewer than were former colonies.
Pride comes before a fall. In the space of a few decades the conquest of centuries
was reversed. Once a source of self-assurance, colonial history became the cause of
deep uncertainty about the significance of European culture. The experience of the
First World War trenches had already delivered a huge blow to Europe’s self-confid -
ence, and after the publication of Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West (-)
Europe’s downfall was commonly depicted as inevitable. The development of civiliza-
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tion was now conceived as cyclical, each flourishing period followed by decline. The
loss of overseas territories reinforced that impression.
Yet the shock of decolonization had a beneficial effect. European integration would
have been unthinkable without that experience. The crucial initiative that brought Eu-
ropean countries together was taken by former colonial powers, such as France and
the Netherlands, which saw the integration of the old continent as a means of check-
ing their own decline. Only when they stood alone did they begin to see each other as
neighbours. This helps to explain why Britain was so slow to join the European Com-
munity. It continued to cherish the illusion of imperial grandeur even when, after In-
dian independence in , there was less and less reason to do so.
The loss of power in the world led to self-examination in another sense too. British
historian Arnold Toynbee was keen to emphasize the limited horizon of the colonial
worldview: ‘The paradox of our generation is that all the world has now profited by an
education which the West has provided, except the West herself. The West to-day is
still looking at history from the old parochial self-centred standpoint which the other
living societies have by now been compelled to transcend.’ That self-satisfied attitude
could not last, since ‘sooner or later, the West, in her turn, is bound to receive the re-ed-
ucation which the other civilizations have obtained already’. He wrote these words in
 and we can see his prediction as having since been borne out by post-war immi-
gration. As a young Pakistani man in London wrote on a banner years ago, cutting a
long story short: ‘We are over here, because you were over there.’ Europe touched the
world and as a consequence it is now being touched by the world.
The one-time colonizers’ ability to adapt is currently being tested in precisely the
way Toynbee regarded as desirable. The elites that once commanded a civilizing mis-
sion have become so uncertain that they no longer have any clear understanding of
their cultural heritage. Who are we – given the moral depths of the colonial period – to
judge others? Immigration forces us to think again about the fundamentals of our so-
cieties. The coming decades will show whether the shock is being absorbed produc-
tively.
A good deal of uncertainty about the role of European culture and religion existed
even during the colonial period. Take the famous missionary and explorer David Liv-
ingstone. In late  he spoke about the situation in India after a revolt against British
rule: ‘I consider we made a great mistake, when we carried commerce into India, in be-
ing ashamed of our Christianity… These two pioneers of civilization – Christianity
and commerce – should ever be inseparable.’ Formulated in this way his conclusion
amounts to a call to his countrymen: profit and principle must go hand in hand in
raising people up. It seems the importance of religion could not be taken for granted.
Livingstone was right in saying that in the first century and a half of its existence,
the East India Company had not made any effort to convert people to Christianity,
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preferring religious tolerance for the sake of its own trading interests. The British Em-
pire was for a long time little more than a loose network of trading posts. Its fairly de-
tached government had no ambition to alter native ways of life but was guided mainly
by the profit motive. That changed in the course of the nineteenth century, when a civ-
ilizing offensive was launched, driven mainly by moral conviction. This too had its
positive side. Opposition to slavery, inspired by religious and humanist beliefs, gained
momentum and ultimately won out over economic interests. In  the slave trade
was banned and Britain deployed its navy to ensure that no more human beings were
shipped out from the West African coast.
The campaign against slavery was accompanied by a revival of missionary fervour
in the colonies. The abolitionist movement favoured the conversion of heathens. In
his biography of David Livingstone, entitled Victorian Superman, British historian
Niall Ferguson shows how the two motives were bound up together. The civilizing zeal
of the young missionary was sorely tested as he watched an attempt to convert the na-
tives end in a drinking spree. He noted in his diary, with unintentional irony: ‘A minis-
ter who had not seen as much pioneer service as I have done would have been shocked
to see so little effect produced by an earnest discourse concerning the future judge-
ment.’ Livingstone eventually chose to take his leave of missionary work, throwing
himself and his unbounded energy into the exploration of the African interior. What
followed became a children’s adventure story.
Livingstone’s uncertain quest in India is representative of what was happening on a
far larger scale. Anyone reading about European colonialism will be struck by a succes-
sion of unintended consequences. It’s a tale of improvisation. What began as a scatter-
ing of trading posts in Asia and the New World developed by fits and starts into a sys-
tem of foreign rule that aroused its own opposing forces and was eventually destroyed
by them. The gradual penetration of the interior from coastal regions has been de-
ployed as a metaphor often enough; the European powers became increasingly en-
meshed in a colonial enterprise whose balance of profit and loss was not at all easy to
determine.
What still looks in retrospect like a conscious strategy of domination, progressing
step by step, was in reality a piecemeal project. Only in the course of the nineteenth
century do we see a slow transition from an informal to a formal empire and not until
the early twentieth century were the Dutch East Indies truly subjugated and moulded
into a single political entity. The same went for the British colonies. The main factors
prompting the British to consolidate their spheres of influence into colonies and pro-
tectorates were French expansion in Africa, Russian advances in Asia and Germany’s
colonial policies in the latter years of Bismarck’s rule. Even so, the British sought com-
promises with local rulers and respected traditional ways of delivering justice. India,
with a population of million, was administered by just a few thousand British civil
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servants and it always had a complex combination of diverse forms of government
with varying degrees of autonomy.
How can we explain the enormous imbalances of power that enabled European
countries to rule such a large part of the world? After all, empires are of all times and
all continents, so why did modern colonialism not originate in the Arab world or in
China? In the Middle Ages those regions were far more advanced than Europe, but
they failed to recognize the importance of voyages of discovery. Many have said the
reason was primarily cultural. Whereas the Arab world and China were generally in-
ward-looking, Europe developed a huge fascination for things beyond its own concep-
tual universe.
One telling example is the Chinese decision during the Ming dynasty to curtail a se-
ries of important voyages made by Admiral Zheng-He in -. In those years at
least seven expeditions were undertaken in the seas around what is now Indonesia and
in the Indian Ocean. The decision to abandon this venture was inspired by financial
considerations, but it was also a symptom of the politics of seclusion. Historian David
Abernethy concludes: ‘Europe had the will as well as the capacity to reach China.
China had the capacity but not the will to reach Europe.’ Deliberate disengagement
could not have come at a worse moment. As China withdrew, Europe was beginning a
long series of conquests.
A number of researchers have looked at why Europe had an urge to explore, rule
and exploit the world when others did not. In his search for an explanation, American
historian David Landes goes back to the fragmentation of political power after the fall
of the Roman Empire. Coercion was no worse than on other continents, but authority
was widely dispersed, making control more difficult and leading to the emergence of
independent city states, which became the crucible of capitalism and democracy. Serf-
dom was abolished in Western Europe in the fifteenth century.
Tensions between earthly and spiritual powers were another reason why it was im-
possible to control society from a single centre. The authority of religious rulers was fi-
nally curbed, but only after a long struggle. They lost control of scholarly work. The
split within the Christian church known as the Reformation caused a crisis of authori-
ty, and the individual relationship with God that Protestantism encouraged cleared
the way for more democratic forms of government. 
German sociologist Max Weber believed that the emergence of Protestantism was a
decisive event in the rise of modern capitalism, which went hand in hand with colo-
nization. Landes comments: ‘The heart of the matter lay indeed in the making of a
new kind of man – rational, ordered, diligent, productive. These virtues, while not
new, were hardly commonplace. Protestantism generalized them among its adherents,
who judged one another by conformity to these standards.’ He goes on: ‘It gave a big
boost to literacy, spawned dissents and heresies, and promoted the skepticism and re-
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fusal of authority that is at the heart of the scientific endeavor.’As a result, large devel-
opmental differences grew up within Europe; much of Eastern Europe remained ex-
cluded from the revolution of the mind and even the original pioneers of discovery –
Spain and Portugal – were left behind, since for religious reasons they shut themselves
off from the new way of thinking. Figures for illiteracy demonstrate the sharpness of
the contrast: by  only  per cent of people in Britain were unable to read or write,
whereas in Spain the percentage was  and in Portugal . A similar distinction exist-
ed between North and South America.
Cultures differ historically in their degree of scientific and technological develop-
ment and in their receptivity to advances made by other countries, but large discrep-
ancies in economic productivity do not mean that those differences are permanent,
let alone innate. Japan, for example, has made Western progress its own to a great de-
gree since the mid-nineteenth century. Other countries have been slower and many
are underdeveloped in a technological sense to this day.
Landes seeks the key to European expansion in what he calls ‘the invention of in-
vention’, meaning the spread of unrestricted research. He points to the development
of mechanical clockwork as one example, and to printing, seen in the Muslim world as
blasphemous. In Istanbul the Jews and Christians had printing presses while the Mus-
lims did not. For many years the prospect of a printed Koran was unthinkable: ‘Islam’s
greatest mistake … was the refusal of the printing press, which was seen as a potential
instrument of sacrilege and heresy. Nothing did more to cut Muslims off from the
mainstream of knowledge.’
The greatest puzzle is why China, ahead in a technological sense for so long, was not
responsible for the most important scientific breakthroughs. Most commentators at-
tribute this less to religion than to state control. Discoveries such as gunpowder, the
compass, porcelain and paper were not taken further, whereas the military applica-
tions of gunpowder, for instance, were eagerly seized upon in Western Europe. This il-
lustrates the fact that individual freedom lies at the heart of the scientific and later the
industrial revolution: freedom from church authorities, the liberation of the peasants,
the breaking of the exclusivity of guilds, the abolition of tolls, freedom of settlement –
they are all examples of increases in spiritual and physical mobility, which in many
parts of the world came about only much later. These were the reforms that made pos-
sible the unprecedented power of the West.
Expansion was driven by what Abernethy describes as an ‘explore-control-utilize
syndrome’. He writes: ‘Imperial expansion and scientific/technological innovation
share an underlying logic.’ Knowledge and power were inextricably linked; the will
to discover and the will to govern went hand in hand from the start. Public institu-
tions, private entrepreneurs and religious groups reinforced one another, Abernethy
writes, in ‘a triple assault on other societies: on indigenous institutions of governance,
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on long-standing patterns of generating and distributing economic assets, and on
ideas and values that gave meaning to life’.A combination of nation building, urban
capitalism and Christianity made expansion possible and at the same time territorial
expansion strengthened the economic growth of Western Europe and its political and
religious institutions.
The consequences can still be seen every day in the former colonies. It’s possible to
think of countless examples: demographic patterns were deeply affected by the near
or even complete extermination of the native inhabitants and by slavery; the model of
the nation state imposed long ago is still in place and colonial borders have usually re-
mained unchanged; the language of the former colonizers is more often than not still
the official tongue; the spread of Christianity into innumerable regions is another
legacy of colonialism; and the concept of economic development has taken root in the
former colonies, whatever obstacles may have been encountered in practice.
How should we take stock of the colonial era? The combination of the profit mo-
tive and public-spiritedness – think slavery and railways – makes a straightforward
verdict both impossible and undesirable. Henk Wesseling is critical, but at the same
time he rejects the idea that the severity of colonial exploitation explains anything
about the relative success or failure of states in our own time. India and Indonesia
were subjugated for centuries but are better off today than, for example, Ethiopia or
Afghanistan, which escaped colonization. Weighing up the economic consequences
of colonialism is difficult. Which criteria should we apply? Some would emphasize the
deep chasm between rich and poor in the world and blame systematic exploitation for
underdevelopment today. Others point to economic development in the colonial era
and conclude that the average income of the indigenous inhabitants increased. The
rise of a well-educated native middle class was a precondition for the anti-colonial
movement that heralded the end of foreign domination.
Still, its contribution to progress does nothing to mitigate the moral catastrophe
that colonialism also represented. Wesseling describes the dark side: ‘The slave trade
was not only immoral from a contemporary point of view, it had indisputably nega-
tive effects on the demography of West Africa, while slavery in the New World had per-
manent or at least very long term negative consequences for the slaves and their de-
scendants.’ He also points to the genocide that was perpetrated in colonial times. ‘The
annihilation of the Herero in south-western Africa is the most vivid example.’
A recollection of the low points of colonial rule should be part of our historical con-
sciousness. If anything shows that the open society represents a fragile norm of civi-
lization, then it is colonial history, with its genocide and its trade in human beings.
The humanist ideal the West has wanted to present to the world since the American
and French revolutions was blatantly betrayed. 

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 208
‘’ 
The conflict between self-declared principles and colonial practice has prompted
both self-justification and self-criticism over the years. Justification of imperial rule
usually took the form of a racist worldview that envisioned a fixed hierarchy of cul-
tures, with those of white Europeans at the top. Self-criticism ultimately led to cultur-
al relativism, which assumes as a matter of principle that all cultures are of equal value.
In societies that now include so many migrants from former colonies it’s important to
understand each of these two contrasting outlooks in the context of the other. After all,
accusations of racism are still a prominent feature of criticism of Western society; feel-
ings of superiority among whites are still said to be the norm.
In the late s, in his now famous The Colonizer and the Colonized, Tunisian
writer Albert Memmi portrayed the psychology of colonial relations. He showed how
colonial subjects were in a sense placed outside time, no longer seen as shaping their
own histories. The route to full citizenship was blocked, which destroyed the social dy-
namic. Under normal circumstances generational conflicts would find an outlet in so-
cial reform, but the colonial situation prevented access to positions of responsibility.
Cultural expropriation – the fact, for instance, that education was geared towards the
motherland and delivered in the language of the colonizer – divided local populations,
with people increasingly feeling like outsiders in their own countries.
One option for those affected was to take the route of complete identification with
the culture of the distant metropolis in the hope of being absorbed into the communi-
ty of the colonizers. But all too often this was accompanied by self-loathing and ulti-
mately it led nowhere, Memmi writes, since the route to true assimilation was barred.
It would have undermined the colonial relationship. This was another reason why
there was no real will to make a success of conversion to Christianity: a shared religion
would be too much of a threat to the colonial hierarchy.
Memmi describes the mediocre quality of colonial elites and says the discrepancy
between the privileges enjoyed by the colonizers and their accomplishments cried out
for justification. The theory of racism provided the answer. It would be a mistake to
think that colonial expansion flowed from a worldview that saw white civilization as
the indisputable apex of history. In fact the opposite is closer to the truth: voyages of
discovery led to dominion over a large part of the world that then needed to be justi-
fied. Contact with other cultures forced colonizers to reflect upon the place of their
own civilization.
Classic racism, as it arose in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe and
America, offered an explanation. The theory is not hard to summarize: humanity is di-
vided into races that have internal as well as external characteristics; the morality and
culture of the various racial groups are directly linked to their biological features. Fur-
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thermore, the races – the most commonly distinguished are the Caucasian (white),
the Negroid (black) and the Mongoloid (yellow) – exist within an immutable hierar-
chy, with white civilization at the top, followed by the Asiatic peoples, and at the bot-
tom the Africans and their descendants.
In our day racism is equated with ignorance, but when it first emerged it was a gen-
erally accepted worldview with a scientific basis. Little by little, the desire to investigate
nature and to record observations created a belief that humanity too could be classi-
fied all in its diversity. Using increasingly precise methods – such as that endless meas-
uring of skulls – distinct races were charted.
The doctrine of racial inequality can be seen as a product of the scientific attitude
disseminated by the Enlightenment. Indeed, great philosophers such as David Hume,
Immanuel Kant and Voltaire all believed there was a hierarchy of races, even though
that belief was at odds with their philosophical principles. Hume, an opponent of slav-
ery, comments in On National Characters (): ‘I am apt to suspect the negroes … to
be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other com-
plexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation.’
A little further on he sneers: ‘In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man of
parts and learning; but ’tis likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a par-
rot, who speaks a few words plainly.’
Similar views were expressed by the founder of modern liberalism, British philoso-
pher John Locke, who in the second half of the seventeenth century wrote about the
colony of Carolina: ‘Every freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authori-
ty over his negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever.’ This was not simply a de-
fence of slavery; it meant that should any of them convert to Christianity it would not
affect their status as slaves.
It would be easy to come up with a whole raft of such statements, showing that the
greatest minds of early-modern times, almost without exception, had a racial view of
the world. It was a product of those voyages of discovery that brought Europeans into
contact with ‘primitive’ peoples. How could the differences, especially in technologi-
cal development, be explained? Surely not by external factors alone?
Another question occupied many minds. How could it be that so many profoundly
different peoples had emerged from one act of creation? Christians were torn between
the biblical creation story and their increasing difficulty in believing that the different
races had a common origin. The religious dogma of a single creation (monogenesis)
was incompatible with the scientific notion of multiple creations (polygenesis).
Voltaire – in contrast to Kant, incidentally – was drawn to the notion of polygenesis, if
only as a way of treading on the church’s toes. The debate raged in the Netherlands
too, but there powerful religious convictions meant that arguments in favour of poly-
genesis were consistently quashed. In the mid-eighteenth century a Dutch scholar
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called Camper even went so far as to ask whether the first human might perhaps have
been brown or black: ‘Whether Adam was created black, brown, tawny or white, his
descendants must of necessity, as soon as they were spread out across the wide earth,
according to the way the land, the particular foods and sicknesses differed, have
changed their colours and shapes.’ In short, in his view racial differences were a prod-
uct of the highly contrasting environments in which people lived.
With the arrival of Darwin’s theory of evolution, the controversy was settled. Natu-
ral selection explained how such diverse races could have arisen from a single source
and why one race had adjusted better than another to the circumstances in which it
found itself. Darwin’s On the Origin of Species is subtitled The Preservation of Favoured
Races in the Struggle for Life. The application of his theory to society – later known as
social Darwinism – was a natural step and one the great scholar did nothing to dis-
courage.
In a later book, The Descent of Man (), Darwin looked at racial issues in more
detail. He was convinced the races differed in their emotional lives and indeed their in-
tellectual capacities. In a section entitled ‘Natural Selection as affecting Civilized Na-
tions’ he leaves no room for doubt that efforts to protect the weakest in society will re-
sult in the degeneration of the race. The struggle for existence, which only the most
vigorous peoples will survive, must not be alleviated. Nothing must be placed between
mankind and its suffering. Darwin was an opponent of poor relief and of institutions
for the mentally ill: ‘There should be open competition for all men; and the most able
should not be prevented by laws or customs from succeeding best and rearing the
largest number of offspring.’
He is aware that a rejection of social legislation is reason for discomfort: ‘Nor could
we check our sympathy, even at the urging of hard reason, without deterioration in
the noblest part of our nature.’ It was impossible to deny that modern society, de-
spite poor relief, had developed extremely successfully during the nineteenth century,
but Darwin was perturbed by its leniency: ‘Thus the reckless, degraded, and often vi-
cious members of society, tend to increase at a quicker rate than the provident and
generally virtuous members.’
It’s important to realize that judgments concerning the colonial world at this time
were embedded in seemingly enlightened notions about the struggle for existence.
Historians have pointed out that the conditions in which slaves lived were not much
worse than those of workers in Europe’s major cities in the late eighteenth century
and the early years of industrialization that followed. Average life expectancy among
the urban proletariat was low. Dreadful living conditions were recorded by Jacob Riis
even at the start of the twentieth century. His photographs show immigrant popula-
tions living like rats in damp cellars and in fire-trap apartment blocks without sanita-
tion. The struggle for existence was merciless indeed.
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What went on inside the borders of the home country could easily be perpetuated
in the colonies. The civilized nations’ struggle to subdue the ‘barbarians’ was there-
fore predictably short. ‘Viewing such men,’ Darwin remarked, ‘one can hardly believe
that they are fellow-creatures, and inhabitants of the same world.’The civilizing mis-
sion, the so-called ‘white man’s burden’, was based on this social-Darwinist vision.
‘You may roughly divide the nations of the world as the living and the dying,’ said
British prime minister Lord Salisbury at the height of British expansionism. It was
clear to everyone on which side the dying was happening.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, out of a not altogether coherent com-
bination of racial classification, evolutionary theory and research on heredity, racism
emerged as a worldview with a scientific foundation. Up until at least the s and
’s it was the usual way of understanding the world. One consequence was a deep
aversion to racial mixing, since it would surely bring about the decline of civilization.
In this sense the ideology of apartheid was presaged long before it was given a name.
Racism was more, incidentally, than simply a matter of colour. The different na-
tional groupings in Europe were regarded as racial as well. Europeans were usually di-
vided into three races. In the late nineteenth century they were referred to as the
Nordic, Mediterranean and Alpine races – in descending order of civilization. A com-
mission of the American Senate adopted this way of thinking, describing the Dutch as
‘the Englishmen of the Continent’. Racism was not just a question of white versus
black but of white versus less white. The then widely respected Madison Grant com-
plained about the new migrants from Europe who were not of the Nordic race: ‘The
new immigration … contained a large and increasing number of the weak, the broken,
and the mentally crippled of all races drawn from the lowest stratum of the Mediter-
ranean basin and the Balkans, together with the hordes of the wretched, submerged
populations of the Polish ghettoes. Our jails, insane asylums, and almshouses are
filled with this human flotsam and the whole tone of American life, social, moral, and
political has been lowered and vulgarized by them.’
Racism was part of a far broader pattern of discrimination and inequality. Eugen-
ics, specifically the forced sterilization of the social underclass, was regarded as a per-
fectly acceptable means of dealing with misfits and at the same time reducing pressure
on the elites. Those who embraced such beliefs in the s and ’s, with their fear
and loathing of the masses, include some of the most prominent writers of their day.
Aldous Huxley, having made approving reference to the steps being taken in Hitler’s
Germany, challenges the critics of such measures: ‘We may ask mystical democrats
how they expect democratic institutions to survive in a country where an increasing
percentage of the population is mentally defective.’ Control of ‘barbarians’, so char-
acteristic of the colonial worldview, was being practiced robustly within the territories
of the ruling nations.
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   
Cultural relativism emerged as a reaction to colonial abuses, and especially the racial
arrogance contained in the arguments used to justify them. Its most important theses
can be summarized as follows: cultures do not have biological roots but are acquired
by learning, so it’s wrong to connect race with culture; there’s no evolutionary pro-
gression from primitive to civilized forms of society and we’re mistaken whenever we
think in terms of a hierarchy; the judgements people make are linked to their cultures
and therefore biased from the start.
These ideas were originally formulated, with a good many reservations, by anthro-
pologist Franz Boas, but step by step his students took cultural relativism to a more
radical conclusion. It’s to the lasting credit of Boas, who came to prominence at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, that the racist worldview was knocked off its scientif-
ic pedestal. The idea that cultures have a racial foundation and that the races can be
arranged in an immutable hierarchy from high to low is hardly ever taken seriously
these days. Racism in its scientific manifestation has been marginalized.
Boas begins with a cautious suggestion for further research: ‘If a close relation be-
tween race and culture should be shown to exist it would be necessary to study for
each racial group separately the interaction between bodily build and mental and so-
cial life.’But if this endeavour proves unsuccessful, as it inevitably will, then we must
study the different cultures without reference to biological characteristics. Boas be-
lieves environmental factors are far more important than racial differences: ‘In short,
historical events appear to have been much more potent in leading races to civiliza-
tion than their innate faculty.’ He cites an example from migration to America,
which offers ‘ample proof showing that the racial position of an individual does not
hinder his participation in modern civilization’.He can see no reason to assume that
the black population is incapable of developing, indeed he believes that were it to be
treated in an equal manner to the white population, then the performance of both
groups would very likely be comparable.
Looked at in this way, racism can be regarded above all as a ‘narcissism of small dif-
ferences’. The similarities in physical make-up between the racial groups are many
times greater than the distinctions between them, for all our relentless attempts to
squeeze people into racial categories. There’s generally more variation within racial
groups than across racial dividing lines, and a ‘greater lack of cultural values than that
found in the inner life of some strata of our modern population is hardly found any-
where’.
With these observations Boas breaks the connection between race and culture. At
the same time he criticizes the idea that in primitive societies we’re looking at what
amounts to a childlike stage of humanity. History should not be seen as a transition
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from social simplicity to social complexity; Western societies are highly developed
from a technological point of view, but technology is not to be taken as the measure of
all things. The languages and religions of primitive peoples cannot be dismissed as
simple, and the same goes for family structures, which are often extraordinarily com-
plex. Nevertheless, Boas clings to the notion of progress. Primitive societies are far
more wedded to habit. As civilization advances, opportunities for critical investiga-
tion of traditions increase. The number of people for whom we feel responsible has
grown enormously; members of primitive societies identify with comparatively tiny
groups. 
Boas’ followers drew more radical conclusions. Melville Herskovits rejects all sug-
gestion of evolution, since as soon as we adopt the evolutionists’ stance we are led inex-
orably to a belief in a hierarchy of cultures. He therefore criticizes Boas’ belief in
progress: there are no stages leading from ‘primitive’ to ‘civilized’ culture; such a view
is little more than prejudice, a way of seeing our own culture as an end point and ar-
ranging all the other cultures according to their proximity to our own norms. In order
to banish this hierarchy of cultures we must acknowledge that all judgments are of
their time and place. The quest for universally valid norms will get us nowhere, since
all morals are embedded in specific traditions, which are non-transferable outside
their own cultures. As Herskovits puts it: ‘Cultural relativism is a philosophy which, in
recognizing the values set up by every society to guide its own life, lays stress on the
dignity inherent in every body of custom, and on the need for tolerance of conven-
tions though they may differ from one’s own.’
This tendency within anthropology has an explicit pedagogical goal: a recognition
of the relativity of all morality will encourage politeness and respect in our dealings
with people of other cultures. The defeat of ethnocentrism in Europe and America is
therefore seen as a contribution towards the peaceful coexistence of different cultural
groups. Boas speaks of ‘a higher tolerance than the one we now profess’. Herskovits
for his part talks of the ‘social discipline’ and ‘mutual respect’ that anthropology
will be able to instil in people if at its heart lies a recognition of that ‘dignity inherent
in every body of custom’ of which he writes.
Sometimes this line of thought is extrapolated even further. In some cases the study
of other societies has actually led to a reversal of the hierarchy, such that the ‘noble sav-
age’ represents a higher form of civilization that the supposedly civilized West. Barbar-
ians, as Montaigne knew, are people who see others as barbarians. There is of course
a contradiction here, since even if we reverse the ranking of civilization and bar-
barism, as soon as any ranking is laid down, relativism has been rejected.
Boas’ school of thought has great merit, but its weaknesses are no less significant.
Whereas biology was once seen as decisive in explaining human behaviour, culture is
now regarded as all-embracing. This form of determinism carries within it a similar
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risk of a closed worldview. If people correspond to the cultures to which they’re pre-
sumed to belong, then what remains of human freedom? Anthropologist Ton Lemaire
puts his finger on a sensitive spot: cultural relativism is actually ‘racism in reverse’,
with a no less ‘conservative outcome’ than its opposite. Relativism is shaped by that
which it hoped to defeat. 
So despite its historical significance and noble intentions, the verdict on cultural
relativism cannot be a favourable one. Acknowledging the fateful power of tradition
doesn’t so much defeat ethnocentrism as confirm its inevitability. Bias is democra-
tized, as it were; everyone has a right to his own prejudices. No escape is possible, since
we are all trapped in our own partiality. In this sense relativism is a form of conser-
vatism; if we take the force of custom as a starting point, cultural innovation becomes
hard to conceive. A critical morality, on the other hand, aims to put cultural traditions
up for negotiation in the name of universal values.
Here the inner contradictions of relativism emerge. If we are all tied to our own tra-
ditions, how can the colonial claims of European powers ever be challenged? What
makes the cultural relativists themselves immune to the general rule they posit in say-
ing that everyone is a prisoner of the beliefs and habits of a specific place and time?
Lemaire puts it this way: ‘On the one hand Herskovits denies that it is possible for hu-
manity to have a value-free, non-culturally-determined standpoint, whereas on the
other hand he wants to practise a non-culturally-determined, objective, value-free an-
thropology!’ Relativism fails to take full account of the fact that people can rise
above their own cultures and assess them critically.
French philosopher Tzvetan Todorov points to yet another paradoxical habit of cul-
tural relativists: familiarity with something from their own history makes it accept-
able when they see it in others. In connection with Islam it is often said that condem-
nation of homosexuality is part of Western history and therefore Westerners
shouldn’t take such exception to it. Not only is this to regard history as the measure of
all things despite a professed relativism, it is also to forget that a critical attitude to tra-
dition is precisely what made the moral advances of the past few decades possible.
If we reject the concept of universal morality, on what basis will we ever be able or
willing to condemn anything? Female circumcision, the immolation of widows, hon-
our killing, cannibalism, slavery, infanticide, witch trials – they are all culture-specific
practices that clearly do not have and should not have universal legitimacy. No won-
der authoritarian regimes all over the world are more than happy to appeal to rela-
tivism as a way of staving off interference, which they usually describe as ‘meddling in
internal affairs’. The silence of cultural relativists in the name of the ‘dignity inherent
in every body of custom’ is not innocent. It can easily degenerate into complicity in
human rights violations.
Relativism seems to deny the possibility of moral progress. Hirsi Ali writes about
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traditional family culture: ‘The individual is completely subordinate to the collective.
Every child is socialized into the culture of shame, in which concepts of honour and
disgrace are central. Values such as freedom and individual responsibility play no part
at all in this way of thinking.’Although we are aware of all the problems of individu-
alism, a culture that stresses the importance of self-determination represents moral
progress compared to a culture in which birth into a specific class or caste, or with a
particular skin colour or gender, determine the entire course of a life.
To put it another way, relativism denies the possibility of progress, since there is no
higher or lower. It therefore fundamentally rejects the idea of developmental coopera-
tion. What do we mean by development if there’s no such thing as underdevelop-
ment? Although there may be countless domains of social and spiritual life in which
the ideal of progress is meaningless, without it we are at the mercy of the gods. Accord-
ing to the relativist, there are no shared aims for diverse cultures to strive after. In that
case, how can we cooperate? A dialogue between cultures presupposes the possibility
of rising above the cultures to which we belong in order to judge other cultures and
our own.
Anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, in many ways an advocate of relativism, was
aware that ‘what countries that are “insufficiently developed” reproach other coun-
tries for in international assemblies is not that they are Westernizing them but that
they are not giving them the means to Westernize quickly enough… It is pointless to
try to defend the originality of human cultures against those cultures themselves.’
He wrote this in , but in the intervening years countless people have brushed aside
precisely this insight in their efforts to defend ‘the originality of societies’ whether or
not it means bowing to authoritarian, even murderous practices.
Relativism might be an appropriate creed if cultures were still separate and uncon-
nected, but in an interconnected world we cannot say, for example, that the ban on
child labour must be upheld in our own country but we’ll continue to trade with
countries that have no objection to it. We can’t work together in international organi-
zations without both asking and listening to questions about breaches of human
rights.
Quite apart from its moral ambivalence, relativism falls short as a description of a
world in which relations between different cultures have developed to the extent they
have now. Ruth Benedict, another follower of Boas, says explicitly that the ‘untouched’
cultures, those that exist in ‘comparative isolation’, are a kind of laboratory for an-
thropologists. These are the circumstances in which cultural patterns can best be stud-
ied. Hence the conservative tendency in cultural relativism. Its origins lie in the
study of comparatively isolated cultures and it’s hard to apply to our increasingly in-
terconnected world.
This is especially true of contacts between cultures as a result of migration. What
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cultural relativists cannot comprehend is precisely the alienation that invariably af-
fects those who start a new life elsewhere. Cultural habits that had a function in a tradi-
tional rural society – such as the custom that the eldest son inherits all his parents’
property – are inappropriate in the major cities of post-industrial countries. We don’t
need to make value judgments in order to recognize this. 
Cultural relativism, which understands conservatism better than change, does not
offer a good description of the consequences of the migration process for those in-
volved. As well as falling short in its descriptive powers, relativism is a dead end in the
prescriptive sense. Migration brings very different traditions into close proximity. So-
ciety needs a number of shared norms if people’s contrasting backgrounds are not to
lead them into violent conflict. To take one example, the tradition of forced or
arranged marriages marriage must not escape critical scrutiny, however much we em-
phasize the ‘dignity inherent in every body of custom’. Migration forces choices upon
us. It is indeed best thought of in the way it was once described: as a ‘brutal bargain’.
 
This critical discussion of the ideas of Boas and his school helps to identify the contra-
dictions inherent in multicultural thinking, which in many respects represents a con-
tinuation of cultural relativism by other means. For many years multiculturalism set
the tone, to such an extent in fact that the idea of a multicultural society was taken for
granted. A reversal in thinking can now be seen everywhere. After more than twenty
years of debate in the Western world, the tenets of multiculturalism are slowly being
abandoned. We are moving in the direction of a renewed emphasis on the ideal of
shared citizenship.
Before enumerating the various problems with the notion of a multicultural socie-
ty, something needs to be said about its history. The first systematic exposition of a
multicultural philosophy comes from American author Horace Kallen, who emerged
in the s as a fierce critic of the doctrine of the ‘melting pot’, speaking out against
its forceful agitation for the ‘Americanization’ of the immigrant. His appeal reads like
a precursor to what would later become a widely held view, namely the notion of soci-
ety as an aggregate of cultural minorities. ‘For in effect the United States are in the
process of becoming a federal state not merely as a union of geographical and admin-
istrative unities, but also as a cooperation of cultural diversities, as a federation or
commonwealth of national cultures.’
Under the influence of decolonization, a multicultural way of thinking that elabo-
rates on this opposition to the ‘melting pot’ revealed itself first in America, then in Eu-
rope. If taken merely to suggest that worldwide migration produces multifarious soci-

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 217
eties, then there’s little to be said against it. It’s broadly accepted nowadays that such a
society must create space for everyone by, for example, adjusting laws about the dis-
posal of the dead or by opening prayer rooms, to allow for the rituals engaged in by
Hindus or Muslims. The marking of religious festivals of one kind or another can be
seen simply as a reaching out of hands.
Beyond this emphasis on the kind of pluralism that in theory characterizes every
open society, and beyond the practical adjustments needed to make room for new reli-
gions and lifestyles, a more drastic idea has arisen. It has to do with the belief that soci-
ety is made up of more or less autonomous cultural communities, which ought to be
handled separately in a whole range of areas including the administration of justice,
education and the jobs market. Will Kymlicka, who advocates a mild form of multicul-
turalism, acknowledges that those who defend it as an idea have little to say about the
limits of diversity. As a result of this inadequacy, the tendency to see society as a
patchwork of ethnic communities has aroused opposition.
The term ‘multiculturalism’ refers to a wide range of approaches and it’s easy to get
caught up in a war of words. One person will have a very different idea from another
about exactly what it means. The work of British political theorist Bhikhu Parekh and
sociologist Tariq Modood represents what Modood describes as a ‘self-critical’ and
‘moderate’ multiculturalism. Although my criticism of the concept is mainly aimed
at what might be called strong multiculturalism, even in its more moderate form it
places the emphasis on groups to an extent that goes beyond the empirically justifiable
and the normatively desirable. The Parekh Report’s description of Britain as a ‘com-
munity of communities’ is problematic, as is the notion that diversity is a concept of
the same order as equality and freedom.
Recent books such as Modood’s Multiculturalism. A Civic Idea have taken into ac-
count much of the criticism of the strong or broad interpretation of the term. He
writes, for example, that ‘to speak of the recognition or accommodation of minority
identities is not necessarily to advocate the reproduction of the past or customs from
far-off places’.Yet many of the practical applications he writes about, such as appeals
for bilingual teaching, single-sex schools and new housing stock for large families,
point towards the retention of culture. He also has a habit of combining ethnicity
and religion by writing of ‘ethno-religious groups’ and ‘ethno-religious minorities’.
This too tends towards conservatism, since there is a permanency to religious groups,
whereas ethnic identifications usually diminish from one generation to the next.
Modood is certainly aware of variety within ethnic groups and of change as a char-
acteristic of all cultures, yet he appeals for ‘the building of group pride’ without asking
whether or not it is compatible with variety and change. He regards pride with justi-
fiable suspicion when expressed by majority cultures but embraces it in minority cul-
tures. In other words, multiculturalism, even at its most moderate, places more em-
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phasis on heritage than on openness, whereas the important thing now is to explore
the productive tension between the two. This tendency towards cultural conservatism,
which cannot be defended in either its descriptive or its prescriptive form, shows that
a new paradigm is needed. 
To summarize, multiculturalism in its strong or immoderate form tempts us to par-
tition people off into ethnic categories in the name of cultural pluralism. Based on ‘in-
tegration with the retention of identity’, respect for others has in practice meant ham-
pering people’s freedom to shape their own lives, with the ultimate result that cus-
toms such as honour killing have been ignored for years, claiming hundreds of vic-
tims. We should defend the kind of open society in which all traditions are subjected
to critical examination, as opposed to the conservatism of group cultures. In this
sense multiculturalism is a ‘first-generation philosophy’, a way of thinking that be-
longs to avoidance and is now giving way to a phase in immigration history in which
conflict features large – as does, increasingly, accommodation.
Amartya Sen is decidedly not an adherent of multiculturalism. He quotes Gandhi,
who was quick to oppose what he called ‘the vivisection of a nation’, meaning a divi-
sion into its cultural or religious components. Sen asks himself where we got the idea
that the coexistence of an array of cultures in close proximity will be peaceful in na-
ture. Without a shared foundation, no meaningful exchange is possible and instead
we become caught up in permanent miscommunication or worse. An open society
should afford plenty of room for disagreement, but without a minimum of common
ground disputes cannot be productive, whether in an economic or a democratic sense.
A small but telling example concerns how we deal with performance in school.
Canadian sociologist Peter Li points out that researchers always compare the progress
of migrants’ children to the average for the indigenous population. He claims that
the use of such benchmarks is a concealed attempt to assimilate them. It does indeed
seem logical that a multicultural society would let go of shared norms. Why should
the school performance of the native population be the standard measure? In debates
about education we have seen a temptation to compare children primarily with their
parents, but this fails to address the question of what they need to succeed in the work-
place. After all, they are not competing within their own communities – they need to
be able to hold their own in society at large.
Another shortcoming of multiculturalism is its underestimation of modernity as a
shared horizon. It’s simply not the case that all cultural manifestations are appropri-
ate to a modern post-industrial society. In a service economy, cognitive and social
skills are of great importance and selection takes place more than ever on the basis of
socio-cultural capital. Kymlicka writes: ‘A modern economy requires a mobile, edu-
cated, and literate workforce, and standardized public education in a common lan-
guage has often been seen as essential if all citizens are to have equal opportunity to
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work in this modern economy.’ Unless a society exhibits some degree of cultural co-
hesion it can neither produce nor sustain a modern economy.
The redistribution involved in many kinds of social provision is another reason
why cohesion is essential. Kymlicka lays considerable emphasis on this point: ‘The
sort of solidarity required by a welfare state requires that citizens have a strong sense of
common identity and common membership.’ Experts on immigration are suspi-
cious of national borders as a way of excluding people, but they seldom look at the
positive side. The history of the liberal nation state is a history of social rights and cul-
tural emancipation that would be impossible without external borders.
The history of migration teaches us that survival strategies which work well in one
environment may be dysfunctional in another. Take the example of the extended fami-
ly, so essential to societies without social welfare provision. In such environments,
having a lot of children is the only way to guarantee a carefree old age, but in modern
societies families in which three generations live together are increasingly rare. The
offspring of migrants tend to have far fewer children than their parents, in fact their
families are not much larger than those of the population in general. This brings with
it a different family culture. So not only does multiculturalism have its weaknesses in a
normative sense, it also fails as a description of integration processes down through
the generations.
Another objection concerns what is perhaps multiculturalism’s most curious fea-
ture, namely that it does not attribute any explicatory value to culture. All cultures are
equal, we’re told, so they can’t be used to explain disparities between ethnic groups in
socio-economic outcomes, say, or in crime figures. Explanations in terms of class, on
the other hand, are extremely popular. Multiculturalism celebrates cultural difference
and is happy to discuss anything else as long as cultures are spared all criticism.
In a balanced assessment of ‘culture and inequality’, anthropologist Hans Ver-
meulen criticizes this unwillingness: ‘The cultural dimension is important in study-
ing social mobility among immigrants and their offspring. But cultural patterns
should wherever possible be understood in relation to prior structural circum-
stances.’ He describes for example the changing attitude to education in Turkish fami-
lies. ‘It involves more investment in the educational careers of the children and less in
the old social obligations in Turkey.’ A greater emphasis on education also changes re-
lationships within the family. Daughters, for example, are given more freedom out-
side the home.
There are plenty of other instances of cultural preference that cannot be reduced to
class differences and undoubtedly have an impact on the severity of disadvantage. In
the end everyone is free to choose which elements of a cultural heritage he or she will
adopt or decline to adopt, but migrants are shaped by the habits and customs of their
countries of origin. Leaving their native lands changes them, if only slowly, as is often
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the case, and their cultural preferences have an influence on the social opportunities
open, for example, to their daughters.
Yet another objection is that multiculturalism cuts receiving societies loose from
their history. It’s a conservative concept from the newcomers’ point of view – after all,
they’re expected to cherish their traditions – but from the point of view of the estab-
lished population it entails profound change, since it requires the setting aside of
many prevailing customs. Multiculturalism doesn’t explicitly recognize any obliga-
tion arising from achievements made by the receiving society through considerable ef-
forts over many generations. It silently accepts this inheritance while at the same time
rejecting any suggestion of continuity as merely a way of excluding migrants and their
children by regarding them as people who are not part of a shared history and who
therefore cannot identify with it.
Recall the telling statement from a Dutch researcher: ‘Surely you’re not going to
bother Turkish children with the years ’-’?’ Why shouldn’t children whose par-
ents were born in a village in Anatolia be put in a position to learn about a crucial
episode in Dutch history, the Nazi occupation, so that they have a chance to influence
the way in which the memory of those events is shaped?
A step further and we see how the denial of a collective memory which newcomers
could share fits neatly with a sense of revulsion among orthodox Muslims, who be-
lieve their children shouldn’t be bothered at school with lessons about the persecu-
tion of the Jews. It starts with an enlightened idea – let’s look beyond the boundaries
of national history – and ends in a form of self-censorship. Once we stop feeling we’re
part of a continuing history, every attempt to draw upon the past in a way that’s open
to all as a matter of principle will fail. Surely broadening the historical picture – for ex-
ample by paying more attention to the history of migration – implies a belief that the
story we tell about our countries remain significant. There’s no need to choose be-
tween a black history and a white history. As historian Arthur Schlesinger said, chil-
dren must learn to see the arrival of Columbus both through the eyes of those already
there and through the eyes of those who sent him off on his distant adventure.
Another, final objection is that, taken to its logical conclusion, multiculturalism
leads to an undesirable legal pluralism. This occurs when on the basis of a recognition
of the equal value of cultures, ‘distinct’ communities are given the right to live accord-
ing to their own authority and their own laws, even if their legal institutions deviate
from prevailing judicial practice. There are innumerable problems with this ap-
proach. When is a community truly ‘distinct’? What demands are to be made of it? Are
group rights binding on anyone judged to belong to that group, or can an individual
decide whether or not to be counted as a member?
Here it’s illustrative to look at attempts to absorb sharia law into the Canadian legal
system. This application of multiculturalism seems fairly logical. Why shouldn’t Mus-
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lims be able to resolve issues such as divorce through mediation within their own cir-
cles? That was the thinking behind the change in Ontario, but the results were highly
problematic. Who will defend the position of women within the Muslim community?
Can there ever be any guarantee that a spouse will submit to such mediation voluntar-
ily?
There have been comparable controversies in other countries. In  a verdict by a
German court caused a huge stir. Arguing that in ‘Moroccan culture’ violence within
marriage is customary, a judge in Frankfurt turned down an application for divorce
submitted by a German woman of Moroccan origin who had been abused by her hus-
band for many years. In her final decision the judge referred to verse : of the Koran,
which states that Muslim men are permitted to beat disobedient wives. Necla Kelek
commented that the judge had adopted precisely the argument of traditional Mus-
lims, who believe there is an inner world and an outer world. They argue that in the
private domain, which includes marital relationships, Islamic law applies and the Ger-
man state must not come between man and wife.
In theNetherlands too a developmentwas underway that would have createdmore
space for cultural diversity in the field of law, as described in a study by two Dutch
lawyers: ‘Attitudes to “separate development” are now much more positive, both in
the realm of policy and politics and among spokespeople for the communities in-
volved.The claim to their own separate law and a separate legal position is thereby giv-
en a completely different social significance.’Thatwas a decade ago.Now the balance
has shifted and responses to pleas for separate development are far less compliant.
In sum, the main weakness of the notion of a multicultural society is that it is con-
servative, as its most common definition suggests: ‘integration with the retention of
identity’. This formulation was introduced with a view to the eventual return of mi-
grants to their native countries. Education in their own language and culture was
judged necessary to ensure that children didn’t become divorced from their countries
of origin and have great difficulty adapting when they returned. The migrants stayed,
but so did the idea of ‘integration with the retention of identity’. As a result, migrant
communities became diasporas, which is to say groups that continued to orientate
themselves towards what they had left behind.
This approach not only underestimates the changes thrown up by the transition
from one society to another and the generational dynamic that results, it also falls
short in a normative sense, since it ignores the shared norms any modern economy
and democracy needs to enable it to compete productively and resolve conflicts. In the
absence of shared laws, shared public holidays, generally recognized standards of suc-
cess at school, a level playing field for job interviews and historical references under-
standable to all, the room for meaningful differences of opinion shrinks and the room
for misunderstanding grows.
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 
This criticism of themulticultural worldview has consequences for thewaywe look at
prejudice. Broad concepts such as xenophobia, which colour much of contemporary
literature about immigration,are away of focusing on a social phenomenon asmainly
a question of guilt.The answer is plain and simple: themajoritymust learn to open up
tominorities.Whowould deny that?We come upon far toomany examples of hostile
or even aggressive attitudes towards newcomers among the established population.
What makes this outlook one-sided, however, is that only the majority is confront-
ed with its prejudices, whereas in reality migrants are not without firmly held opin-
ions of their own. What should we make of the relationship between Creoles and Hin-
dustanis from Surinam, between Arabs and Berbers from Morocco, between Turks
and Kurds – in short between majorities and minorities within migrant communi-
ties? And what about the opinions Antilleans hold about the Dutch, Algerians about
the French or Pakistanis about the British? The still limited number of mixed mar-
riages tells a story of ethnically-motivated prejudice and that story too must be told.
Alagiah concludes: ‘It’s true that there is a strong and visceral strain of racism
amongst some Asians that is rarely, if ever, confronted with the same vigour that is re-
served for white racism.’
Anyone who advocates an open society should see every claim to superiority on the
part of one ethnic group over another as an unfounded tradition. Adherence to
shared norms always necessitates an investigation into the prejudices of our own com-
munities, without waiting to see whether others are prepared to do the same. We can-
not exempt our own group. The revolving door of self-righteousness results in an eter-
nal ‘after you’ in which the first step always has to be taken by somebody else.
The opposite of the self-examination we need is an uncritical embrace of what we
regard as our own communities, also known as ethnocentrism. The term was first
used by the American sociologist William Graham Sumner in his book Folkways
(), where he describes ethnocentrism as ‘this view of things in which one’s own
group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to
it… Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its
own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders.’ In the same context Sumner
introduces a distinction between ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’.
It’s possible to read his study as an early expression of cultural relativism: everyone
is simply aprisonerof thebeliefs andcustomsof his ownculture. Inotherwordsweare
all creatures of habit, and questions of good and evil aremeaningless when applied to
ourmoral standards, since the criteria by which we distinguish between the two lie in
those moral standards themselves: ‘Everything in the mores of a time and place must
be regarded as justified with regard to that time and place.’ For centuries Europeans
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regarded torture as a natural part of the judicial process, and in colonial NewEngland
countless witch trials were held. In his own time too, says Sumner – a time apparently
so critical of traditions – it’s almost impossible to hold a rational discussion on mat-
ters such as private property, parliamentary democracy or monogamous marriage.
Values are the driving force behind social selection. They determine what is normal
and what is abnormal, who is well-adjusted and who is not. This kind of selection is
ruthless. It’s all about who best conforms to the dominant values. So there’s little con-
nection between success and merit. Sumner has no illusions: ‘[Most people] are con-
servative. The great mass of any society lives a purely instinctive life just like ani-
mals.’ No attempt to enlighten the masses will ever come to anything. Whatever free-
dom may mean, no one can disregard the morals with which he grew up.
Lévi-Strauss interprets the inward-looking mentality in a similar way as a ‘normal,
even legitimate attitude, in any case inevitable’. He believes identification with spe-
cific norms and values within a group is required to make it partly or wholly impervi-
ous to other groups. This relative inability to communicate is the price that must be
paid to preserve a community’s values; cultural self-preservation is impossible with-
out ethnocentrism.
According to this anthropological approach, prejudice is unavoidable, and since
it’s a universal trait this goes for majorities as well as minorities. Yet the degree to
which groups and individuals have fixed opinions varies greatly. Some are more preju-
diced than others. In short we need more research into relationships between differ-
ent groups and into the character traits of individuals who are biased in their opin-
ions, to a greater or lesser degree. Both ways of looking at prejudice – we might call
them the sociological and the psychological approach – have proven their worth.
Sociologist Norbert Elias lays the emphasis on interaction between the established
and outsiders. In the s he compared two white working-class neighbourhoods in
a British city to see how they differed in their degree of prejudice. Ethnic factors were
not significant and neither were socio-economic differences. The only distinction be-
tween the two groups was that in one the residents had lived in the area for genera-
tions, whereas the neighbouring district was inhabited by people who had come to
live there relatively recently. ‘Without regard to this diachronic group dimension, the
rationale and meaning of the personal pronoun “we” which they used with reference
to each other cannot be understood.’
Differences in length of residence create power differentials: ‘Because they had
lived together for a fairly long time, the old families possessed as a group a cohesion
which the newcomers lacked… And this integration differential substantially con-
tributes to the former’s power surplus.’ Thinking in terms of power relations is im-
portant, because inequalities affect the images that groups have of each other and the
likelihood that those images will gain broader acceptance. Elias shows that the target

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 224
group has the tendency to adopt the very same prejudices: ‘These newcomers them-
selves, after a while, seemed to accept with a kind of puzzled resignation that they be-
longed to a group of lesser virtue and respectability, which in terms of their actual con-
duct was found to be justified only in the case of a small minority.’
It’s always disturbing when people accept the unjustified verdict that others pro-
nounce upon them, but Elias underestimates the importance of self-criticism within
groups, whether the established or outsiders. He tends to see the problematic behav-
iour of some in the outsider group purely as a reaction to the attitude of the estab-
lished: ‘How far the shame of outsiders produced by the inescapable stigmatisation of
an established group turns into paralysing apathy, how far into aggressive norm and
lawlessness, depends on the overall situation.’
Elias’ theory explains a great deal about the history of, for example, the Irish and
Germans in America, or Caribbean migrants in the Netherlands. Those communities
were indeed absorbed into society within a few generations. It’s surely relevant to note
that the former outsiders began to be regarded as belonging to the same group as the
established as soon as new outsiders arrived. With the arrival of the Italians and Poles,
earlier migrants suddenly became ‘old’ immigrants. The same can be said of post-
colonial migrants in the Netherlands, who were thought of as outsiders right up to the
point when guest workers and their families from Morocco and Turkey became a visi-
ble part of society.
Old distinctions can be driven out by new distinctions. Enzensberger sums up this
phenomenon in an image to which everyone can relate, that of a train compartment.
A person sitting alone in a carriage experiences the first person to come in as an in-
truder, making room for him with visible reluctance. When they are joined by a third
passenger at the next station, a degree of solidarity immediately develops between the
former opponents. Both scowl at the new outsider, whose arrival has disturbed the
balance. The initial opposition between established and outsider is swept away by the
fresh intruder. The pattern that emerges here applies on a far larger scale between eth-
nic groups. 
Earlier migrants often react with just as much hostility as the original inhabitants
to the arrival of newcomers. ‘Full means full’ is not a sentiment exclusive to the white
majority. The history of migration can be envisioned as a slowly expanding circle of
established residents, such that each new group gains a place within the image a socie-
ty has of itself. As we shall see, Catholic migrants were far from welcome in Protestant
America, and the same went for ethnic communities from eastern and southern Eu-
rope. A century later those religious and ethnic groups had been absorbed into a new
‘us’ that was less exclusive than before. The community of the established in America
and Europe is growing still.
Which is of course not to say that all prejudice vanishes into thin air as time goes by.
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Elias is being rather optimistic when he writes: ‘What one calls “race relations”, in oth-
er words, are simply established-outsider relationships of a particular type.’ There
are plenty of examples to the contrary. Anti-Semitism has turned out to be a persistent
phenomenon and the same is true, although in a different way, for problematic rela-
tionships between black and white in the Anglo-Saxon world. The idea that ethnic re-
lations are not much different from relations between the established and outsiders is
too limited.
The sociological way of addressing the issue is in need of further input from psy-
chology. Why does one person in a given group exhibit so much more prejudice than
another? There are two classic studies, both concentrating primarily on personality
traits: The Nature of Prejudice () by American social psychologist Gordon Allport,
and a study by German philosopher Theodor Adorno and his team that looks at the
authoritarian personality, called Studies in Prejudice (). Both were written at a
time when experiences with Nazism and Fascism were fresh in the memory. The fear
of a repeat of those horrors clearly shows through.
Allport examines at length the distinction between prejudice and rational verdicts
about groups. He writes that investigations into differences between groups must con-
tinue, because otherwise it will be hard to distinguish between justified and unjusti-
fied generalizations. Not every generalization is a prejudice. People need to categorize
things if they are to bring order to the chaos of everyday life. We often need to antici-
pate unprecedented circumstances, and since we can’t judge each and every case on its
own merits, we have to fall back on previous experience and the judgments we’ve
formed as a result. This is a normal way of proceeding, although of course it can easily
spill over into unjustified prejudice. There are real conflicts of interest too, which
must be distinguished from bias. When a strike is broken by low-paid immigrants, for
example, tensions and conflicts naturally arise, but these are not necessarily a matter
of bias, however readily prejudices may come to the fore at the same time.
Allport’s most important claim is that preconceptions often stem from personality
traits in those who pass judgment, rather than having very much to do with the char-
acteristics of the groups concerned. This is demonstrated clearly by the way negative
verdicts on different ethnic or racial groups often coincide. Generally speaking, a
white person who cannot abide Jews will not be particularly well-disposed towards
the black population. Blatantly contradictory views about specific population groups
are another sign of a prejudiced personality. Allport took note of the following conver-
sation: ‘Mr. A: I say the Jews are too much alone; they stick together, and are clannish.
Mr. B: But look; in our community there are Cohen and Morris on the Community
Chest, several Jews in the Rotary Club and Chamber of Commerce. Many support our
community projects... Mr. A: That’s just what I was saying, they’re always pushing and
elbowing their way into Christian groups.’
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Allport recognizes a type of personality that he calls prejudiced and contrasts it
with the more tolerant personality. Their cognitive processes differ markedly, he con-
tends. The prejudiced or authoritarian person, as Adorno describes this type, has a
tendency to see sharp dichotomies, to make few subtle distinctions and to have a rigid
approach to reality. Prejudices are functional. They help those with insecure personal-
ities to maintain a favourable self-image, and they help people to convert frustrations
about their own lives into aggression against other groups, whether in word or deed.
Allport believes insecurity is the key to understanding prejudice: ‘In order to avoid
hurt and achieve at least an island of security it is safer to exclude than to include.’
This is not merely a matter of upbringing, since insecurity may increase considerably
in times of great social change that affect a person’s social status.
Like Adorno, Allport also points to the role of religions. Rather reluctantly he con-
cludes that ‘individuals having no religious affiliation show on the average less preju-
dice than do church members’. The explanation for this, he says, lies partly in the
fact that religions absorb the cultural traditions of groups: ‘It is the prevalence of eth-
nocentric interpretations of religion that alienates many tolerant people from the
church.’ Much of today’s discussion about Muslim communities in the Western
world relates to this intermingling of their religion and the culture of their countries
of origin.
One of the more problematic conclusions of these studies aimed at finding psycho-
logical explanations is that as character traits prejudices are stubborn. Indeed they’re
so much part of a personality that relinquishing a prejudice would involve a profound
change to the whole ‘emotional economy’. This conclusion overlooks the fact that
prejudices are often born of conformism and not always particularly deeply rooted.
Developments in many countries since the s, America included, show at the very
least that a new conformism can arise, a new norm that, for example, condemns dis-
crimination against the black population, even if it remains true to say that old habits
die hard.
If we are to break the cycle of prejudice, then self-criticism is essential, not just
among the majority but among migrants and their children. Allport concludes that
‘ethnocentrism may be higher among minority groups than among the dominant ma-
jority’. This has indeed been confirmed by research on the black population in
America and the Turkish community in Germany. Like Elias, however, he regards
such prejudice as primarily a defensive attitude. The formation of clans is a result of
exclusion. He has little to say about bias in minority circles towards other minorities,
or about bias that cannot be attributed to hostility on the part of the majority.
With his study in hand we have to go a step further, since factors that contribute to
the formation of prejudice can often be found to an above average degree in migrant
communities. Ethnocentric traditions are often prevalent in their countries of origin,
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and this is compounded by the fact that their children are generally brought up with
greater respect for authority. The strong emphasis on family is accompanied by dis-
trust of society. Furthermore, the majority of migrants have had relatively little educa-
tion, which makes them more likely to exhibit prejudices. Add to this the insecurity
that inevitably results from migration and the stronger religious ties that go with it,
and all the ingredients for an ‘authoritarian’ personality come together. Although we
should not see the prejudices of the majority as cancelled out by those of minority
groups, it’s far too simple to regard the ‘my own people first’ of the minority purely as
a reaction to the ‘my own people first’ of the majority.
How are we to respond to all this? In many European countries there’s a growing
rift between members of elites, who increasingly regard themselves as world citizens
with a vested interest in a transnational society, and people who lead lives far more
firmly tied to a specific place. There are many indications that in a society which em-
phasizes ethnic differences, majorities too may start to see themselves as ethnic
groups. Surely white is a colour? Such declarations of loyalty present a real danger at a
time when everyone is in search of an identity of his or her own. We have to break the
vicious circle of prejudice. The first step is to salvage the ability to reach critical judg-
ments about our own traditions.
    
We need to move beyond criticism of the colonial worldview and set off in search of a
contemporary cosmopolitanism. Relativism must be given a place, but it should never
be allowed the final say. Universalism is essential, since it holds open the possibility of
reaching a critical verdict on norms that are generally accepted within a specific com-
munity. We have to resist the temptation to embrace traditions uncritically, but at the
same time we must reject any concept of world citizenship that fails to relate to a com-
munity for which a person can feel responsible. It’s proving increasingly difficult to
reconcile a cultural heritage with openness to the world, two things that seem to be
drifting apart in the richer nations.
Our world is becoming both larger and smaller, bringing people closer together
and pushing them further apart. The astonishing mobility of capital, information,
goods and people is making societies not only more involved with each other but
more permeated by each other. At the same time the aversion to integration and cul-
tural mixing is increasing and people are withdrawing into their shells. World citizen-
ship is a remote prospect for most. The central question here is what a contemporary
cosmopolitanism ought to look like.
Polish-Canadian writer Eva Hoffman emphasizes the fact that the conditions for
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world citizenship have changed: ‘Whereas cosmopolitanism used to defend itself
against the narrow-mindedness of provincialism and nationalism, nowadays we are
trying to use it as an antidote to the superficiality of globalism and life as social no-
mads.’ She sees a ‘new betrayal’ by intellectuals in ‘the denial of the desire for mean-
ingful attachment’.Which returns us to the question: What form should an open so-
ciety take in a borderless world?
There’s a great deal to be said for the attempts that have been made in our own time
to expand the community with which a given individual can identify – just as long as
it’s a matter of deepening responsibility, rather than a flight from obligation of the
kind that’s all too much in evidence everywhere. The current blurring of borders pres-
ents more opportunities for self-interest than for serving the needs of communities.
The notion of world citizenship may help to expedite enlightened ways of living to-
gether, but it has its dark side. French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau knew this:
‘Distrust those cosmopolitans who go to great lengths in their books to discover duties
that at home they regard as beneath them. Such philosophers love the Tartars to avoid
having to love their neighbours.’
A useful observation, particularly now. Many people are trying out a comfortable
identity as citizens of a global village in the making without asking themselves
whether the pursuit of a world without borders is not all too often a way of ignoring
those close to them. The festive embrace of the global village is offset by urgent ques-
tions about the conditions for citizenship of a city and a state. In defiance of a readily
professed openness towards the world, our heritage retains its significance.
In his autobiography, Austrian writer Stefan Zweig presents a wry exploration of
the illusions surrounding the concept of the world citizen. He tells of how he was ex-
iled. After a long wait on the ‘petitioners’ bench’ it dawns on him exactly what the dif-
ference is between having the right to a passport and being granted a residence permit.
‘Often in my cosmopolitan reveries I had imagined how beautiful it would be, how
truly in accord with my innermost thoughts, to be stateless, obligated to no one coun-
try and for that reason undifferentiatedly attached to all.’ Now he knows better and
speaks of ‘that terrible state of homelessness’.Elsewhere he writes that emigration
‘disturbs the equilibrium’. His book could be read as an account of the disenchant-
ment of a world citizen as he slowly discovers the unspoken conditions of his mobility
at a time when being uprooted is no longer the result of a free choice but is brought
about by force of circumstance. His life story invites a study into the often misunder-
stood notion of world citizenship.
We come upon a similar grappling with cosmopolitanism in the work of French
philosopher Alain Finkielkraut. At first the targets of his indictment were those who
glorify what is theirs at the expense of the things we hold in common. He clearly opted
for a form of universalism. In his recent books, however, he explains the risks of exact-
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ly that option: faith in humanity turns out to be as easily abused as the cherishing of a
birthplace. He now refuses to choose between the resulting alternatives: ‘Detachment
or attachment. Openness or heritage. Tolerance or loyalty.’
By combining the two rather than opting for one or the other we can avoid an im-
passe. We should value the crossing of frontiers in the knowledge that borders are an
inalienable part of our lived reality. We need to contemplate cultural differences in-
stead of denying they exist. People are not prisoners of their origins, but each individ-
ual existence has to be embedded in something. It’s a matter of seeing a heritage not as
prescriptive but as a prerequisite for independent action. Freedom, after all, needs a
context.
A true cosmopolitan tries to embrace that tension between the local and the univer-
sal. This is surely rather different from believing in a worldwide market of ideas, each
of which can be appropriated or rejected at will. How can we envision and revise our
own cultures in the light of those of others? When we try to make comparisons we find
ourselves forced to lower our sights. It’s not easy to find a way into a foreign culture,
even that of a neighbouring country. Anyone who tries to fathom the often implicit
references in a novel originally written in another language immediately runs into dif-
ficulties. The reader is required to transpose himself or herself, and that requires ef-
fort. As TS Eliot rightly observed: ‘Though it is only too easy for a writer to be local
without being universal, I doubt whether a poet or novelist can be universal without
being local too.’
Surely the attitude that many adopt is a strange one. They claim to be greatly inter-
ested in other cultures and regard the rejection or brushing aside of their own culture
as a gesture that underlines that interest. But only those who are conversant with their
own cultural traditions can move beyond them; only those who understand that
boundaries exist can overstep them. In the end we learn by comparison. We get to
know ourselves better by examining that which is foreign. Detachment and attach-
ment, heritage and openness, loyalty and tolerance: these attitudes belong together
and if they’re decoupled a precarious balance is upset.
Finkielkraut describes his own stance: ‘The cosmopolitan is distinguished by the
fact that he does not regard it as dreadful but as salutary to be put to the test by the oth-
er, the stranger: the other, that which he is not, over whom he has no hold.’ Were all
borders truly dissolved, there would be no outside world any longer. He therefore pass-
es stern judgment on self-declared citizens of the world: ‘They couple the tribal prac-
tices of introverted groups with the moral condemnation of their own hearth and
home… A person without a navel is a person who advocates unbounded human
rights, but an abominable citizen.’
The weakness of cosmopolitanism lies in the fact that the ambitious ‘everyone is in
principle responsible for everything’ can easily degenerate in practice into ‘nobody is
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any longer responsible for anything’. This was tragically illustrated by the peacekeep-
ing operations in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Where no direct security interests are in-
volved, it’s easy to look the other way. Even the aim of making the international com-
munity live up to a collective responsibility to prevent genocide – surely a moral mini-
mum – seems extraordinarily difficult to realize.
We are looking for words that bridge the gap between the local and the universal,
for a world citizenship that connects with its own lived environment. Philosopher
Kwame Anthony Appiah tells of a life lesson he received from his father, who was born
in Ghana: ‘“Remember that you are citizens of the world.” He told us that wherever
we chose to live we should endeavour to leave that place “better than you found it”.’
His father thereby made clear that even those who settle somewhere temporarily can
leave something permanent behind, or rather, ought to want to leave something per-
manent behind. He describes this idea as ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’.
The concept of the world citizen is in the first instance a European legacy, but the
source of humanist ideals need not discredit them in the eyes of non-Europeans.
When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drawn up it was deliberately
not given a philosophical basis. It may have been conceived according to the European
tradition of individual rights, but no cultural grouping can repudiate its norms. They
are applicable to all countries, including those in which they were originally formulat-
ed. One example here is of course decolonization. The revolt against the colonial pow-
ers was led by elites educated in the West, who used the modern vocabulary of self-de-
termination and human rights. There is no escaping the paradox: resistance to Euro-
pean colonizers took place in the name of ideals that originated in Europe.
We must learn to distinguish between the origin and the spread of ideas. Just as the
classics in music, architecture and literature are appreciated far from their countries
of origin, so the democratic revolutions of America and France can be seen as a univer-
sal heritage that has broken free of its sources. Singaporean diplomat and scholar
Kishore Mahbubani writes: ‘For  years the West has been the only civilization car-
rying the burden of advancing human knowledge and wealth. Today, it can share this
responsibility.’ And he adds: ‘It should also celebrate the clear spread of Western val-
ues in the rise of Asia.’ The applicability of human rights is not limited by their Euro-
pean background. Whatever we may say about Asian values – with their emphasis on
collective duties rather than individual entitlements – there is no real alternative to the
code of human rights. 
British author Timothy Garton Ash advocates a transition from the idea of the
West as the embodiment of ‘the free world’ to that of ‘a free world’ that covers far more
regions of the globe. He sees it as an historical opportunity: ‘Isn’t it better to accept
that the West, in going so far beyond its historic self, also ceases in some important
sense to be the West?’ This is an important question now that democracy has spread
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so far across the globe. We can join Garton Ash in talking of the ‘post-West’, just as
long as we realize that there are as yet few institutions that can give any real substance
to this commonality of interests among the world’s democracies.
The rights of man are essential to any society, but they do not encompass culture in
a general sense. For that reason we should never speak of a hierarchy of cultures. What
is the point in comparing Spanish and Turkish literature in such a way, or Western and
Asian architecture? Within Western culture too, questions of this type are nonsensical:
Is Schopenhauer a better philosopher than Socrates? Should we see Stravinsky as supe-
rior to Schubert? What could statements of this kind mean? There are many domains
of social life where questions about progress or hierarchy are meaningless. It therefore
means little to say that Islamic culture is backward.
There is only one way to prevent criticism of ethnocentrism – which elevates specif-
ic traditions to the status of universal truths – from degenerating into a cultural rela-
tivism that rejects universality in the name of particular preferences. Anyone choos-
ing to defend a civilizing mission is himself part of that mission; norms held up as an
example to the world will inevitably backfire at some point on those who disseminate
them. The civilizer must become civilized – that duty is unavoidable if we want to con-
tinue to defend universalism. It’s unhelpful to speak of the superiority of Western civi-
lization, since an open society relies on a capacity for critical self-assessment.
What we are eager to defend must be understood as a history of trial and error. Any-
one hoping to impress upon others the importance of equal rights for men and
women will do well to realize first of all that these are norms that came into being only
after considerable resistance had been overcome. Precisely because they are such re-
cent achievements, they must be protected against the hostility of those who wish to
undo them.
No regime can any longer entrench itself behind its own borders. Even the most au-
thoritarian governments feel forced to justify themselves on the basis of generally ac-
cepted norms, whether or not they repeatedly violate them. The effects of worldwide
openness undoubtedly contribute to this. We live in what has been called an ‘emotion-
al democracy’. The decline of indifference towards injustice wherever it occurs in the
world can certainly be seen as moral progress. Aloofness is increasingly difficult to sus-
tain. 
Nevertheless, the colonial past casts its shadow across every intervention. In our
own day some speak with enthusiasm of ‘democratic imperialism’, which they say
should be the guiding principle for activist politics around the world. It stands in con-
trast to the ‘multicultural aloofness’ that draws a quite different conclusion, namely
that because of the abuses of the colonial period, Western values have largely lost their
appeal. Whatever we may conclude about European domination, it’s clear that the at-
titude we adopt towards the colonial period is of great significance for the way we act
today.
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The imperialism that regarded the dissemination of its own civilization as a mis-
sion violently broke through the walls of other cultures and brought them into con-
tact with each other without their consent. This combination of power and principle
has produced a guilty conscience, which reveals itself in the notion that it’s impossible
to pass judgment across cultural boundaries. An attitude of this kind means opting
for detachment: Who are we to judge, let alone interfere? Samuel Huntington has
been wrongly criticized for deriving an American imperialism from the ‘clash of civi-
lizations’. In fact he does the opposite. He rejects the claim that Western countries
have a right to intervene outside their own cultural realms. He sees his clashing civi-
lizations in the light of cultural relativism and his analysis amounts to an invitation to
stand aloof from interaction between civilizations. Further clashes are exactly what he
wishes to avoid. 
Universalism and aloofness do not go together. This conclusion is far from innocu-
ous. Many see the new interventionism – in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq for example
– as a continuation of the old colonialism by new means. People have quite rightly
asked whether such a thing as ‘democratic imperialism’ is possible, or whether the use
of force inevitably corrupts all moral intentions. A heedless rush to defend human
rights everywhere can easily lead to a deepening of the gulf between ‘the West and the
Rest’.
Even those who advocate greater involvement in human rights issues elsewhere
may well question the notion of humanitarian intervention, which ultimately
amounts to warfare. Is the militarization of morality sensible, or is it a way of continu-
ing colonial history by other means, with all the profound contradictions that in-
volves? The idea that humanity must be placed above sovereignty – which is to say that
third parties can intervene in a country in the name of human rights – has problemat-
ic consequences to say the least. Canadian essayist Michael Ignatieff puts it like this:
‘Human rights is increasingly seen as the language of a moral imperialism just as ruth-
less and just as self-deceived as the colonial hubris of yesteryear.’
What remains is the conclusion that universally valid norms must be defended in
our own countries and abroad. This will be possible only once universalism has ab-
sorbed the experience of colonialism and digested it. All pertinent questions thrown
up by cultural relativism should be taken into account, but to relinquish democratic
impatience would be to betray the open society as an ideal. It would surely not be cred-
ible to swear loyalty to our own democracies and exhibit indifference to democracy
elsewhere in the world. This universalism creates obligations. Plainly Western coun-
tries cannot withdraw from the modern world order, which they have created, when-
ever it suits them. There is no longer any way out of the colonial trap.
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The rediscovery of America
The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 235
The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 236
 ’ 
America is regarded as an exception by the rest of the world and it sees itself as a coun-
try with a unique destiny. Central to this self-image is the idea that ever since inde-
pendence it has been a ‘nation of immigrants’. Every American has a story of depar-
ture and arrival somewhere in his or her family history. The United States is both the
most powerful country of our day and the most cosmopolitan, drawing people from
all points of the compass. This melting pot of migrants has increasingly come to repre-
sent all the peoples of the world, and it has acquired a global scope.
The image of a ‘nation of immigrants’ is often held up as a reproach to Europe, a
continent bound by its own traditions. Whereas Americans can look back on a proud
history of accommodating immigrants, Europeans have proven incapable of success-
fully integrating those who have arrived since the Second World War. Not wanting to
acknowledge that their countries too are gradually becoming nations of immigrants,
they refuse to absorb the lessons of American history.
This reproach is hard to ignore, if only because we hear it so often. The most obvi-
ous answer, and the least interesting, is that Europe is a collection of nation states with
many centuries of history behind them and therefore cannot be compared with Amer-
ica. Immigration into Europe took off only after nation building had reached an ad-
vanced stage, whereas on the other side of the ocean the arrival of migrants was woven
into the story Americans told about themselves. The contrast is undeniable and its im-
pact on attitudes towards immigration impossible to ignore.
It’s far more interesting, however, to take the comparison seriously and to look in
more detail at the American experience. It soon becomes clear that the self-image of a
‘nation of immigrants’ masks several of the country’s essential characteristics. These
have to do with aspects of American history that may contain valuable lessons for Eu-
ropean countries. Experiences on the two continents have a great deal more in com-
mon than is often supposed. Conflicts surrounding immigration in contemporary
Europe resemble the opposition frequently faced by newcomers to the United States.
What does it actually mean to say that America regards itself as ‘a nation of immi-
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grants’? The focus of attention is usually the enormous diversity of its migrant popu-
lations, but what is the ‘nation’ that holds all this diversity together? For an answer we
need to look back to the origins of the United States. American history begins not with
immigration but with colonization, which is a different thing altogether, not only in
that it involved the displacement and annihilation of the indigenous inhabitants, the
‘Indians’, but because there is a considerable difference between colonists and immi-
grants. Huntington stresses the distinction: ‘Settlers leave an existing society, usually
in a group, in order to create a new community… They are imbued with a sense of col-
lective purpose.’ Immigrants do not create a new society: ‘Migration is usually a per-
sonal process, involving individuals and families, who individually define their rela-
tion to their old and new countries.’ Whereas colonists create a society of their own,
immigrants become part of an existing society.
In , the year of the Declaration of Independence, around four million people
lived in America, , of them slaves. Eighty per cent of the white population was
British, the remainder overwhelmingly German or Dutch. At the time of the first fed-
eral census in  around ,Americans had Dutch roots, the majority of them
residents of New York (formerly New Amsterdam). The number of today’s Americans
who have Dutch ancestry has been estimated at about four million. Research shows
that around  per cent of contemporary Americans are descendants of the original
colonial population, including the slaves, while the other half has its origins in later
immigration. The description of America as a ‘nation of immigrants’ is therefore liter-
ally half true. Moreover, between  and  the proportion of the population
born abroad was never more than  per cent, except for the years between  and
, when the proportion of migrants reached - per cent, which is comparable to
present-day figures.
‘Before immigrants could come to America, settlers had to found America,’ Hunt-
ington concludes. The society the immigrants encountered had a number of well-de-
fined characteristics. The original population was almost exclusively Protestant, the
main exception being the colony of Maryland where many Catholics lived. Intense re-
ligious feeling set the tone. Early Americans can be described as dissidents within
Protestantism, which was itself a form of dissidence. Those who came to America had
often belonged to persecuted minorities in their own countries. Its religious heritage
helped to shape America’s democratic ideals. Individualism, moral fervour and oppo-
sition to hierarchy made the country what it is today.
Out of that culture and out of the Enlightenment, America developed a creed in
which the main emphasis lay on the fundamental equality of all men and on individ-
ual liberty. Religious tolerance was hard to achieve in a country with conflicting reli-
gious passions, but nevertheless it was an essential feature of the new republic. The
separation of church and state did not mean the marginalization of religion, rather it
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was a way of guaranteeing freedom of worship. America has always had a mainly
Christian population and a secular government. Even before Independence, Voltaire
and other Enlightenment thinkers wrote in praise of religious freedom in Pennsylva-
nia, for instance, although in the colony of New Amsterdam there was rather less free-
dom of worship. Peter Stuyvesant, governor from  to , refused to allow the
Lutherans to found a church of their own and placed restrictions on the activities of
Quaker missionaries. He also limited the rights of Jews. Only under pressure from the
West India Company – which had several major Jewish investors and advocated toler-
ance for commercial reasons – was this stance moderated. 
The separation of church and state was an important achievement of the  con-
stitution, which avoided any reference to a higher power. Thomas Jefferson said that a
‘wall of separation’ must be built between church and state. The first article of the 
Bill of Rights states that America will have no established religion, while article six of
the  Constitution makes clear that no religious test will ever be required of anyone
wishing to hold public office. The latter provision was heavily criticized in some quar-
ters, but it remained unaltered.
The idea of a land without precedent was set down in Letters from an American
Farmerby John de Crèvecoeur, an immigrant from France, written shortly after Amer-
ica became independent. ‘Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of
men, whose labors and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world.’ (The
term race was then used mainly to indicate a people or a nation.) Truly prophetic
words, at least as far as the influence of America in the world is concerned, but we may
well ask whether reality has lived up to that faith in a new kind of human being.
The situation at the end of the eighteenth century did not match De Crèvecoeur’s
hopes. Nation building was a slow process in America, in fact it was only really in the
second half of the nineteenth century, in other words after the Civil War, that a true
sense of being one nation developed. The opening up of the country by means of the
railroad was crucial in this respect, although the impact of the telegraph should not be
underestimated. Because of America’s sheer size, which makes it more a continent
than a nation, local and regional identities were still strong a century after independ-
ence. Only when communications improved could a real national identity emerge. As
poet James Russell Lowell observed in the aftermath of the Civil War: ‘It is no trifling
matter that thirty millions of men should be thinking the same thought and feeling
the same pang at a single moment of time, and that these vast parallels of latitude
should become a neighbourhood more intimate than many a country village.’
The expansion westwards was particularly conducive to integration. American his-
torian Frederic Jackson Turner emphasized this point: ‘In the crucible of the frontier
the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and fused into a mixed race.’The great
mobility of Americans helped mould them into a single nation. Even today their ten-
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dency to move within their own country exceeds that of the population of any coun-
try in Europe, let alone mobility across European borders. The new states out west
promoted national unity in another way too. They had not existed as independent en-
tities before independence but were called into being by the new America, so their
identification with the nation as a whole was stronger than that of some of the existing
states, which focused on their own independence. The arrival of increasing numbers
of migrants from countries other than Britain further weakened ties to the old coun-
try and made it easier to create an American self-consciousness.
The extent to which America defined itself in opposition to Europe at an early stage
is striking; the terms New World and Old World speak volumes. The ideal of equality,
with the great opportunities it presented to immigrants, was seen as a huge improve-
ment on attitudes in the class-ridden societies of Europe. The promise that anyone
with sufficient determination could build a better life encouraged newcomers to iden-
tify with America. Historian Merle Curti writes that even during the eighteenth centu-
ry ‘the belief in the degradation of the Old World and the mounting fame of America
had become widespread’. Europe stood for absolutism and doctrinal dogmatism,
whereas America wanted to serve the democratic ideal. It became a refuge for all the
persecuted of the earth. Its mission to embody a new world is essential to any under-
standing of America, especially as a ‘nation of immigrants’. It was a broadly propagat-
ed mission which, for all its problematic aspects, helped to hold all that ethnic diversi-
ty together.
It’s no coincidence that America’s openness to immigrants increased in periods
when it was intensively involved with the rest of the world and decreased in times of
isolationism. The idea that America could reshape the world in its own image went
hand in hand with a confidence that immigrants would be assimilated. ‘We are the Ro-
mans of the modern world – the great assimilating people,’ wrote Oliver Wendell
Holmes. By contrast there were periods, between the wars for instance, when Ameri-
ca held aloof as far as possible from the rest of the world and immigration was kept to
a minimum.
Involvement in two world wars contributed enormously to the integration of mi-
grant groups. There were many conflicts of loyalty, one example being the crisis expe-
rienced by the German community in America during the ’-’ war, which we will
look at later. Another concerns the Japanese community during the Second World
War. The fate of the Japanese who were living in the United States in those years has
rightly been described as one of the low points of recent American history. After the at-
tack on the  fleet in Pearl Harbor, many were picked up and interned. Despite such
excesses it was that war more than anything else that brought the country together.
Few people realize that hundreds of thousands of American troops of German extrac-
tion and a large number of Italian-American soldiers fought in Western Europe. How-
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ever seriously their loyalty may have been questioned before the war, little remained of
that distrust by the time it ended.
For the black community too, both world wars represented great strides towards
emancipation. Initially many regiments were still segregated, but even so, the sight of
black Americans bearing arms was a slap in the face to those who persisted in seeing
them as second-class citizens. Precisely because the struggle against Nazism and Fas-
cism was motivated by a rejection of racist thinking, the gap between America’s civi-
lizing ideals and everyday practice became increasingly obvious. Racial segregation in
the South could no longer be justified. The campaign for civil rights for the black pop-
ulation was given a huge boost by the war.
Irrespective of the internal tensions created by America’s involvement in a range of
conflicts elsewhere, generally speaking its world role increased the tendency of its citi-
zens to identify with their country, which seemed to have a special mission. The na-
tional pride forged by those interventions is undeniable, and worldwide opinion polls
consistently place Americans at the top on a scale of patriotic sentiments. The power-
ful emotions aroused by the attacks of  September  illustrated the country’s faith
in itself, and the destruction of the World Trade Center claimed the lives of people
with extremely diverse backgrounds. The building was a symbol not just of the capital-
ism so hated by some but of an unparalleled ethnic diversity.
The notion of America as embodying the entire world is an inspiration to many mi-
grants. One telling example is that of General John Abizaid, who at the turn of this cen-
tury was the highest ranking American soldier at Central Command, which covers the
Middle East. The son of a Christian Lebanese-American father, he speaks fluent Ara-
bic, attended a university in Jordan and specialized in the Middle East when he contin-
ued his studies at Harvard. Careers like his exemplify America’s status as a world pow-
er, and the role migrants and their children can play in it.
The self-image of America as the world in a nutshell, as a country without prece-
dent, as the one and only ‘nation of immigrants’ makes it hard to distinguish self-in-
terest from principle in its foreign policy. A display of power that cloaks itself in mor-
alizing rhetoric provokes fierce reactions from the rest of the world, but in presiden-
tial speeches we can still recognize the America that aspires to be a beacon, however
unpopular and thankless a task that may be. ‘At some point we may be the only ones
left,’ said Bush Jr shortly after /. ‘That’s okay withme.We areAmerica.’ Indeed, the
words of Oliver Wendell Holmes still ring true a hundred years later: America is the
new Rome. In our day too it’s a country with an almost irresistible power of attrac-
tion.
Nevertheless the place of America will change over coming decades. In The White
Tiger, Indian novelist Aravind Adiga describes the rise of an entrepreneur in Banga-
lore. The novel takes the form of an open letter to Chinese premier Wen Jiabao. In the

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 241
margins of his story we read: ‘White men will be finished within my lifetime. There are
blacks and reds too, but I have no idea what they are up to – the radio never talks about
them. My humble prediction: in twenty years’ time, it will be just us yellow men and
brown men at the top of the pyramid, and we’ll rule the whole world. And God save
everyone else.’
This might stand as a witty summary of the content of a good many academic
bookshelves. We continually hear predictions that the centre of gravity of the world
economy is slowly but surely shifting eastwards. The combination of irresponsible
borrowing and two vastly expensive wars have undermined America’s position in the
world. Mahbubani has accentuated the point: ‘It is futile for the  percent of the
world’s population who live in the West to imagine that they can determine the des-
tinies of the remaining  percent, many of whom feel newly energized and empow-
ered.’ The question for America is how to deal with this relative loss of power.
   
The melting pot has become the most enduring image of the great experiment that
America undeniably represents. As early as , Ralph Waldo Emerson spoke of the
desire to ‘construct a new race, a new religion, a new state, a new literature, which will
be as vigorous as the new Europe which came out of the smelting-pot of the Dark
Ages.’ This is a notion reflected in America’s motto, E pluribus unum, out of many
one, a unity born out of a multiplicity. By multiplicity, of course, the founders prima-
rily meant the thirteen colonies that formed the United States, but later the phrase ac-
quired the additional meaning of a ‘nation of immigrants’.
The notion of unity in diversity contains an irresolvable tension that is the source
of America’s dynamism. One moment the emphasis is on unity, the next on diversity.
Both can be interpreted according to the thinking of either the Enlightenment or Ro-
manticism. Unity can be seen either as a democratic ideal of mixing and blending or
as an organic national character that excludes certain groups from the start. The same
goes for diversity. It can be seen either as the kind of pluralism that should be part of
any open society or as a collection of groups that exist side by side and put their own
ethnic origins first.
The melting pot idea is the interpretation closest to Enlightenment thinking, since
it regards America as a blend of old cultures that are the raw material for a new culture.
It was the British playwright Israel Zangwill who in , in his play The Melting Pot,
conveyed this metaphor to a broad audience – meeting with great enthusiasm, inci-
dentally, from the then  president, Theodore Roosevelt, who attended the opening
night. The play itself, the slightly saccharine story of a Jewish boy and a Christian girl
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who fall in love, is not an outstanding artistic achievement, it’s too didactic for that,
but it did turn out to be an extremely effective way of making a point.
The melting pot has become part of the image Americans have of their country. In
the Ford factories of the s it even became the basis for an elaborate public ritual.
On the stage stood an enormous cauldron with the words Ford English School Melt-
ing Pot emblazoned on it. At the back of the stage was a cardboard steamship out of
which came the immigrants, holding signs that indicated their countries of origin.
Then the factory’s English teachers approached, holding enormous spoons and call-
ing out ‘stir, stir’. On cue the scruffy immigrants of a moment ago came walking out of
the melting pot as neatly dressed Americans, holding the stars and stripes.
The period - can be seen as the high tide of assimilation, and although on
closer examination that century can be broken down into periods with contrasting cli-
mates of opinion, the fundamental tone was that of a conscious effort to absorb new-
comers into their new country. In the early years of the twentieth century a large popu-
lar movement grew up in support of the ‘Americanization’ of immigrants. Some have
seen this as cultural conformism, while others would say that successful immigration
depends upon pressure to assimilate. Historian John Higham emphasizes the move-
ment’s dual nature: it involved both an explicit desire for social reform and nervous-
ness about a lack of loyalty among newcomers. In theory these democratic and nation-
alistic impulses clash, but in practice they often turned out to reinforce one another.
The initial impetus towards a deliberate integration of newcomers came from so-
cial reformers. At first they had not been particularly concerned about the fate of im-
migrants. ‘The progressives of the early twentieth century were unafraid, but in gener-
al they were also indifferent and aloof,’ Higham writes. This soon changed. The dis-
covery that a growing number of migrants were illiterate led to the founding of night
schools offering lessons in the English language. The first of these opened in  in
New York, in  in Chicago and in  in Detroit. In that same period the first re-
search was carried out into the deplorable living conditions endured by immigrants
in New York and in  former president Roosevelt denounced ‘the fatal policy of in-
difference and neglect which has left our enormous immigrant population to become
the prey of chance and cupidity’.
This increasing sense of urgency gave rise to the North American Civic League for
Immigrants, an organization founded in  that is generally seen as the start of the
popular movement for the Americanization of migrants. We should take a close look
at this movement, since it gained a good deal of experience that is of particular rele-
vance to all those in European countries that are now urging the integration of new-
comers. The history of the League sheds a great deal of light on both the productive
and the problematic aspects of this democratic impatience.
The movement for Americanization was fuelled first of all by unease about the vul-
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nerable position of immigrants, people unable to take a full part in society because of
their inadequate command of the language. They were victims of much exploitation
and abuse. Frances Kellor, a key figure in the movement, said that in retrospect a lack
of protection by the federal government had forced migrants back into their own cir-
cles and made them dependent on what she described as ‘racial solidarity’. The re-
sult was a society in which the established population and newcomers had hardly any
contact with each other: ‘America is a country which is just awakening to the fact that
it is not a nationality but a mixture of nationalities.’
From the start, the League was a coalition of social reformers, teachers, concerned
intellectuals and representatives of the business sector. This last group regarded the
rapid assimilation of immigrants as a convenient way of disciplining the workforce.
Businessmen like Henry Ford were at the forefront; English became the compulsory
language of Ford’s employees. There was all the more call for such rules when strikes
and unrest broke out in -. The chairman of the League concluded that ‘none of
these incendiary movements would have the sinister form which makes them danger-
ous, had it not been for the mishandled non-English-speaking population’.After the
Russian Revolution in particular, the fear of the red peril grew.
The movement strove for a rapid identification with the principles and institutions
of American society (assimilation), for the learning of the language (education), for
resistance to the concentration of migrant groups in poor urban districts (distribu-
tion), for a rapid decision to acquire American nationality and education that would
prepare people for citizenship (naturalization) and for improvements to immigrants’
living and working conditions (protection). It was truly an ambitious undertaking,
which received a powerful stimulus from the growing threat of war and developed
into a crusade that could boast strong approval among the population at large.
When the First World War broke out there was increasing emphasis on national
unity. Kellor was aware of the danger that national conflicts in Europe would spark vi-
olence between migrant groups in America: ‘Isolated as we are from the foreign born
groups we are likely to assume that they, like ourselves, are immune from foreign influ-
ences.’ How could Americans prevent Germans, Hungarians, Austrians, Turks and
Bulgarians, all of whom were at war with the Allied forces, from laying claim to the loy-
alty of their compatriots in America?
Americanization steadily became an integral part of the war effort, placed at the
service of plans for general mobilization. In , Independence Day, the Fourth of
July, was turned into an Americanization Day under the slogan ‘Many Peoples, But
One Nation’. A year later that motto was changed, significantly, to ‘America First’. The
war in which America was now becoming involved called for undivided loyalty. The
movement leading the way named itself One Hundred Per Cent Americanism, with
all the intolerance inevitably attached to such a high dose of patriotism.
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There were plenty of attempts at coercion. Some states demanded that all school-
teachers should be American citizens; other states forbad education in any language
but English. A bill was introduced into Congress that would have provided for the de-
portation of immigrants who failed to declare within three months that they wanted
to become American citizens. Many such resolutions were quashed by judges or
blocked by the House of Representatives, but they demonstrate the risks of the cam-
paign for Americanization. Despite all this, Higham, who describes the lapses in de-
tail, concludes that the movement was ultimately based more than anything else on an
invitation to the immigrant: ‘It turned part of the new fears of foreign influence which
came out of the war into a positive program of emancipation rather than a wholly neg-
ative one of exclusion.’
French sociologist Denis Lacorne is of the opinion that what began as an opportu-
nity quickly became an obligation: ‘Assimilation was no longer a choice freely made,
an attractive hybridity or a love story, as Zangwill imagined it, but a conformism bru-
tally imposed by those who believed they possessed the truth about America. Ameri-
canization “to the full hundred per cent” broke through the boundaries of private life
in the name of an Anglo-Saxon concept of efficiency in the workplace, moral recti-
tude and modernity.’ Seen in this light, Americanization has a great deal in common
with the civilizing offensive undertaken in so many European countries in the early
twentieth century. Ideas about the education of the masses went hand in hand with
pressure to conform, which did not stop at the front door. In the European ‘offensive’
too, social engagement and fear of conflict reinforced one another.
Frances Kellor’s approach unites these two motives; social welfare and national dis-
cipline are inseparable in her thinking on integration. She consistently advocates as-
similation, but she develops the idea with far more subtlety than her later critics
would have us believe. What are the underlying principles of the citizenship of new-
comers? She names recognition, reciprocity and participation in that order. Preju-
dices entertained by the established population have stood in the way of a due recogni-
tion of migrants and their role in American society. Racial barriers must be removed
and economic life is the place to start, but this is not the full story, since the immigrant
has paid too little attention to the achievements of American society: ‘He has come to
know the dollar far better than he has the man.’ In many cases the migrant has been
heard to express superficial criticism of a society he did not help to build and therefore
cannot fully fathom: ‘He has often mistaken liberty for license and duties for privil -
eges.’
Reciprocity imposes a duty on the established population as well, since everyone
must aspire to live up to the same norms. Take the example of the chairman of the
largest trades union, Sam Gompers, who wrote in a letter to the League that if workers
at the United States Steel Company were expected to embrace American ideals, then
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factory managers must at least make an effort to comply with those ideals in their deal-
ings with workers. Kellor writes that this demand lies at the heart of all integration: the
norms that are held up before newcomers will make no impression on them unless
they are taken seriously by the country’s longstanding inhabitants.
Regardless of any moral verdict on the desirability of assimilation, it’s useful to ask
whether the melting pot image accurately describes America’s historical develop-
ment. In the early s, in their classic Beyond the Melting Pot (), sociologists
Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Nathan Glazer drew an unambiguous conclusion, dryly
remarking that ‘the point about the melting pot is that it did not happen’. Migrant
groups with diverse backgrounds were not absorbed into a greater whole. They re-
mained clearly distinguishable. In the s ethnicity was still of enormous impor-
tance to large migrant communities like those of the Italians, Irish, Puerto Ricans and
Jews of New York.
Yet ethnicity is not what we often imagine it to be, namely a residue of old tradi-
tions and customs that have proven hard to let go. Rather, ethnic groups are a new so-
cial fact. Moynihan and Glazer write: ‘Ethnic groups then, even after distinctive lan-
guage, customs, and cultures are lost, as they largely were in the second generation,
and even more fully in the third generation, are continually recreated by new experi-
ences in America… A man is connected to his group by ties of family and friendship.
But he is also connected by ties of interest. The ethnic groups in New York are also in-
terest groups.’
Moreover, although it is true that after a while the nationalist dimension of ethnici-
ty fades, this is far less true of the religious dimension: ‘Religious identities are strong-
ly held by New Yorkers, and Americans generally, and they are for the most part trans-
mitted by blood line from the original immigrant group.’ This explains why despite
the fact that intermarriage between national groups increased as time went, there
were far fewer marriages between different religious groups. Catholic, Protestant and
Jewish melting pots developed. The arrival of Muslims may well create a fourth melt-
ing pot.
Since Moynihan and Glazer published their book, time has not stood still, and cer-
tainly as far as Americans with European backgrounds are concerned there are in-
creasing signs of fusion. According to the most recent census figures available (),
more and more people do not identify with any specific ethnic community but simply
call themselves Americans. Among the descendants of nineteenth-century immi-
grants from Europe, bonds with the countries of origin can be said to have steadily
weakened. We might even conclude that America is as yet the only place where Euro-
pean integration has been truly successful.
Historians Leonard Dinnerstein and David Reimers think that, on the whole, as-
similation still works. They claim that those who advocate the preservation of a way of
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life orientated towards their countries of origin cannot offer nearly enough to keep
their children away from mainstream American society. Youth culture alone is far too
attractive. The immigration of people from many parts of the developing world is
too recent for us to reach an unambiguous verdict on their fortunes in America, but
Asian Americans are increasingly entering into mixed marriages and therefore, as
with other immigrant communities, the boundaries separating them from the out-
side world are starting to fall away.
  
The history of immigration in America is not a simple success story. It’s also a tale of
ethnic conflict and of opposition to newcomers. Immigrants – a total of sixty-six mil-
lion over the past two centuries – were by no means always welcome. Historians who
have studied American immigration are broadly in agreement. In all the familiar ac-
counts we come across statements like: ‘For most of their history, Americans did not
hold favorable views of immigrants.’ Or: ‘The immigrants came with high hopes,
and although in some places they got on well, in general they were unprepared for the
coolness with which so many Americans received them.’ The notion of America as a
‘nation of immigrants’ conceals a long history of opposition to immigration.
The doubts felt by one of the founders of the republic, Benjamin Franklin, about
the feasibility of making German immigrants integrate, as expressed in his ‘Observa-
tions Concerning the Increase of Mankind’ (), are well known. In the final decades
of the eighteenth century, immigration from Germany got into its stride and Ger-
mans formed around a third of the then quite small population of Pennsylvania.
Franklin questioned the willingness of migrants to adopt the language of their new
country and believed great moral disparities existed, as well as a lack of political loyal-
ty. He feared Germans would become ‘so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our
Anglifying them, and will never adopt our Language or Customs, any more than they
can acquire our Complexion.’ These are fundamental concerns that arise in all de-
bates about migration and they demonstrate that current differences of opinion in Eu-
rope represent a continuation of that historical pattern rather than a radical departure
from it. Reactions do not differ so very greatly after all between the Old World and the
New.
Sociologist Aristide Zolberg describes how, right from the early days of independ-
ence, arguments raged about how much immigration was desirable and of what kind.
It’s interesting to note that his interpretation of the disputes surrounding immigra-
tion diverges from a commonly held belief of the past few decades that sees the call for
the influx of newcomers to be stemmed as a means of venting other frustrations. He
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writes that anyone who believes immigrants are merely scapegoats ‘minimizes the ra-
tionality of the behavior of groups and classes with respect to the consequences of im-
migration’. Large-scale migration always tests a country’s social and cultural com-
promise. It’s a ‘legitimate source of concern’ rather than a symptom of ‘paranoia’.
Zolberg talks of ‘the perennial dialectics of American immigration politics’. Mass
immigration provokes opposition from the existing population, which in turn
prompts immigrants to mobilize. Generally speaking those with a vested interest in
the arrival of immigrants, mainly employers in search of cheap labour, have won out
against opposition to newcomers. This has produced a relatively open immigration
policy. There were three periods in which the call for strict limits to be set became very
loud indeed: the mid-nineteenth century, the years between  and , and the
early s to the mid-s. Zolberg links these reactions to peaks in the level of im-
migration. The timing of opposition from large majorities of longstanding residents
is never a matter of chance.
Let’s look more closely at these episodes. Protests against immigration were heard
as early as the s. There was Samuel Morse, for instance, the man who invented tele -
graphy. His proposals sound familiar to a contemporary observer: immigration con-
trols to prevent penniless new arrivals becoming a drain on the public purse, the de-
nial of voting rights to recent immigrants, and an extension of the period that individ-
uals would need to reside in the country before they could become citizens. He also ad-
vocated the founding of publicly-funded schools to counteract the influence of
Catholic ideas on young people.
Morse’s suggestions turned out to be a portent of much fiercer opposition to immi-
gration. In the mid-nineteenth century the Know Nothing movement emerged. It
arose out of the Supreme Order of the Star-Spangled Banner, a secret society whose
members were sworn to silence, which probably explains the sobriquet ‘Know Noth-
ing’. The movement had a considerable following in many states and it was responsi-
ble for organized opposition to Catholic immigration in particular. The background
to this development was a sharp increase in immigration in the period -. In that
ten-year period almost three million migrants arrived in America, more than the total
for the preceding seven decades.
Not only had the extent of immigration increased, it had changed in character as
well. Newcomers from Ireland and Germany in particular were more likely to be illit-
erate, and there were far more Catholics among them. People suspected that a conspir-
acy by the Vatican lay behind this new wave of immigration. Although the Catholic
population was modest in size, many were fearful of a demographic shift that would
undermine America’s Protestant culture. Protestantism was seen by the Know Noth-
ings as a guarantee of individual liberty in their country and they regarded the hierar-
chical Catholic Church as the epitome of despotism. Catholics were suspected of
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block voting in elections, whereas the Protestant vote was split between different par-
ties. 
This criticism did not arise out of thin air. Catholic bishops were making an un-
precedented show of missionary zeal in these years. They attacked the public schools,
opposing for example the use of the Protestant King James Bible in education. Not
only did Catholics found their own schools, there was increasing pressure to have
them financed by the state. ‘Are American Protestants to be taxed for the purpose of
nourishing Romish vipers?’ asked the Philadelphia Sun.
In his history of the Know Nothings, Tyler Anbinder writes that their aim was not
so much to reduce the level of immigration as to impose restraints on the political role
of immigrants. They were convinced that for electoral reasons the governing parties,
far from caring about newcomers as such, were corrupting the political process by nat-
uralizing large numbers of them shortly before elections, purely so they could vote.
In the end the Know Nothings failed to alter the requirements for citizenship. They
had proposed that a period of no less than twenty-one years ought to pass before a mi-
grant could put in an application. That period was justified by reference to native-
born Americans, who had to wait until they were adults, in other words twenty-one,
before they were entitled to vote. The idea was that the migrant must first be ‘national-
ized’, in other words made to identify with his new country instinctively, before he
could be naturalized.
Despite this failure, the Know Nothings gained a considerable following. The
movement had more than a hundred representatives in Congress within a few years of
its founding in , as well as eight state governors and the mayors of cities including
Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago. President Lincoln was outspoken in his response.
Referring to the Preamble to the Constitution he wrote: ‘As a nation, we began by de-
claring that “all men are created equal.” We now practically read it “all men are creat-
ed equal, except negroes.” When the Know-Nothings get control, it will read “all men
are created equal, except negroes, and foreigners, and Catholics.”’
Yet the situation was more complicated than that, since the Know Nothings in the
North were vehemently opposed to slavery, which they saw as a form of oppression
comparable to the despotism of the Catholic Church. One particular bone of con-
tention was the compromise reached with the southern states, which obliged the
North to return escaped slaves. One famous case was the arrest by an Irish militia in
Boston of the runaway slave Anthony Burns, which led to fierce anti-Catholic protests.
It is understandable, Anbinder writes, that historians have been reluctant to mention
the bigoted Know Nothings in the same breath as the admirable advocates of the aboli-
tion of slavery, but the movement nevertheless ‘displayed a precision and sophistica-
tion equal to that of other antebellum reform movements’.
Let’s look in more detail at the considerable hostility aroused in the course of the
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by the arrival of Irish and German immi-
grants. Later we’ll examine opposition to the ‘new’ immigration from countries in-
cluding Italy and Poland. These are interesting examples for several reasons. For one
thing they demonstrate that clashes between the established and outsiders often have
social and religious aspects. They also show how immigration can create wrenching
conflicts of loyalty. It’s also fascinating for Europeans to see that the emigration of
their compatriots in earlier times aroused such intense emotion.
The level of Irish immigration was high, as illustrated in a marvellous book by Os-
car Handlin about the mainly Irish immigrants who came to Boston in droves from
 onwards. By  some ,, out of a population of a mere ,, were Irish.
The overwhelming majority were poor peasants who had fled famine and arrived des-
titute. Living conditions for this new underclass were appalling. Packed together in
slums, without sanitation, the Irish immigrants quickly fell victim to epidemics of
cholera, tuberculosis and other diseases eradicated elsewhere in Boston long before.
Life expectancy was low. It was said that an Irish immigrant lived for an average of
fourteen years after arrival – or, more accurately, managed to survive that long by
hook or by crook.
Handlin writes of a great divide between Irish migrants and the society around
them: ‘For a long time they were fated to remain a massive lump in the community,
undigested, indigestible.’ The causes of this unwillingness to live together were not
just economic but cultural and religious. The deeply traditional Catholicism of the
Irish was far removed from the relatively liberal Protestantism of most Bostonians.
The Irish had a fatalism born of experience, an attitude diametrically opposed to the
prevailing sense of progress. They were against all reforms, whether the abolition of
slavery, rights for women or the introduction of publicly funded schools. The contrast
could not have been greater, and the Anglophobia the Irish brought with them for un-
derstandable reasons certainly did not help to bridge the gap. So hostility towards
Irish immigrants was in essence the result of a conflict between a reform-minded ma-
jority and a traditionalist minority. It does not take a great deal of imagination to see
in the Catholic Irish of the nineteenth century the Muslim migrants from Morocco or
Pakistan of the twentieth.
The history of the Boston Irish can be evaluated from a number of different per-
spectives. First of all it’s clear that their integration was ultimately successful, since
eventually little hostility would surround what had once been regarded as irreconcil-
able differences. But seen from another angle their story shows that migration can dis-
rupt and divide an urban community for many years. Look at how long it took before
a Catholic president could be elected. During his campaign for office, John F Kennedy
was repeatedly forced to underline the fact that his loyalty lay with America and not
with the Vatican. Even a hundred years and more after the first Irish immigrants ar-
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rived, it still did not go without saying that a descendant of theirs would one day hold
the highest office in the land.
It wasn’t only the Irish who provoked hostility; the Germans too were far from wel-
come. In the century of mass European immigration (-), some six million
Germans moved to America, the majority before . Until the s, German mi-
grants and their children were the single largest immigrant group. In  .per cent
of newcomers were from Germany. The proportion then fell sharply, but in  it still
stood at . per cent. Around the turn of the twentieth century, New York, with its
half-million German-born residents, was known as the world’s second largest Ger-
man city. The Germans were the first substantial immigrant group to arrive from con-
tinental Europe, later followed by Scandinavians, Italians and others.
John Hagwood divides the history of German immigration to America into three
periods. First, from  to , there was the time of the ‘German Idea’, with plans to
form a German state in America modelled on New England. A serious attempt was
made to give Missouri, Wisconsin and Texas a predominantly German culture by
means of mass immigration. ‘Its aim was to keep the German element in its new envi-
ronment racially and culturally distinct,’ Hagwood says. The idea was to create a dis-
tinct German territory and German economic activity. It had no chance of success,
this pursuit of a ‘New Germany’ on American soil, but it indicates how powerfully op-
posed German immigrants were to absorption into American society, which they re-
garded as culturally inferior. ‘They struggled harder than perhaps has any other immi-
grant group in the United States of America, at any time.’
When it became clear that efforts to create a territorial barrier against assimilation
had come to nothing, all the more energy was invested in the creation of a psychologi-
cal barrier designed to preserve German culture, even though this often meant forego-
ing economic opportunities. This second phase in the history of German immigra-
tion ran from  (the failure of the New Germany project) to  (with increasing
pressure on German Americans as a result of the First World War). It was the period of
hyphenation, of the emergence of a group known as the German-Americans. Hag-
wood writes: ‘Germans in America between  and  lived not in the United States
but in German-America.’ They formed a counterculture known as Deutschtum.
Many clashes resulted, especially over prohibition and Sunday observance, which did
not much suit German immigrants.
The centres of resistance to pressure from American society were the family, the
school, the church and the press. German immigrants successfully blocked compulso-
ry English-language education in Wisconsin and Illinois. This defensive attitude was
not simply a matter of preference, it was a reaction to efforts to force migrant commu-
nities to adapt. As Hagwood sees it: ‘The greatest influence in bringing the Germans
into politics was undoubtedly the Nativist movement… In many ways this is the great-
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est tragedy of German-America.’ It was a vicious circle. German-Americans looked
down on the society around them and that society did not hold them in particularly
high regard.
Against this background it’s easy to understand why the First World War brought
an end to hyphenation. A choice had to be made between Germany and America;
there was no longer any place for German-Americans. This marks the start of the
third period of German immigration history, in which German-Americans ceased to
exist as a distinct community. Appeals by the German-American Alliance for a neutral
stance on the war in Europe were felt to indicate a lack of loyalty. ‘The time has come
for the American people to end hyphenism,’ said President Woodrow Wilson. Educa-
tion in the German language was an immediate target, but it did not stop there. Every-
thing that smacked of German culture was attacked, even in the field of classical mu-
sic, with a campaign to oust Karl Muck, conductor of the Boston Symphony Orches-
tra. The German-language press disappeared, the Lutheran Church switched to hold-
ing services in English and countless Germans Anglicized their names. Assimilation
was forced upon them and it was successful in the sense that after  the Germans
were barely recognizable as a community.
The collapse of the German-American ideal after the First World War makes
painfully clear that considerable tensions can arise between migrant groups and their
host societies when international armed conflicts break out. Concerns about their loy-
alty can have dramatic consequences for migrant groups should they have any doubts
about which side to choose, but the reaction of the receiving society, which in such cir-
cumstances soon tends to imagine itself faced with a fifth column, can have a pro-
found impact too. The history of the German-Americans demonstrates this vividly.
There is no reason at all to dismiss their experiences as irrelevant.
   
The Know Nothing movement was swept away by a larger conflict, the Civil War, in
which countless immigrants on both sides proved themselves loyal citizens on the bat-
tlefield. After a period of reconstruction and economic prosperity, opposition to im-
migration resurfaced at the end of the nineteenth century. Above all there was opposi-
tion to the arrival of Catholics, of anyone assumed to be a revolutionary, and of sup-
posedly inferior southern and eastern Europeans. Higham sums up the mood: ‘Typi-
cally they trembled at the Roman challenge to American freedom, rallied to the de-
fense of the public school system, and urged limitations on immigration and natural-
ization.’
He believes that opposition to further immigration was spurred not just by periods
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of economic crisis during the s and s, but by the completion of the coloniza-
tion of America, the closing of the frontier. The sense of a ‘closed space’ expressed it-
self in a diminishing faith both in social mobility and in assimilation as a natural
process. Another important factor in creating this growing opposition was a radical
change to the level of immigration around the turn of the twentieth century and to the
composition of the immigrant population. The numbers rose rapidly – in the first
decade of the twentieth century . million new immigrants were registered – and
their countries of origin were different. The old immigration from England, Ireland,
Germany and the Scandinavian countries was outstripped by what became known as
‘new immigration’ from Italy, Poland, Russia and the Balkans.
One of the leading thinkers behind the campaign for limits to be set to immigra-
tion was Henry Pratt Fairchild, professor of sociology in New York, whom we have
come upon already in this book. His Immigration, published in , is a fascinating
mishmash. He explicitly distinguishes between ‘race’ as a biological fact and ‘national-
ity’ as a cultural phenomenon, but in his discussion of the problems surrounding im-
migration he tends to conflate the two. His approach is to draw a clear dividing line be-
tween ‘old’ and ‘new’ migration and in doing so he distinguishes between European
racial groups. Simply put: yes to Swedes and Brits, no to Italians and Poles, who were
regarded as inferior peoples.
It’s interesting to note what Fairchild has to say about assimilation. Races can be
mixed, although that isn’t something he advocates, but nationalities cannot be forged
into something new. The notion of the melting pot is a fallacy. Nationalities have an in-
herent cohesion. ‘There is no such thing as a composite language, a blended religion,
or a mixed moral code.’ Fairchild gives an example: either you should hit your wife
or you should never hit her. We cannot say that on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays
you are permitted to do so and on other days you should keep your hands to yourself.
Give and take is not the solution. What does it mean, anyhow? ‘While we were going to
meet Italy half way in some particular we would be moving further away from Den-
mark, and when we were trying to accommodate ourselves to Hungary we would be
destroying our unison with England.’ People from north-western Europe were
racially the closest to existing Americans and therefore a brake should be put on the ar-
rival of migrants from other parts of the old continent, Fairchild insisted.
As early as the final decade of the nineteenth century, opposition to the ‘new’ immi-
gration began to grow. There were appeals for stricter conditions to be placed on natu-
ralization, and with the founding of the American Protective Association in  and
the Immigration Restriction League in  these took the form of calls for the intro-
duction of a literacy test. Every immigrant aged fourteen or over would have to be able
to read and write. This proposal was blocked three times by presidential veto and final-
ly introduced during the First World War, twenty-five years after it was first submitted.
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Even then, in , the president of the time, Woodrow Wilson, made one final attempt
to prevent the resolution becoming law.
It turned out to be extraordinarily difficult to change the immigration laws. How
can we explain this? Higham concludes that interests and principles became inter-
twined: ‘Immigration was one of the cornerstones of the whole social structure, and a
cosmopolitan ideal of nationality was woven deeply into America’s Christian and
democratic heritage. The stone could not be dislodged or the ideal renounced with
ease.’ This social structure was defended most consistently by employers, who had a
vested interest in a high level of immigration, since it kept wages low and guaranteed a
flexible workforce. Workers of different nationalities could easily be played off against
one another.
The trades union movement defended a different set of interests, although with a
fair amount of hesitancy. Organizations such as the American Federation of Labour
had many migrants among their members and felt bound by principles of social jus-
tice, so the unions were initially rather unresponsive to pleas for limits to be set, but
their attitudes gradually changed and they started to support the campaign against
further immigration. By excluding foreign labour, they were hoping to achieve greater
economic security for their members.
As we have seen, the FirstWorldWar was a turning point. It became possible to in-
troduce measures that had previously met with resistance and laws were passed with
the aimof limiting immigration drastically.Thewartimemood is illustrated by the re-
establishmentof theKuKluxKlan in ,anorganizationoriginally formed tooppose
the emancipation of the black population in the South during the years of reconstruc-
tion after the Civil War. In those days the Klan had preached white supremacy as op-
posed to national unity,which it regarded as the oppression of theAmerican South by
theNorth.Now the Klan had become a distinctly nationalistmovement that put itself
forward as the defender of Anglo-Saxon tradition and therefore admitted only native-
born Protestants asmembers. In Klanmembership reached its peak at little short
of threemillion, after which an equally rapid decline set in as a result of infighting.
In these years laws were introduced that placed strict limits on the influx of mi-
grants from Europe. Asia had been targeted long before. With the Chinese Exclusion
Act of  almost all immigration from China was banned and the route to natural-
ization blocked. Not until  were Chinese people once again permitted to become
 citizens. The campaign against Japanese immigration had also begun at an early
stage, especially in the case of the so-called ‘picture brides’, women brought to Ameri-
ca by Japanese migrants solely on the basis of photographs. Once again the history of
immigration in America suggests remarkable parallels – European countries are
struggling to deal with comparable forms of arranged marriage today.
The laws introduced in  to control the migration of Europeans to America took
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the form of a strict quota system. Ethnic groups in America, as measured by the 
census, were to be allowed to increase by no more than  per cent a year as a result of
immigration. The bulk of available places went, as intended, to the British, Irish and
Germans, while the Poles and Italians were given a raw deal. This meant that after the
mass immigration of -, America was more or less closed to outsiders for a
long period. The level of immigration fell drastically in the years -. The figures
speak for themselves. Whereas in the period - a little under nine million mi-
grants were admitted, that number fell to just over half a million in -. The eco-
nomic crisis had a severe impact, of course, but restrictive immigration laws were un-
doubtedly responsible for part of the a drop in the figures, and most of the new legisla-
tion remained unchanged until .
All kinds of questions might justifiably be raised about the climate in America in
those years after the First World War, but too many assessments of the Act neglect
the fact that America’s controls on immigration helped to create a new equilibrium.
Dinnerstein and Reimers, who are critical of opposition to immigration, cannot avoid
this conclusion: ‘As a result of the immigration laws of the s, the nation had
achieved a general balance of ethnic groups.’ Historian Philip Gleason too, after crit-
icizing the racist undertone of the new laws, concludes that ‘once restriction had been
accomplished, Americans could afford to relax about national unity’.
The new law also brought about a considerable change to the relationship between
generations within ethnic groups. In  around per cent of the population was for-
eign-born; in  a mere  per cent.After several decades of strict limits to immigra-
tion, first-generation migrants were no longer a significant factor in American life.
Then the country returned to a more liberal policy and by  the proportion of the
population born elsewhere had reached  per cent once again. High levels of immi-
gration mean that experiences in the country of origin remain hugely significant,
tending to hinder integration, whereas tighter restrictions reduce the influence of new
migrants, with the result that ethnic groups are more quickly absorbed into the socie-
ty around them.
The third wave of opposition to immigration – after those of the mid-nineteenth
century and the turn of the twentieth – lies only just behind us. In the mid-s,
America, like Canada and Australia, experienced fierce arguments between advocates
and opponents of immigration. Alongside doubts about the economic contribution
made by new migrants, the main stimulus to debate was a commonly-held belief that
illegal immigration was out of control. In  the number of illegal immigrants in
America was estimated at five million, with annual growth of ,. In other words,
the illegal population of the United States was predicted to reach about eight million
within ten years. In fact the rate of increase was twice that and by  there were
around twelve to thirteen million illegal residents in America.

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 255
Reimers has reconstructed this latest debate about immigration and he concludes
that much of the legislation of the s and s can be seen as ‘catering to a variety
of interests, business, ethnic, national, religious and legal’. The degree to which es-
tablished groupings have formed alliances of convenience with the aim of maintain-
ing the level of immigration is indeed remarkable. One telling example was the joint
attempt by a particularly liberal senator, Ted Kennedy, and a distinctly conservative
one, Orin Hatch, to remove from the  law all sanctions against employers who
hired illegal migrants. Similarly, a motley array of people now oppose the introduc-
tion of national identity cards that would make it possible to put in place more effec-
tive controls on illegal residence.
In the early s, a widespread campaign against immigration, especially of the il-
legal kind, emerged in California.More than  per cent of America’s immigrants live
in California or Texas, so it’s no surprise to find that opposition is concentrated in
those two states. A citizens’ movement succeeded in having Proposition  adopted
in a referendum, winning  per cent of votes cast. This piece of legislation would
have disqualified illegals and their children from public services including education.
It was later declared invalid by the Supreme Court, but it did lead Congress to intro-
duce stricter immigration laws in , which among other things prevent migrants
from applying for a wide range of public provisions in their first five years of legal resi-
dence.
The conflict surrounding these most recent changes to the law is instructive. The
original intention was to reduce legal immigration to the level of the s, at around
, new immigrants a year. An intriguing coalition formed to create the lobby
that stood in the way. It was only to be expected that it would include ethnic groups, es-
pecially Latin Americans, but opposition from the Catholic Church and fundamental-
ist Christian organizations, which put themselves forward as defenders of family mi-
gration, was rather less predictable. Not without reason, they regarded migrants as ex-
emplars of traditional family values. Representatives of the business sector also fought
against limits on immigration; as ever, they did not want the stream of cheap labour to
dry up. In short the issue of immigration makes for strange bedfellows. This explains
why the latest struggle to restrict immigration failed at the final hurdle.
In America a deep divide has opened up between public opinion and official policy.
Not a single opinion poll since has shown a majority in favour of the relaxation of
immigration laws. In fact since the early s there has almost always been majority
support for a reduction in the number of immigrants. A survey carried out in  –
when new legislation was introduced that had the effect of raising the number of mi-
grants admitted to the country by a third – showed that only a very small proportion
of those questioned were in favour of more immigration, whereas almost half wanted
precisely the reverse.
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This gap between political negotiations over immigration legislation and trends in
the public mood is striking and it continues to cause periodic outbursts of discontent.
The ‘golden door’ to America is still open, having been left only slightly ajar for many
years, but once again differences of opinion about the desirable level of immigration
have come to the fore. Resistance to the current rapid increase in the number of ille-
gals is so powerful that their status cannot easily be regularized. In the ultimate coun-
try of immigrants, immigration does not go unchallenged.
    
To think of America as a ‘nation of immigrants’ is to gloss over another essential as-
pect of the country’s history. Slavery, which grew enormously in the first half of the
nineteenth century, does not fit with the country’s self-image. However much born
out of need, immigration is ultimately a free choice. The forced shipment of millions
of Africans cannot be compared to it in any way, and unlike slavery in European his -
tory, the trade did not happen in a distant colony but in full view of all Americans. It
had a far more direct impact on society as a whole and in some ways this remains true
right up to the present day.
Slavery is of all times and all places. The ownership of human beings was common
in ancient Greece, in African societies and in the Muslim world. The reproach that
slavery flows from a racist view of the world is therefore historically incorrect. In
Africa it was the usual custom for tribes defeated in war to be led away as slaves. In Is-
lamic countries the trade was widespread and slavery was abolished there only rela-
tively recently. It is rarely mentioned that the year in which America freed its slaves,
, coincides almost exactly with the year in which Russia freed its serfs: .
The unique feature of slavery in America is the wrenching conflict to which it led,
and this has everything to do with a profound contradiction between the trade in hu-
man beings and the principles on which the new republic was explicitly founded. It
has often been pointed out that the authors of the Declaration of Independence of
, with their ‘all men are created equal’, established a principle they intended to live
up to only in part. One of those founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson, was a slave-own-
er, as was the first  president, George Washington. The interests of the southern
states – where the majority of slaves were held – were diametrically opposed to the
principle laid down in the Declaration of Independence.
Slavery was crucial to the founding and shaping of the United States – so much so
that a history of the black population is in many respects a history of America. The
past few years have seen an increasing emphasis on the significance of slavery. Histori-
an Ira Berlin, for example, writes of ‘the extent to which slavery was woven into the
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fabric of American life’. From the earliest days of the colonies, ‘slavery shaped the
American economy, its politics, its culture, and its most deeply held beliefs’.
The arrival of twenty Africans in Jamestown in  is generally seen as the begin-
ning of the Atlantic slave trade. In the first half of the seventeenth century, slavery co-
incided with the rise of the plantations, where the main crops were initially tobacco
and sugar. In the nineteenth century cotton predominated. Most worked on the plan-
tations, but there were slaves in the cities too. They did domestic chores and generally
enjoyed better living conditions.
In a major history of black America, John Hope Franklin writes that each colony
dealt with slavery in its own way, as demonstrated by the contrasting examples of
Georgia and Pennsylvania. Whereas in Georgia slavery boomed and soon involved the
majority of the population, in Pennsylvania there was opposition to the practice from
the start. Within a few years Pennsylvania had made the import of slaves subject to tax-
ation and in  the trade virtually stopped. This was a result not just of humanitari-
an concerns but of a fear that the presence of too many slaves would disturb social rela-
tions. In Virginia, the colony with the highest number of slaves, this same concern
soon led to stringent legislation designed to limit the slaves’ freedom of movement se-
verely. Franklin comments that there was a conflict in people’s minds between the eco-
nomic value of the black population and the threat to social stability it posed. The
profit motive usually won out, but this did not reduce the fear of a slave uprising.
In  panic in New York sparked an explosion of violence against the city’s black
inhabitants. After a break-in at a merchant’s home and a series of arson attacks, anger
among whites soon became targeted at the slaves, of whom more than a hundred were
convicted at an improvised trial. Eighteen were hanged and thirteen burned alive. A
number of poor whites were also convicted for what had seemed like an attempted up-
rising. There were several such eruptions of panic and violence, indicating the great
unease that accompanied slavery.
It was the struggle for independence from Britain that truly laid bare the inner con-
tradictions of slavery. How could the image of colonists oppressed by their mother
country be reconciled with the thraldom of hundreds of thousands of people in Amer-
ica itself who had absolutely no rights? A passage laying all the blame for slavery at the
door of the King of England, which Jefferson tried to have adopted as part of the Dec-
laration of Independence, was a distortion of history. It foundered because representa-
tives from the South refused to accept its inclusion.
The drafting of the Declaration of Independence is a fascinating story in its own
right. How could the general principles of equality and freedom be reconciled with
slavery? One of the ways in which Jefferson evaded the issue was by refusing to include
the word ‘property’ in the definition of inalienable rights, replacing it with the much
broader ‘pursuit of happiness’. A right to property would have been understood as a
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defence of slavery. Slaves were, after all, considered to be possessions. Nor is there any
reference to slavery in the constitution. The compromise with the slave-owners was a
practical one and not formally recognized.
Slavery therefore continued after independence. In his Democracy in America, Alex-
is de Tocqueville devoted the longest chapter by far to the lamentable fate of the Indi-
ans and the Negroes. He opposed the institution of slavery, both in his own country
and elsewhere, in the name of human freedom. ‘Plunged into this abyss of troubles,
the Negro barely feels his misfortune. Violence has made a slave of him, the habit of
servitude has made his thoughts and ambitions those of a slave.’
Whereas the British abolished slavery in , America did not follow suit until .
Franklin writes that ‘ironically enough, America’s freedom was the means of giving
slavery itself a longer life than it was to have in the British empire’. This line of rea-
soning has been pursued by lawyers Alfred and Ruth Blumrosen, who argue that the
American rebellion against British rule was motivated in part by a fear in the southern
states that the British might intervene to end slave ownership. Anxiety on this point in-
creased markedly after the verdict of a London judge in  that upheld the claims of
the slave James Somerset, who had escaped during a journey to England. In passing
judgment Lord Mansfield called slavery ‘so odious’ that it could not possibly be justi-
fied on either moral or political grounds. His statement was soon relayed to the Ameri-
can colonies, where slave-owners feared for their property since in theory their slaves
could walk away on the basis of this finding by a British court.
The interests of the northern and southern states may have coincided when it came
to independence, but that did not defuse the explosive charge attached to slavery. With
great difficulty a compromise was reached about how the population of the South
should be counted for the purpose of determining the number of delegates each state
was entitled to send to the House of Representatives. Counting slaves as part of the
population was seen by the northern states as a recognition of and encouragement to
the slave trade. In the end the two sides agreed that each slave should be regarded as
equivalent to three-fifths of a non-slave. It would be hard to find a more cynical ex-
pression of the moral and political confusion surrounding slavery. The numbers in-
volved were large. Despite high mortality among slaves, in states including Georgia,
South Carolina and Virginia they represented between  and  per cent of the popu-
lation in .
The compromise reached over slavery ran counter to the basic principles of the
young republic. With the ideal of equality enshrined in the Declaration of Independ-
ence, the seeds had been sown for the Civil War that would divide the nation so deeply
almost a century later. Jefferson’s agonizing – later in life he became an increasingly ve-
hement opponent of slavery – demonstrates that from the start Americans were divid-
ed on the issue. It was a matter of time. The conflict would have to be resolved one way
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or another. As well as dividing the races, slavery pitted white against white, ultimately
to the extent of civil war.
The black-and-white image of slavery is incorrect in another, perhaps more sur-
prising sense. Berlin points to the existence of black slave-owners: ‘In slave societies,
nearly everyone – free and slave – aspired to enter the slaveholding class, and upon oc-
casion some former slaves rose into the slaveholders’ ranks.’ This was far from com-
mon but nevertheless, slavery could also pit black against black. The history of black
slave-owners has received little attention, for understandable reasons, but the publica-
tion of The Known World by black author Edward P. Jones broke the silence. He tells
the story of the rise and fall of Henry Townsend, a black slave-owner: ‘We owned
slaves. It was what was done, and so that is what we did.’
The Civil War put an end to slavery. The emancipation of all slaves was declared in
. The effects of this proclamation on soldiers in the northern army were problem-
atic. Curti comments: ‘Although the Proclamation inspired patriotism in the aboli-
tionists, it dampened the enthusiasm for the war in countless soldiers and civilians.
Many humble folk who earned their livelihood by manual labour feared that the freed-
men would become economic competitors.’ In New York that year there were riots
against conscription that lasted several days. The black population bore the brunt;
many were lynched.
The North’s rather half-hearted attitude to the black population is further illustrat-
ed by Abraham Lincoln’s initial refusal to accept freed Negroes into the federal army.
Throughout the war he continued to believe in the eventual return of the black popu-
lation to Africa. In August  he said to a delegation of black Americans: ‘Your race
suffer greatly, many of them, by living among us, while ours suffer from your pres-
ence… In a word we suffer on each side. If this is admitted, it affords a reason why we
should be separated.’
The Civil War left deep wounds that were slow to heal. The emancipation of the
slaves certainly did not mean that black people would henceforth be treated as equals.
During reconstruction, especially in the southern states, legislation was introduced
that severely limited the rights of the black population and established segregation
along racial lines in every conceivable field. Far from putting an end to prejudice, free-
dom tended to widen the racial divide. Even where blacks were initially given a chance
to vote, a combination of legislation and terrorization quickly made it impossible for
them to do so. The blatant contradiction between the founding principles of the re-
public and the exclusion of a tenth of the population was not resolved. ‘The great test
of America’s democratic tradition is the acceptance of the Negro with other minority
groups into the mainstream of American life,’ John Hope Franklin wrote.
At the turn of the twentieth century Booker T. Washington was a leading figure in
the black community. His was a gradualist strategy, taking one careful step at a time to

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 260
avoid provoking whites in the South in any way. He did not appeal for the granting of
civil rights. It was far too soon for that. First the black population must be systemati-
cally trained to become useful artisans and industrial workers. Washington succeeded
in setting up a series of educational institutions and through a network of white phi-
lanthropists he became extremely influential. In his autobiography he writes: ‘I think,
though, that the opportunity to freely exercise such political rights will not come in
any large degree through outside or artificial forcing, but will be accorded to the Ne-
gro by the Southern white people themselves.’
His strategy was increasingly controversial, since it did nothing to improve the situ-
ation in the South, especially after a verdict by the Supreme Court in  that present-
ed a legal justification of segregation using the now notorious formulation ‘separate
but equal’. Washington’s critics claimed that the route of extreme caution – the conde-
scending charity of his financiers being painfully obvious – amounted in practice to
the acceptance of the notion that the black population was inferior and that racial seg-
regation was not in itself a problem. They believed that giving up the struggle for polit-
ical power, for genuine civil rights and for higher education would mean relinquish-
ing their self-respect.
There was a wish to be absorbed into mainstream society and at the same time an
awareness that this was not really possible. Rarely has the desire to become part of
America been described with so much compassion and suppressed rage as in The
Souls of Black Folksby WEB Du Bois (). He begins by posing a question: ‘How does
it feel to be a problem?’ He then goes on to describe how two worlds, divided by
colour, have grown apart: ‘Despite much physical contact and daily intermingling,
there is almost no community of intellectual life or point of transference where the
thoughts and feelings of one race can come into direct contact and sympathy with the
thoughts and feelings of the other.’
Their exclusion, and the contempt with which blacks were treated, created a split
personality. This could certainly be overcome, but not by giving up one half or the oth-
er. Du Bois attempts to explain the Negro’s position: ‘He would not Africanize Ameri-
ca, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his
Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a mes-
sage for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro
and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows.’ Du Bois want-
ed more than simply vocational training for the black population; he aimed to foster a
black elite which he called the Talented Tenth.
His essay reads as a lengthy plea for even-handed reconciliation: ‘I should be the
last one to deny the patent weaknesses and shortcomings of the Negro people; I
should be the last to withhold sympathy from the white South in its efforts to solve its
intricate social problems.’ Anyone who calls to mind the realities of the South with
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its lynchings and its segregated restaurants, buses and toilets will appreciate the al-
most implausible generosity of these words.
Yet thirty years later the writer had become an advocate of segregation. What hap-
pened? In the life story of Du Bois, who was one of the founders of the National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People (), which had both black and
white members, we see all the contradictions of failed integration. He died at the age
of ninety-four, on the eve of the march on Washington in the summer of , when
Martin Luther King gave his most famous speech. Years earlier he had given up his 
citizenship and emigrated to Ghana.
Why, despite all his early anger about segregation, did he ‘return’ to Africa? Having
long since lost faith in equitable integration, he came to the conclusion that black seg-
regation was the only answer. The diagnosis arrived at by the later Du Bois is bitter.
The ideal of integration had come to nothing; even Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal ig-
nored the needs of black people. His Talented Tenth was threatening to drift away
from the mass of the black population. Nothing remained to black people but to make
a virtue of necessity and build up a separate economic, political and cultural life of
their own. They should no longer rely on the benevolence of white liberals, no longer
wait for acts of charity. They must take their fate into their own hands. 
The words of the later Du Bois, full of rage and frustration, say it all: it’s a myth that
in the North there’s no racial segregation, at best it differs from the South only in de-
gree. The higher a Negro wants to climb, the more pitiless his exclusion on grounds of
colour. Segregation is an evil, but at the same time there is no escaping it. ‘Without it,
the American Negro will suffer evils greater than any possible evil of separation: we
would suffer the loss of self-respect, the lack of faith in ourselves, the lack of know -
ledge about ourselves, the lack of ability to make a decent living by our own efforts and
not by philanthropy.’ His followers were shocked.
The background to his loss of faith provides sufficient explanation. The exclusion
and humiliation of the black population are part of a history that can never be un-
done. We cannot ignore that legacy, since its consequences are obvious for all to see,
even in our own day. How can people interact open-mindedly with such a past to look
back on? Nevertheless, fostering racial differences is a dead-end route, since it only in-
creases the divide and makes mutual trust impossible. There can be no productive in-
teraction in a society that sees everything in terms of colour. The conflict between the
ideas of the young and old Du Bois has never been resolved. It was to return in the
clash between King’s pursuit of integration and the separatism of Malcolm X.
We have all seen dramatic images of the Civil Rights Movement, which eventually
led to the Civil Rights Act of . Announcing the passage of the legislation, President
Johnson said of the black American: ‘He has called upon us to make good the promise
of America. And who among us can say we would have made the same progress were it
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not for his persistent bravery, and his faith in American democracy.’ The most im-
portant judicial step had been taken in  with a Supreme Court decision that went
against segregated education. At long last the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine introduced
by the Court in  had been renounced, as a result of the simple but penetrating in-
sight that segregation always brings inequality with it. The images are indelibly print-
ed on the memory of an entire generation: the university student James Meredith who
had to be escorted to and from classes by federal marshals, and the governor of Ala-
bama, George Wallace, who personally stood in the way to prevent black students
from registering at the university.
That  court decision was only the first step towards genuine integration, since
segregation continued in everyday life much as before, even in many schools and col-
leges in the North. The problem of ghettos is still a pressing one all these years after the
granting of civil rights. This is a story of broken promises, of laws that were never ob-
served, of exclusion justified by religion and a great deal more besides. It’s easy to con-
clude from these developments that democratic principles are of little consequence.
Yet other things may strike us too: an ideal of citizenship will always make prevail-
ing exclusion problematic; general principles of equality have their own eloquence
and demand to be realized. These are the central themes of Gunnar Myrdal’s book An
American Dilemma (). The issue of race is in essence a moral one, he writes. ‘The
Negroes are a minority, and they are poor and suppressed, but they have the advantage
that they can fight wholeheartedly. The whites have all the power, but they are split in
their moral personality. Their better selves are with the insurgents. The Negroes do
not need any other allies.’ In other words, the qualms of the majority will suffice.
A subtle paternalism lurks within this attitude, of course. The problem of the
blacks was ultimately the problem of the whites, and the experiences and potentials of
black people were passed over by Myrdal as by so many before him. The inner conflict
had to be resolved by whites and the responsibility for improving the lot of the black
population therefore lay largely with them. In the years of the Civil Rights Movement,
when black activists and white liberals walked hand in hand, that dilemma seemed to
have been resolved. But the hypocrisy contained within the ideal of shared citizenship
would soon be unmasked.
 
Du Bois’s change of heart turned out to be the harbinger of a far broader shift in atti-
tudes. At the point when important civil rights finally became a reality, many in the
black community lost any hope of integrating, or even the desire to do so. In their
wake, some migrant communities too began laying the emphasis on their own identi-
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ties. From the s onwards the old adage that America was a ‘nation of immigrants’
was often interpreted as an acknowledgment of unbridgeable cultural differences. In
many ways what had begun as a time of hope and reform in the name of a shared ideal
of civil rights changed course to become a celebration of ethnic identity.
Philip Gleason describes how the mood has shifted again and again. Periods in
which universalist interpretations of American identity predominated were times of
self-confidence, whereas periods of particularism, whether construed as religious,
racial or ethnic, point to a lack of faith. The s and ’s were indeed marked by a
crisis of confidence, low points being the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal and
race riots in many major cities. The democratic ideal of America was dismissed as in-
sincere and many responded by withdrawing into subcultures.
The revival of ethnic thinking should be seen against this background. Important
examples are the revision of school textbooks and the introduction of positive dis-
crimination in the jobs market, known as affirmative action. In education a form of
multiculturalism was advocated that went far beyond drawing attention to forgotten
aspects of American history. The introduction of the Ethnic Heritage Studies Pro-
gram Act in  sparked a divisive debate that in many ways is still going on. In the
battle over the curriculum some starkly contrasting visions emerged as to what might
suffice to hold the ‘nation of immigrants’ together in our own day.
The more radical champions of multiculturalism in the black community aimed to
replace a Eurocentric curriculum – described by Molefi Kete Asante as ‘killing our
children, killing their minds’ – with an Afrocentric one. Black children were said to
have been estranged from their origins, underperforming in school as a result. There
was talk of a lack of ‘self-esteem and self-respect’ that could be resolved only by an
edu cation that recovered the alleged continuity in their past. As Asante puts it: ‘There
exists an emotional, cultural, psychological connection … that spans the ocean.’
African-Americans were urged at the very least to think back to the place from which
they once came.
Earlier generations had rejected such Afrocentrism out of hand. In the nineteenth
century black leader and former slave Frederick Douglass commented: ‘No one idea
has given rise to more oppression and persecution toward the colored people of this
country than that which makes Africa, not America, their home. It is that wolfish idea
that elbows us off the side walk, and denies us the rights of citizenship.’ There is in-
deed a tragic side to the Afrocentric plea to black Americans to cut themselves off
from their surroundings: get back to where you came from, you don’t belong here.
James Baldwin too turned against this way of thinking: ‘The Negro has been formed
by this nation, for better or worse, and does not belong to any other – not to Africa,
and certainly not to Islam… To accept one’s past – one’s history – is not the same
thing as drowning in it; it is learning how to use it.’
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This is not at all to say that the reinterpretation of American history serves no pur-
pose. We need only recall the words of Arthur Schlesinger: ‘Let our children try to
imagine the arrival of Columbus from the viewpoint of those who met him as well as
from those who sent him.’But a critical investigation is a quite different matter from
an education that aims to bolster ethnic self-esteem. The rewriting of American histo-
ry has huge consequences and it leads to a belief that every shared history is a distor-
tion. After all, it’s impossible to tell a story that will satisfy both ‘victims’ and ‘perpe-
trators’. Schlesinger expressed his concern and apparently he was not alone, since in
 Congress unanimously passed a resolution to increase investment in the teach-
ing of American history.
The pursuit of bilingual education, for Hispanics in particular, is an extension of at-
tempts to make the teaching of history a tool for consolidating ethnic groups. Educa-
tion in the child’s mother tongue took off in the s and s, but as in many Euro-
pean countries it is now on the retreat. There have even been calls for a constitutional
amendment that would make English the country’s only official language. In seven
states such a rule has been introduced on the basis of referendum results. Of all the ref-
erendums held on the subject of strengthening the position of English and opposing
bilingual education, only one has been lost – an indication that the mood has changed,
especially in states with a large number of Spanish-speaking immigrants. 
These and other initiatives are manifestations of an underlying conflict about the
nature of American society and especially the concept of assimilation. Will the United
States remain faithful to its basic mission of forging a new people with a wide variety
of ethnic backgrounds, or is it on its way to becoming a patchwork of closed-off ethnic
communities, as Horace Kallen envisaged? Will the individual route to citizenship
continue to be given priority or will group rights gain the upper hand? Within the Civ-
il Rights Movement lies a seemingly irresolvable tension between these two approach-
es.
Affirmative action attempts to provide an answer. It is based on a belief that formal
equality is insufficient to overcome a historical legacy of inequality. All those centuries
of slavery and racial segregation cannot be consigned to the past unless the victims are
given preferential treatment in the here and now. This applies to access to education,
jobs in the public and private sectors, and the awarding of government contracts. As
President Johnson said in : ‘You do not take a person who, for years, has been hob-
bled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say,
“You are free to compete with all the others”, and still justly believe that you have been
completely fair.’
Originally advocated as a temporary and targeted measure to help African-Ameri-
cans, this approach has grown since the s to become a system of positive discrimi-
nation for all minority groups, and it has acquired a permanent character. Since the
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s, if not before, a great debate on the subject has raged in America, and it’s far
from over. This is a dispute from which Europe has much to learn, since here too simi-
lar ideas and measures have been introduced, if in a less rigorous manner.
What are the grounds for affirmative action? Is it indeed a possible answer to pat-
terns of exclusion that are still in place? Classic racism may be losing some of its power,
the argument goes, but racism still exists in hidden forms. A well-known researcher in
the field, Thomas Pettigrew, writes: ‘Racism is typically far more subtle, indirect, and
ostensibly nonracial now than it was in , during the full swing of the Civil Rights
Movement. Consequently, detection and remedy have become much more diffi-
cult.’Racism is now the outcome of anonymous processes of selection and exclusion
– sometimes called ‘institutional racism’ – rather than individual preferences or aver-
sions. It’s not the intentions of the employer that matter; we need instead to look at
outcomes. The assumption here is that all groups are equal and therefore cannot be
distinguished in terms of talent. All ethnic groups should therefore be represented in
all walks of life according to their share of the population, once all hindrances have
been removed. The under-representation of minorities in specific occupations or spe-
cific educational institutions is therefore attributable to discrimination.
This prompts the question: Is it in fact true that cultural differences have no effect
on schools and the jobs market? The history of Asian immigrants demonstrates that
although discrimination can lead to low performance in education and in economic
life, it is not the whole story. Asians have faced exclusion in American history yet they
have on the whole been relatively successful. Moreover, the existence of a black middle
class proves that African-Americans are not condemned to live in the underclass. Es-
cape is possible. 
No one would want to deny that the history of segregation has left deep scars, but in
parts of the black community in America, Thomas Sowell says, cultural patterns have
emerged that make social advancement difficult. The large number of one-parent
families, for example, is not simply the result of a history of discrimination. It’s a phe-
nomenon that was far less pronounced half a century ago, in a time when discrimina-
tion was taken for granted in large parts of society. In  three-quarters of black fam-
ilies had two parents; the figure is now only  per cent. The fact that so many people
have become trapped in the lifestyle of the underclass is more than simply an expres-
sion of poverty or exclusion. 
Meanwhile special measures in education and employment are now being de-
manded by innumerable ethnic groups that have no connection with the history of
slavery and segregation. This has eroded the justification for such approaches, and the
proponents of affirmative action all too often forget that there are people who pay the
price. No small number of white and Asian Americans have seen their access to the
better universities blocked despite good academic results. Wherever one is helped, an-
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other is disadvantaged. In the s and since, this has created considerable resent-
ment, helping to fuel opposition to immigration. As the result of a flurry of court deci-
sions, affirmative action is now on the wane.
The battle surrounding the Eurocentric curriculum and positive discrimination
demonstrates that considerable uncertainty has arisen in America over the past few
decades as to what it means to be a ‘nation of immigrants’. Many of its critics feel that
the idea of assimilation was brought into disrepute as soon as large-scale immigration
resumed in the mid-s. Decolonization brought a new wave of immigrants, but
that same decolonization aroused considerable doubts about the value of Western cul-
ture. The same happened in Europe; mass immigration from all over the world was ac-
companied by a wholly new perspective on integration.
Samuel Huntington, in his book Who Are We?, gives a clear impression of the dis-
quiet this cultural reversal is causing. He describes the triumph over racial and ethnic
interpretations of the nation’s identity, and the creation of a multiethnic and multira-
cial society in which people are judged on their merits, as America’s greatest accom-
plishment. There is a danger that this achievement will be lost, Huntington contends,
especially given the mass immigration of Spanish-speakers, who will soon form the
largest minority group in America. He sees this type of immigration as unusual on
several grounds. The enormous difference in prosperity between the two sides makes
the shared border between the United States and Mexico unique in the world and this
has led to unprecedented levels of illegal immigration. Never before has one group of
newcomers been as dominant as the Mexicans are now, making up a quarter of all im-
migrants in the s. (As we have seen, this is not entirely true. The Germans, for ex-
ample, once made up an even larger proportion of the total immigrant population.)
Then there is the regional concentration of these new migrants, which Huntington
claims is equally unprecedented.
He concludes that all these factors have changed the dynamics of integration con-
siderably. His assertions have attracted a good deal of criticism, but the impression
that Mexican immigrants and their descendants are not rising up the social scale at the
rate that might have been expected is confirmed in a comparative study of second gen-
eration of Mexican-Americans by Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut. They identi-
fy ‘low aspirations and cumulative disadvantages’ and conclude that performance in
school remains poor. They see a ‘downward assimilation’ taking place in this group,
meaning an adjustment to the most deprived social milieus. But they place the blame
for these outcomes in part on a history of contempt for Mexican immigrants: ‘The re-
sults are not hard to discern in the spectacle of the impoverished barrios of Los Ange-
les, San Diego, Houston, and other large southwestern cities.’
Demographic predictions suggest that Hispanics will make up around a quarter of
the American population by . Spanish has become America’s de facto second lan-

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:20  Pagina 267
guage. From  onwards President Bush held his weekly radio address in Spanish as
well as English: ‘Mi Casa Blanca es su Casa Blanca.’ Not long ago Mexican demonstra-
tors in Chicago made clear that they are well aware of this: ‘Today we march, tomor-
row we vote.’ Such is the history of America, says Zolberg. Mass immigration pro-
vokes resistance among the established population and this hostility in turn prompts
migrants to mobilize. In short, conflict of this kind is not about the repudiation of
shared citizenship, it’s part of the history of integration and participation. The num-
ber of Mexicans taking  citizenship has increased hugely, as has their participation
in elections. In that sense Huntington’s pessimism about their unwillingness to be-
come part of American society is premature, in fact his critics are right to point out
that ‘contrary to popular opinion Mexican-Americans acquire English in ways simi-
lar to previous immigrants and, according to at least one important measure of assim-
ilation – conversion to evangelical Protestantism – are likely ahead of all other immi-
grant groups except Koreans’.
There are historical parallels, but they include the recurrent uncertainty about the
future of America as a ‘nation of immigrants’, which is palpable in our own time. The
emphasis currently lies on the millions of illegal aliens among them, who, incidentally,
are simply included in the figures used to determine the number of members from
each state in the House of Representatives. Today’s increasing sense of uncertainty
also has to do with the continuing high rate of influx of legal migrants since , un-
precedented in American history, which as we have seen has always alternated be-
tween a raising and lowering of barriers. This consistently high level of immigration
changes the relationship between the generations and with it the character of ethnic
groups.
In Europe we are witnessing a comparable trend. The uncertainty with which the
Old World has reacted to the arrival of migrants from all regions of the globe is not so
very different from the insecurity that is a feature of the long history of immigration
to the New World, with all the conflict it has entailed. It’s actually quite surprising that
the two continents, so closely linked by a shared history of immigration, exchange
ideas on the subject relatively rarely. There are so many shared principles and experi-
ences, so many shared interests and family histories, that it seems logical to make com-
parisons.
The challenge of controlling the -Mexican border, for example, has a great deal
in common in many respects with problems surrounding illegal immigration from
the Mediterranean region. In both cases a contest is underway between migrants and
border guards, one that’s claiming an increasing number of victims and causing grow-
ing unease among local populations. The generally fruitless attempts by America to
handle both legal and illegal migration more effectively – a failure attributable mainly
to a lack of political will – contain plenty of lessons for European countries. The fiasco
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surrounding two important reforms is particularly instructive. The Immigrant Re-
form and Control Act of , which was intended to combat illegal residence by deal-
ing more harshly with employers while regularizing the status of around three million
illegals, achieved only the latter. A revision of the Act ten years later, which among oth-
er things excluded migrants from certain forms of social welfare, produced few results.
The Act was soon pared back drastically under pressure from interest groups.
Recurrent conflicts over migration have ultimately made the idea of America more
inclusive. Each of the periods in which opposition to immigrants was uppermost had
a different focus. With the Irish it was a question of whether Catholics belonged in
America, with the Italians and Poles it was all about ethnic differences, and with the
Mexicans it’s to a large degree a matter of holding on to English as the official language
in the face of pressure to recognize Spanish. America is overcoming more and more of
its original religious and racial limitations on the concept of citizenship, but it’s un-
likely to go so far as to embrace official bilingualism.
The election of Barack Obama has brought America closer to its own principles
and changed its image in the world. Of course it is troubling that fifty years after segre-
gation was formally abolished the election of a black president is celebrated as a major
breakthrough. A sense of relief can be heard in the enthusiasm of many white Ameri-
cans and Europeans: at last a line can be drawn under a shameful history; never again
the ‘white man’s burden’. But the past cannot be shaken off so easily. President Oba-
ma is not the final endpoint of the long history of emancipation but a milestone with-
in it.
Part of his attraction – especially for many white voters – is that Obama is a relative
outsider to the bitter history of black America. As the son of a Kenyan immigrant and
a white woman from Kansas, he is far from the embodiment of slavery and the segre-
gation that followed. His life story is that of an immigrant’s child, and furthermore
the product of a mixed marriage. In his autobiography he writes that he sometimes
found himself talking dismissively about ‘white folks’ and at such moments ‘I would
suddenly remember my mother’s smile, and the words that I spoke would seem awk-
ward and false’.
America is a compelling experiment as a ‘nation of immigrants’, for all the qualifi-
cations we need to set beside that rather rosy self-image. It’s increasingly a country
that embodies all of humanity, now that people from continents other than Europe
have come to make up such a large share of its population. Zolberg is hopeful, ending
his history with the words: ‘Immigrants who feel welcome rarely set out to destroy
their new home.’ Indeed there are no examples in America of migrant communities
that have caused endless social disruption. Clashes have been fierce nonetheless. Im-
migration doesn’t just bring about more immigration, it provokes opposition among
a large segment of the existing population.
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In this sense it’s important to rediscover America. Behind the slogan ‘a nation of
immigrants’ lies a history of avoidance, conflict and accommodation. The slogan has
obscured the fact that the welcome given to newcomers has never been unconditional.
Along with openness, America has been through lengthy periods in which its doors
were closed. A country of unprecedented diversity, it nevertheless has a long history of
assimilation, the aim of which was to forge the many into one. The failed integration
of a considerable proportion of the black population has divided America particular-
ly deeply. Strictly speaking, slavery and racial segregation are not part of the history of
immigration, but their legacy influences the way in which America deals with ethnic
differences to this day. Migrants have ultimately created a great world power, which as
a ‘nation of immigrants’ is held together by a potent sense of mission. These are the
lessons of the history of America, and they are both instructive for Europeans and of
great value to contemporary Americans.

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The divided house of Islam
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  
There’s no escaping it any longer. Every day, certainly since that bolt from the blue,
we’re confronted by violence in the name of religion, in the name of Islam. It shrinks
our world, turning the global village of our dreams into a beleaguered city. This
makes it increasingly hard to look at Islam without thinking of fundamentalism and
terror, increasingly hard not to see the Muslims within our borders as part of a world-
wide community of faith that’s in a deep state of crisis.
We’re assured from many sides that Islam is ‘a religion of peace’ that preaches toler-
ance and respect. At the same time pictures roll across our screens of Muslims who say
they’re engaged in a ‘holy war’. The fact is that all monotheistic religions have both
peaceful and violent traditions. Their scriptures support the image of a loving God
but no less the image of a vengeful God. In our time Islam is at the centre of a global
conflict, but we should not forget that great diversity exists within the Muslim com-
munity, nor that Christianity too has a history of violence.
American political scientist Carl Brown criticizes both the way Islam is presented
in the West and attitudes to the West in the Islamic world: ‘The one constant element
in Muslim-Western relations throughout the centuries is that of religious suspicion
and politico-military confrontation.’This is unique, since the West does not have
such tense relations with any other faith. The religions of the east are simply too far
away and they have not sought political confrontation. The clash between Christian -
ity and Islam has everything to do with the geographical proximity of the Middle East.
Moreover, both are monotheistic religions with a universal mission. There’s a lot to be
said for the idea that this age-old conflict arises as much out of what the two religions
have in common as out of their differences.
Their confrontation has a long history, shaped in part by the crusades and the way
they’re kept alive in our minds. It says a great deal about the contemporary Arab self-
image that those confrontations long ago – the crusades began in  and ended with
the expulsion of the Franks from the Holy Land in  – still figure so large in the col-
lective memory. This equating of the West with imperialism and colonialism, the self-
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image of Islam as the eternal victim, is a rather one-sided view of history, and a way of
evading responsibility.
Muslim interventions in Europe, by contrast, culminating in the seizure of large
parts of Spain and southern Italy (eighth century), the Battle of Tours-Poitiers (),
the sack of Rome (), the fall of Constantinople (), the conquest of the Balkans
(sixteenth century) and the sieges of Vienna ( and ), contribute hardly any-
thing nowadays to the image of Islam in the Western world. Nevertheless, up until the
early eighteenth century the fear in Europe was considerable. The relief that followed
the Treaty of Karlowitz in , which many historians regard as the start of a new era
in political relations between the two sides, was correspondingly great.
Italian historian Franco Cardini describes the centuries of pressure from Islam as a
‘violent midwife’ to Europe. The contrast gave rise to self-definitions and self-images.
Initially the battle against Muslim armies was not considered a religious conflict, but
this changed in the mid-ninth century after the looting of St Peter’s in Rome and the
killing, for refusing to convert to Islam, of the ‘Martyrs of Córdoba’, forty-eight Chris-
tians in the Iberian peninsula, which by then was almost entirely under Muslim con-
trol.
That memory now has little significance, except in Spain, where during one debate
a journalist with the quality newspaper El Pais remarked that it was perfectly clear
what the Muslims were up to. This was still quite some time before the fateful March
, when four trains were blown up in the Spanish capital and some two hundred
people killed. He believed we were witnessing an attempt to reverse the Reconquista of
, when Muslims were driven out. In Austria too the historical clash with the Mus-
lim world still works its way through into public life. The siege of Vienna by the Ot-
toman armies was a turning point in the country’s history.
These two nations aside, it’s clear that the old conflict with Islam has little effect on
the way Europe looks at current tensions. The balance of power has changed and the
influence of religion is declining. Critical commentary on the crusades goes back a
longway.Take the Dutch classic byC.BuskenHuet,Het land vanRembrand [Rem-
brandt’s country], inwhich the crusaders are ridiculed as culturally inferior: ‘Familiar
with no other forms of building than those of the ungainly or wretched abbeys of
Bloemhof and Rozeveld,Moorish architecture fills them with a sense of wonder they
would like to put into words. Yet they are still too much bushman of the North to be
able to venerate thatwhich they donot understand.TheirChristianity and race hatred
makes them see the work of the Devil in the artistic creations of the Mohammedans.’
European countries and the Muslim world differ significantly in the way they deal
with the past. The direct connection made by quite a few Muslims between the cru-
sades and the modern-day imperialism of Europe and America obscures several essen-
tial historical episodes. Crucially, Islam coincides from the start with a history of colo-
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nization and imperial conquest. On the subject of Indonesia, for example, VS Naipaul
remarks: ‘Islam and Europe had arrived here almost at the same time as competing
imperialisms.’ He describes how non-Arab peoples were colonized twice over, twice
alienated from themselves. The cultural influence of Islam was profound: ‘Converted
peoples have to strip themselves of their past. It is the most uncompromising kind of
imperialism.’
Not that Western expansionism is cancelled out by that of Islam, but we should be
aware of both. The notion of ‘competing imperialisms’ seems exactly right. Coloniza-
tion by Islam was just as much a matter of cultural domination, slavery, violence and
abuse of power. Slavery, for example, was provided for at length in Islamic law. The
trade was not abolished in the Ottoman and Persian empires until the early twentieth
century, in Egypt even later, in , and in Iraq in , while anti-slavery laws were in-
troduced in Yemen and Saudi Arabia as recently as . Even today we hear reports of
slavery in African countries such as Sudan.
Muslim reformer Fatima Mernissi concludes bitterly that the Islamic struggle for
equality was turned on its head: ‘So we see that Muslims, beginning in the seventh cen-
tury, could have started elaborating laws that would have realized the Prophet’s dream
of an egalitarian society. But it was not until the twentieth century that with much an-
guish – and under pressure from the “immoral infidels,” otherwise known as the colo-
nizers – they renounced slavery.’
Islam as a victim of the imperialism of others, Islam as underdog. It’s a rather cur-
sory way to summarize centuries of expansionism. At the very least we should recog-
nize that the Muslim world has always aspired to create states. History has left its mark.
Islam and Christianity have contrasting views on the relationship between church
and state. In the Christian tradition, which took shape politically only after a full three
centuries of battle and persecution in the Roman Empire, we find a doctrine dealing
with the relationship between spiritual and earthly powers: ‘Render therefore unto
Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s.’
(Matthew :). No matter how the relationship between holders of worldly and spir-
itual power changed – from open conflict to close cooperation, from subordination to
domination – a church hierarchy existed throughout, with institutions of its own.
From the outset Islam, by contrast, developed hand in hand with a rapidly expand-
ing empire. The state was Islamic from its inception and therefore had little need of
separate religious structures. Islam has no ‘church’ in the sense familiar to us. The less
hierarchical way in which the ulema (religious scholars) are organized makes an insti-
tutional confrontation between church and state such as arose in Christian Europe
virtually impossible. The history of the Islamic world is characterized by a separation
of state and society rather than church and state. The main features of its political cul-
ture were subordination and resignation. 
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Pointing to the Islamic world’s expansionism does nothing to justify the often bar-
barous methods by which the European powers tried across two centuries to gain a
foothold in the Middle East, but it does give us the context. In his study of the crusades,
Amin Maalouf describes the differences between the belligerents from an Arab per-
spective. He portrays their history with considerable sympathy for the Muslim point
of view, yet he concedes that whereas in Europe the crusades heralded a long period of
prosperity, the Arab world had entered a period of decline even before hostilities be-
gan. Maalouf speaks of ‘long centuries of decadence and obscurantism’. He goes on:
‘Assaulted from all quarters, the Muslim world turned in on itself. It became over-sen-
sitive, defensive, intolerant, sterile – attitudes that grew steadily worse… Henceforth
progress was the embodiment of the “other”. Modernism became alien.’
The nostalgia of many Muslims for their Golden Age refers not just to a quest for re-
ligious purity and originality but to a desire for imperial greatness. Abhorrence of the
West is not a rejection of the imperial idea as such, rather it reflects a much lamented
loss of power. There is a great feeling of hurt in the Muslim world, especially the Arab
part of it. Understandably so, since the scars of the colonial era remain. Travelling
through Algeria in the early nineteenth century, Tocqueville arrived at a harsh verdict:
‘We have brought Muslim society to a far more miserable, more disordered, more ig-
norant and more barbaric state than it was in before they came to know us.’
Yet the decline of the Islamic world began before it was subjected to colonial inter-
ference and continued after the colonial powers withdrew. There’s therefore every rea-
son for greater self-examination, and it should not be evaded by continually posing
the question of guilt: ‘Who has done this to us?’ The answer is: ultimately, no one. Re-
sponsibility needs to be acknowledged by the Islamic world itself. Its decline was of its
own making, a natural outcome of deliberate isolation from the economic and scien-
tific innovations of Europe. The Renaissance, the Reformation, the technological rev-
olution – they all passed most of the Muslim world by virtually unnoticed. The major-
ity of Muslims persisted in seeing Christian Europeans as barbarians, from whom lit-
tle or nothing could be learned. This introverted attitude on the part of the Muslim
world has proven extremely disadvantageous. 
That deliberate and profound isolation from Europe lasted for centuries. In his
novel My Name Is Red, Turkish author Orhan Pamuk portrays the conflict at the Ot-
toman court that resulted from the introduction of Venetian painting techniques. The
painters of miniatures refused to have anything to do with the technique of perspec-
tive: ‘If the houses on a street were rendered according to man’s false perception that
they gradually diminish in size as they recede into the distance, wouldn’t man then ef-
fectively be usurping Allah’s place at the centre of the world?’ The new way of looking
sparked deep fears. It was surely downright heresy to ‘draw, from the perspective of a
mangy street dog, a horsefly and a mosque as if they were the same size – with the ex-
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cuse that the mosque was in the background – thereby mocking the faithful who at-
tend prayers’.
Islam sees itself as the successor to, indeed as the ultimate, perfected version of Ju-
daism and Christianity. This inherent superiority of Islam in the eyes of its main-
stream followers goes some way to explain why their interest in the Western world de-
veloped only at a late stage. Reformers within Islam have tried to put a different slant
on it. Nasr Abu Zayd, for example, describes Islam as ‘a closing message and the last
word from heaven to earth’, meaning above all a recognition ‘that humanity had left
behind it the stage of immaturity, which required continual tutelage, and had grown
up’. Tunisian liberal Muslim thinker Mohamed Charfi says more or less the same
thing: the ending of the time of prophesy actually opens up space for people to ‘con-
struct their futures in freedom, with individual responsibility and active solidarity’.
So the belief that Islam marked the final chapter of the prophetic tradition can be
explained by these scholars as an invitation to independent thought. Yet that call for
intellectual freedom only goes to show that the closed attitude is currently dominant.
This is all the more striking when we consider that the period in which the Islamic
world flourished in the Middle Ages can be regarded as the only link between ancient
scholarship and European modernity. Much of the knowledge from classical antiqui-
ty that was of such crucial importance during the Renaissance would have been lost
without the great scientific and cultural achievements of the Muslim world, which
was governed successively from Medina, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo and Istanbul.
The caliphate was not just a rapidly expanding political force, it represented a develop-
ing civilization, even in respect to its dealings with other religions. 
The ever-critical Bernard Lewis is outspoken in his appraisal of the historical mer-
its of Islam. He points to the lead taken by the liberal democracies in modern times:
‘There is nothing in Islamic history to compare with the emancipation, acceptance,
and integration of other-believers and non-believers in the West.’ At the same time,
however, he writes that ‘there is nothing in Islamic history to compare with the Span-
ish expulsion of Jews and Muslims, the Inquisition, the Auto da fés, the wars of reli-
gion, not speak of more recent crimes of commission and acquiescence’. From a con-
temporary point of view Christians and Jews were certainly second-class citizens in
the Islamic world, and they were required to pay a special tax, but by the standards of
the time they did have a fair degree of autonomy. They could organize their lives large-
ly as they chose.
After the long centuries in which the Muslim world occupied a central position po-
litically and culturally, its decline came as a bitter blow. Stagnation now blights the
core countries of Islam. The Arab Human Development Report of  paints a tragic
picture. Compiled by scholars from the countries concerned, the report draws atten-
tion to three major shortcomings of the Arab world: the lack of democratic freedoms,
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the weak position of women, and problems in science and education. It gives concrete
examples: the total production of translations in the Arab world from the ninth cen -
tury onwards is equal to the number of translated works published in Spain every year
and, to stay with Spain, the total income of that country is greater than the income of
all Arab nations combined.
Yet there’s no reason to exclude the possibility of Islamic reform out of hand. Lewis
refuses to be convinced that Islam cannot in theory be combined with freedom, sci-
ence and economic development: ‘How is it that Muslim society in the past was a pio-
neer in all three, and this when Muslims were much closer in time to the sources and
inspiration of their faith than they are now?’ In saying this he means to make clear
that the history of Islam suggests possibilities beyond the current doldrums.
There’s a general feeling that stories about a flourishing Islamic culture refer to an
increasingly distant past. A civilization that derives its legitimacy from such a far off
history has lost much of its power to convince. A split self-image results. The lofty civi-
lization of memory makes the demonstrable time-lag that now separates it from the
West – and to an increasing extent even from other countries in Asia – unbearable.
This perspective is generally avoided, but under the skin self-criticism is rife. We
might call it the malaise within Islam, a whole raft of cultural and religious doubts
that cannot be voiced, which therefore find an outlet in aggression and resentment, or
in resignation of a kind that refuses to acknowledge any responsibility.
Reformers like Abu Zayd have not failed to notice that their world is languishing.
Dependence on the West is obvious in all fields of modern science and technology.
‘The form, the material life, is modern and progressive; the content, the intellectual
and spiritual life, is traditional and archaic. These contrasts are a direct menace to all
kinds of modern ways of life and they threaten the Islamic consciousness with slow
suicide.’
This developmental disjunction in the core Islamic countries is reflected in the
composition of their populations. Demographic projections suggest that the Arab
world, which is to say a group of countries in the immediate vicinity of the expanded
European Union, will see its population grow from million in  to somewhere
between  and  million by . In the short term the rise will place these soci-
eties under even greater strain. A majority of the population are minors, almost per
cent aged under fourteen, which means tens of millions of young people find them-
selves in a fairly hopeless situation. It’s a known fact that a relatively young population
is in itself a source of unrest and carries within it the seeds of violence.
The better news is that the pressure will ease from about -, since the average
number of children born per woman is falling. The population will by then be slightly
older than it is now. American demographer Philip Longman even speaks of a ‘demo-
graphic dividend’, since resources will come free for infrastructural development and,
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so he hopes, ‘the appeal of radicalism could also diminish as young adults make up
less of the population’.
Even if in the longer term the prospects are somewhat brighter, it’s clear that rapid
population growth will only add to the pressure to migrate. Already many young peo-
ple say they want to move to Europe or America. This is of course impossible and the
deep frustration that already exists will not be reduced if children now growing to
adulthood feel imprisoned in a stagnating society, while on the other side of the
Mediterranean the wealth and freedom of Europe beckon.
   
Today’s migration flows reveal the true relationship between Europe and the Arab
world. People are voting with their feet. In authoritarian Arab states they have few oth-
er means of expression. Those who don’t become resigned to their fate or resort to
more violent forms of protest leave their native countries and head for the major cities
of the former colonial powers, against which their parents’ generation fought so hard
to achieve independence. The irony of the situation is inescapable and migrants might
well ask themselves why they’ve been set adrift. Why have poverty and repression, far
from decreasing, often increased since decolonization?
Meanwhile Europe is home to many Muslim immigrants and the malaise within
Islam has migrated into our world along with them. It’s estimated that within twenty
years around thirty million Muslims, twice the current number, will be living in the
European Union. This creates a situation unique in the history of Islam, namely the
permanent settlement of a large number of Muslims in a liberal and secular society,
that of Western Europe, a region made up of the most irreligious countries in today’s
world. How are they to live as a minority amid Christians and Jews, apostates and hea-
thens?
Within Muslim communities there have been various responses to this challenge.
One possible route is liberal reform, with Islam somehow reconciling itself with the
principles of a secular society. Innumerable Muslim thinkers are searching in this di-
rection, although their voices are weaker than we might wish. On the other hand there
are clear instances of fundamentalism within the Muslim communities of Europe. As
a third possibility we might expect to find European secularization rubbing off on
Muslim immigrants. There are plenty of signs of reduced religious commitment.
These are the three possible directions: orthodox, liberal and secular.
Let’s first look more closely at signs of secularization, before moving on to examine
evidence of radicalization and liberalization. An article written by journalist Gerard
van Westerloo about the Dutch branch of the Turkish Muslim movement Milli Görüs
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illustrates the fact that migration to the West deeply affects the self-image of Muslims.
The problems of permanent settlement as a Muslim in a secular environment are
summed up by one member of Milli Görüs, Selami Yüksel: ‘It means letting go of an
essential part of yourself.’ Van Westerloo asks what part he means and notes his inter-
viewee’s response. ‘He hesitates for a moment and then comes out with a key state-
ment that explains why integration is so painful. “The idea that you’re one hundred
per cent a Muslim. The idea that you’re perfect.”’
In a secular environment, religious purity can be experienced only in isolation.
Even then there are limits, since in a constitutional state with no place for Islamic law,
a traditional Muslim must always accept some degree of affront. The sharia attaches
legal sanctions to apostasy that are unacceptable in Western countries, such as the dis-
solution of marriage and deprivation of parental and inheritance rights. The moral
convictions enshrined in Islamic legislation are not the same as those recognized in
the West; they contravene the principles of freedom and equality for all. Where free-
dom of conscience exists, religion as a juridical doctrine has no place. 
In the view of social scientists Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, the yawning gap
between secular European societies and the overwhelmingly religious Muslim world
is all about the security of existence. Their argument has the charm of simplicity.
There’s a powerful inverse relationship between religious belief and feeling secure.
The more vulnerable people are to unpredictable forces in life, the greater their ten-
dency to have faith in God. Conversely, the more secure people feel, the less likely they
are to embrace a religion. ‘Societies where people’s daily lives are shaped by the threat
of poverty, disease, and premature death remain as religious today as centuries earli-
er.’Richer countries, on the other hand, are engaged in a fairly steady process of secu-
larization. ‘The need for religious reassurance becomes less pressing under conditions
of greater security.’
Based on the research carried out by Norris and Inglehart – and a degree of caution,
given the unequivocal nature of their argument – we can draw certain conclusions
about migrants and faith. If it’s true that there’s a close connection between security
and secularization, then it’s surely no accident that many migrants who find them-
selves in a relatively marginalized and insecure position cling to religious faith. It’s a
phenomenon extensively documented in American migrant history. Immigrants
have a strong tendency to group up around shared beliefs. One report on Muslims in
the Netherlands concludes: ‘A certain degree of religious perpetuation is only to be ex-
pected, to the extent that religion is bound up with family life, ethnic identity and so-
cial ties in immigrant communities.’
If we assume religion plays a greater than average role in the lives of the children of
Muslim immigrants as well as those of their parents, then it’s important to think
about the changes that religion will undergo in a secular society. Existence as a minor -
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ity faith in a relatively non-religious environment is an entirely new experience in the
history of Islam, and indeed the history of Europe. Because there are no precedents,
the outcome is unpredictable. In modern societies, culture and religion have grown
apart. Several obstacles need to be removed if we’re to make a more or less natural inte-
gration of Islam possible and if Muslim believers are to emancipate themselves from
the cultures of their countries of origin.
French researcher Olivier Roy has written about the Islamic diaspora in Western
Europe. He looks primarily at the children of migrants and detects an increasing indi-
vidualization of religious experience, speaking of ‘the reinvention of an ideal religious
community, founded solely on the practice of the faith and personal adherence to it,
to the exclusion of the specific traditions and cultures of any one country or geograph-
ical area’. In the second generation at least, a split can be seen between culture and re-
ligion: ‘The greatest innovation brought about by the transition of Islam to the West is
the decoupling of Islam as a religion and as a concrete culture.’
Roy believes this lack of social embedding means the faith is increasingly a matter
of individual choice for young Muslims: ‘Everything that was simple because silently
accepted, embedded in custom and consensus … , suddenly has to be explicitly formu-
lated. Islam becomes the object of reflection.’ This has its consequences: ‘The values
of the inner life come to the fore: patience, trial, resistance to temptation, or prohibi-
tions are just as much opportunities for spiritual development.’
Many options are available; the future is truly open. Take the story of Salma Ismaili,
a Moroccan woman, which reads like a tale of conversion. After a fairly wild youth she
suddenly became extremely pious. She wears a headscarf: ‘No one talked me into it.
It’s not necessary, either. I wear it as a symbol. I’m making clear I’m a Muslim!’ A little
later: ‘They can’t stand the fact that, when it comes down to it, you recognize no au-
thority other than God. I set a good example, don’t I? Who am I threatening by not be-
lieving in evolution? What trouble does that cause anyone?’ She wants to return to
Morocco eventually. The aggrieved tone is conspicuous, but no one would want to
challenge her personal choice, as long as her rejection of evolutionary theory doesn’t
become the opening shot in a new battle over education.
Her story suggests that the individualization of the experience of faith is by no
means always the same as its liberalization. In fact, says Roy, if anything the opposite is
the case, at least in the short term: ‘The individual appropriation of the sacred is gener-
ally speaking profoundly orthodox.’Making religion more explicit is not the same as
liberalizing it, in fact their articulation will tend to make beliefs more dogmatic: ‘The
hardening of the discourse about values … is taking place in the context of a crisis of
those values.’ He’s more optimistic about the longer term prospects; ultimately, the
liberalization and secularization of Islam in Europe will continue.
In opposition to this turn towards orthodoxy stands Fadoua Bouali, a Moroccan-
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Dutch nurse who writes, for example: ‘My Islam would never approve of violence to-
wards women and it would never force me to marry a man and give birth only to sons.’
Most striking here is the term ‘my Islam’. Bouali is demanding and exercising the right
to a personal interpretation of the faith. She writes about ‘the entire Muslim commu-
nity which for centuries has watched passively and cooperated as women are made to
suffer in the name of Islam’.
These two contrasting life stories indicate that within the Muslim community
many different choices are being made. Yet group pressure should not be underesti-
mated. With his stress on the privatization of faith, Roy pays insufficient attention to
social pressure within families and the loyalty children feel to their parents, a loyalty
that’s often at odds with personal preferences but has an effect nonetheless. He writes:
‘Neither law nor social pressure nor simple custom forces anyone who is “Muslim” by
origin to practice the faith.’ That’s too hasty a verdict, since there can be no doubt
that many people are indeed placed under pressure. Conformism is reinforced by the
fact that in European cities more and more ethnic enclaves have grown up, and within
them attempts are being made to preserve religious beliefs.
It also remains true that for a Muslim, openly stating that you no longer believe is
social suicide. Apostasy actually carries the death penalty in orthodox Islam, as a
much-consulted book by Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri confirms: ‘When a person who
has reached puberty and is sane voluntarily apostatises from Islam, he deserves to be
killed.’ This won’t happen with any great frequency in the West, but an apostate is at
real risk of exclusion, of being cast out of his or her community or family. This is an-
other reason why it’s premature to see Islam as an individual experience of faith. All
the same, there’s a considerable likelihood that it will move in that direction, since we
can expect the already fragmented Muslim community to be less and less able to keep
a firm grip on its religion.
There are a good many obstacles yet to be overcome before Islam can take root in a
democratic environment, but Norris and Inglehart point out that the conflict mainly
concerns personal morality. ‘The central values separating Islam and the West revolve
far more centrally around Eros than Demos.’ Simply put, the most profound differ-
ences between secular and religious societies concern relationships between men and
women, issues surrounding homosexuality and abortion, and beliefs about the family.
This cultural or moral divide has widened spectacularly in the past few decades, main-
ly because of rapid liberalization in our part of the world, which has broken free from
God.
These cultural differences affect migrants directly. Family life and the position of
girls and women within it is a source of particularly fierce conflict. Children growing
up in Muslim families worry a great deal about what is or is not permitted. Their
dilemmas are usually private but they have obvious public consequences. People are
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too often distracted by the intriguingly modern appearance of many young Muslims,
failing to realize that in many respects they are trapped in a fairly traditional morality.
The loss of virginity before marriage is seen as a problem. One option is surgical repair
of the hymen. A handbook for social workers suggests that when a girl asks about this
possibility ‘it is worth first finding out whether there might be other ways of getting
blood onto the sheet, such as a minor cut or a prick to the finger or thigh’. It all seems
reminiscent of a bygone era, the days of abortions in grimy back rooms, but many
girls and boys struggle with this kind of anxiety every day.
Homosexuality remains hidden too, even though it’s not exactly unknown in the
Arab world. Aggression towards homosexuals sends an unambiguous message: it’s in-
creasingly dangerous to come out. Muslims with the wrong sexual orientation lead a
double life and face a constant moral dilemma. Hakan puts it like this: ‘It’s damned
hard to be born a homosexual in an Islamic family. You’re pretty much doomed from
the start to a miserable existence. Your own parents renounce you as if you’re a piece of
dirt.’
There’s a long way to go yet before the moral stance of the average Muslim coin-
cides with that of mainstream liberal society. Many deeply traditional customs from
their countries of origin are justified in the name of Islam. For girls, growing up in
Muslim communities in the West can be a confusing and sometimes terrible experi-
ence. For many years it was assumed that honour killings and other violent practices
never, or hardly ever took place in migrant communities. We now know better. In
countries like Germany and the Netherlands many cases are registered annually, and
they’re the tip of an iceberg of domestic violence. Some years ago the murder of twen-
ty-three-year-old Hatun Sürücü, a Turkish woman living in Berlin, broke the silence
in Germany. Three shots were fired at close range by her younger brother, hitting her
in the head and face. The two older brothers, who were almost certainly involved in
the murder plot, were acquitted. A photograph of them walking out of court smiling,
flashing victory signs, was shown all around the world.
What part do religious convictions play in such cases? There’s a combination of cul-
ture and religion here that’s not easy to disentangle. We shouldn’t regard honour
killing as specific to Islam, if only because it can also be found in Mediterranean cul-
tures with Christian traditions, but Islamic teachings often bring violence against
women within easy reach. Investigating the phenomenon in Turkish communities in
the Netherlands and Germany, Erdal Gezik, comments: ‘Rules of honour and shame
are the result of the natural separation of man and woman, such that honour is repre-
sented by the man and shame by the woman. Women are expected to be sexually pure
before marriage and spiritually pure after marriage.’ This inequality between men
and women is an essential article of faith for many mainstream Muslims in migrant
communities. 
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We see the same inequality in the debate about the wearing of the headscarf or hi-
jab. It signifies many different things – it’s part of a shame culture as well as a religious
obligation and a political statement – and has become a loaded symbol. As a personal
choice made in freedom, everyone should accept it, but clearly children are not fully
free to choose to wear the hijab. In some countries, including France and Belgium,
there’s a widespread belief that a ban in schools might contribute to the protection of
children and the preservation of a degree of neutrality in the public domain. In other
countries too, many schools have banned it.
Fawzia Zouari, born in Tunisia and now living in France, opposes a ban. She be-
lieves critics of the headscarf are ignoring something essential, in that many Muslim
women believe it’s not a matter of subordination to men but of subordination to God.
She claims they see the hijab as symbolizing equality of treatment, since it’s a way to
avoid being seen as a sex object when out in public, a way of moving around without
attracting attention. The paradox here of course is that in Western societies a woman
actually draws attention to herself by wearing a headscarf. It’s a highly visible symbol
by which she continually declares her religious convictions to the outside world. It
marks her out to such a degree that the astonishment we often hear – ‘Why does every-
one see me as a Muslim?’ – seems rather other-worldly. 
Another observation by Zouari is more convincing. She says the aim of many
women who choose to wear headscarves truly is their own emancipation: ‘Their ob-
jective is clear: they want to escape from family bonds by means of Islam, to question
their parents and their traditions while making sure that such questions cannot be at-
tributed to Western beliefs.’ She quotes a Muslim woman called Nouria, who says:
‘Having command of Islam is the best means of defending yourself against obscuran-
tism and of resisting traditions that oppress women.’ There’s something to be said
for this notion and some girls who wear the hijab do indeed seem far from timid. In
some cases it can be seen as a step towards the outside world, a way of exploring life
without interference from the family.
Yet the hijab is commonly seen not as an expression of independence but rather as a
sign of conformism. In many neighbourhoods it is increasingly hard to walk down the
street with no head covering. Conservative imams claim that women who wear head-
scarves run less risk of sexual intimidation – which amounts to saying that women
who do not do so are making themselves vulnerable. Such statements can be interpret-
ed as a concealed threat. True though all this may be, whether it could justify a general
ban, in schools for instance, remains an open question. Whether it’s a matter of faith
or of lifestyle, there’s an inherent contradiction in any attempt at forced emancipa-
tion. 
The government must tread carefully, certainly where adults are concerned. The
wearing of a headscarf is ultimately a personal choice, although it ought to be ruled
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out for those fulfilling certain public functions on behalf of a neutral government,
such as police officers. This basic premise is now being challenged. A few years ago a
Dutch court refused to take on a student as assistant clerk after she announced that
she wanted to wear her headscarf in the courtroom. Those affected by the ban say the
blindfold and the hijab go very well together, not only in the case of an assistant clerk
of the court but for a judge. Yet the maintenance of neutrality in the courtroom is a
thing of great value and it requires some degree of uniformity.
The same goes for the police. In the Netherlands the integration of religious sym-
bols into the uniform is being seriously considered. The proposal by Dutch chief con-
stables to allow an officer to exchange the uniform cap for a turban or headscarf
should he or she wish to do so is a good example of the uncertainty that the presence
of an increasing number of migrants brings with it. Such genuflections to religious
preference are no doubt well-intentioned, but it seems people have not asked them-
selves whether this infringement of uniform regulations is compatible with the goal of
equality for all. In jobs where the wearing of uniforms is not compulsory, uniformity
is presumably regarded as less important and the wearing of a headscarf need not be a
problem.
It’s important to make a clear choice in the public domain. Liberal democracy of-
ten presents itself as a neutral arena within which cultures can collide and meld. Toler-
ance means accepting that others have a right to their religious beliefs, and people
who want to do away with the separation of church and state or with equal rights for
men and women are entitled to voice their opinions. But that neutrality has to stop
somewhere and such beliefs must be contradicted by public authorities, one of whose
primary tasks is to defend equality. This will give no satisfaction to orthodox religious
groups that insist their own cultures must be recognized as of equal worth.
  
The clashes surrounding The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie drew our attention to
another tendency within the Muslim community in Europe: radicalization can spill
over into violence. Rushdie has been the target of public threats in towns like Brad-
ford, such as this statement by the secretary of the Bradford Council of Mosques,
Sayed Abdul Quddus: ‘Muslims here would kill him and I would willingly sacrifice my
own life and that of my children to carry out the Ayatollah’s wishes should the oppor-
tunity arise.’
In facing such threats it’s essential always to make a distinction between doctrinaire
Islam, which has moral objections to liberal lifestyles, and a politically motivated re-
jection of Western society. Conservative cultural criticism may often go together with
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political radicalism, but it need not. Many people adopt a defensive attitude to a socie-
ty that seems strange and hostile. Attempting to survive in an enclave is not the same
as trying to dislocate a society by intimidation.
In a liberal environment there’s nothing neutral about the prospect of integration.
Clearly some have more to lose by it than others. What one person calls integration
may mean disintegration to someone else. Interaction with an open society turns the
notion of a cohesive Pakistani or Turkish community into a fiction. This is the reason
many religious leaders try to maintain as great a distance as possible between their fol-
lowers and the outside world by continually insisting that the decadent society they
live in won’t give them a chance.
Some say what we’re seeing is little more than an Islamic version of orthodox Chris-
tian movements, a variation on all too familiar religious hair-splitting. As far as issues
surrounding homosexuality or family life are concerned, there’s much to be said for
this comparison. In other milieus too modern society is viewed with suspicion. The
similarities between conservative Christianity and orthodox Islam are obvious, but
they threaten to obscure a number of differences. Dogmatic believers are to be found
in all faiths, but they are a minority in Western Christianity, whereas they constitute a
majority in the Muslim communities of Europe and certainly beyond, as confirmed
by the authors of a recent study: ‘The contemporary interpretation of the religious
doctrine of Islam is predominantly conservative in nature.’
Another difference is that in most Western countries Christian orthodoxy is con-
centrated outside the major cities – many countries have a Bible Belt – whereas the rise
of Islamic conservatism is an urban phenomenon. The reasons why major European
cities such as Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Lyon, London and Copenhagen attract Muslim
migrants are largely economic, but cultural differences are maximized by the urban
environment. As we have noted before, this transition from the countryside to the city
is difficult enough even in migrants’ home countries; Algerians or Pakistanis who
move to their own major cities have all kinds of problems adjusting.
For all their hostility to the majority culture, home-grown Christian orthodox be-
lievers are not affected by the cultural alienation that accompanies migration, and
most Muslims are in a weak social position, partly as a result of their history as guest
workers. These are further reasons why traditionalism has an effect on the integration
of Muslims into society that is quite different from the effect that attendance at
churches preaching hellfire and damnation has on believers in the established com-
munity.
Some think the dogmatic interpretation of Islam will soften of its own accord. It’s
often argued that today’s liberal societies had a less than enlightened attitude towards
homosexuality, for example, in the recent past, so Muslims shouldn’t be blamed too
harshly for holding similar views today. There’s something odd about this notion,
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since outright conflict with a conservative religion was required to move society for-
ward. There’s nothing automatic about the liberalization of religious practices. Open
clashes between people with firmly held opinions are an essential part of the process.
Anyone who values the emancipation that has taken place over past decades should at-
tach great importance to initiatives aimed at liberalization of a similar kind within
Muslim communities.
A gulf yawns between liberal societies and the culture of traditional Muslims.
Dutch author Yasmine Allas, who comes from Somalia, offers us a taste of their world:
‘I met people who had lived here for years but who really had no idea what the Nether-
lands was, people who were surrounded only by their own culture and by fellow be-
lievers, children who were born and brought up here in this country yet had never had
any contact with Dutch children.’ Inevitably, there are consequences: ‘To my amaze-
ment I met people who had opted for this country but at the same time spoke about it
with contempt. I met parents who had passed on to their children the distorted image
of our society that they’d created for themselves.’
Allas describes how her once liberal mother gradually fell under the spell of an ex-
tremely conservative form of Islam. The true faith was drummed into her via cassette
recordings. ‘Men’s voices cheer at the punishment that awaits apostates in the here-
after.’ Mother and daughter grew apart: ‘I’ll never forget her funeral. It was unreal,
since the religious extremists who prayed for her said that I, as a woman, was forbid-
den to attend. “This is men’s work,” they announced. From far away, between two
trees, I tried desperately to catch a final glimpse of her coffin.’
The reinforcement of strict religious convictions can hardly be seen as progress –
had they not freed themselves from believers who adhered to an oppressive form of
faith, Western societies would never have become so open – but it’s a far more serious
matter when traditional beliefs become distilled into a radical rejection of liberal
democracy. From time to time fiercely hostile pronouncements by imams or other re-
ligious leaders reach the outside world. After a flurry of consternation, they’re usually
quickly forgotten.
We’d be wise not to underestimate the radical minority. There are many such move-
ments and they are gradually trying to gain a foothold in Europe. The Salafists are the
best known. They see Europe as dar-al-kufr, a region of heretics and unbelievers. One
Salafist group will conclude that violence is justified under present circumstances, an-
other that it has every reason to close itself off as far as it can from a morally corrupt
environment: ‘Salafism is not a coherent, uniform movement, rather it consists of a
number of currents, ranging from religious puritanism to violent political-religious
activism.’
This is illustrated by the situation in the Netherlands, where radicalization among
Muslim youth does not differ greatly from similar tendencies in other Western Euro-
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pean countries. In one study, a number of young Salafists were interviewed. Mounir,
who adheres to a violent interpretation, formulates his harsh beliefs as follows: ‘There
can be no compromise between Islam and democracy. Democracy has nothing to
teach us; everything has already been said by our religion. What has democracy ac-
complished up to now? What have they achieved here in the West? Travel to the moon?
That was a lie. People say they faked the pictures.’ He is convinced of one thing: ‘An Is-
lamic state must come; the aim and the means are realistic. Look at the WTC, Madrid
and London. Our religion, our prophet and his companions are being insulted. Our
brothers are being killed. People who kill us, we must kill.’
What all the radical currents have in common is the conviction that Islam’s very ex-
istence is under threat. The work of Sayyid Qutb, the most important thinker of the
fundamentalist Muslim brotherhood in Egypt in the s, demonstrates the kind of
arguments used to support political Islam. Qutb condemns the decadence of the West
and above all the separation of religious and worldly affairs, saying that every dividing
line between the secular and the sacred suggests that in everyday matters there’s more
than one supreme authority, and that this in turn implies the existence of more than
one God. He fears that liberal ideas would slowly spread to the Islamic world and sees
radical engagement as the only fitting response to that threat. Qutb suggests quite
baldly that fathoming the truth of the Koran requires not just religious devotion but
revolutionary action in the name of Islam.
Such a worldview means it’s one easy step from rebelling against liberal values to
justifying the use of violence. Radicalization is a slow process, however, since it takes
time to sever all links with established society. People need powerful reasons for re-
sorting to violence. The alienation that makes young people receptive to radical Islam
is, among other things, an indirect consequence of migration. Mustapha says: ‘My
family is straying. They no longer practice the faith. All my family thinks about is
whether you’ve got your diploma and whether you’re earning a good salary. That’s the
pursuit of your desires. Their Islam is very weak; they know nothing.’ The rift be-
tween parents and children that characterizes all migratory processes clearly con-
tributes to radicalization.
A large proportion of young Muslims born in the West have set off on their own
roads to nowhere. What often surprises people is that so many of these radicalized
youngsters were born in European countries. Three of the perpetrators of the attacks
on the London Underground of  July  – Shehzad Tanweer (), Hasib Hussein
() and Mohammed Sidique Khan () – come from Asian families in towns and
cities such as Leeds. These home-grown terrorists were described by their friends as
helpful and open. Their conversion to murderous obsession came as a huge surprise
to those around them. Perhaps this banality of terror, the thought that today’s friendly
boy next door could become tomorrow’s suicide bomber, is the most disturbing of all.
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It’s precisely the fact that the violence is so close and can’t be dismissed out of hand as
the product of a disordered personality that should worry us most. 
In sum, radicalization does not stem purely from the consequences of migration;
its causes are in part international. A sense of identification with Muslims as victims
in Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq and Afghanistan is an important motive. Ibrahim, one of
the Salafists interviewed, says: ‘I worry about the oppression of Muslims. I empathize
with my brothers in the faith. Islam is like a body, the pain is felt all over. So I feel the
pain of the Muslims.’ There’s a logic to terrorism that we should acknowledge. The
thinking behind it is that violence in the Muslim world, perpetrated anonymously by
the West, must be transferred to the streets of Western cities, since that’s the only way
to bring change. The concept of retaliation makes it possible to justify murder and to
cross the boundary into violence.
This explains why the British government and its security services laboured for a
long time under the misapprehension that a clear line could be drawn between terror-
ism within the country’s borders and acts of terror outside them. Radical Islamic
groups – such as Abu Hamza’s Finsbury Park Mosque – were tolerated on the unspo-
ken assumption that their radicalism would not be aimed at targets on British soil.
The attacks of July  brought an abrupt end to this way of thinking. Daily Mail
columnist Melanie Phillips wrote: ‘They finally lifted the veil on Britain’s dirty secret
in the war on terrorism – that for more than a decade, London had been the epicentre
of Islamic militancy in Europe.’
There is a clear relationship between events in the world at large and the radicaliza-
tion of young Muslims in cities like Lyon, Bradford and Amsterdam, one example be-
ing the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Muslim communities in Europe,
which enables the intifada to travel there from the Middle East. In the time when Ed
van Thijn was mayor of Amsterdam, there was a belief among some Muslims that they
needn’t obey the laws of a city governed by a Jewish mayor. The letter left on Theo van
Gogh’s body by his murderer had an anti-Semitic tenor as well: ‘It is a fact that Dutch
politics is dominated by many Jews who are a product of Talmudic educational insti-
tutions.’
We must not be too quick to psychologize acts of terror. First we should take the
perpetrators’ convictions seriously. Mohammad Sidique Kahn, one of the men who
mounted the attacks on the London Underground, left a video message that testifies
to an unshakable conviction: ‘We are at war and I am a soldier… Your democratically
elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people and your
support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for
protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you
will be our target.’ His choice of words demonstrates once again the extent to which
international conflict is regarded as a justification for violence at home.
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The alienation of radical Muslims from their home environments can’t be attrib-
uted to any single cause. It has to do with both a worldwide conflict and issues inher-
ent to migration, including a serious inter-generational dispute. Some young Mus-
lims distance themselves from their parents, who for numerous reasons are unable to
serve as an example to them, and at the same time they reject a society that sees their
faith as merely one among many and which they feel is doing its best to belittle Islam.
Their quest for a subculture of their own is in itself understandable. The hope remains
that peaceful ways will be found of articulating their protest.
The radical Arab European League, which had a following in Flanders and the
Netherlands for several years, seemed to offer just such an alternative. The inspiration
behind the movement, the articulate Dyab Abu Jahjah, gave a voice to Muslim discon-
tent, reiterating the old theme: the danger that the Muslim community will be de-
stroyed. In his autobiography he couples assimilation with ethnic cleansing and geno-
cide as ‘different methods that lead to the same goal’.He sees a sliding scale from cul-
tural adjustment to physical annihilation and believes that in Belgium all politicians
are in favour of assimilation, and therefore the obliteration of the Arab community.
What does Jahjah offer by way of a response? ‘We want to foster our own identity
and culture while being loyal and valuable citizens of the countries in which we live.’
Little can be said against this as it stands, but the danger of his line of reasoning lies in
the fact that if the debate about integration becomes burdened by the idea that ulti-
mately it’s all about survival as a community, the end may come to justify the means.
He alludes to this in his ominous conclusion: ‘The choice is yours: Sinn Fein or the
, Herri Batassuna or , the  or God knows what if you destroy us.’ This way
of presenting politics and terrorism as alternatives seems above all rhetorical, but it’s
hard to regard it as anything other than a concealed threat, even though Jahjah goes on
humbly: ‘We hold out our hands for dialogue and forgiveness.’
Movements like Jahjah’s must be given a chance to prove themselves, since if demo-
cratic mobilization within the Muslim community is seen to be unproductive, the vio-
lent option may gain a broader following, just as student movements in Germany and
Italy once spilled over from radicalism into terrorism. Indeed Roy sees a parallel here:
‘People are now wondering about the source of the fascination exercised by Bin Laden
on young people who have gone astray, but have we forgotten that exercised by Baader
(not to mention Mao)?’Less reassuringly, he adds: ‘The great difference is that Islam-
ic radicalism seems to have a potential social base the internationalist Marxists lacked:
the uprooted Muslim population.’ Such a base can be found in the Islamic world
from Morocco to Indonesia, but it undoubtedly exists in the suburbs of European
cities too. It really ought to surprise no one that some young people are receptive to
the temptation of political Islam. After all, it gives a new significance to lives lived in
anonymity. 
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It would be unforgivably naive not to be aware of the threat, but to what degree is
Muslim terrorism, as manifested in the attacks in New York, Madrid and London, a
strategic challenge? That such violence can create a climate of fear has been proven,
that it can divide population groups along ethnic and religious lines has been amply
demonstrated, and that it can influence foreign policy is clear from Spain’s decision to
withdraw its troops from Iraq. So there is every reason to take these acts of violence se-
riously, even if the perpetrators sometimes give the impression of being merely
teenagers who’ve gone off the rails.
Is there any real danger, however, that coordinated terrorism will disrupt Western
society permanently? Some radical groups certainly have this aim in view, but it’s fair-
ly unlikely that anyone is yet in a position to accomplish such a thing. That could
change if these groups get their hands on weapons of mass destruction, but historical-
ly terrorism has always been the weapon of the weak. It can trouble a society for many
years, divide people and threaten their civic freedoms, but the political and military re-
sources available to Western societies are so overwhelming that no one need worry too
much about the outcome of this trial of strength. Just as long as everyone is prepared
for the worst.
Acts of terror are targeted at Muslim communities in the West as well. Radical Mus-
lims believe these communities need to be confronted with a choice: either you try to
become part of the receiving society, which means corrupting your faith, or you re-
main doctrinally pure by keeping your distance as far as you can. From this point of
view it’s impossible to be both a good Muslim and a good citizen. More moderate voic-
es deny there’s a choice to be made and claim that Muslims can be citizens of a liberal
society.
The way the battle against terrorism is fought will help to determine whether Mus-
lims can stand up to intimidation by radical fellow believers. Stringent identity checks
in London after the attacks, for example, provoked considerable opposition. If Mus-
lims can see the liberal, constitutional state as protecting them, the battle against Mus-
lim terrorism will not be perceived as a confrontation with Islam as such. The remark
of one young Moroccan in a Dutch television debate points in this direction: ‘I de-
mand of the government that it protect me against violent people within my commu-
nity.’ At least as important is the degree to which Muslims face up to their own respon-
sibilities. British MP Shahid Malik was right to say, after the attacks in London: ‘Con-
demnation is not enough, and British Muslims must confront the voices of evil head
on.’

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:21  Pagina 291
 
It would help if a more liberal Islam had a greater chance of success, but attempts at re-
form have been limited up to now. Why do those who favour a more open attitude
turn out to be so ineffective? For a start this is a problem common to all world reli-
gions. Faith and democracy do not sit easily together, as the long struggle to separate
church and state in Europe illustrates. Orthodox believers cling to immutable doc-
trines and consciously set their faces against the modern world. The reformers who
try to modernize their faith often end up leading people to a loss of faith and for that
reason they’re condemned by more pious fellow believers.
Furthermore, Islam has developed historically as a majority religion in a far from
democratic environment. It has therefore rarely been challenged, either by other reli-
gions or by secular views of the world. Abdou Filali-Ansary, a reform-minded philoso-
pher from Rabat, points out that the modernization of European societies was carried
through in the face of opposition from the Christian churches. Those churches re-
fused to take a step back until forced to do so. There are few places where Islam has
been forced to re-examine itself in a similar way, so reform has been harder to initiate. 
However limited they’ve been up to now, attempts to interpret Islam in a more up-
to-date way have a significance of their own. Why should we disregard these efforts?
It’s not simply a matter of choosing between apostasy and dogmatism. A third way
may ultimately prove an illusion, but even so, if it leads people to strive for a contem-
porary interpretation of Islam it could be an extremely productive illusion. Reformers
like Hans Küng and Edward Schillebeeckx offered many believers within the Chris-
tian churches the opportunity to expand their horizons and put the certainties of
their faith into perspective without qualms. Reform-minded thinkers could play a
similar role in Islam, perhaps finding a particularly eager audience among Muslim mi-
norities in the Western world.
Despite their many differences, reformers within Islam share some common
ground. For a start they all have a sense of urgency. They acknowledge that the Muslim
world has fallen into a state of profound stagnation, partly because of its resistance to
outside influences. Abdolkarim Soroush, who comes from Iran, criticizes the concept
of gharb zadegi, which roughly translates as ‘intoxicated by the West’. Those who ad-
here to this notion advocate a return to tradition, to the things that are theirs. ‘Such
people never realize that the self must be created, that it does not come prefabricated
and maintenance-free.’ We should not direct our thoughts primarily towards that
which is ours as opposed to that which is foreign, Soroush says. Instead we should sim-
ply distinguish between good and bad, truth and falsehood. Nothing has an automatic
entitlement to our devotion simply because it originated on our own soil: ‘Each cul-
ture must disavow certain elements of itself.’
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Soroush attempts to reconcile Iran’s three cultures: a national tradition that
stretches back even beyond the introduction of Islam in the eighth century, the Islam-
ic worldview and Western thinking. All three go to make up the heritage of contempo-
rary Iran, he argues. The country has already rejected the idea of a pure culture free of
foreign influences, since anyone thinking along those lines would first have to reject
Islam, which came from outside Iran. It’s precisely the exchange with other cultures
that makes true purification possible.
Moroccan feminist Fatima Mernissi likewise takes stagnation in the Muslim world
as the starting point for her discussion. ‘And how do we react … By sliding, sorrowful-
ly, wounded, and infantilized, back toward our origins, toward an anesthetizing past
where we were protected, where we had dominion over the rising and setting of the
sun.’ In her own way, incidentally, she too is held hostage by the ancient texts, since
all her efforts are focused on a new reading of the original sources in order to be able to
interpret them differently. She realizes, however, that ‘appealed to from time to time,
our ancestors can be a resource for us, but if they take over, they devour the dawn and
the sun and turn our dreams into nightmares’.
It would be a mistake to assume that a self-critical attitude will automatically lead
to an embrace of the Western world. Mernissi writes about Western culture as a threat
to the identity of Muslim societies: ‘America does not have to occupy the Muslim
countries in order to bring them to their knees.’ Egyptian Muslim thinker Nasr Abu
Zayd, who fled his country and now teaches at Leiden University, speaks fairly regular-
ly of ‘the enemy’. The Arab world finds itself in a situation in which ‘we ourselves have
to defend our own continued existence, now that the enemy has almost succeeded in
breaking through our ranks to try to rob us of our true consciousness for ever’.As to
the identity of ‘the enemy’, Abu Zayd leaves no room for doubt: ‘Western imperialism
and Israeli Zionism.’
It’s important for these unconventional thinkers to accept that Muslims them-
selves are responsible for the decline of Islamic countries, to break the habit of blam-
ing the evil outside world for all their problems. This turn towards self-criticism is key.
It will release the energy needed for democratization, which is the only possible basis
in the longer term for a civilized ‘clash’ with Western countries. Up to now, those who
place all the blame on the Western world have had the upper hand, and they have cho-
sen to face every possibility except that of their own failure.
Another shared element in reformist thinking is its emphasis on the fact that the
history of Islam is nothing other than a history of interpretation. Abu Zayd: ‘The be-
lief that the Koran has existed for centuries fossilizes the religious texts and pins down
their religious meaning. The belief that the Koran is an event and that the revelation is
part of history gives vivacity back to the texts.’ To him the important thing is ‘to ap-
proach the heritage and the study of it from the perspective of our contemporary con-
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sciousness’. This involves a more open-minded interpretation, one that takes account
of the intentions of the ancient texts rather than simply reiterating them time and
again.
He says he’s not denying the divine origin of theKoran,merely saying that its origin
is hidden, so we cannot study it. The text of the Koran as a ‘cultural product’, on the
other hand, can be fathomed using criticalmethods derived in part from literary stud-
ies. ‘TheKoran thatwe read and interpret is in no sense identical with the eternalword
of God.’ To put it another way, the content of the Koran has been shaped by the lin-
guistic and spiritual horizons of those to whom it was addressed. Before Islamic scrip-
ture can be put into a different historical context those past circumstancesmust be ful-
ly absorbed.TheKoran is the product of a culture and at the same time it has shaped a
culture. Abu Zayd says there is a ‘dialectical relationship’ between text and reality.
According to liberal Muslim thinkers, therefore, we must return to the tradition of
interpreting scripture, referred to as ijtihad. The Koran suggests this possibility explic-
itly when it says that ‘some of its verses are decisive’ but that ‘others are allegorical’
(:). The ambivalences or allegories in the Koran are all too obvious, in fact it’s possi-
ble to say that it contradicts itself in truly essential areas, but then the same is true of
the founding texts of all religions.
In his much-read introduction to Islamic theology, Ignaz Goldziher raises the issue
of free will and predestination as an example of ambiguity in the Koran. Can a person
freely accept or reject his faith? Or is everything ultimately decided by a higher power,
with everyone’s path in life laid down for him? According to one text, God proposes
and disposes: ‘And it is not for a soul to believe except by Allah’s permission; and He
casts uncleanness on those who will not understand’ (:). Another says much the
same: ‘Therefore (for) whomsoever Allah intends that He would guide him aright, He
expands his breast for Islam, and (for) whomsoever He intends that He should cause
him to err, He makes his breast straight and narrow as though he were ascending up-
wards; thus does Allah lay uncleanness on those who do not believe’ (: ). But there
are just as many passages that emphasize freedom of the will, even in relation to
whether or not to believe. Take for example the passage ‘let him who please believe,
and let him who please disbelieve’ (:). Or, later: ‘Surely this is a reminder, so who-
ever pleases takes to his Lord a way’ (:).
Clearly justification can be found in the Koran either for a belief in an almighty
God who intervenes whenever he chooses or for freedom of choice and the moral re-
sponsibility of man that flows from that freedom. These diverse readings have given
rise to an enduring battle between different schools of Islam. The Koran is so coded
that there have been endless attempts to decode it. The difference between the literal
reading and the more liberal interpretation is that the reformers recognize the possi-
bility of different interpretations.

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Where does the alternative way of dealing with the Koran lead? One of the most im-
portant areas of innovation concerns the position of women. Verse : states: ‘Men
shall have a portion of what the parents and the near relatives leave, and women shall
have a portion of what the parents and the near relatives leave, whether there is little or
much of it; a stated portion.’ In the pre-Islamic tradition women had never been right-
ful claimants, so in that sense it is possible to say that Islam improved the position of
women considerably. Still, it’s hard to speak of equality of the sexes, given the state-
ment in verse :: ‘Men are the maintainers of women.’ Or a little further on in the
same verse: ‘And (as to) those on whose part you fear desertion, admonish them, and
leave them alone in the sleeping-places and beat them.’ Or in another verse, ::
‘Call in to witness from among your men two witnesses; but if there are not two men,
then one man and two women.’ There are countless further examples, making clear
that in Koranic texts women are seen as second-class citizens.
Reformers deal with passages like these by concentrating on identifying the begin-
nings of a struggle for equality in the context of the time, then projecting that re-
formism onto the present as normative. Mernissi seeks a rehabilitation of women in
Islam. ‘All the monotheistic religions are shot through by the conflict between the di-
vine and the feminine, but none more so than Islam, which has opted for the occulta-
tion of the feminine, at least symbolically, by trying to veil it, to hide it, to mask it.’By
unravelling, through textual criticism and a historian’s approach, the most quoted
verse of the Koran, which describes the origin of the face-covering veil (:), she tries
to convince us it was about a form of spatial separation ‘that can be understood to be a
separation of the public from the private, or indeed the profane from the sacred, but
which was to turn into a segregation of the sexes’. The latter is surely another thing al-
together.
One final important theme common to Islamic reformers is a contemplation of the
relationship between Islam and the idea of secularism. Filali-Ansary reconciles Islam
and the secular principle in his own way. He opposes the notion that the Koran carries
within it a kind of constitution that describes the functioning of an Islamic state. The
form the political community took could have been different, as is proven by the divi-
sive conflict that occurred a few decades after Mohammed’s death. Moreover, the
prophet did not name a successor, and apart from the fact that it caused a great deal of
confusion, this indicates that the formation of states was seen as belonging to a differ-
ent sphere of life.
Filali-Ansary repeats an old question: ‘Was the prophet a king?’ He says there’s an
essential difference between the authority of the prophet over those who have convert-
ed to Islam and the authority of a worldly ruler. If Islam explicitly intended to unite
spiritual and worldly power, why do we learn nothing about the founding of such a
state from either the Koran or the Hadiths (the texts about the life and work of Mo-
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hammed)? Filali-Ansary’s conclusion is that the religious ideal must be separated
from the historical forms within which it has organized itself. He says it’s time to rec-
ognize that the experiences of the first Muslim community in Medina no longer have
any significance as a model.
He believes that being a Muslim is a cultural identity, which is to say a connection to
spiritual values; it doesn’t mean people must allow their lives to be ruled by Islamic
precepts. The bringing into being of a Muslim community takes second place to the
individual and free character of the faith. Islam is not a social discipline that can be en-
forced by a public authority, rather it’s a personal engagement, an act of faith, an ex-
pression of the will to submit to God.
There are other reformers who likewise see Islam as a spiritual message rather than
a legislative system. According to Mohamed Charfi, the Koran doesn’t speak of sharia
as a law but as a path. Of the , verses in the Koran, between  and , or no
more than  to per cent of the total, have a legalistic purport and even then it’s mostly
a matter of moral guidance, which is often closely bound up with specific circum-
stances. Charfi speaks of the ‘perversion of all prophetic messages from the moment
they are placed within the history of man with his passions, interests, cultures, mental
horizons and sociological constraints of all kinds’. He seeks a modernization of
Islam, which will inevitably bring secularization with it.
Questions about how to deal with the separation of church and state are also being
asked, naturally enough, within Muslim communities in the West. As we have seen,
Muslims who find themselves a minority in a secular democracy are forced to recon-
sider their stance. Swiss Muslim philosopher Tariq Ramadan in particular has tried to
describe the position of Muslims in a secular environment. He says that Muslims must
break with the idea of themselves as a diaspora, in other words they must cease to see
their presence in Western society in the light of their origins or indeed their possible
return.
He criticizes the first generation, which lived too defensively in the West, always
with a sense of being on foreign soil. This is unnecessary, since there’s another way of
understanding the distinction between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb – ‘house of Islam’
and ‘house of war’. According to one of the four Sunni schools of law, the Hanafi
School, the difference lies primarily in the degree of security in which Muslims can
live. By that criterion, Ramadan says, Western countries are just as much part of the
dar al-Islam, perhaps even more so than their countries of origin, since ‘sometimes
Muslims can feel safer in the West when it comes to the free practice of their faith than
in some so-called Muslim countries’.
For this reason Muslims must come out of their shells and adopt a more self-con-
scious attitude in the Western world: ‘It’s a matter of integrating all dimensions of life
that are not opposed to our orientation and considering them to be entirely our own.

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It’s a matter of clearly going beyond a binary vision and ceasing to hold on to the feel-
ing of being eternal outsiders.’ Ramadan talks about a principle of integration: as
Muslims we can regard as Islamic everything that is not opposed to Islam. This is an
ambiguous formulation, since although it means Muslims should throw themselves
open to a great many things that originate outside the Islamic tradition, at the same
time they can accept those attainments only by absorbing them into Islam. Clearly Ra-
madan is not distancing himself from the all-embracing ambition of Islam, since he
seems to suggest it’s impossible for anything of lasting value to exist outside Islam
without potentially being part of it.
Compared to the reformers we’ve already looked at, Ramadan is circumspect, try-
ing to reconcile all the various currents. He makes no real choice between them. He
strives to normalize the presence of Muslims in the West without playing it down.
Their role must be self-evident yet not necessarily invisible. This seems to be his ulti-
mate motive, to search for a form of words that will give Muslims confidence in them-
selves. In this respect his work can be seen as an important contribution. But having
set himself up as a reconciler within a deeply divided Muslim community, he needs to
give all the various tendencies within Islam their due, even if in daily practice they are
mutually exclusive. The ambivalences in the work of Ramadan – which are not veiled
but visible to all – arise as a consequence of this. 
    
Having looked at the factional struggles within and between Muslim communities we
must now turn our attention to the inability of receiving societies to find ways of deal-
ing with Islam. A number of clear choices have to be made, but they will be acceptable
only if based on the principle of equal treatment. Nothing feeds suspicion so much as
a sense that double standards are being applied.
It’s strange, to put it mildly, that the debate the Dutch are now having about Islam
takes no account of attempts to tackle the same issues at a time when the Netherlands
was doing its best to govern a country with the largest Muslim population in the
world. Although colonial rule over a Muslim majority presents a very different chal-
lenge from the integration of a Muslim minority, there’s nevertheless something to be
learned from the debates about Islam in that period. As we shall see, some of the same
misconceptions have returned in our own day.
This is perfectly illustrated by a critical study of Dutch colonial policies with regard
to Islam called Nederland en de Islam, published in  by the well-known orientalist
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje. He reacts strongly against the idea that Muslims ought
to be converted and is unimpressed by efforts to this end by Catholic missionaries and

The open society_bw  09-11-10  10:21  Pagina 297
Protestant evangelicals. Not that he’s completely neutral towards Islam: ‘Since the
Netherlands has woken to an awareness that its task is to make the peoples of the Ar-
chipelago, according to their nature, ready to participate in modern culture and inter-
action, it therefore has its own Islam question, just like every non-Mohammedan state
with Muslim subjects.’
He concludes that for years the government has failed to concern itself with the in-
digenous population, and more specifically their religion. This indifference has sud-
denly flipped over into a call for restrictions to be placed on the pilgrimage to Mecca:
‘The most innocent Mohammedan religious teachers, pupils at pesantrens [religious
boarding schools], those who lead services of worship, were then after a period of neg-
lect approached with idiotically generalized distrust, often placed under supervi-
sion.’ This amounted to saying that ‘pilgrims to Mecca come back armed, as it were,
with dynamite bombs, that every hadji is an agitator’. We may live in new times, but
the old debates continue.
How should the Dutch colonizers deal with Islam in the East Indies? Snouck Hur-
gronje’s approach is three-pronged and it can serve as a guide in our own time, even
though his thinking ultimately remains within the colonial paradigm. He appeals for
‘the most strict and sincere maintenance of the freedom of religion, if with an impor-
tant reservation with regard to the political side of the Muslim system and with the
holding open of all routes that could lead the Mohammedans to social evolution, even
to rising above their religious system’.
His aim was therefore first of all to separate religion and politics. Nothing must be
put in the way of Islam as a religion – ‘the most strict and sincere maintenance of the
freedom of religion’ – and all attempts at conversion would fail, of that he was firmly
convinced. At the same time all forms of political Islam, including pan-Islamism,
must be combated as a dangerous challenge to the authority of the government. In
that regard any passivity would be misplaced. 
He found it hard to imagine reform of Islamic law, but its rigid character was such
that real life would move away from it: ‘What for the new age and its interactions are
galling bonds, which the Muslim law wraps around the lives of the adherents of Islam,
will loosen of their own accord as soon as our cultural life by one means or another
pulls them towards it more powerfully.’ Opposing overly ambitious plans to that
end, he added: ‘The pressure must come from the inside outwards and not the other
way around.’ He was aware that ‘everything that is open to attack rises in value to
those who possess it’.Again, the old debates are still significant in our day.
What would relations with Islam on the basis of equal treatment look like? The sep-
aration of church and state, on which freedom of religion is founded, is the first priori-
ty. That ‘most strict and sincere maintenance of the freedom of religion’ is crucial. Not
only must the state be safeguarded against improper pressure from the church; to an
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equal or even greater extent the church must be protected against meddling by the
state. Certainly where Islam is concerned, as a matter of principle nothing must be
laid in the way of Muslims who want to practice their faith openly. Mosques belong
here, even though many people will be shocked to learn that the Essalaam mosque to
be built in Rotterdam, with its fifty-metre-high minarets, is expressly intended as a
major feature of the city’s skyline.
If we are going to emphasize the principle of equal treatment, then we need to ask
ourselves whether Europeans are complying with it. If we are going to emphasize the
principle of equal treatment, then we need to ask ourselves whether Europeans are
complying with it. Many countries have regulations that are at odds with the separa-
tion of church and state, such as the obligation to pay church taxes in Germany and
Denmark. The secularization of institutions needs to go further, and those who ask
Muslims to respect religious freedom should feel obliged to summon up a comparable
willingness themselves. The recent decision by the European Court that the require-
ment to display crucifixes in Italian state schools is incompatible with the principle of
equality is therefore a move in the right direction. 
This certainly does not mean religion must be banished from the public sphere. Be-
hind the unwillingness to accept a highly visible Islam lies the notion that religion is
purely a private matter, but the separation of church and state is not the same as the
separation of church and society. Religions are an essential part of a pluralist society,
which is why Muslims, especially given the differences that exist between them, must
venture into the public arena of the countries in which they now live. This is a para-
doxical invitation, since as someone remarked: ‘You only really want to accept a pas-
sive Islam.’ Indeed, up to now there’s been little willingness in the West to see Islam as
part of social life.
Jean Baubérot comments that the greatest advocates of a rigorous separation of
church and state exhibit a remarkable inconsistency in that they often welcome state-
ments from the churches that relate to public matters, such as world poverty or the
arms race, but are hugely resistant to statements about people’s private lives, such as
matters surrounding the family or sexuality. If they are so keen to restrict the role of re-
ligion to the private domain, surely their reaction should be precisely the reverse.
First of all, then, a clear commitment to the equal treatment of religions is needed.
Political Islam can be combated effectively only if the principle of freedom of religion
is defended unambiguously. A leading question can then be posed: Doesn’t the exer-
cise of the right to religious freedom inevitably bring with it a duty to defend that
same freedom for other believers and for non-believers? This is of course exactly what
political Islam contests, not only in words but with threats and violence. Which brings
us to Snouck Hurgronje’s second point. What form should that ‘important reserva-
tion with regard to the political side of the Muslim system’ take? 
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The political ambitions of Islam do not exist in a vacuum, rather they are based on
a fairly common habit of dividing the world into Muslims and non-Muslims. Far too
often, Muslims withdraw into a believing ‘us’ that strives to keep its distance from an
unbelieving ‘them’. When freedom of religion is exploited as a means of spreading
contempt towards non-Muslims, the right to that freedom is eroded and sooner or lat-
er a time will come when Muslims start to undermine their own ability to live in a
democracy characterized by religious diversity. The right of one is after all the duty of
another. This holds true for everybody, including members of the Muslim communi-
ty. If a significant majority cannot summon respect for this rule, Muslims will stigma-
tize themselves.
Interreligious dialogue, which is underway everywhere, requires a number of prin-
ciples to be held in common. At the very least such a dialogue has to be based on the ac-
ceptance of religious freedom. Experience shows that quite a few religious leaders re-
ject this: ‘Yes, it is laid down in the law of European countries, but elsewhere it may be
different; higher authorities will have to decide.’ We can simply take note of such reac-
tions, but that is to follow the path of least resistance. When it comes to equal treat-
ment a more principled stance would be appropriate from those who lay claim to
equality as a matter of principle.
The integration of Islam into democracy therefore requires it to make profound ad-
justments. Some do not believe such reciprocity is possible. Ayaan Hirsi Ali considers
what she calls ‘pure Islam’ to be incompatible with liberal democracy. Sometimes she
refers to ‘the excrescences of Islam’ or to ‘some principles within Islam’ as being in
conflict with democracy, but this is merely a slightly more diplomatic way of saying
that Islam and democracy do not go together. She believes there’s no such thing as Eu-
ropean Islam or, more generally, reform within Islam.
Perhaps we will eventually have to concede that she’s right, but what goal would be
served by excluding the possibility of reform? The migration of Muslims has created a
unique situation and it’s therefore premature to say that Islam as it has developed in
the West can never be combined with democratic principles. The assumption that
Muslims must abandon their faith if they’re to live in a secular environment is not
only rather unrealistic, it’s incompatible with the principle of religious freedom.
There are undoubtedly signs of secularization among European Muslims, but there
are plenty of examples too of an increased interest in religion. In short, it’s vitally im-
portant for Muslims to continue exploring ways of developing Islam as a minority reli-
gion in a secular environment. It may prove essential to the preservation of peace in
Western societies.
Finally, the principle of equal treatment has another inevitable consequence. Any-
one claiming freedom of religion for a group must be able to summon a willingness to
grant the same freedom to members of that group. Alternative movements are now
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quite often excommunicated, as Tariq Ramadan is forced to acknowledge. He’s ex-
tremely critical of the absence of a culture of dialogue within the Muslim community,
where denunciation is rife. We need only think of how some of the more wayward
groups within Islam, such as the Alevis and the Ahmaddiya movement, have been ex-
cluded. Ramadan believes there’s a lack of willingness to enter into dialogue with
those who hold different beliefs.
The ways in which disputes within Islam are handled are most problematic of all
when it comes to the loss of faith. This relates to the final prong of Snouck Hurgronje’s
approach: ‘The holding open of all routes that could lead the Mohammedans to social
evolution, even to rising above their religious system.’ Most Muslims have exceptional
difficulty on this point. But again, anyone who demands the right to practice his reli-
gion freely has no choice but to grant that same right to other members of the same re-
ligious community. Faith must either be practiced in freedom or abandoned. This too
is a long way from the situation as it stands, since for Muslims openly saying you no
longer believe means social exclusion or worse. Young Salafists leave no room for
doubt about this: ‘An intruder inside the house is certainly more dangerous than one
outside,’ said Mohammed Bouyeri.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is perfectly clear on the issue of apos-
tasy: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief.’ (article ). Like many other articles
of the Declaration, this has remained a dead letter in many countries, where freedom
is restricted in the name of a state religion. In the Western world too, the freedom to
abandon the Muslim faith is disputed and ex-Muslims have formed groups in order to
stand up for their choice publicly in the face of serious threats. Muslims will have to
learn to accept the decisions of those who want openly to bid farewell to their faith.
Freedom of religion does not exclude criticism of religion. On the contrary, part of
the price of an open society is that religious traditions can be the subject of public de-
bate. Some sensitivity on the part of critics is only right, since speaking freely about
things some people regard as holy can be deeply hurtful. Nevertheless, if Muslims in-
tend to live in liberal democracies while retaining the idea that the Koran or the
prophet are above all criticism and must never be the object of ridicule, then they con-
demn themselves to the role of eternal outsiders. Freedom for Muslims can be defend-
ed only if Muslims are willing to defend the freedom of their critics.
Confronted with a similar appeal on an American television programme, one Mus-
lim organization responded in a revealing manner, issuing a public statement that
read: ‘We as an American Muslim community claim the human right to self-defini-
tion.’ Since when has ‘self-definition’ been a human right? Since when have believ-
ers had exclusive permission to speak about their holy books? These are astonishing
demands that have no place in a democracy. Every faith belongs to everyone in the
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sense that we can all have opinions about it and are free to express those opinions.
Statements made by the British and Dutch governments as they consider making
blasphemy punishable under law once again have not always been sensible either. Why
should insulting the gods be any worse than insulting people? Anyone who supports
the principle of equal treatment is obliged to regard religious and secular worldviews
as equal before the law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is clear about this:
religion is on a par with other convictions. There are certainly limits to freedom of
speech, but we can’t draw the line at criticizing or ridiculing a faith, otherwise we’d
have to start by tossing onto the pyresThe Praise of Folly by Erasmus, with its passages
about ‘folly in the Bible’.
Conflict avoidance is the wrong response when freedom of expression is at stake,
not only for reasons of principle but because it does nothing to calm the situation
when feelings run high. One evasion leads to another. If a decision is made not to pub-
lish any more cartoons, then what about the commotion surrounding an opera on the
subject of Aisha, one of the prophet’s wives? The performance was abandoned in re-
sponse to threats. If objections are met in the case of opera, what should be the reac-
tion when a newspaper discovers that even an image of the Koran on the front of its
monthly magazine section is reason enough for some delivery boys to refuse to dis-
tribute it? The ban on images embraced by part of the Muslim world can never be a
guideline for journalistic or artistic expression, if only because it’s a short step from
banning images to banning spoken statements, and from there to banning comments
made in writing. By that point openness has been abandoned altogether.
During a British debate about proposed new legislation on incitement to religious
hatred, Timothy Garton Ash confronted the government with its self-declared aim of
protecting the Muslim community. He commented that it made him think of ‘a man
trying to stop a leaking wastepipe with a priceless Raphael drawing’. He went on: ‘The
Government is preparing to do great damage in the cause of averting damage.’ It is the
task of every government to balance the competing demands of liberty and of public
order. In this case, Garton Ash said, ‘they are proposing too great a risk to freedom, for
too uncertain a gain in security’.
On balance, freedom of speech contributes to the avoidance of social conflict. Pre-
cisely because people are able to convert their anger into words or images, the road
that leads from resentment to aggression becomes longer. It’s no accident that the car-
toons affair eventually led to violence in Middle Eastern countries, where freedom of
speech is much more limited and people are therefore more likely to resort to violence
as the last available means of expressing their discontent. The idea that limitations on
freedom of speech could help to calm feelings within the Muslim community is there-
fore based on a misconception. 
The freedom to practice a religion and the freedom to criticize a religion are insepa-
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rable. This is hard for practicing Muslims to accept. Equality of treatment, however,
doesn’t mean that everyone must now suddenly embrace liberal ideas. Just like other
traditional believers, conservative Muslims are free to reject institutions like homosex-
ual marriage, as long as they accept that as things stand a majority has made a different
decision. In an open society there must be room for traditional interpretations of any
faith, as long as the freedom of others isn’t limited by them. In practice, it seems, it of-
ten is.
The impasse over Islam shows there’s still no generally accepted basis for a discus-
sion about its place in a liberal democracy. Diplomatic avoidance doesn’t help, where-
as honesty about the principle of religious freedom does. Most liberal societies do not
yet live up to the ideal of equal treatment. There’s every reason for a critical reconsider-
ation of the majority culture and at the same time a need for self-examination on the
part of the Muslim minority. Muslims could be far more open about what is happen-
ing in the mosques and take a more active stance against expressions of intolerance in
their own circles.
Shaping public opinion in this way remains difficult for many Muslims. Solidarity
with your own community is often understood as a promise to say nothing about the
things that give offence within that community. Often people think: we’re not going
to hang out our dirty washing, we’re vulnerable enough as it is. But room for newcom-
ers in a society actually increases when differences of opinion are made more plainly
visible. What Islam needs are whistle blowers, people who’re willing to let go of their
spurious loyalty to ‘the community’ and break out of that deadly encirclement by
friend and enemy to speak freely about wrongdoing within the divided world of Islam
– like the parents who revealed financial mismanagement at an Islamic school, for in-
stance, or the writer who brought to light the way mosques were orchestrating claims
for welfare payments, or women who draw attention to tyranny and violence behind
the closed doors of the home, or leaders of mosques who inform the security services
about extremism they come upon there.
Such whistle blowers will ease relations, counteracting the crude caricatures on
both sides that result from distrust. Something that is by no means cohesive – whether
it be the culture of the majority or of a minority – is too often seen as monolithic. To
put it another way, peaceful co-existence is an extremely limited interpretation of
what integration means. Compare the Europe of before and after . Where there
was cold peace and distance there is now space for interaction and rapprochement.
The same applies to the multicultural society. We are still too much caught up in the
era of diplomacy and non-interference, but society demands more than that. The fu-
ture of Islam affects everyone, not just Muslims. Trust is another word for integration,
and it will develop far more readily if pluralism becomes visible on all sides.
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     
With the immigration of millions of Muslims, the crisis of Islam has become Europe’s
crisis too. It remains to be seen whether Gilles Kepel, a French expert on the subject,
will be proven right in thinking that the struggle to create a European Islam will be of
decisive importance to the modernization of Islam worldwide. The divided Muslim
community will in any case engage the attention of Western societies for a long time to
come, even though many Westerners may have a feeling that the battle being fought in
their midst for the future of Islam takes no account of them.
If Islam can find a place for itself in a secular environment, then Western democra-
cies will have confirmed their leading position in the world. The extent to which the
societies affected can encourage such an accommodation is limited. After all, never be-
fore has a wave of immigration been so interwoven with an international crisis as the
arrival of millions of Muslims in the West. In Europe in particular there’s an urgent
need to avoid a violent clash of civilizations. In contrast to the situation in , the
year of the Six Day War, millions of Muslims now live in Western Europe, four to five
million in France alone.
The crisis in the Muslim world is spilling over into aggression against the West.
There’s therefore every reason for a closer examination of the arguments involved. Ian
Buruma and Avishai Margalit, in a study into what they have called ‘occidentalism’,
write that the image of the West as a degenerate society in which moral licentiousness
reigns supreme has generated some powerful symbolism. They see a deeper reason be-
hind the attack on New York: ‘A deliberate act of mass murder played into an ancient
myth – the myth about the destruction of the sinful city.’ The classic form of this
myth is the fall of whorish Babylon, which in its pride vied with the gods. In this way of
seeing the world, Buruma and Margalit recognize a means of dehumanizing Western
society: ‘To diminish an entire society or a civilization to a mass of soulless, decadent,
money-grubbing, rootless, faithless, unfeeling parasites is a form of intellectual de-
struction.’
It’s not just a matter of words but of words that lead to violence. First of all there’s a
need to acknowledge that the threat is real. All the ingredients for a spiral of violence
are present. Wars in the Middle East or turmoil in Pakistan may lead to a further radi-
calization of Muslims all over the world and there’s certainly reason to see in the ‘war
on terror’ a dilemma that confronts the liberal democracies with fundamental ques-
tions.
The problems faced by Muslim immigrants in Europe must be separated as far as
possible from the widespread conflict between the West and politicized Islam in the
world at large. This will not be easy, but the signs of a change in mentality are visible
everywhere. More and more Muslims have settled in Europe for good and no longer
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see themselves as part of a ‘diaspora’. In the midst of the uproar about the Danish car-
toons of the prophet, it became clear that two worlds are slowly but steadily growing
apart: that of Muslims in the West and that of their fellow believers in the Arab world.
It’s surely no accident that the issue exploded on the streets of Damascus and Beirut,
not in London or Amsterdam.
There’s a striking difference between the United States and Europe in their ap-
proaches to radical Islam. In America it’s seen mainly as a problem of international
politics, whereas in Europe, domestic and foreign affairs are inseparable as far as this
threat is concerned. The explanation lies in the different backgrounds and circum-
stances of their Muslim communities. Muslims in the United States could generally be
described as middle class, so the social problems that come to the fore in Europe are
less in evidence. Their numbers in relation to the rest of the population are much
smaller – estimates give figures of three to four million  Muslims – and therefore
they have much less of an impact on the major cities. Moreover, a considerable num-
ber of Muslim believers belong to the black community and are therefore unaffected
by problems specific to immigration. Finally, its proximity to the Arab world gives
greater weight to conflicts that arise as a result of the presence of Muslims in Europe
Several European countries are engaged in public discussions about how Islam can
become part of their national identities. This gives an extra charge to the debate.
American researcher John Esposito thinks that the big questions about the place of
Islam in America have yet to be asked: ‘The majority of Americans have yet to realize
that Muslims are “us”, but many Muslims have not solved the problem of the relation-
ship of their faith to national identity either: will they remain Muslims in America or
become American Muslims?’
It’s too early to say whether Muslim communities in the Western world will be-
come integrated and whether Muslims will succeed in shielding their lives in the West
against the worldwide conflict raging in the background, but there can be no doubt
that it’s extremely important for them to do so. History offers plenty of examples of
migrants being crushed by the larger forces of international conflict. At such mo-
ments majorities may be inclined to doubt the loyalty of their fellow citizens. This
threatens to happen to Muslim communities, but their own public choices are just as
important. To the extent that they start to see their own lives as inherent to the coun-
tries in which they now live, to the extent that they choose to see the practice of their
faith in the context of religious freedom, they can contribute to a lessening of distrust
and ensure that their presence is not continually associated with the ‘war on terror’.
The confrontation with political Islam can end well only if receiving societies take a
stand against the temptation to divide the world into good and evil along religious
lines. The cohesion that exists between Western democracies was produced to a large
extent by the contrast between them and totalitarian states during the Cold War.
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There is now a temptation to draw new dividing lines along old religious boundaries.
That would mean once again seeing the fault-line between Western Christianity and
Islam as fundamental to the way Europe defines itself.
The current significance of such traditions is the focus of Samuel Huntington’s
book about the ‘clash of civilizations’. The main criticism that has been made of his
work has to do with his underestimation of nation states, which form coalitions for
reasons of power politics irrespective of the supposed battle lines between civiliza-
tions. European history shows that countless ruinous wars are possible between peo-
ple who believe themselves to belong to the same civilization, and more recently the
First Gulf War demonstrated that Islamic solidarity is fairly weak. We need to keep a
close eye on regional and national differences within civilizations.
There’s another qualification that should perhaps be set beside the notion of a
‘clash of civilizations’. Norris and Inglehart have pointed out that societies in which
God is in retreat generally produce fewer children, so much so in fact that they often
decline in size. Today’s religious societies are experiencing a population explosion. ‘In
virtually every case they encourage people to produce large numbers of children, and
discourage anything that threatens the family, such as divorce, homosexuality, or abor-
tion. Rich, secular societies produce fewer people, but with relatively high investment
in each individual.’
These contrasting demographic trends have an unexpected outcome: ‘Rich soci-
eties are becoming more secular but the world as a whole is becoming more reli-
gious.’In short, there have never been so many traditional believers in the world as
there are now, which means among other things that religion is increasing in impor-
tance, in world politics as elsewhere: ‘A growing gap has opened up between the value
systems of rich and poor countries, making religious differences increasingly
salient.’ In this sense the authors agree with Huntington that a ‘clash of civilizations’
is underway. Indeed, religion and culture will continue to put their stamp on interna-
tional relations – certainly when it comes to the encounter between the world of Islam
and the West – which is not to say that differences of this kind inevitably lead to vio-
lence.
But Huntington is wrong, Norris and Inglehart say, when he claims that the germ
of the present confrontation lies in divergent beliefs about political democracy. Their
research in a wide range of Muslim countries shows that when it comes to the subject
of democracy the difference between public opinion in the West and in the Arab
world is negligible. Democratic aspirations are high among Arab populations, al-
though they do give more weight to the public role of religious leaders.
At the moment a considerable and growing proportion of the world’s population
leads an insecure existence. Religion is still extremely important in societies where this
is the case and as a result cultural divides in the world have widened. This is especially
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true of the divide between Islam and the West. The malaise in the Islamic world, which
of all religious communities is by far the worst off in terms of average income and de-
velopment in general, goes a long way to explain today’s fundamentalism. From this
perspective, everyone who wants to prevent religious wars has a major interest in help-
ing to ensure the basic needs of people in the Arab world are met, beginning with sup-
port for nascent democratization. In that sense the history of the Western world does
not offer much reason for hope; all too often Europe and America have supported au-
thoritarian regimes.
There’s another sense in which the democracies are in danger of betraying their
own norms. Contemporary terrorism confronts liberal societies with a fundamental
problem: How can Muslim communities in the West avoid being riven by conflicts of
loyalty? Which methods and which moral codes must be deployed against the terror-
ist threat? As the controversial treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay has shown,
there’s a real risk of a tit for tat battle with terrorism in which liberal democracy be-
trays itself.
Even if political Islam is indeed a new form of totalitarianism, the question re-
mains: What attitude should Europe and America have towards their Muslim commu-
nities? It was the historical parallel with Fascism that inspired a despairing plea from
Italian writer Oriana Fallaci. She asked herself how a culture so backward as that of the
Muslims could possibly be a threat to the West. Her answer was as follows: ‘They stay
in our own countries, in our cities, our universities, our business companies. …
Worse, they live in the heart of a society that hosts them without questioning their dif-
ferences, without checking their bad intentions, without penalizing their sullen fanati-
cism. … If we continue to stay inert, they will become always more and more. They
will demand always more and more, they will vex and boss us always more and more.
’Til the point of subduing us.’
This kind of polemic opens the way to policies of the kind that led to the American
internment of Japanese residents during the Second World War, a decision now right-
ly spoken of with shame. This does not alter the fact that her tirade is a frightening il-
lustration of the eternal dilemma faced by an open society. To what extent can liberal
principles survive events like /? Which means of self-defence are permissible and
which are not? Even more importantly, should open societies respond to the challenge
of fundamentalism by seeing the world in the same way as the fundamentalists, as a
‘war between civilizations’, or should they do all they can to avoid exactly that?
While Fallaci regards the defence of the liberal worldview as primary, British
philosopher John Gray takes the attacks by Al Qaida as a starting point for reflection
on the relationship between liberalism and Islamism. He believes self-examination
should come first: ‘Western thinkers rightly note that Islam has never grasped the
need for a secular realm. They fail to note that what passes for secular belief in the
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West is a mutation of religious faith.’ He’s referring to Enlightenment thinking,
which is based on the assumption that reason and morality go hand in hand. With the
growth of knowledge, morality too would increase – that was the expectation, and
Gray regards it as a secular religion.
These are valid questions, but they do not obviate the need for self-defence. The
vulnerability of the open society was made obvious by the attacks in New York and
Washington, Madrid and London. The concern here is first of all physical vulnerabili-
ty. In an economy so interwoven with the outside world, can adequate security be
guaranteed in the face of those determined to abuse our freedoms? Would tight bor-
der controls not lead to huge economic losses, as we saw in the days and weeks after the
attack on the Twin Towers? Within thirty-six hours some car assembly plants reported
they would have to shut down temporarily because of log jams at the  border.
American scientist Stephen Flynn, a former senior officer in the American Coast
Guard, thinks that with sufficient investment and new technology much can be done
without seriously disrupting world trade. The hunt for terrorists and their networks
remains of great importance, but ‘the more daunting challenge will be to reduce the
vulnerability of the systems of transport, energy, information, finance, and labor’.
The infrastructural backbone of an open society – such as the extensive network of
high-speed trains that is beginning to reduce distances in Europe – is indeed com-
posed of vertebrae that can cause general paralysis if hit.
Along with its physical vulnerability, a major concern is the moral vulnerability of
an open society. Gray points to the paradoxical situation that arises when a liberal so-
ciety is faced with a terrorist threat. Groups such as Al Qaida can rely on considerable
mutual trust among their supporters: ‘Liberal societies cannot replicate this suicidal
solidarity. Values of personal choice and self-realisation are too deeply encrypted
within them.’ Yet open societies do have to defend themselves, which necessitates
greater controls on people within their own territories. ‘The price of individualism is
proving to be the loss of privacy.’
All over the Western world we see this dilemma time and again. To what extent can
and should our private lives be restricted for the sake of defending public order and
public safety? Should existing laws be recalibrated to protect the liberal constitutional
state more determinedly from its enemies? Must the law be adjusted to make recruit-
ing for the jihad a punishable offence? A tightening of the rules might help, but each
case needs to be considered on its merits to ensure the means does not corrupt the end.
It is essential to ask whether the open society is slowly being undermined from within
by those who want to defend it by all available means.
American writer Paul Berman observes that it was a symptom of Eurocentrism to
think that in  totalitarianism had met its end – as if Islamism was not spreading at
that very moment. He also rejects the image of a clash of civilizations, which after all
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suggests that in the world of Islam the fundamental principles of liberal democracy
will never have a realistic chance. Nevertheless, if we’re hoping to disseminate democ-
racy, we must be able to rely on citizens of the Western world to defend democratic
principles and propagate them passionately, no matter how difficult that may be.
Self-examination and self-defence do not sit easily together, especially now that the
liberal democracies are confronted with a real threat. Yet the Cold War was won by re-
maining true to the ideal of an open society. Some are now announcing, as they did
then, the end of the European democracies. Alarming books with titles like The Last
Days of Europe and While Europe Slept are selling well. In Cold War days it was ar-
gued that democracy was doomed by an inner weakness, namely its perpetual self-
doubt and open debate. Now too the fervent defenders of the open society, facing a
new threat, seem unable to believe in its continuing viability. There are calls for dra-
conian measures. Instead, a combination of openness and resilience is required. The
strength of Western societies lies in their ability to combine liberal principles with an
effective response to any security challenge that arises.
All of us, in unguarded moments, must have tried to imagine those final minutes in
the World Trade Centre. The endlessly replayed footage vividly evoked the claustro-
phobia, the panic of so many people with no way out. Those pictures capture our
times. The world has become smaller over the past few years and it will be increasingly
difficult in future to escape global disorder. A plane crashes into a New York sky-
scraper and the whole world, from Vancouver to Islamabad, is dislocated. Immigra-
tion, including that of countless Muslims, has strengthened intercontinental ties even
further. The call for self-defence must therefore be accompanied by an awareness of
increasing interdependence. The perpetual need to find a balance between security
and openness demands a great deal from both citizens and governments, but the alter-
native is the start of an all-consuming war. We live in a world without an emergency
exit.
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Post-war immigrants were not only numerous, they came from an unprecedentedly
wide range of backgrounds. Migrants from what used to be called the third world are
changing Europe and America. Urban populations increasingly reflect every conti-
nent in the world and it’s no longer unusual for more than a hundred different nation-
alities to live next to and with one another. In all senses this is a unique experience,
which by its very nature often causes conflict. Western societies are now so diverse that
they are left wondering what holds them together.
Migrants have unintentionally exposed a more general difficulty. The requirement
placed upon them to integrate has developed into a quest for contemporary citizen-
ship. Here is the reciprocity we’ve been seeking throughout this book: integration
means all sides must engage in self-examination. For a long time, making demands of
newcomers was equated with standing in their way, so little was required of them, but
when a person takes on a new nationality it ought to mean not just acquiring rights
but consciously accepting duties. In a time of immigration, we need to start out by re-
considering what citizenship means.
Author Fouad Laroui has written, in ironic tones, of his disappointment on gaining
Dutch nationality: ‘My Dutch wasn’t bad. To increase my chances I learned the geneal-
ogy of the House of Orange, the height of the mountains (!) and the breadth of the
rivers by heart. I read the biography of the great Thorbecke, who gave this country its
first democratic constitution. I wandered the corridors of the Amsterdam Historical
Museum. In the public library I called up the complete works of the Great Three: Reve,
Hermans, Mulisch.’ (He is referring to the three major post-war Dutch novelists.) He
needn’t have bothered. The procedure took less than five minutes and there were no
questions, not even any expression of interest; it was purely a formality.
Afshin Ellian, a lawyer who moved to the Netherlands from Iran, has described a
similar disillusionment. ‘I received the most important decision about my life by post:
my Dutch citizenship. It was nothing more than an administrative letter, signed by
Nawijn, then director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A deep sense of
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embarrassment and disappointment tempered my joy. The moment of naturalization
should be ritualized, out of respect both for the new citizen and for the constitution.’
But in the Netherlands, country of avoidance, there was little respect for rituals. Peo-
ple preferred to keep things low-key; a passport through the post or across a counter
would do fine.
These voices have now been heeded. In  the Netherlands introduced a natural-
ization ceremony based on those held by classic countries of immigration like Canada.
In Amsterdam the awkwardness was immediately apparent. At the first ceremony on
 August  the mayor reminded those present that the Netherlands is a country
with traditions very much its own: ‘Certain things are forbidden by law, but some-
times we feel they should be permitted nonetheless. Gedogen, we call it, a word that’s
difficult to translate. Why? Because other countries are not familiar with the phenom-
enon in this form.’ There are those who might regard lax law enforcement as a reason
for soul-searching, or at any rate not as a tradition to point out to newcomers with
pride on the day they receive their new citizenship.
The same awkwardness showed through in the gift new compatriots were given. It
was a thoroughly Dutch Delft-pottery potato. Designed by a Chinese immigrant to
the Netherlands, Ni Haifeng, it seemed intended as an ironic comment on the ceremo-
ny. The reality was even worse; this platitude had a serious purpose, as the accompany-
ing text made clear: ‘Now you’ve become what you’ve already been for a long time. A
Netherlander in Amsterdam, an Amsterdammer in the Netherlands. A potato in the
mash, a plank in the ship, a stone in the statue.’ Anyone looking at the solemn yet
emotional faces of all those for whom a Dutch passport marked the end of a long, of-
ten difficult story of migration would know that it wasn’t an occasion to talk about
permissiveness and hand out potatoes.
Nevertheless, the ceremony does mark a break with a time when little or nothing
was demanded of people, when the failure to ask questions of applicants made it clear
no one was expecting an answer from them. The implicit message was: you’ll never be
part of this society and we certainly don’t expect you ever to have any influence on go-
ings on around here, so stay where you are and by all means preserve your own identi-
ty. There was no mention of responsibilities, since the government knew perfectly well
that as soon as you make demands of newcomers, you place commitments upon the
receiving society.
A gradual change is in sight, marked by new rituals. Other European countries too
are introducing naturalization ceremonies and citizenship exams. Britain is one of the
places where a new outlook is emerging. A government commission wrote: ‘The
rights – and in particular – the responsibilities of citizenship need to be more clearly
established. … This should then be formalised into a form of statement of alle-
giance.’ Not long ago just such a ceremony took place. Some fifty immigrants in
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Birmingham stood in a circle, simultaneously swearing an oath of allegiance, prompt-
ed sentence by sentence by a civil servant: ‘I will give my loyalty / to the United King-
dom / I will respect its rights and freedoms / I will uphold its democratic values / I will
observe its laws faithfully / and fulfil my duties and obligations / as a British citizen.’
An Indian man commented on being given his new passport: ‘I think it is quite a seri-
ous day, It makes you feel welcome, it is an important landmark in my life.’ Finally,
rather stumblingly, all those present sang the National Anthem.
In France and Germany too, more is now being asked of immigrants who apply for
naturalization. Nor is the new focus on citizenship confined to Europe. Australia, a
classic country of immigration, is moving away from official multiculturalism. The
period of residence after which migrants can become citizens has been extended from
two to four years and a citizenship test is in place.
In America the idea of citizenship is far more ritualized. During a speech to a mass
demonstration by illegal immigrants in Chicago in May , Senator Barack Obama,
as he then was, reminded the demonstrators in no uncertain terms of the rights and
duties of American citizens. A few days later he summarized what he had said: ‘When I
spoke to folks at this rally I insisted that for those undocumented workers who hope
some way to have a pathway to citizenship, they have to understand that citizenship in-
volves a common language, a common faith in the country, common commitments
and a common sense of purpose.’
As if that were not enough, he added firmly ‘and fealty to a common flag’, a refer-
ence to a controversy that had arisen over the fact that many of the demonstrators had
been waving the flags of their own nations, in most cases Mexico. ‘I think there are
times in these marches where you have seen Mexican flags. I think that is not helpful
because it indicates that somehow the traditional pattern of immigrants assimilating
to a broader American culture is not what these marchers are seeking. I think they
have to seek that because that is the essence of this country – that in diversity we come
together as one.’
Europe has a different tradition and differences between nations remain, but in this
sense too we can see lessons being learned from countries with longer histories of im-
migration. All this represents an important change in attitude: the emphasis used to
lie on cultural differences, whereas now the main focus of concern is a person’s ability
to participate as a citizen. Freedom of choice is crucial. A sense of loyalty is required,
something that can never be imposed from above. In the end, migrants have to decide
for themselves how to relate to the countries where in all likelihood they’ll spend the
rest of their lives. The established population must open its doors to their potential
contribution, inviting and challenging newcomers to shoulder a shared responsibility.
Although steps are now being taken to make the meaning of citizenship more ex-
plicit, it’s not yet possible to say that we’re being presented with any particularly clear
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ideas on the subject. Is the new ‘us’ any broader than the old ‘us’? Are we managing to
create societies that reach across their current ethnic and religious divides, that strive
towards a shared future rather than continually emphasizing differences in origin?
Communities are changing and the ways they imagine themselves must change too –
a challenging thought in a time when familiar faces and surnames are fast disappear-
ing.
In many countries this has led to debates about what holds society together, such as
discussions about French ‘national identity’, or about ‘Britishness’. Contributions to
the British debate make the discomfiture instantly visible, such as this from journalist
Jeremy Paxman: ‘I am fed up to the back teeth with middle class, soi disant cultural
commentators saying there is something contemptible about the idea of Britishness,
or suggesting it is exclusively the preserve of thugs.’ Commentator Will Hutton has
remarked with some scepticism: ‘What will happen, I suspect, is that the British will
carry on with their understated Britishness.’ Philosopher Roger Scruton, meanwhile,
is less phlegmatic: ‘If people don’t have a social and individual identity, they have no
way of identifying with their neighbours or anyone else. That way lies social chaos,
which is a potentially violent place to be.’
Attempts by the British and French governments to stimulate such debates have
produces few results, in fact they have done more to arouse suspicion than to inspire
trust. The internal discord that characterizes an open society makes it undesirable to
settle upon a clearly defined notion of national identity. A new image of what it means
to be French or British emerges when more and more people with a background in im-
migration make their voices heard in the media, sport, politics and literature. Their
visibility has above all a symbolic significance. Issues that touch upon identity should
be spoken of with some restraint in the political sphere, but as we have seen, it is possi-
ble to conceive of citizenship rituals, and in schools more attention could be paid to
history and law. The maintenance and handing down of the cultural heritage could be
taken in hand with more vigour. At their best, such efforts are an invitation to citizens
to develop outlooks that are both concerned and critical.
Debates about national identity have revealed uncertainty about how a society of
immigrants might see itself. A commission led by political philosopher Bhikhu
Parekh has suggested that Britain should be thought of as a ‘community of commun -
ities’, which, as he puts it, means attempting ‘to combine the values of equality and di-
versity, liberty and solidarity’. But the classical ideals of freedom and equality that
constitute the core of an open society already involve a recognition of the diversity of
beliefs and lifestyles. Furthermore, it is not accurate to describe society as a commun -
ity of communities, and such an approach fosters the conservatism of group cultures,
no matter how much Parekh wishes to avoid exactly that.
It’s not easy to find your place in a society that’s at odds with itself. Migrants are be-
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ing asked to free themselves from group ties and concentrate on their independence as
individuals, while at the same time the limits to individualism are under fresh scrutiny
and there’s a widespread feeling that after a one-sided defence of individual rights the
emphasis should now lie on responsibilities towards society as a whole. In short, new
currents are moving in different directions, muddying the waters.
The confusion takes many forms. Isn’t an emphasis on integration ultimately a be-
trayal of liberal principles? If girls go out on the street and say ‘In a country of religious
freedom we have the right to wear headscarves or veils whenever we like’, then on
what grounds could anyone contradict them? Yet people who live in an open society
and opt for a closed community, using their freedom to embrace a lack of freedom,
cross a line as soon as they interfere with the freedom of others. In practice they soon
will, and repeatedly. Is the preaching of tolerance for intolerance not a departure from
the principle of equality?
Meanwhile, migrants are caught up in ambiguities of their own. They need to ask
themselves why they left hearth and home. Why is it that the countries where they
grew up are in such a bad way? Why has independence from colonial powers in so
many cases led to more poverty and repression rather than less? And why have they de-
cided to come to countries they used to condemn with such passion and in many cases
still look upon with a combination of timorousness and distaste? Could there be
something inviting about liberal cultures after all, something hugely attractive that no
society in the world can ignore?
Migrants are too strongly influenced by their own hesitancy, even aversion. Of
course many are completely taken up with the daily struggle, puzzling out how to sur-
vive in a strange country. Still, they could do more, not to speak of their children, who
were born in wealthy nations and grew up with every opportunity. Moroccan-Dutch
author Abdelkader Benali believes his compatriots need to look more closely at what
‘being Dutch’ means: ‘It seems as if many non-natives here are silently waiting for that,
so that at last they can feel properly and fully absorbed into Dutch society.’ But
there’s little point waiting quietly for a place to be allocated; migrants and their off-
spring must raise their voices. No one can do the talking for them.
Multiculturalism offered an answer that entailed no obligation, by saying that it
had become meaningless to talk about ‘us’, that society was a collection of subcul-
tures. Where this leaves citizenship is unclear. Without ‘us’ there can be no such thing;
without critical engagement, society will disintegrate. That ‘us’ need not necessarily
point to shared pride but can equally well express vicarious shame. Surely it was a sign
of progress when Haci Karacaer, spokesman for the North Holland branch of the
Turkish Muslim organization Milli Görüs, said: ‘We failed in Srebrenica.’ By ‘we’ he
meant the Dutch.
In these years of conflict in particular, it’s important for migrants to make their
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voices heard. Dyab Abu Jahjah contradicts himself when he explicitly opts for a ‘mod-
el of equality’ and then abruptly goes on to say: ‘There’s virtually nothing we can do,
since the immigrant population is oppressed by racism and discrimination.’ Within
a single line of reasoning his perspective shifts from citizenship to victimhood. This
won’t do. Reciprocity presumes a shared desire to shape society, a shared willingness
to be critical of the community to which you belong. In short, everyone’s dirty wash-
ing must be hung out in public. There’s no other way. Holding on to a sense of victim-
hood amounts to a rejection of freedom and responsibility.
A new ‘us’ is required. Urban residents old and new don’t yet seem to have recog-
nized this clearly enough, or at any rate they don’t behave as if they have. We need to
be more aware of our mutual dependence. This is more than a matter of pleasantries.
The climate in many cities depends to a large extent on the way migrants and their
children seize opportunities for the future. Their ambition is essential, but everyone
must be receptive to the talents on offer. Institutions can and should be more open
than they’ve been up to now. There’s room for a great deal of change in schools, in me-
dia organizations, in the police service, everywhere – and still too few signs of it hap-
pening.
To what extent are members of the new middle class of migrants willing to engage
with problems in their own communities? It’s wholly understandable that a Moroc-
can or Pakistani doctor simply wants to be a good doctor, nothing more. Others in mi-
grant communities regard attitudes among their own emerging middle class as a
threat, criticizing what they see as too great a willingness to adjust to the ‘white’ major-
ity. But even those who set themselves up as spokespeople for the communities to
which they’re presumed to belong and exercise some form of responsibility don’t
have an easy time of it. People all too readily reproach them for trading their integrity
for political office. 
Those able to articulate effectively the interests of their supporters while at the
same time criticizing their own communities are of great value to society, as a city
councillor in The Hague, Rabin Baldewsingh, made clear in a speech several years ago:
‘The immigrant segment of the population of The Hague is not a homogenous com-
munity. What you see is that people can be forced to live next to each other but not to
live with each other. There’s no communality, no common history that binds them.
People pitch their tents next to each other in the hope of eventually being able to settle
somewhere else. There’s no affinity with others in the same street.’ For him this is rea-
son enough to appeal for greater involvement in public affairs.
British writer, former broadcaster and one-time mayoral candidate Trevor Phillips,
who spent part of his childhood in Guyana, expressed similar concerns about growing
segregation in Britain: ‘In recent years we’ve focused far too much on the “multi” and
not enough on the common culture. We’ve emphasized what divides us over what
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unites us. We have allowed tolerance of diversity to harden into the effective isolation
of communities, in which some people think special separate values ought to apply.’
The receiving society is continually asked to measure itself against the norm of equali-
ty of treatment and therefore to oppose all forms of discrimination, but newcomers
have a responsibility of their own: ‘We are looking for migrants who have the ability to
participate in our national life, and the willingness to interact with the rest of us.’
First there’s a need to rescue the word ‘us’. Many have rejected black-and-white
thinking in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and concluded that if we reject the idea of ‘them’
we must also dispense with ‘us’. That seems logical perhaps, but in a democracy
there’s no other option. Without ‘us’, without an imagined community, there will be
no shared responsibility for society’s changing fortunes. That ‘us’ will have to expand
to include today’s newcomers, turning them into the established residents of tomor-
row.
     
Integration is often mentioned, but what it means remains rather vague. Let’s try to
describe it more precisely. When migrants and their children can say ‘this country is
mine too’, everyone will have come a long way. Integration means acquiring a number
of skills, but above all it’s about a willingness to be part of society, and that inevitably
means reassessing traditions brought from elsewhere. At the same time integration re-
quires an environment in which migrants and their children feel invited to take part in
social life. An open society must measure itself critically against its own standards of
equal treatment. Integration forces both natives and newcomers to take a hard look at
themselves.
We can discuss concepts like participation, emancipation and integration endless-
ly, but it would be better to reformulate the question that needs addressing: Where do
people naturally come into contact with the society around them? By concentrating
on socialization we can turn a discussion about immigration into a general social is-
sue. Simply put, newcomers are initiated into society within the family, at school and
in the workplace. There’s another dimension that we won’t include here: the neigh-
bourhood. We’ve discussed that already at length and when it comes to integration it’s
not really the place to start.
We’ve looked in detail at what makes the experience of migration so extraordinary
and how it brings to light more general problems. In many migrant communities ac-
cess to society via the family, school and work has been blocked. Communication
within families has broken down to such an extent as a result of migration that parents
often have little notion of the world in which their children live. Despite all kinds of ex-
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tra investment in education, many children of migrants drop out of school. Finally,
high rates of unemployment among both parents and young people means the work-
place cannot do enough to help them identify with their newly adopted countries.
All these broken connections create a gap between migrants and society, but be-
hind specific problems in immigrant communities lie general social shortcomings.
The only way forward is by consistently transforming the issue of integration into a
question of citizenship that addresses everyone, regardless of background. True equal-
ity will lead to social renewal of a kind that goes further than debates about the posi-
tion of migrants and their families.
To understand the meaning of citizenship we must look at the democratic ad-
vances of the past few decades. Citizens have become more articulate and independ-
ent and less trusting of traditional authority. This new assertiveness is valuable, but
alongside its salutary effects it contains a potential for aggression: reliance on self-con-
trol often proves unrealistic. There has been an increase in violence in the public
sphere, specifically against teachers, doctors, police officers, indeed all those directly
involved in making it possible for everyone to live together. People still want to believe
that freedoms will become more deeply rooted, but it seems freedom itself is being
brought into disrepute amid calls for greater public safety. A famous line by Dutch
poet Lucebert goes: ‘Everything of value is defenceless.’ Turning this on its head, we
might say: ‘Everything of value must defend itself.’
We’re now in a position to make a broader assessment of the cultural transforma-
tion of the s. The challenge to parental authority, criticisms of schools as institu-
tions and improvements to welfare systems have on the whole been beneficial, but
everywhere people are seeking a new balance. It’s clear that the significance of a more
or less stable upbringing has been underestimated, that in schools the skills needed for
citizenship have been neglected and that too many are without work and dependent
on state support. As a result, the places where responsibility is learned – the family, the
school and the workplace – are failing to fulfil that task.
Even forty years ago there were those who believed that the liberation of the s
amounted to boundless individualism, and some claimed that the stress on personal
development had degenerated into narcissism. In , American sociologist Christo-
pher Lash wrote in his well-known polemic about the self-serving society: ‘The new
narcissist is haunted not by guilt but by anxiety. He seeks not to inflict his own certain-
ties on others but to find a meaning in life.’ A craving for personal fulfilment creates
permanent restlessness: ‘The poor have always had to live for the present, but now a
desperate concern for personal survival, sometimes disguised as hedonism, engulfs
the middle class as well.’
The disintegration of hierarchies made room for personal authenticity and experi-
mentation, previously the preserve of an artistic elite. Civic emancipation made
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democracy richer, but having discovered its limits it’s now in danger of being thrown
into reverse. A society in which everyone tries to monopolize the conversation and
fewer and fewer are willing to listen – why would anyone else know better? – produces
a hardening of attitudes towards others that ultimately restricts the freedom of all.
Liberalism has great difficulty establishing where its boundaries lie. The sexual rev-
olution brought not only freedom but new forms of dependence. French author
Michel Houllebecq has described in his novels the defenceless individualism that ac-
companies the untamed satisfaction of desires. In telling the story of one of his anti-
heroes he comments: ‘As the lovely word “household” suggests, the couple and the
family would be the last bastion of primitive communism in liberal society. The sexual
revolution was to destroy these intermediary communities, the last to separate the in-
dividual from the market.’
Even without succumbing to cultural pessimism, it’s easy to discern the shadow
side of a society increasingly dominated by market norms. The potential for construc-
tive criticism inherent in many of the changes of the s has been swallowed up by
ever-expanding consumerism. To put it another way, individualization creates choice
without necessarily giving people more control over their lives. Their relationship to
public affairs has changed; the consumer can drive out the citizen in us.
We’re now witnessing both responsible and irresponsible manifestations of indi-
vidualism. French philosopher Gilles Lipovetsky draws attention to some of them:
more effort to care for our bodies along with higher rates of drug addiction; a greater
aversion to violence along with a trivialization of crime; more tax evasion along with
increases in charitable donations; escalating debt and higher savings. He writes that
while individualism is winning out everywhere, the cultural changes that have
brought welcome emancipation have some clearly problematic aspects.
There’s no way back to the law-abiding society of the s and before, nor should
anyone wish there was, but it must be possible to talk in contemporary terms about
duties. They don’t detract from freedoms; they’re part of what freedom is founded
upon. We’ve noted that the right to freedom of speech, for instance, goes hand in hand
with the duty to defend that freedom for others, but in the absence of an awareness of
history this sense of reciprocity will be lost. Society can be defined as a ‘contract be-
tween the generations’. Whether born in Europe, America or elsewhere, we all en-
counter a society created by the efforts of those who went before; each new generation
succeeds to an inheritance and must continually re-evaluate that inheritance.
The search for a new balance between rights and duties has inevitably been intensi-
fied by the scale of immigration over recent decades. Past migration flows, the results
of early industrialization, inspired a civilizing offensive in Europe and America that
placed the private lives of families under scrutiny. ‘Antisocial families’ were super-
vised by state employees. In the Netherlands these forerunners of today’s social work-
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ers were initially called ‘home inspectors’, but whatever they were called, the paternal-
ism was unmistakable, as was the aspiration to edify. In looking at the movement for
the Americanization of immigrants we’ve seen how in the United States the desire to
emancipate and the desire to discipline overlapped.
It should come as no surprise that in a time of renewed immigration the call for in-
terference in problem families is being heard once more. Cultural sociologist Gabriël
van den Brink appeals for a new ‘civilizing offensive’, not just to tackle the nuisance
caused by troubled families but to hold out clear norms to all citizens. He stresses that
after years of ‘norm liberalization’ in society, there’s now a demand for ‘norm restora-
tion’. Others speak of an ‘educational offensive’, but their intentions are much the
same, amounting to a contemporary form of paternalism in the name of emancipa-
tion. By the nature of things, this is an enterprise riddled with contradictions.
A change of this kind to European and American societies is risky. Paul Frissen, an
expert on public administration, writes that any attempt to achieve social coherence
by government diktat is not only outdated but will erode freedom. ‘Moralizing is dan-
gerous as a policy strategy by the state, which can deploy its monopolies.’ The state
has means of coercion at its disposal, so restraint is required when it comes to moral
and cultural preferences. He is worried. ‘We know we’ve lost control and therefore we
intensify the rituals that reinforce the myth of civilization and social engineering.’
Frissen favours an extension of the relatively relaxed attitude that was dominant in the
s. That feeling of invulnerability defined the social climate for decades, but non-
chalance has come to grief. New forms of responsibility are needed, although they
must not stifle the sense of personal autonomy. This is the context in which the debate
about the integration of migrants is taking place.
British psychiatrist Theodore Dalrymple draws upon some of the more dramatic
examples from his practice to show just how much the underclass has suffered as a re-
sult of the liberalization of norms: ‘Day after day I hear of the same violence, the same
neglect and abuse of children, the same broken relationships, the same victimization
by crime, the same nihilism, the same dumb despair.’ Here again we see that the im-
pact is widely felt, and not just by migrant families. Dalrymple concludes soberly ‘that
the majority of the British underclass is white, and that it demonstrates all the same so-
cial pathology as the black underclass in America’.
Many migrants live in the same neighbourhoods as the underclass and experience
the invitation to integrate as a call to adjust downwards. Sensibly enough, they try to
keep their distance. As Dalrymple comments: ‘I can quite understand that what they
see only reinforces their determination to live according to their own beliefs, and that
they do not want their children to become like that underclass.’This survival strate-
gy offers a temporary solution in a difficult environment, but in the long run it’s not
the answer for children who have to make their way in society.
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Ultimately this is not just a matter of an underclass; the middle classes too are un-
certain about what prospects to hold out to their children. It’s all too easy to blame lib-
eral approaches to childrearing over the past few decades. The decline in parental au-
thority has undoubtedly revealed a great deal of hidden misery in families – think of
child abuse – but it’s equally clear that the increasing number of one-parent families
has produced a large number of children with serious problems. A cautious re-evalua-
tion of the family is now underway and it’s here that efforts to achieve social integra-
tion must begin. Later we’ll look at the importance of education and work to success-
ful socialization.
   
Starting a family is above all a decision for the parents-to-be, but at the same time
their decision has an impact on society. Demographer Franz-Xaver Kaufmann has
written a convincing plea for the raising of children within families to be seen as an in-
vestment in human capacity. He is writing about the German situation, which in
many ways is ahead of developments in other European countries, since the birth rate
is falling dramatically, a fact still obscured to some extent by immigration and a de-
cline in mortality. The average age of Germans has steadily increased.
The problem is not that there are too many older people but that too few children
are being born. This might be described as a breach of the contract between genera-
tions, since who will support and care for the elderly? According to Kaufmann, the
sharply declining number of children means too little is being invested in human capi-
tal. This affects more than just the balance of the workforce, so he prefers to speak of
‘human capacity’. Future generations are not merely an economic asset; they are the
citizens and parents of the coming decades.
In the richer nations of the world, having children is not, as it once was, a direct in-
vestment in your own future, rather it’s an indirect investment in the future of all.
Children no longer contribute to their parents’ livelihood, partly because child labour
has been abolished. In an economic sense it’s not even particularly rational to have
children these days. There is collective provision for those who no longer work, where-
as the costs for those not yet in work are covered largely by private citizens. The par-
ents pay. The childless profit from other people’s childrearing efforts without con-
tributing a great deal themselves. In a time when so few children are being born and
the population is likely to shrink, the family should be valued more.
There are different ways of bringing up children, but the costs of failed or problem-
atic socialization are all too clear. A change in family culture is taking place. Typical of
the modern family is a high degree of independence among children, equality be-
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tween men and women, and minimal interference from relatives in the choice of a
partner. De Swaan has described this as a transition from a ‘household by writ’ to a
‘household by negotiation’. It’s clear that most migrants from countries like Turkey
or Pakistan still rely on an authoritarian style of childrearing. There’s therefore a con-
siderable gap between the more traditional family relationships of many migrant fam-
ilies and the modern lifestyles that prevail in most indigenous families. These cultural
contrasts affect upbringing, as we have seen. Norms at home, on the street and in
school may differ hugely, and in many migrant families this creates a generation gap
that’s hard to bridge.
The problems involved in raising children in a foreign country mean that immigra-
tion offers only a partial answer to the dilemmas raised by the increasing proportion
of elderly people. A shrinking population must revise its ideas about the family. The
question of how to encourage people to have children, the offspring of migrants in-
cluded, is fairly urgent. For a long time a decline in the number of children has been
seen as a natural phenomenon. Population politics was brought into disrepute in the
twentieth century. Attitudes are slowly changing as the awareness grows that a popula-
tion that cannot replace itself is less able to renew itself. The focus should lie not pure-
ly on increasing the birth rate as such but on increasing the number of families that are
able to bring up children successfully. In other words the central concern should be so-
cial quality, not demographic quantity. Kaufmann calls for measures such as a change
to the tax system so that resources are redistributed from childless adults to parents:
‘Those who don’t bring up children don’t invest in human capacity for the future and
therefore their own care in old age.’
So the debate about immigration and integration throws a new light on the family.
The same goes for another institution: school. Past emancipation movements were al-
ways concerned about material and spiritual progress. Education was central to such
efforts and understandably so, since in an open society the government is better
placed to shape education than anything else. The state can have a more powerful in-
fluence there than in either the family, which after all largely belongs to the private
sphere, or the workplace, which is affected mainly by the workings of the market.
As well as passing on knowledge and skills relevant to later working practices, edu-
cation aspires to promote citizenship. It seems that as soon as the emancipation of the
workers was complete, the notion of ‘cultural advancement’ was abandoned. The so-
cial questions surrounding migrants and their children have given new weight to this
aspect of emancipation. Citizenship is about feeling responsible for the wider social
environment, about taking account of people outside your immediate family, and this
kind of fellow-feeling is of great significance for all children as they grow up.
It’s important to ensure that such initiatives fall under the heading of ‘freedom of
thought’ rather than, as the report The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain recommends,
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‘multicultural and antiracist education’. Schooling should be a matter of acquiring
competency, not an obligatory worldview. So talk about ‘skills of deliberation’, or
knowledge of ‘human rights principles’ and ‘equality legislation’ can be defended, but
if the moulding of citizens boils down to ‘opposition to racist beliefs’, as advocated in
the report, then it quickly crosses a line, especially in combination with a plea for a
multicultural view of society.The boundary between stimulating critical citizenship
and intellectual paternalism is all too easily crossed.
A number of countries are considering introducing community service as part of a
child’s education. Now that conscription has been abolished more or less everywhere
– the army too contributed to social integration – some form of community service
might not be a bad idea. In the Netherlands new legislation obliges schoolchildren to
work for a number of weeks in public organizations, in hospitals, for example, or nurs-
ing homes for the elderly. In view of the aging of the population and the resulting
shortages of manpower in many parts of the service sector, extra hands might help.
It’s also worth considering how schoolchildren could become involved in efforts to
help migrants integrate. The children would learn more about a fast-changing urban
society and immigrants would come into contact with their new environment more
quickly.
A sense of responsibility is not at all the same as an uncritical acceptance of things
as they are. In fact an open society depends on the ability of citizens to think independ-
ently and judge for themselves. Nevertheless, meaningful differences of opinion rely
upon mutual engagement, which in turn requires that more attention be paid to cul-
ture and history in education. Citizenship is all about a consciousness that something
came before us and something will come after us. A society that regards itself as no
longer capable of engaging with earlier generations is in a state of decline.
The creation of a canon is one way to present history in schools. As philosopher
Maarten Doorman writes: ‘Not the principle of the canon but its content should be
the focus of debate. The fact that along with its content the values of our culture are up
for discussion is all to the good, since this underlines the fact that a canon provides the
context for an unavoidable debate about cultural identity and diversity.’ Such calls
have been heeded, leading to the formulation of fifty key events in Dutch history that
all school-aged children should know about. We see similar initiatives all over Europe.
Denmark, for example, now has a literary canon.
After a fierce debate, the Netherlands has decided to create its own National Histor-
ical Museum. There was no shortage of objections, based mainly on a fear that any
such institution would become a temple to national pride. That certainly need not be
the case. It’s a matter of delving into the past as a means of self-examination, not self-
glorification. Slavery is part of the Dutch canon. It’s important to resist the tempta-
tion to sweep away the less appealing aspects of the past, as was in danger of happen-
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ing in France in  when the Assemblée Nationale attempted to pass a law stating
that the ‘positive work’ accomplished in the colonial period must be emphasized in
schools. After countless protests the act was withdrawn. In their report, Bhikhu
Parekh and his colleagues show a greater sense of reality in their take on the British
Empire: ‘There has been no collective working through of this imperial experience.’
Citizens should know about the high and low points of national history and all the
mediocrity in between. It makes no sense to present the past as a story of gradual
progress towards freedom for all – it’s of course far more complicated than that. His -
tory offers no simple truths and few certainties, but this is no reason to regard the past
as a closed chapter and focus purely on the future. The Dutch have done exactly that
with gay abandon over past decades, but now they’re beginning to realize that culture
depends not just on creativity but on continuity as well.
In France too, opinions differ starkly on this point, as demonstrated for example by
a debate between philosophers Alain Finkielkraut and Alain Badiou. Finkielkraut is
concerned about the handing down of culture: ‘As for our heritage, over the past forty
years schools have worked with a passion to erode it. More and more French people,
the elite included, are now strangers to their language, their literature, their history,
their landscape.’ Badiou, by contrast, sees an increasing emphasis on heritage and
identity as a significant threat to an open society: ‘The public debate is currently tak-
ing place in between two disastrous positions: on one side the free market consensus
and universal commercialism, and on the other frenetic attempts to hold on to an
identity, which constitutes a reactionary barrage against globalization and in the end
is totally ineffective.’
It is possible to reach beyond this antithesis, since there are plenty of ways of com-
bining heritage and openness without denying the tension between them. No matter
how troubling, it ought to go without saying that the history of the arrival and settle-
ment of migrants should feature in any national museum. There are plenty of exam-
ples that can serve as inspiration. Take the national museum in Canberra, which
didn’t shy away from the difficult subject of the original inhabitants of Australia, the
Aboriginals, and their tragic history. A museum that recently opened in France, with
the inviting slogan ‘Their history is our history’, is devoted entirely to the history of
migrants. Everyone immediately notices the ambiguity of that publicity slogan, which
could be understood as a kind of expropriation, and it will prompt a great deal of de-
bate yet, as was clearly the intention. Knowledge of the past is a precondition of a lively
culture of citizenship.
Finally, along with the family and school, work is an important domain through
which people become involved in society, in fact it may be the most quickest route to
social integration. Low levels of participation in work among migrants are forcing a
reconsideration of state involvement in support for the unemployed, but this should
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not affect immigrants alone. There’s a far wider problem here: the welfare state has
trapped many people in positions of dependency and become an obstacle to their so-
cial advancement.
Over past decades there has been much cultural criticism of the welfare state, the
main target being freedom without responsibility. Dalrymple paints a grim picture of
the British social security system as seen through the eyes of a group of visiting Fil-
ipino doctors. At first they are full of praise, but gradually the picture starts to shift:
‘They see it now as creating a miasma of subsidized apathy that blights the lives of its
supposed beneficiaries. They come to realize that a system of welfare that makes no
moral judgments in allocating economic rewards promotes antisocial egotism.’
We see the same problem on a larger scale in the migrant communities of continen-
tal Europe. Economist Arie van der Zwan has pointed out that jobs in industry offered
a ‘schooling in modernity’.Tragically, a generation of guest workers was cut off from
work by the economic crisis of the early s. In receipt of generous unemployment
benefits, migrants were placed on the sidelines and ended up in permanent isolation.
The effects can be seen in subsequent generations: ‘For two thirds of these population
groups the chances of integration are poor. They cannot keep up at school and they oc-
cupy the lowest positions in the jobs market.’ As far as the chances for migrants in
the labour market goes, it’s clear that something is wrong with Europe’s welfare states.
There’s little solidarity between natives and newcomers. Researchers have reached the
same conclusion: ‘The bridging of differences along ethnic lines is undoubtedly the
main task.’
Reforms are needed that do not involve unequal treatment, unlike proposals to dis-
qualify immigrants from receiving social welfare payments. In America in the mid-
s limits were placed on access by newcomers to state support of all kinds. Social
provision in the United States is far from bountiful compared to Western Europe, but
it seems it was still felt to be too generous towards new arrivals. There are sporadic ap-
peals for similar measures to be introduced in Europe, but it would be far better to im-
plement initiatives across the board aimed at reducing dependence on state aid. The
social benefits system needs to be remodelled so that it no longer stands in the way of
participation in the workplace. It’s beyond dispute that the protection of those in
need, a task of civilization, has slowly but steadily pushed people into subsidized isola-
tion. Ayaan Hirsi Ali has remarked that for migrants ‘to survive it is not absolutely ne -
cessary for them to adapt to [the receiving] society. The process of modernization can
thus grind to a halt in a welfare situation, where people on the margins of society go
on clinging to values that stand in the way of their own emancipation.’
That insight has gained ground. Over the past few years we’ve seen a slow reversal
of the tendency to hand out welfare payments too readily, along with a move towards a
greater emphasis on participation in paid work. The specific problem of high unem-
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ployment among young people from migrant families should be cause for broader
self-examination. We may well wonder why someone who has never worked should
have an automatic right to welfare. In this respect there’s no difference between mi-
grants and school leavers. Both are newcomers in the market for jobs. The call for im-
migrants to be made ineligible for unemployment benefits during the first five years
of their stay in their new countries must be countered with proposals for a universal
requirement to build up rights through work before qualifying for financial support.
Young people in the Netherlands can in theory no longer resort to welfare until they
reach the age of twenty-seven. They have a choice between work and education or
training.
One study has identified four functions of the welfare state, concluding: ‘It’s time
for a shift in attention from the functions of insuring and caring to the functions of
uplifting and connecting.’ This opens up a route towards reconciling economic
competitiveness and social justice, since all studies show that countries with strong
welfare states do well in today’s competitive world economy. External economic pres-
sure is not the most important reason to reform the welfare state; a normative concept
of citizenship represents a more pressing motive for trying to introduce change.
A working life is a route to social acceptance. In the specific case of migrants, their
visible contribution to the economic well-being of society as a whole helps enormous-
ly in justifying their presence. Without it not only do ethnic conflicts threaten, the op-
portunities for migrants and their children to climb the social ladder are blocked. A
decades-old shortcoming of the welfare state has been brought to light in a new way.
   
It’s clear that general social issues lie behind the problems that result frommigration.
The only way to achieve a good outcome is by remaining true to the principle of all in-
tegration: reciprocity on thebasis of equal treatment.TheAmericanDeclarationof In-
dependence begins: ‘Allmen are created equal.’ TheDutch constitution says the same
thing in a slightly differentway: ‘All thosewho find themselves in theNetherlandswill
in equal cases be treated equally.’Article oneof theFrenchconstitutionbegins: ‘France
shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the
equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion.’
In all democratic countries the constitutional principle of equality is carved in
stone. Yet just look at the effort needed to live up to it. We’ve come upon all too many
cases of discrimination based on race and religion. Equality turns out to be far from
simple to enforce. There’s a need to contemplate this constitutional principle afresh
and to ask whether as an ideal it requires a government that forgoes moral judgement.
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Then we’ll touch on the issue of positive discrimination and finally devote some
thought to the language used to describe immigrant populations, terms originally in-
troduced with preferential treatment for migrants and their children in mind.
Let’s first examine the question of whether the principle of equality presupposes
moral neutrality. Equality can be understood in two different ways, and neither is ne -
cessarily an extension of the other. First there’s the legal interpretation. Within the
bounds of the law everyone is free to live according to his or her own beliefs and cho-
sen lifestyle. Restraint of conscience has no place in a liberal society, so citizens are at
liberty, for example, to adhere to conservative ideas about women, seeing them as sub-
ordinates, or to condemn homosexuality as a perversion. People must be given the op-
portunity to shape their own private lives as they see fit, even if in doing so they depart
from what the majority regards as desirable, just as long as they don’t restrict the free-
dom of others.
Then there’s the normative interpretation. In the public arena the authoritiesmust
propagate a standard of equality that goes further than strict implementation of the
law. We can therefore defend government efforts to encourage girls to continue to
study after they pass the school leaving age and to live independent lives, even if this
conflicts with a traditional interpretation of their role. Governments must also try to
foster understanding for homosexuality as a choice in love, even though it’s offensive
tomany traditional believers.This is a questionof emancipation, something thatmust
never be imposed as an obligation but can certainly be promoted by governments.
A strictly legalistic interpretation of the principle of equality for all may well clash
with a more normative one. In a constitutional state people can’t be prevented from
withdrawing into authoritarian communities, whether grounded in a secular or a reli-
gious worldview. In a general sense there should be no attempt to ban manifestations
of religious fervour such as the veil or indeed any other expression of dogmatic beliefs,
as long as they don’t violate the principles of the constitutional state. Thinking is free,
and in principle we should all be free to say what we think.
Freedom of expression is a wonderful thing and it’s odd to see how often its defend-
ers are tempted to deny that same freedom to religious movements of an orthodox
kind. Adherents of fundamentalist faiths, whether Christian, Jewish or Islamic, have a
right to hold their own opinions and to propagate them in an open society, within cer-
tain legal limits. Appeals for an expurgated version of the Koran are as nonsensical as
appeals to give the Koran more protection against its critics by means of blasphemy
laws. Freedom of religion and criticism of religion are two sides of the same coin.
This does not mean that governments must leave all options open. A society is held
together by more than its legislative principles alone. The emancipation of women or
homosexuals is generally felt to represent progress, although no one is forced to adopt
the new ways of thinking. Equality between men and women is a recent achievement
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in many societies and some people wrongly conclude that they are therefore in no po-
sition to hold out these norms as an example to others. This reasoning must be turned
on its head. Precisely because equality was so difficult to achieve, it remains a fragile
norm that needs to be defended, and the rights of women in migrant families are no
exception.
Necla Kelek describes the vexed relationship between men and women by telling
the story of her own family, which emigrated to Germany from Turkey. Her mother
barely had any independent existence at all; from morning to night everything was de-
cided by her mother-in-law and no one ever asked her what she might be planning to
do with her life. That attitude was passed on by the mother to the daughters, who were
expected above all to be compliant: ‘Not that the daughter learns something but that
she makes a good impression on the other women. What matters to them is that she
shows herself to be docile, dexterous and polite.’ On what grounds would anyone
criticize such an attitude based on the concept ‘each to his own’? Should a govern-
ment, in the name of neutrality, refuse to pass judgment on a family culture of this
kind, when growing girls are manifestly suffering as a result?
Take the case of parents who don’t want their children to participate in mixed
swimming lessons. Many schools try to keep the peace by giving in to the wishes of the
parents. Yet there’s a great deal to be said for taking a stand, certainly in state schools,
which really ought to hold on to some basic rules of equality of treatment and not bow
to attempts to separate boys and girls, even though that was relatively common half a
century ago. The new norms are indeed rather different from the generally accepted
ideas of earlier times, but no good arguments have been presented in favour of what’s
generally felt to be a policy of surrendering equality for the sake of apparent neutrality.
If parents opt for faith schools in order to make their preferences a reality, we will sim-
ply have to accept their choice. This, incidentally, is one more reason to query the no-
tion of access to publicly funded faith schools as a constitutional right.
The more normative concept of equality has a broader reach than its legal formula-
tion, but our laws are based upon moral convictions that cannot be taken for granted.
When the Moroccan government urged the Dutch government to lower the age at
which people could marry to fifteen, it suddenly became clear that a whole world of
ideas lies behind the age limit of eighteen that now applies in the Netherlands – specif-
ically the belief that children must acquire a certain maturity, and therefore resilience,
before they’re able to make an independent choice of marriage partner. We could say
the same about the school leaving age of sixteen. It’s a manifestation of ideas about the
importance of education for boys and for girls. These are beliefs that other cultures
aren’t necessarily obliged to share.
Equality of treatment is controversial in another sense too. Everyone agrees that
holding on to equality as a norm is the most effective defence against prejudice, but
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opinions about the ways in which discrimination can best be combated are extremely
diverse. Dilemmas have emerged in the battle surrounding positive discrimination.
Seeking sanctuary in forms of what the Americans call affirmative action has a serious
downside in that it’s a departure from the principle of equality. Special preference is
given to groups, whereas equality relates to individuals. When students from the black
community with lower grades than rival applicants are admitted to good universities,
their origins become the deciding factor. Although there is something to be said for af-
firmative action in the case of America’s black population, which endured slavery for
many years followed by forced segregation, it’s not easy to justify the extension of the
idea to other migrant groups that do not need to be compensated for any kind of his-
torical injustice.
This is not to say that job-seekers with the same training and capacities always re-
ceive equal treatment. Studies of job applications have shown that replacing an Arabic
name with a European one makes a difference to the way a letter is handled. Even in
economic boom times it’s possible to point to forms of exclusion from the world of
work. Saïda Sakali, a civil servant at a Flemish ministry, writes: ‘We, the second and
third generation, were for many years promised a different future. As long as we stud-
ied hard, we would get there. Participation in the jobs market would be a logical conse-
quence. We were fed a fairy tale. The future we’ve ended up in looks very different. In
one out of every three vacancies an applicant from a migrant community is treated
differently. Subjective and irrational mechanisms are at work here, forms of discrimi-
nation large and small.’
For as long as this reproach is justified, it will be hard to speak of full citizenship.
Put like this, however, is it really an accurate observation? Some people avoid others in
their daily lives based on well-founded generalizations that can nevertheless be unfair
to individual members of a group. If criminality in the black community is high, then
the reluctance of taxi drivers to pick up black compatriots may be justified, certainly
in neighbourhoods with bad reputations, even though such attitudes may be excep-
tionally hurtful to respectable citizens. Why should a shopkeeper or business manager
take on a young person from a migrant community with a poor reputation, thereby
deliberately running a greater than average risk that the placement will not work out? 
Yet even with this reservation in mind, there are plenty of examples of discrimina-
tion in the jobs market that are indeed ‘irrational’. The costs of discrimination, both
where it exists and where it’s presumed to exist, can be high. The sense of alienation in
society increases and rare talent is lost. Quite apart from the fact that there are com-
pelling moral reasons to combat discrimination, enlightened self-interest comes into
play. As ever it’s better if people embrace such insights voluntarily, since there will
then be no need to use official quotas to try to force people to change their behaviour
or their opinions.
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It was the free-market liberal Dutch politician Frits Bolkestein of all people – ahead
of his time in the s in speaking openly about problems of integration – who point-
ed out to the business community that it had certain responsibilities in this field: ‘Per-
haps they would like to remember how this problem arose in the first place. Exactly.
Employers imported labour in the s (and were helped in doing so by an unbeliev-
ably short-sighted government).’ The history of guest workers at the very least obli -
ges employers to treat job applicants from migrant communities fairly, he told them.
An emphasis on equality brings something else to the fore, namely a reconsidera-
tion of categories such as established and outsider, native and foreign. People continu-
ally stumble over the problem of which words to use. Majority and minority, natives
and newcomers, the multicultural or multi-ethnic society – the variety of words used
to describe the experience of migration illustrates the uncertainty that arises from the
profound social changes it brings. Anthropologist Margaret Mead once suggested that
in talking about ethnic or religious groups it’s best to do so in adjectives rather than
nouns. Indeed, it makes a difference whether you speak about a Pakistani or a Pak-
istani schoolboy, and calling someone a Jew is not the same as calling him a Jewish
shopkeeper.
This goes only a little way towards solving the problem of language, however. The
words used by governments are important, since vested interests are attached to the
categories selected. Many new words have been introduced into European languages,
with the best of intentions. In the s the Dutch settled upon the neologisms ‘au-
tochthon’ (autochtoon) and ‘allochthon’ (allochtoon) as a means of avoiding the term
‘foreigner’ when referring to first or second generation migrants. These relatively neu-
tral monikers are still in everyday use, but they’re no longer uncontroversial, mainly
because the reality behind them has become a matter of dispute. The division of a pop-
ulation into two parts, such that the descendants of migrants are described as allochto-
nen, is problematic. Generations of people are placed in a category that becomes less
specific by the day. Splitting society in two makes communication between different
groups all the more awkward. Words introduced to ease discomfort have themselves
become a source of discomfort.
Sevtap Baycili, a Dutch writer of Turkish origin, points out that words create their
own reality: ‘Young Moroccans and Turks who speak the language perfectly, even
those who have Dutch nationality, are regarded not as Dutch but as allochtonen. It’ll be
another generation and more before people learn to see beyond that.’We don’t have
that much time. More impatience is needed. There’s no avoiding it: the words must be
reassessed. It’s sad to hear some migrants say that they don’t want their children to
grow up in the Netherlands because they’ll be trapped in an existence as allochtonen.
In other words they’ll always be outsiders.
The Netherlands is not the only country where great uncertainty exists about the
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terms that can best be used to refer to migrants and their children. Take the British ob-
session with colour or race. Countless recent studies speak of the rise of ‘multiracial’
Britain, but surely the use of that term is a late echo of a time people want to leave be-
hind them, namely a time when Caribbean or Asian immigrants were consistently re-
ferred to as ‘coloured migrants’? The British seem trapped in an imperial era when
racial differences were at the centre of an entire worldview.
In Australia the long-winded ‘non-English-speaking background’ (NESB) was in
use for some years, despite criticism that it placed an excessive emphasis on language.
Now the no less artificial term ‘culturally and linguistically diverse’ (CALD) has been
introduced. Canadians talk of ‘visible minorities’, again with the best of intentions,
but the term seems to denote a remarkable emphasis on colour, or racial difference. In
America ‘foreign-born’ is a common description and France still uses the word
‘étranger’, meaning foreigner or indeed stranger. In fact wherever immigration is con-
troversial the words too are controversial, since every word reveals differences while at
the same time obscuring similarities. There’s really no way to avoid this, since every
bureaucratic classification bends the truth to fit.
But why do these classifications exist at all? The paradox is that the fiercest critics of
the terms used still want to hold on to the material advantages that bureaucratic cate-
gorization brings with it. Does this mean the distinctions aren’t valid but the ‘positive’
discrimination based on them is? Dinesh D’Souza points to the perverse results seen
in America. In the heyday of racism the so-called ‘one drop rule’ applied. Anyone with
a single black ancestor was categorized as part of the Negro population; a drop of
‘black’ blood was enough to get you registered as a black person. Now it’s the black or-
ganizations themselves who want to hold on to this rule, since the more blacks there
are in the ten-yearly census, the greater the flow of subsidy money.
Our words of discomfort are themselves a problem. Their imprecise designations
have an impact on society. In this book I’ve mainly stuck to the term ‘migrants and
their children’. That seems a good description of the individuals concerned. Alterna-
tives like ‘ethnic minority’ appear occasionally, but I use them with some reluctance.
All too often we talk about a majority and a minority. Shared citizenship ought to be
an ideal that everyone can measure himself or herself against. It’s better to use words
that point forwards, that contain expectations, rather than words that make ballast
out of the past. This will help us to break away from prejudices that support and rein-
force one another.
Accommodation will not be easy, since letting go of established certainties causes
pain all round. It’s easier not to ask questions and simply to leave one another alone.
The conservative idea of ‘each to his own’ has failed us. Its main effect now is to rein-
force social inequality, whereas what everyone is after is equal treatment. Progress in
that direction will shake society up, because taking equality seriously as a principle
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means asking a great deal of everyone, certainly in a time of mass immigration. Here
too, reciprocity is key. Anyone wanting to challenge discrimination against migrants
and their children must be prepared to oppose other forms of discrimination too –
against unbelievers or homosexuals, for example. We can’t demand equal treatment
for some but not for all. With this attitude in mind we begin to see the outlines of a so-
ciety in which people with diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds realize that for all
their independence they nevertheless depend upon one another.
’ 
Any attempt to integrate newcomers depends on making clear choices when it comes
to immigration. Equality inside a country’s borders is in many ways predicated upon
inequality at its borders. Some people find this contradiction unacceptable and re-
solve it by appealing for immigration controls to be dropped. What they’re really say-
ing is that parts of the third world are settling into the first world, which is good for the
third world. Anyone championing such a view is in effect claiming that the poverty, il-
literacy and traditionalism that accompany mass migration from the poorer regions
of the world will inevitably raise their heads more and more frequently in Western so-
cieties. Those who oppose the opening up of borders do so because they want to go on
defending a specific ideal of civilization, which has equality at its heart. Not everyone
who wants to can come in.
However understandable the motives of those trying to escape misery in their own
countries may be, in the end the needs of the countries they arrive in are decisive as far
as labour migration is concerned. Allowing some migrants access because their skills
are needed while denying entry to others may be seen as discriminatory. Applicants
for refugee status need to fit into certain categories as well. This is inevitable. Any asy-
lum policy would be meaningless otherwise. One story of exile is acknowledged as
valid whereas another falls outside the rules. A woman who has suffered for many
years as a victim of sexual violence is not allowed into the country, since asylum legis-
lation doesn’t cover a case like hers, whereas an accomplice of the old communist
regime in Afghanistan is accepted as a political refugee.
Another dividing line exists between people with official permission to stay and il-
legal residents. There have been suggestions that the distinction between legals and il-
legals should be abolished as far as possible, but this would mean failing to respect the
law as it stands. If someone has been denied a residence permit, then all reasonable
measures should be deployed to get him or her to leave. This isn’t the same as propos-
ing to bar the children of illegals from education or to exclude illegal residents from
medical care, since that would conflict with humanitarian principles. Being illegal is
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certainly not the same as having no rights. Many countries turn a blind eye to illegal
immigrants, not for reasons of principle but simply to oblige the business community.
Backstreet clothing factories are one example, as are the labourers we commonly see
in market gardening. Businesses that are not economically viable are kept going by
people who have no rights. There’s nothing charitable about this.
Migrants who hold the nationality of the country in which they now live have a dif-
ferent status from those who have merely been given residence permits. Over recent
decades we’ve seen moves almost everywhere designed to make the difference as small
as possible. In some countries, like Sweden and the Netherlands, those legally resident
for five years are allowed to vote in local council elections. More recently there have
been moves in the opposite direction, with a renewed emphasis on the significance of
state citizenship as a route to full participation, involving rights and duties that have
grown up over many centuries. Naturalization is a major step, now rightly marked by
some form of ceremony.
This does not exclude the possibility of dual nationality, since different nationali-
ties can be combined in a single human life, the most obvious example being mixed
marriage. There are plenty of immigrants who have more than one nationality and
who dedicate themselves to public service, or even demonstrate that they identify
with their new country by serving in its armed forces. Their legal position may be
complicated, but their commitment is none the less for that. The conflation by some
of nationality and loyalty, in other words the suspicion that people with dual national-
ity cannot ever be loyal to their new country, leads nowhere except to resentment.
Clear choices need to be made about which immigrants to allow in; selectivity is es-
sential to successful integration. This idea was resisted for many years, with integra-
tion and immigration treated as separate issues. In our examination of American and
European immigration history we’ve seen that policy in the more distant past made a
connection between the two. It’s often said, without any egregious intent, that nation-
al governments have no real control over worldwide migration flows. We’ve explored
at length the inaccuracy of this assertion in a descriptive sense. Governments certainly
do have an influence. In a normative sense the argument that migration is beyond gov-
ernmental control has had a whole range of unintended consequences. Anyone want-
ing to foster openness needs to think in terms of balanced immigration.
There is no escaping the question of what kind of immigration is actually needed.
Based on research, arguments have been advanced for the selection of better educated
or skilled immigrants: ‘In any case it is clear that if labour migration were to consist
primarily of immigration by the uneducated or poorly educated, then the position of
uneducated and low-skilled people who are already here would worsen.’ Advocates
of unrestricted migration are ignoring the relatively high unemployment rate among
migrants and their children, and the potential reserves of low-skilled workers in the
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new countries of the European Union, such as Poland and in the longer term perhaps
Turkey. Here is another clear indication that issues surrounding immigration and in-
tegration confront society with more general shortcomings. 
Treating labour migration as the only way to counteract population shrinkage or to
get around a lack of participation in the workplace by the low-skilled is unwise. It
would be better to resolve the shortages in the labour market as far as possible before
opting for the line of least resistance, which anyhow in the long run turns out to be the
line that arouses the greatest resistance of all. Nevertheless, labour migration may well
be part of the solution. Estimates suggest that if the developed world receives a net av-
erage of .million immigrants a year, then the predicted decline in the working popu-
lation will be roughly halved, meaning it will fall by around  per cent by .
At the moment the classic countries of immigration are absorbing the majority of
their new migrants from Asia, while in Europe many newcomers arrive from Africa
and the Middle East. European countries have a number of valid reasons to promote
immigration from Asian countries, given that they accept the need for immigrants.
Rapid economic development in south and east Asia makes the arrival of students and
other bearers of cultural capital all the more desirable, since they will strengthen eco-
nomic ties between Europe and countries such as China and India. In the information
technology sector, global networks like The Indus Entrepreneur are emerging, and
they may be of huge significance in the future. In the competition to attract highly ed-
ucated migrants, Europe needs to make up lost ground, since it’s currently lagging be-
hind the rest of the developed world.
The sheer diversity of the migrant groups that have settled in America over past
centuries is instructive. As we have seen, first to arrive were the Irish and Germans, fol-
lowed by the Italians and Poles, and in our own time the larger immigrant groups have
included Koreans and Mexicans. Some commentators conclude that this fluctuation
has aided the gradual development of a ‘nation of immigrants’. Extensive and contin-
ual immigration from a single country or region has a strong impact on the relation-
ship between generations. As Douglas Massey puts it: ‘The character of ethnicity will
be determined relatively more by immigrants and relatively less by later generations,
shifting the balance of ethnic identity toward the language, culture, and ways of life in
the sending society.’ It’s felt to be better if a single migrant group does not remain
dominant for too long, which is another reason why European countries should draw
lessons from positive developments in America and try to encourage migration from
the countries of the Far East that are in the ascendant.
These choices are based on a rejection of the idea that receiving societies have a hu-
manitarian duty to permit labour migration from the developing world. It’s not sensi-
ble to be guided by both workforce requirements and developmental issues at the
same time. Yet we see this happening time and again. Practical arguments merge with
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deeply held convictions in a way that’s often impossible to fathom. Philippe Legrain’s
book ends with a cry from the heart of ‘Let Them In’. He’s hoping for a marriage of
convenience between adherents of the free market and advocates of developmental
cooperation. In itself this is less strange than it might seem, since globalization is mak-
ing traditional political dividing lines increasingly irrelevant, in the debate on migra-
tion at least. Yet the need for compliant low-skilled workers does not sit easily with hu-
manitarian arguments for a more open attitude on the part of the North towards the
South.
Despite the problematic history of guest workers, there are now renewed appeals
for the hiring of low-skilled workers from outside the European Union. The language
has changed – its advocates now talk about seasonal or cyclical migration – but the in-
tentions are the same as they were almost half a century ago. Whether such schemes
are more realistic now than when the first guest workers arrived is doubtful. True,
more stringent measures could be put in place to ensure they go back – such as a rule
that a proportion of their salaries can be paid only after they return home – but an in-
terest in staying will often weigh more heavily. The degree to which migrants put
down roots in a society and start their own family histories within it, making their re-
turn an illusion, is still underestimated.
The reduction of the migrant to his labour – which may result in a decision to allow
temporary migration but not permanent settlement – demonstrates the one-sided na-
ture of the economic approach. Those who take the risk of leaving their countries will
often want to settle in their new homelands and it’s better to take this into account
from the start. Labour migrants are more than simply workers, they’re also fathers,
husbands and, the hope is, citizens. The many questions raised by the need to inte-
grate them into society make the appeal for open borders far more than a calculation
of economic profit and loss.
Hatton and Williamson are sceptical about arguments for seasonal migration:
‘Temporary immigration programs may be the worst of both worlds: they discourage
the immigrant’s acquisition of human capital during the period when his or her im-
migrant status is temporary (or at least uncertain), and they end up as gateways to per-
manent migration for those who might not have been admitted had their permanent
status been anticipated from the start.’ So instead of opting for a new influx of guest
workers, developed nations should admit well-educated migrants. Economists like
Hatton and Williamson ultimately conclude that countries allowing in low-skilled mi-
grants ‘get immigrants who assimilate more slowly, crowd out more unskilled natives,
placing a greater burden on the welfare state.’
Migration is here to stay. Demographic projections for European countries such as
the Netherlands, France and Germany show that by mid-century up to a third of their
populations may consist of migrants and their descendants. This is a dramatic change,
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which in itself makes a transparent immigration policy essential. It would be worth-
while to hold annual parliamentary debates about the situation surrounding immi-
gration and population developments as a whole, since citizens must be in a position
to understand decisions about the nature and extent of immigration. This would help
to justify future immigration and therefore contribute to public acceptance of the pro-
found demographic changes that result.
    
The arrival of so many migrants presents a huge opportunity for social renewal. An
opportunity, no more and no less. There is nothing automatic about it, but societies
that absorb migrants successfully are in a position to open up new routes to the rest of
the world from which everyone can benefit. America has proven that a society with
many newcomers can create and sustain a vigorous economy and culture. The price of
that dynamism has meanwhile become clear to all: great social inequality and deep
cultural divides.
There is plenty that makes the American experience unique, yet it turns out to have
more in common with that of post-war Europe than Europeans are inclined to think.
How often have I not thought as I read and travelled: see, all this was happening over
there already. America teaches us that immigration doesn’t necessarily lead to a loss of
power in the world. Quite the opposite, in fact. It’s no exaggeration to say that the
United States is the Rome of our day, with all the symptoms of hubris such a status en-
tails. The dynamism of that country is closely connected to its ability to integrate peo-
ple of extremely diverse backgrounds. It demonstrates the power of a shared idea
about what it means to be an American.
This process was and is accompanied by deep crises. The Civil Rights Movement re-
minded American society so starkly of its own principles that it remains a source of in-
spiration to this day. Author James Baldwin wrote with conviction: ‘We, the black and
the white, deeply need each other here if we are really to become a nation – if we are re-
ally, that is, to achieve our identity, our maturity, as men and woman. To create one na-
tion has proved to be a hideously difficult task; there is certainly no need now to create
two, one black and one white.’ Nevertheless, he believed the maturing of America re-
quired a leap of imagination by the whites: ‘What it comes to is that if we, who can
scarcely be considered a white nation, persist in thinking of ourselves as one, we con-
demn ourselves … to sterility and decay, whereas if we could accept ourselves as we
are, we might bring new life to Western achievements, and transform them.’
The self-description ‘a nation of immigrants’ conceals a complex reality in which
borders have been sometimes open and sometimes closed to newcomers. Recent im-
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migration from developing countries is causing concerns in America comparable to
those of Europe. New controversies are arising not just as a result of the increasing
drain on welfare resources but because of the declining educational level and low so-
cial mobility of some migrant communities. Illegal immigration is causing tension
across the United States. The divisive polemic about multiculturalism and political
correctness illustrates the prevailing uncertainty about what integration means. The
debate is far from over, to judge from a book by Nathan Glazer, whose title belies his
scepticism: We are All Multiculturalists Now.
Yet over the past century America has come closer than Europe to the ‘unity in di-
versity’ to which it aspires. Its migrants and especially their children identify more
quickly with their new country than is usual in Europe, and this should give us pause.
Their identification is easier because America has in many ways come to represent
globalization writ small. America as a world power is more attractive than the Euro-
pean nations, which with the exception of Britain do not automatically offer access to
a world that operates in English.
The New World that America has always aspired to be was founded on a contrast
with the Old World, a continent paralysed by competition and conflict between na-
tions. The triumph over old rivalries – inspired in part by the fear that nationalism
would cross the ocean along with the migrants – was at the heart of the American
creed, in which unity weighs as heavily as diversity. This called for a conscious effort,
since there were considerable obstacles on both sides. Again we are reminded of the
words of Oscar Handlin: ‘The history of immigration is a history of alienation and its
consequences.’
European societies are to this day less than wholly successful at integrating new-
comers. This is not necessarily a fatal flaw, but it does show that the effects of irre-
versible demographic change have been seriously underestimated. The avoidance of
the question ‘Who are we now?’ has opened the way for blunt answers. The shock of
immigration has been downplayed and as a result many opportunities for social re-
newal have been missed. If pluralism becomes an invitation to productive differences
of opinion rather than degenerating into permanent misunderstanding, much will
have been gained. Elspeth Huxley was aware of this in the mid-s when she re-
marked: ‘Immigrants have created few new problems, they have merely underscored
those which already perplex our society. In this case it is a lack of national purpose, of
self-confidence.’
This explains why the debate about migration is so enlightening. A society must
win the acceptance of newcomers by seeing their arrival as a reason to measure itself
against its own ideals. I would like to see migrants and their children becoming more
involved in this process. My wish is that in the not too distant future the contribution
made by migrants will become much more obvious. The languages now spoken by
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many of them are an asset, opening up new avenues to the outside world. I hope we’ll
succeed in making migration a powerful element of the social dynamism we need in
Europe, without necessarily following America in every respect.
After all, the societies of the Old World have a different tradition of social integra-
tion. Countries like the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany are harder to penetrate
than America because they have drawn the net of solidarity far tighter. Whereas in the
streets of New York or Chicago shadow societies of indigents and paupers have grown
up, cities like Amsterdam, Berlin and Stockholm are doing all they can to prevent the
formation of ghettos or of an underclass. Tolerance of extreme differences is more lim-
ited in the Old World, but one advantage of this is that the hope of involving all citi-
zens in society has not been abandoned. The bar is higher, so migrants have to make a
greater leap to be included.
There are those who believe globalization means we’ll have to abandon the mod-
ernist belief in our ability to shape society. Dutch philosopher René Boomkens writes
that because economies and cultures across the world are now interwoven, ‘notions
such as emancipation, civilization and enlightenment’ are rapidly losing their signifi-
cance. To say this is to shake the foundations of Western societies, which see them-
selves as bearers of the promise of emancipation. Yet he is also aware of the threats
posed by globalization: ‘Set against the opportunities that uprooting brings are the
greater risks that go with it.’He therefore advocates a re-evaluation of the promise of
continuity, which he describes as ‘an intergenerational responsibility or engage-
ment’. Responsibility for what? Engagement with what exactly? Who will pay atten-
tion to the conservative pact between generations in the midst of all this welcome
change?
Apparent liberation from a belief in social engineering turns out on further reflec-
tion to be a desire for the crossing of boundaries, a desire that up to now has been firm-
ly grounded in a relatively ordered world. Should that cohesion unexpectedly dissolve,
should important institutions such as schools or the courts fall prey to a ‘new world
disorder’, then the celebration of globalization will not have a happy sequel. What Ste-
fan Zweig called ‘that terrible state of homelessness’ becomes obvious only when the
certainties of a secure home are thrown into doubt. Under pressure from an expand-
ing world market, the other side of human nature comes into view, namely a longing
for security. How do we maintain the correct balance between local public safety and
global openness? How do we prevent the native and the foreign from standing in op-
position to each other? This is the fundamental question of our times. There are plen-
ty of signs of polarization in Europe, and indeed in America. A world without borders
can easily produce the kind of demagogues who mobilize majorities with slogans like
‘full means full’.
Globalization is not a departure from modernity as a challenge but rather an inten-
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sification of it. Under these new conditions, the story of emancipation, far from be-
longing to the past, remains incomplete. In fact globalization can bring societies clos-
er to their declared norms, although this will require some effort. As we have seen, the
arrival of migrants from all parts of the world presents indigenous populations with
opportunities to see through their own prejudices. Natives as well as newcomers need
to think of themselves as part of a greater whole. Will they regard the migrants of to-
day as fellow citizens? Will they expect their new countrymen to become part of their
collective memories and to influence their view of the past? 
Behind that quest for a shared outlook on the past lies a fundamental choice.
Should we try to create unifying symbols and rituals by introducing more opportuni-
ties to celebrate the Sugar Festival together, by building slavery memorials and by ac-
knowledging migrants to be an essential part of Europe’s post-war history? Or should
we say: to each his own calendar, his own shops, his own schools and sports clubs, his
own festivals, his own memories? The answer ought to be clear. We need to look for
new forms of cohesion and for ways to broaden our ‘imagined community’. 
There’s nothing nostalgic about that search for symbols and stories to unite us. A
community requires a shared history and the investigation of the past prompts never-
ending debates that, far from being divisive, can have a unifying effect. It’s possible to
overcome a great deal of distrust by sharing responsibility, which makes it vitally im-
portant that institutions are open to newcomers. Nevertheless, the historical dimen-
sion, a product of interaction between individuals and groups, is crucial as well. Mis-
understandings and conflicts are due in part to a difference in length of settlement.
Residents of long standing have generations behind them; newcomers need time to se-
cure a position for themselves.
In that sense those who say integration is a matter of time and patience are right,
but they would not be right to wait resignedly. Emancipation will not be achieved
without pioneers. In the pressure cooker of the past few years there has been an unmis-
takable quickening of developments. We must acknowledge that the present conflict
signifies a departure from the evasions that preceded it and opens the way for accom-
modation. Conflict avoidance is by no means always a good thing, since it only brings
yet more years of walking past each other with barely a sideways glance. Conflict is ul-
timately a sign of integration, so we should make a clear-eyed assessment of the anger
and frustration of many migrants’ children. Far more often than we may realize, be-
hind what they say lies a burning ambition to be part of society.
In  sociologist Georg Simmel wrote about the significance of conflict. His ver-
dict on indifference is wholly negative, whereas he believes conflict has something pos-
itive at its core: ‘Our opposition makes us feel that we are not completely victims of cir-
cumstances. It allows us to prove our strength consciously and only thus gives vitality
and reciprocity to conditions from which, without such corrective, we would with-
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draw at any cost.’ The dramas of the past few years are part of that conflict, including
the riots in the French banlieues and the cartoons crisis in Denmark. We must do all in
our power to make a virtue of necessity. Communities are built on shared experiences,
shared fates. All the loaded conversations we engage in now can help to create a new
‘us’, one that includes all those who, regardless of origin, feel allied to the countries in
which they now live.
Trust takes time to build, but its value is inestimable. Where routine falls away, and
predictability along with it, transaction costs rise. Distrust makes all kinds of explicit
rules necessary where previously we acted informally. This applies to the economy
and it also holds true for social interaction in a general sense. Only if we succeed in
transforming the breach of trust that concerns us here into new ideas about citizen-
ship will we succeed in making immigration beneficial to all. 
There are some signs of change. The idea that trust can be strengthened in this way
is now more broadly shared. George Alagiah looks ahead: ‘Instead of trying to work
out where people belong, we should ask what they are doing now that they are here.
This is a question about citizenship rather than ethnicity.’ The many migrants who
work hard to stay afloat and to give their children a better life have at least as much
right to citizenship as those who have acquired it by birth and consistently failed to
live up to the accompanying responsibilities. Alagiah concludes: ‘The test of contribu-
tion is colour-blind.’
We must aspire to rise above ourselves. In the competition between the Old, the
New and the Newest World, Europe could easily fall behind America and Asia. This is
not inevitable. The foundations have been laid for a vast single market. By allowing
the internal borders on the continent to fall away we have created the potential for
great mobility, not only of money and goods but of people and ideas. If Europe suc-
ceeds in uniting itself in a peaceful manner, not just by overcoming the old antipathies
but by offering migrants the opportunity to make a place for themselves, then there’s
no reason why the Old World should not discover itself afresh.
Europe’s conservatism is understandable. It has much that should be cherished
rather than brutally modernized. All the same, the shock of migration must be under-
stood as an invitation to re-examine the principles of an open society. If we can re-
main true to the ideal of religious freedom and succeed in integrating millions of Mus-
lim migrants into our societies, then we will have stolen a march on the rest of the
world. Those who keep insisting there’s ‘nothing new under the sun’ are missing out
on an important experience now being gained in the major cities of Europe. Above all
they lack the words needed to turn migration into something everyone values. The ar-
rival of migrants is not just irreversible, it forces us all to rise above our prejudices.
That is to ask a great deal, but anyone who doesn’t ask a great deal in these times falls a
long way short of the mark.
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Europe has reached out to touch the world and is increasingly touched by the world
in return. Not only have we caused this reciprocity, in many ways we wanted it. The
confrontation with militant Islam is obscuring a welcome change. Competition with
the Far East can release energies that will help Europe to move beyond its current heav-
iness of heart. That pressure from outside is sorely needed. The same goes for the ar-
rival of migrants; their presence is an enduring invitation to self-examination. If we
acknowledge that it takes effort to perpetuate a relaxed society, then we’ll be able to say
with conviction to those who come from far and wide: welcome.

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